





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THE CONSULATE AND EMPIRE
OF FRANCE

VOL. XI.



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CONGRESS OF VIENNA

HISTORY OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF FRANCE
UNDER NAPOLEON

By LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS

TRANSLATED, WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL
OF THE AUTHOR, BY
D. FORBES CAMPBELL AND JOHN STEBBING

With Thirty-six Steel Plates



IN TWELVE VOLUMES
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BOOK LVI.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

WE have seen in what position the Bourbons had placed France, although they were bound by a written constitution, and watched over by public opinion of a most censorious character, and though they were actuated by the best motives; but they yielded to the reactionary influence which tended to re-establish the old régime on the ruins of the Revolution and the empire. We should next consider Europe divided into a number of governments, unrestrained by law or public opinion, and consequently at liberty to seek the re-establishment of the old order of things, and determined to resume the territories they had lost, or to appropriate those to which they had no claim. This unhappy Europe was fearfully disturbed by *its* emigrants, as short-sighted as ours, as well as by its ambitious chiefs, who were tearing it to tatters. It thus presented a kind of chaos, where avidity struggled with madness. The man who was then called the "Genius of Evil"—Napoleon—might well from the watch-tower of his isle say, with all that bitterness of which he was accused, and which he indeed possessed, that his fall had not been the triumph of disinterestedness and moderation. We must consider this distracted Europe for a moment, in order to form a just idea of her state at the period which was called that of her deliverance.

The Belgian provinces, which had at first felt a real relief in escaping from our yoke, were surprised and annoyed to find themselves oppressed by another quite as heavy, and at the same time opposed to all their national feelings. It was the conscription, the *droits réunis*, the closing of the ports, and regulations in matters of religion, which had alienated these

provinces from us. They were freed from the conscription for the moment, but not from indirect imposts, which were still maintained. The ports, indeed, were open, but only to allow the English, those rivals of the Belgians, to bring in their goods, whilst they were debarred from intercourse with France, whose commerce had so much contributed to enrich them. The Pope was re-established at Rome, whilst the Belgians were placed under the rule of a Protestant nation for which they felt no affection. They were annoyed by the presence of the British army, which was constantly increasing, in order to protect the new kingdom of the Low Countries, and they accused Austria, that had principally contributed to their separation from France, of having betrayed and sold them to England.

The Rhenish provinces were no better satisfied. If, like the Belgians, they were no longer subjected to conscription, and the Rhine, the chief source of their wealth, was allowed free communication with the sea, the French markets were no longer open for the products of their industry, which had greatly increased under the empire, nor was the commerce of Prussia a compensation for that of France. In a word, it seemed as little natural to them to be fellow-citizens of the inhabitants of Königsberg as of the Parisians, and the liberty of the Pope was no more consolation to them than to the Belgians for being ruled by a Protestant sovereign. They also experienced the inconveniences of foreign occupation, for the Prussian army was in their territory, and they were horribly ill treated by Blucher's soldiers, who had not yet learned to consider the inhabitants of Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle as fellow-countrymen.

Beyond the Rhine discontent resulted from other causes. The Prussians were satisfied, and justly, for they were conquerors, and expected great aggrandisement; but they hoped to receive as the reward of their patriotism the liberty that had been promised them, but which, it seemed, there was no hurry to grant. Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse, whilst anxiously awaiting the decision of their fate, were devastated by the passage of the allied armies. Saxony, that had abandoned the French on the field of battle, was thrown into despair by the prospect of falling under the power of Prussia, and losing her nationality as the reward of her defection. Meanwhile, she had the mortification to see her sovereign a prisoner at Berlin. The princes of the smaller German States were disturbed by the projects imputed to the more powerful sovereigns of the country, and the peoples were discontented by the little liberty that appeared in the principles avowed by their princes. Bavaria having considerable claims to indemnification for what Austria was about to deprive her of, she felt little pleasure at the

prospect of being compensated on the left bank of the Rhine, quite close to France, with which power it was thus intended to compromise her.

Switzerland had fallen into a state of confusion from which it was impossible to free her, and which put all her interests in opposition, all her populations in arms. The Act of Mediation, making a happy application in the Alps of the principles of 1789, by setting the old subjugated countries at liberty, and forming all into nineteen independent cantons instead of thirteen, had abolished the inequalities of condition, together with all kinds of oppression, and had created a perfectly well-balanced state of things, which had rendered Switzerland perfectly happy during ten years, and which would have left her nothing to desire, had not war disturbed the happiness of the whole world.

It was this same Act of Mediation which the inhabitants of Berne had intended, and succeeded in destroying by introducing the allies into Switzerland during the preceding December. Immediately all the old pretensions were renewed. Berne wanted to bring Pays de Vaud and Argovia under her yoke, and deprive them of their position of federal cantons. Uri wished to deprive Tessin of the Vale of Levan, and actually took possession of it without an appeal to any authority. Schweitz and Glarus were preparing to snatch back the territories of Utnach and Gazter from the Canton of St. Gall, and for that purpose excited disturbances in these ancient districts; Zug claimed Argovia as her dependency; and Appenzell flattered herself with the hope of recovering the Rheinthal. On the other side, the threatened cantons put themselves on the defensive. The citizens of Vaud, Argovia, Thurgovia, St. Gall, and Tessin had taken up arms to the number of twenty thousand men. The interior policy of the cantons was in no less danger than their territorial possessions. The subjection of class to class was about to reappear. It was at least intended to re-establish the system, and all the new and legitimate interests which had been recognised by the Act of Mediation, seeing the threatened danger, were ready to revolt.

The Diet having assembled at Zurich, wishing to put a stop to this state of anarchy, had tried to reconstitute Switzerland. But the five cantons which were meditating these territorial changes, viz., Berne, Uri, Schweitz, Glarus, and Zug, having induced the cantons of Fribourg, Soleure, Lucerne, and Unterwalden, which shared in their sentiments, to join them, formed a counter-diet, which would neither yield to that held at Zurich, nor recognised its acts. The Diet at Zurich was composed of the cantons whose liberties were in danger, viz., Vaud, Argovia, Thurgovia, St. Gall, and Tessin, together with the so-called

impartial cantons of Zurich, Bâle, Schaffhausen, Appenzell, and the Grisons. The latter Diet represented ten cantons; its opponents nine.

Fortunately for the cause of justice and good sense, Alexander, liberal both from feeling and education, besides being influenced by M. de Laharpe and General Jomini, had no idea of lending his aid to such a work of destruction. Under his influence the allied sovereigns declared that they would recognise no other Diet than that of Zurich, nor would they consent to the suppression of a single one of the existing cantons; and that as Berne had lost much, they would endeavour to compensate her with some portion of the territory recovered from France.

The Diet of Zurich, strengthened by this support, conquered and even absorbed the dissenting cantons. This Diet had drawn up the plan of a federal union, recognising the existence of the nineteen cantons, and which, leaving to the Congress of Vienna the care of deciding territorial questions, had preserved all that was good in the Act of Mediation with regard to civil equality and legislative power. But this plan being rejected by the dissenting cantons, those cantons whose existence was threatened refused to lay down their arms. Pays de Vaud was transformed into a sort of camp, and instead of being, as once, the seat of wealth and repose, presented nothing but a scene of anxiety and agitation. This was all that Switzerland had gained, at least for the present, by the deliverance of Europe. It depended on the Congress of Vienna to restore order and justice, if possible.

As we pass the Alps the prospect becomes sadder and drearier. The French in retiring had left the wrecks of their Italian army at Milan, and the Austrians had left the remnant of their army in the fortresses of Lombardy. Notwithstanding his noble fidelity to Napoleon, Prince Eugène flattered himself that he would be able to retain a part at least of his viceroyalty. For this he had counted on the influence of his father-in-law, the King of Bavaria, and the personal consideration enjoyed by himself in Europe. The wisest amongst the Italians would have desired him for their prince, and the Lombard Senate was considering how the object might be effected, when the Milanese populace, weary of the abode of the French amongst them for eighteen years, and also excited by some members of the nobility and clergy, revolted, attacked the Senate, and massacred Prina, the finance minister. They were about to murder the war minister when their violence was checked. General Pino having placed himself at the head of the public forces, a kind of regency was formed of intelligent patriots, who demanded a sovereign from the Congress of Vienna. The reply

to this demand was, as may be expected, the occupation of the country by Austrian troops. Marshal Bellegarde, at the head of fifty thousand Austrians, invaded Lombardy as far as the Po, dissolved the provisional regency, and took possession of the country in the name of the imperial court of Austria. Although it was not yet announced to what power these countries were to be subjected, it was easy to foresee that they were about to become Austrian provinces.

The Austrian rule was harsh, but conducted with legal forms in Lombardy, whilst from the very first day it was exercised with disorderly severity in Piedmont. The old King of Sardinia having passed the period of his exile at Rome, and assisted at the Pope's return, at whose feet he had prostrated himself, returned to Turin and took possession of his dominions, which the English proposed increasing by the addition of Genoa. He governed after the fashion of the most short-sighted of emigrants. He not only re-established absolute power, but he employed it in punishing all who had served under France, and persecuting those who did not abstain from flesh meat on Fridays and Saturdays, and in all things acted with the most violent intolerance in a country which during twenty years had been imbued with the French spirit. A great number of Piedmontese officers fled to Murat, who received them with delight, and those who remained, either refusing to serve, or detesting the new government, were very little suited to support it. A general insurrection would certainly have broken out but for the neighbourhood of the Austrians on the Tessino and the Po.

Genoa thoughtlessly yielded to the English, and was promised her independence by the complaisant and liberal Lord Bentinck, but she was thrown into despair when she saw the fate that was being prepared for her. It was remarkable that at first all the seaport towns of Europe stretched forth their arms towards England, that is to the sea, but now drew them back in anger. Genoa acted like Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes, Antwerp, &c., &c.

The Legations, which under the empire had been included in the viceroyalty of Lombardy, were occupied by Murat, who had invaded them in the name of the coalition. In conformity with the opinions of the day, that each prince should recover what he had formerly possessed, the Legations ought to be restored to the Pope, and he was justified in expecting that they would. But the Pope at his return having refused to recognise Murat's title, the latter avenged himself by continuing to occupy these provinces, not indeed ill treating the inhabitants, but leaving them in a painful state of uncertainty as to their future destiny.

At this period—September and October 1814—Tuscany was

the only country in Italy, and perhaps in Europe, that was at rest. Under the empire Tuscany had been restored to the Archduke Ferdinand, Duke of Wurzburg, and after being tossed about for twenty years from one sovereignty to another, found herself at last under the government of a wise and moderate prince, who did not seek to deprive her of the privileges she had obtained from the French, nor persecute those who had served under Napoleon, but, on the contrary, placed MM. Fossombroni and Corsini, the most distinguished members of the French administration, at the head of his government. Thus Tuscany, fully aware of the advantages of her position, was the only Italian State that neither regretted nor desired anything. The turbulent Leghorn, having obtained the freedom of the sea, and unlike Genoa, not being threatened with a foreign ruler, was as contented and peaceful as the rest of Tuscany.

The Romans had got back the Pope, whom they received on their knees on the Place du Peuple. Amongst those prostrated before him might be seen poor Charles IV., his wife, and the Prince de la Paix, sad remains of the Spanish family, collected at Rome like the waifs of some great shipwreck. Pius VII., generally so mild and moderate, seemed to have flung aside these qualities the moment he was restored to his own sacred domain, and put into practice the most unwise and least humane rigours of the Church. He immediately annulled all the improvements that the French had introduced into the administration, he persecuted most pitilessly all those priests or laymen who had served under them, he annulled the sales of Church property, and proclaimed the re-establishment of the Jesuits, which caused no little inquietude to all enlightened men. These imprudent resolutions were not suggested by Cardinal Consalvi, who was gone to solicit the support of the European courts in the affair of the Legations, but by his temporary substitute, Cardinal Pacca. Cardinal Maury had been banished to his diocese of Montefiascone, and was forbidden to appear before the Holy Father. Why? Because he was a bishop appointed by Napoleon, who had been crowned by Pius VII. All the cardinal's relations had been deprived of their appointments. Things were carried so far that Pius VII. began to be ashamed of proceedings so contrary to the usual generosity of his disposition.

We have already explained the relations existing between the Pope and the Bourbon government concerning the revocation of the Concordat. At the same time that Pius VII. asked the support of the Bourbons in the question of the Marches and the Legations, he demanded the restoration of Avignon and Benevento. He requested Louis XVIII. not to

accept the Charter because of the liberty of worship therein guaranteed; he also demanded the abolition of divorce—a change in the law of marriage which would restore to the religious ceremony its superiority over the civil; he also demanded a dotation in land for the Church. In return, the old bishop of St. Malo, ambassador of Louis XVIII., had presented the demands of his court, which consisted in the unconditional abolition of the Concordat, and the restoration of the French clergy to the same position they held before 1802. Whilst the Bishop of St. Malo presented this demand with all the respect due to the Holy See, he yet gave Pius VII. to understand that the Bourbons were far from approving of his reign, and would even blame its weakness, had they dared to utter a reproach against the representative of God on earth.

On his side, the Pope, who saw nothing strange in his demanding the restitution of Avignon, or opposing freedom of worship, thought it both astonishing and offensive that he should be asked to undo his own work by the re-establishment of the ancient French Church, or that it should be insinuated that he had done wrong in signing the Concordat. The doctrine held by him and his negotiators was, that the Holy See could not err. Had the Bourbons been consistent, they would not have disputed this; but as in this case everybody was inconsistent, the minister of Louis XVIII., to obtain the abolition of the Concordat, asserted that the Pope could err, and thus declared himself a Gallican; whilst the Pope asserted ultramontane principles, in order to defend the Concordat, the least ultramontane of his acts.

However, as both parties needed each other's assistance, they endeavoured to come to an understanding, and Pius VII. appointed a congregation of cardinals to examine the important question of the revocation of the Concordat, and resolve the numerous difficulties dependent thereon. Amongst the demands of the court of France, there was one very agreeable to the court of Rome, which was an increase in the number of episcopal sees. This measure was therefore admitted, not as a revocation of the Concordat, but as a simple increase of the number of bishoprics—a demand which the Church has not refused to grant at any time. As far as individuals were concerned, the Pope was equally ready to yield, and made no objection to reinstate all the ancient titulars that were still in existence, numbering about twelve or thirteen, notwithstanding the self-contradiction of reappointing prelates whom he had deposed. But at the same time he demanded and obtained well-secured pensions for the prelates he was about to depose after having appointed them himself. However, these negotiations, as often happens at Rome, proceeded very slowly, which on this occasion was

very fortunate both for Pius VII. and the Bourbons, neither of whom suspected the benefit conferred by this delay in the accomplishment of their wishes.

Naples still remained with what wrecks of the imperial dynasty still existed in that kingdom. Murat's astonishment at finding himself on the throne of Naples could only be equalled by that which Europe felt at seeing him there. In the first days of 1814, whilst the allies were still doubtful of their victory, Austria, in order to detach Murat from Napoleon, had guaranteed him the throne of Naples, and England confirmed the act. Now that the allies were completely victorious, they repented of having bound themselves so early and so formally. The powers that had not taken part in the negotiation blamed the precipitancy of England and Austria, who indeed were ashamed of what they had done; and though they could not venture to undo their work themselves, were very well disposed to allow it to be undone by others.

All the princes of Italy, and the Pope in particular, had refused to recognise Murat, who avenged himself on the latter, as we have seen, by occupying the Legations and the Marches. Whilst this neighbour, so morally powerful, refused to recognise Murat, another, Ferdinand IV., King of Sicily and Palermo, regarded him as an adventurer whom the confusion of European affairs had allowed to continue on a usurped throne. As might be expected, the legitimate heir of the Neapolitan Bourbons made every exertion to recover his patrimony. Murat could now estimate at Naples, as Marmont at Paris, what one gains by abandoning a course to which he is naturally allied, whatever excuse unjust treatment might furnish for such conduct. Regret is the commencement of remorse; and Murat already regretted deeply having abandoned his true interest when he abandoned Napoleon. His sister-in-law, the Princess Pauline, aided by the queen, did all she could to make him feel what he only felt too deeply already. She then left for Porto-Ferraio, to bring about a reconciliation between the brothers-in-law.

But Murat was determined not to give the powers assembled at Vienna a pretext for dethroning him, by appearing unfaithful to his engagements; and whilst he sent messages of repentance to the island of Elba, he avoided any act that might compromise him, and always addressed the allies as a member of the coalition who rejoiced at having aided in conquering the tyrant of Europe. But he gave a most friendly reception to the Piedmontese and Lombard officers who sought refuge in his dominions. He acted in the same manner towards the French officers who came to offer him their services, although an order of Louis XVIII. recalled the latter to France; and he paid

them all well, for his finances were in excellent condition. He made every exertion to increase his army, which already amounted to 80,000 men; for he knew that a large military force would constitute his very best title with the negotiators of Vienna. He had many partisans amongst the nobility and citizens of Naples, who dreaded all that the return of Ferdinand IV. would entail. If the better educated classes, whom he did not offend, were on his side, it was not the same with the *lazzaroni*, who had a lively remembrance of their ancient masters, although they often applauded him because of his noble person, which he frequently displayed by riding through the streets of Naples. He was not altogether unpopular; but he was no longer the hero of Italy, as he had been for a few months. No; the real hero of Italy was elsewhere: he was in the isle of Elba. Having at first wished to free themselves from the conscription and the *droits réunis*, the affections of the Italians soon returned to Napoleon, and they saw in him the ideal representative of their cause conquered, and Prometheus-like, chained to a rock. With the exception of Tuscany, the dominant wish from the Alps to the Straits of Messina was that the sovereign of Elba might quit his isle, put himself at the head of the Neapolitan army, and march on Milan. There was very little probability of such an event; for Napoleon would not leave his island, in order to attempt, with the assistance of the Italians, what he had failed in when aided by the French; or in other words, to undertake a desperate struggle against victorious Europe, to do battle for the unity of Italy, a cause in which he had never taken any great interest. However, it is certain that, had he appeared, all who were disgusted with the military régime of Austria, with the pious tyranny of Piedmont, and the domination of the sacred college, would certainly have risen at his voice, and repeated one of those attempts so often made by the Italians, but in which they have not yet succeeded.

Italy, like the rest of Europe, after having desired and invoked what was called their common deliverance, was now very little satisfied with it. But there was one country more dissatisfied than any other—a country justly indignant at the deceptions that had repaid her efforts: this country was Spain. Spain had shed torrents of blood, and supported a heroic struggle for the restoration of her king, and for all this blood and all these efforts she had only obtained a stupid and sanguinary tyranny.

Ferdinand VII., who, as we have seen, had by Napoleon's orders been conducted to the frontiers of Spain and restored to the Spanish troops, had entered Gironne on the 24th of March. From Gironne he proceeded to Saragossa, where he found deputies from the regency and the Cortes, who, before

restoring him the royal authority, required that he should swear to observe the constitution of Cadiz, a proceeding similar to that adopted by the Senate with regard to Louis XVIII. Let us imagine how the Bourbons would have acted at Paris had they been unrestrained by public opinion and by the presence of the imperial army at Fontainebleau; and instead of depending exclusively on the support of foreign armies, obedient to the will of Alexander, had they rested on a Vendean army, we shall easily understand the conduct of Ferdinand VII. in Spain. This prince refused at first to enter into any explanation with the deputies from the regency and the Cortes, and proceeded from Saragossa to Valencia, greeted as he passed by the homage of the people, who were delighted at his return and the restoration of peace. At Valencia he was received with transports of delight. The army even came voluntarily to take the oath of allegiance, and this general good feeling, which his presence inspired, continuing to increase, he considered himself sufficiently strong to enter into explanations with the authorities at Madrid. Enlightened men were indeed of opinion that he could not, without some modifications, accept the constitution of Cadiz—a constitution still more defective than ours of 1791. General Castaños, the conqueror of Baylen, and the most distinguished man at that time in Spain, together with M. de Cevallos, the most enlightened of the ministers, advised him to negotiate, and confine himself to demanding modifications of the constitution, and not to break off with men who had defended his throne with their blood. Nothing would induce him to adopt conciliatory measures; for he felt more indignant against men who sought to limit his royal authority after having conserved it for him, than against those who had sought to deprive him of it for ever by shutting him up at Valençay. Unfortunately, the heads of the Cortes, unwise as he, were quite as unwilling to make concessions, and the unity whose result might have been the establishment of rational institutions in Spain was become an impossibility.

The Cortes having commissioned the Archbishop of Toledo to go to the king, and request him to declare his decision concerning the constitution, his majesty said he would not accept it, and sent back the archbishop to Madrid, resumed the plenitude of his authority, annulled all the acts of the Cortes, and ordered the troops to march upon the capital. The people and the army, who only saw in him the king for whom they had fought so long, and understanding nothing, or almost nothing, of the theoretic dispute between the sovereign and the Cortes, and even feeling astonished that the royal authority could be refused to him for whom it had been preserved at the expense of such exertions, had encouraged him by their enthusiastic

submission to dare everything, and he entered Madrid as an absolute monarch, that is to say, free to pursue those measures that might lead to his ruin. Scarcely was he settled in his palace when he exiled or imprisoned those who had struggled hardest to preserve his crown; sent to his diocese the Archbishop of Toledo—the head of the regency, the man who had supported the royal prerogative with all his might; he re-established the Inquisition with all its consequences, and thus added to what was ridiculous in an impossible restoration, the odium of the blackest and basest ingratitude. There were, however, men in Spain who, without entirely participating in the liberal opinions of the Cortes, were yet impressed by them; and who, considering the present reaction absurd, were determined to oppose it. These men abode chiefly in Catalonia. They were joined by several members of the Cortes, and it looked as if an organised resistance were about to commence in that quarter. When these men saw in what manner the son of Charles IV. behaved, they thought of recalling the old king, whose want of intellectual power was compensated by the gentleness of his temper.

The difficulties of the position increased visibly, and Ferdinand VII., attributing the present movement to the intrigues of the Prince de la Paix, who was staying at Rome with Charles IV., preferred a request to the Holy See that this old minister of his father should be exiled to Pesaro. Charles IV., whose affection for his favourite had never wavered, was indignant at hearing this, and seemed inclined to go to Barcelona or to Vienna, and appeal to Spain or to Europe to restore his throne, and avenge him on an unnatural son. It was with difficulty that he was pacified, and it needed all the Pope's sacred authority to restrain him.

Such was the spectacle that Spain presented, and in contemplating it we cannot but feel inclined to thank the Senate for having drawn up a rational constitution for us; nor can we refuse our gratitude to the foreign sovereigns who supported it, and Louis XVIII. who accepted it, and thus spared us the disgraceful reaction which recompensed the devotion of the Spaniards. Although the Bourbons who reigned over us did not imitate the odious conduct of Ferdinand VII., they still committed faults that sufficed to open a new career of adventures to Napoleon, and a fresh source of misfortunes to France.

We shall complete this picture of Spain by a short explanation of its relations with the cabinet of the Tuileries. The treaty of peace was signed in July, the bulwark of the Pyrenees being no unimportant argument in its favour; and nothing now remained to be done but to make a reciprocal exchange

of prisoners. But France had secretly promised to assist Spain in getting a double restitution from Vienna—that of Parma for the Queen of Etruria, and Naples for Ferdinand IV., who during the past eight years had no territory but Sicily. It did not require much entreaty to induce France to support these demands, as, indeed, she would have made them herself. At this very time Spain contracted a secret engagement with England, by which she bound herself not to renew the family compact with the Bourbons, and abruptly broke off her engagements with us, for a very strange reason. The guerilla chief Mina, from whose enterprises we had suffered so much, and to whom Ferdinand VII. was so much indebted, was one of those whom the restored monarch persecuted for opposing his assumption of absolute power. This celebrated man had taken refuge at Bayonne, where he was arrested by the Spanish consul, with the concurrence of the French authorities, who had the weakness to consent to his arrest on French ground. Louis XVIII. and the Duke de Berry were indignant at such an insult to the French Crown, and demanded that Mina should be set free; that the French agent who had assisted in this illegal act should be deprived of his place; and that reparation should be demanded from the Spanish court. Ferdinand VII., instead of granting satisfaction, demanded that reparation should be made to him, and consequently all diplomatic relations ceased between the two courts. Thus Ferdinand VII. first quarrelled with the Spaniards who had saved his crown, and then with the Bourbons of France, his only relatives, his only allies in the whole world, and sacrificed the family compact to England without being assured of her support—for she blamed him loudly for the injurious reaction, of which, indeed, he was as much the instrument as the author.

Such was the state of Europe, freed from Napoleon's power, but exposed to a species of universal counter-revolution; nor were these the sole evils with which Europe was threatened! After fifteen years of suffering caused by the exorbitant ambition of Napoleon, the fall of this insatiable conqueror might have served as a lesson, and taught moderation to all. But it had no such effect, and the victorious powers seemed, from their boundless avidity, more inclined to justify Napoleon than to cause the world to bless his fall. This was the painful spectacle they presented at Vienna, where they had appointed to meet on the 1st of August.

The allied sovereigns, on leaving Paris, had all, with the exception of the Emperor Francis, who was no lover of tumult, gone to pay a visit to the Prince-Regent of England, and received in London such an ovation as the English know well

how to bestow when their passions are inflamed, and their interests satisfied. Rome, Madrid, Vienna, Berlin, had echoed to loud acclamations, but all were surpassed by the enthusiastic delight exhibited in London when the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia appeared. Their reception verged on folly. Not wishing to disturb these magnificent fêtes by discussions on business which might have marred the universal joy, it was decided that they should remain good friends, and if necessary, even make reciprocal sacrifices, and maintain at any cost the alliance of Chaumont, by which they had rid themselves of the tyrant of Europe. France, it was said, though restored to the Bourbons, was not resigned to her fate, nor was Napoleon forgotten, though banished to the isle of Elba, and unforeseen events might arise which could only be overcome while the allies remained united. Without entering, therefore, into any explanation concerning European arrangements, the monarchs swore an eternal friendship, and promised to meet at Vienna with the same sentiments.

According to the 32nd article of the Treaty of Paris, which fixed the meeting of the approaching Congress within the next two months, the representatives ought to meet on the 1st of August. But as this date would not allow sufficient time for all that was to be done, the meeting was therefore deferred to the month of September.

After the fêtes in London, the King of Prussia, notwithstanding his modesty, went to receive the congratulations of his subjects. On the other hand, the Emperor Alexander had gone to Warsaw to excite the foolish imagination of the Poles in favour of a pretended reconstitution of Poland which he meditated, and consequently the two monarchs could not meet at Vienna before the 25th of September. They made a brilliant entry into the Austrian capital, worthy of their joy and their success. The Emperor Francis, who took part in these displays rather for the sake of his allies than from any feeling of personal gratification, went to meet the two monarchs, embraced them in the presence of his people, and then returned with them into his capital amidst the enthusiastic applause of the inhabitants. The Kings of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Denmark arrived successively, and after them all the German, Italian, and Dutch princes who had their interests to defend in the approaching negotiations. Princesses were as abundant as princes at Vienna, and amongst the former none was more conspicuous than Alexander's sister, the Grand Duchess Catherine, widow of the Duke of Oldenburg, an active-minded and intellectual woman, who possessed a certain amount of influence. To these crowned heads were joined the generals and diplomatists of the coalition, anxious to compliment each other on their

military and political successes. Some came merely to receive felicitations, and rejoice in the common triumph, whilst others came to represent their governments, but all alike greedy of rewards, fêtes, pleasures, news, and forming with the sovereigns the most dazzling and tumultuous assembly that ever was seen. But from this brilliant meeting of monarchs two personages were absent—the unfortunate King of Saxony, imprisoned at Berlin, for having been the last to break his alliance with the French, and Marie Louise, buried in the palace of Schönbrunn, whence she heard with a sort of envy the noise of the festivities, and where she was occupied, not in preparing to join her husband in Elba, but in disputing her Duchy of Parma with the two houses of Bourbon, under the guidance of M. de Neiperg, who was appointed her adviser. He was an experienced officer, acquainted with war and diplomacy, and capable of informing her of all that was necessary for her to know; and in the profound isolation into which she had fallen, the count was becoming daily more her counsellor, advocate, and friend.

After some days devoted to amusement of every kind, it was time to think of matters of more serious import; a change of occupation unwelcome to all. Whilst the sovereigns always declared that unanimity ought to be maintained, they had not entered into explanations on any subject, with the exception of some points already decided in the Treaty of Paris. Written documents had already been drawn up, by which England was to get Belgium and Holland, and therewith form the kingdom of the Low Countries, as a protection against France; Austria was to have Italy as far as the Tessino and the Po; Prussia was to be reconstituted, and put in the same position with regard to territory as she had been in 1805; whilst Russia, freed from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (Napoleon's attempt at a French Poland), should share its wrecks with the neighbouring States. But there was so little desire to disturb the general happiness that no arrangement had been made as to the disposition of the vacant territories, all debates on this difficult and doubtful point being referred to the autumnal meeting.

There could be no dispute as to Italy, which, as far as the Po and the Tessino, was given to Austria; nor the Low Countries, where the French frontier of 1790 was accepted as a definite boundary; but ample subject, not only of debate but of contention, would be found in the centre of Europe, in the territories touching on Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia were each secretly determined to have entire possession, the one of Poland, the other of Saxony.

These two princes, equals in age and rank, though very different in disposition, had in the commencement of their

reigns been firm friends. But their friendship was destroyed by the events of 1807, when, both being conquered, they experienced such very different treatment. Provinces were bestowed on Alexander, whilst Frederick William was deprived of half his dominions. In 1813 they renewed their alliance under the harsh oppression of Napoleon, and on the battlefields of Lutzen and Leipsic their ancient friendship revived, and they vowed that nothing thenceforward should disunite them. They had consequently no secrets from one another; each felt perfect confidence in his friend; they were of the same opinion on every subject; and whenever Alexander spoke, it was pretty certain that Frederick William would echo his sentiments. As Alexander not only spoke but thought first, he guided the opinions of his friend, though not to the disadvantage of Prussia, for they were as closely united by political interest as by personal affection. These two princes esteemed each other highly, looking upon themselves as the honestest men of their age, whilst they considered England the most egotistical of all powers, and Austria the most astute. If they were to be believed, the whole civilised world would be still in a state of bondage if Alexander had not given the signal of resistance in 1812, and if Frederick William had not joined him in 1813, or if, when they had reached the Oder, they had not pressed forward, carrying all Europe in their train, until they reached the Elbe, the Rhine, and even the Seine. They esteemed nobody so highly as themselves, and this esteem was not altogether ill founded, for though Frederick William sometimes exhibited a duplicity not uncommon in weak-minded men, and though Alexander's fickleness made him sometimes appear false, still the former was upright and modest, and the latter generous in disposition, and fascinating in manner. But as often happens to honest people who pique themselves on their honesty, these two monarchs believed they were impeccable, and even looked upon their ambition as a virtue. If the one desired to obtain possession of Poland, and the other of Saxony, it was, according to them, from the purest and noblest motives. Alexander desired to get Poland that he might reorganise the country. And indeed, in his youth he had often thought and said that the division of Poland by Catherine, Frederick the Great, and Marie Therese, was an odious crime, and ought by all means to be repaired. But he was very much annoyed at Napoleon's attempts at this reparation from 1807 to 1812, and did all he could to prevent him. But thinking the moment was now come when he could undertake the task himself, he commenced his preparations with the ardour that characterised all his movements. He possessed many facilities for carrying out his project, for he was master of the greater number of the Polish

provinces. By joining to these the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, comprising Warsaw, Thorn, Posen, and Kalisch, he might compose a magnificent kingdom, extending from the Niemen to the Crapach range. On this kingdom he intended to bestow free institutions, and assume the crown himself, remaining at the same time Emperor of all the Russias. He would thus assume the double title of emperor and king—the very summit of human power—and would be in the eyes of Russia the equal or even the superior of Catherine and Peter the Great, since in the course of a single reign he should have added to Russia, Finland, Bessarabia, and Poland. These dreams of ambition seemed to him but schemes for the benefit of humanity. Many Poles who considered France too distant to befriend Poland, which they believed could only be efficaciously done by Russia, together with many others who had adopted the same views since our misfortunes, now collected round Alexander, and contributed not a little to excite his ambitious views. He determined to become the restorer, the liberal restorer of Poland; for though he meant to place his new kingdom under the Russian sceptre, he did not mean to subject it to Russian despotism; the government should somewhat resemble the English. By acting in this manner, Alexander did not look upon himself at all as a conqueror; on the contrary, he said that he would deprive himself of Lithuania and Volhynia, in order to create this new kingdom, of which, if it would give less offence to European jealousy, he would make his brother Constantine king, and be himself only suzerain. In his opinion, the Congress of Vienna, by assisting in this plan, would put the acme to the glory of victorious Europe, and would be in a position to say it had reconstituted the world on the bases of justice, liberty, and true political wisdom. We must pardon such illusions, for it is something gained when ambition thinks it necessary to assume the appearance of honesty, a point on which so many are indifferent, satisfied if they can obtain what they desire, without seeking to give their conduct even the semblance of justice.

There was, however, one objection to this fair vision, to which Alexander did not blind himself, but for which his reply was prepared. The territories of which the Grand Duchy of Warsaw had been composed had been formerly divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The principal part had belonged to Prussia, whose rule extended as far as the Vistula, including Warsaw. This large portion, then, was to be taken from Prussia, who would certainly demand compensation somewhere; and this extension of the Russian frontier from the Vistula to the Oder should be sanctioned by Europe—an extension which would be a real subject of alarm to the entire

continent, and would be also contrary to the Treaty of Kalisch (28th February 1813), to the Treaty of Reichenbach (15th June 1813), and to the Treaty of Töplitz (9th September 1813), treaties which had successively formed the bonds of the coalition. By the conditions of these treaties the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was to be distributed between the co-sharers of Poland, agreeable, or very nearly so, to the old partition that had been made of it; besides, Prussia should get ten thousand additional subjects, and Illyria was to be restored to Austria. This was what they had promised each other when they formed the European coalition against France in 1813; but the unexpected success of this coalition had permitted them to extend the sphere of these restitutions, for Austria, instead of getting Illyria alone, was to get back the Tyrol and the north of Italy, with the addition of Venice, that she had never possessed before. England, that would have been very well satisfied to deprive France of the seaports of Hamburg and Bremen, and still happier if she could deprive her of Holland, was now, in addition to these, about to rob her of Belgium, which she intended for the house of Orange. If all these powers had in this manner enlarged their original demands, was Russia alone, asked Alexander, to confine herself within the narrow views she had formed at a time when the utmost the allies hoped was to reach the Elbe, but had no expectation of touching the Rhine? Certainly not; and Russia's share should, as well as that of the others, be proportioned to the unhoped-for success of the coalition.

Saxony, Prussia's compensation, was ready; the possession of this kingdom would be the realisation of all her wishes. This power, since Frederick the Great, by the united genius of policy and arms, had put it together in bits and scraps, had always presented a kind of geographical deformity. On the map of Europe it appeared as a State of disproportioned length, extending from the Niemen to the Rhine, with many long intervals, and above all, wanting solidity in the centre. If Dresden were added to Berlin, this awkward configuration would be partly remedied, and Prussia would obtain possession of that field for military operations, whose importance had been proved by Napoleon in the nineteenth and by Frederick in the eighteenth century. And by this arrangement Prussia, instead of disaffected Poles, would have honest German subjects, and still better, she would thus become one of the chief German powers, and be placed in a position to bring about that Germanic unity the bare mention of which is sufficient to excite the Prussian mind; whilst Alexander believed that he was performing a duty to the human race in remodelling Poland. Frederick William believed it was a duty he owed

Germany to make this first great step towards her unity, and flattered himself that he would thus pay for all the blood she had shed in the common cause, never permitting himself to perceive that it was more for Prussian than for German unity he was working; that the lesser German States would be seriously alarmed by such a move; that Austria would be offended; and that all Europe would be terrified at the prospect of paying for German unity by abandoning Poland to Russia. Like Alexander, he had answers for all the objections that could be made to his projects, for the prism of desire always shows objects as we wish to see them. Prussia had been promised, he said, ten thousand subjects, without mentioning the locality, and she would not exceed this number in taking possession of Saxony; she would merely choose what suited her best. The King of Saxony's interests could not be alleged against this measure, for he was a traitor who had deserted the cause of Europe. Besides, when Russia and Prussia were united, they need fear no opposition. Austria and England were so much occupied in satisfying their avidity—the one in Italy, the other in the two hemispheres—that neither would take notice of what was going on. France deserved no consideration. In short, Europe was under so many obligations to both Russia and Prussia that she could not refuse them the gratification of such honest and legitimate desires. So did Frederick William argue with himself, and he thought his reasoning excellent. Alexander and Frederick William had pledged their word to each other, and they came to Vienna persuaded that they should have Poland and Saxony.

Was it possible that England and Austria entertained no suspicion of these projects, and if they suspected that, they made no opposition? This certainly looks very strange when we reflect on the violent opposition that soon burst forth. But, as we have said, the fear of disturbing the general harmony had prevented all explanations. The reconstitution of Poland had been often spoken of, as well as the deserved punishment of the King of Saxony; and the partition of the Duchy of Warsaw was provided for by the treaties. The reconstitution of Poland had even been mentioned as one of the questions that might be submitted to the Congress. But so many places had been parts of Poland for the last fifty years that in speaking of the country no precise boundaries were understood. This threw a vagueness over the subject, which was very agreeable to all parties; besides, the all-absorbing interests of the present excluded all thought of the future. England could not yet forget how the continental ports had been shut against her, and it was to prevent the recurrence of such an event that she formed the kingdom of the Low Countries; that she sought to give

Hanover more importance, and endeavoured to make Prussia the ally of both, for which reason she was ready to make every concession to Frederick William to induce him to adopt her views. Austria, more clear-sighted than England, had more quickly detected the views of Russia and Prussia, for it was a serious consideration for her that Prussia should take possession of Saxony, and that the Slavonic race should extend to the foot of the Crapach mountains. But these were not her only cares, and in the midst of her present prosperity she was oppressed by greater and more serious anxieties than she had ever known before. In the west and north she had to apprehend Prussia and Russia; she had to watch over the reconstitution of Germany, and fix her own position amongst the Germanic powers; she had to organise Italy, to restrain Murat, to watch over the prisoner of Elba, to keep an observant eye on France, and at the same time be cautious that in treating these different interests she did not allow one to mar the other. Austria was therefore determined to employ all the means at her disposal—patience, tact, vigilance, and if necessary, force. Of the three hundred thousand soldiers at her disposal, she had assembled two hundred and fifty thousand in Bohemia and Hungary, and left but fifty thousand in Italy, where she was exposed to be attacked by Murat, the Italians, and perhaps the prisoner of Elba. Austria had, consequently, silently made her preparations in the direction of Poland and Saxony, but the more her difficulties increased, the more she desired to overcome them by the union, by the good understanding of the Four—that is, of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia; for, in her opinion, were France and the lesser German States allowed to interfere, all would be plunged into a real chaos, whence would spring the modern Lucifer—that is to say, Napoleon, who was not yet forgotten, and who certainly was determined not to allow himself to pass from men's minds, although he affected to slumber in that profound sleep that might naturally be supposed consequent on his long fatigues. Under the influence of these impressions, the first words spoken at Vienna were the last that had been pronounced at London—that the allies should remain united in opinion at any sacrifice; and this was the oftener repeated, as they felt that the day of disunion was approaching.

Such were the dispositions of those that formed the Congress; all were extremely anxious to maintain unity, and all were filled with a boundless avidity, little compatible with such union. If ever the fault that France had committed in signing the Treaty of Paris with so much precipitation was evident, it was at this moment, when destiny decreed that Europe should be disunited, for it was impossible that Austria would consent that Prussia

should take possession of Dresden, or Russia of Cracow; or that the lesser German powers would allow Saxony, the most respectable amongst them, to be suppressed because of her alliance with France—a fault that was common to them all; or that England would sanction the execution of these ambitious projects in the face of the British Parliament. If amid these divided interests France had come to Vienna unrestricted by a treaty which marked out her frontiers, there can be no doubt but that her position would be better than it was in Paris in the month of May. Whilst, on the one hand, Russia and Prussia were determined to have Poland and Saxony at any price, and on the other hand, England and Austria were determined that they should not get them, France would have been able to give so decided a preponderance to whichever party she joined, that certainly no concessions would be spared to gain her support. Russia and Prussia were the two powers most inclined to make concessions to France, for their interests were connected with the Elbe and the Vistula, and not with the Rhine and the Schelde. It is evident that had we joined these powers, we should have got very different frontiers to those assigned us by the Treaty of Paris. Had we only gained the line of fortresses demanded by our negotiators, it would have been a great advantage; and being gained by diplomacy alone, would have obtained for the Bourbons that popularity of which they stood so much in need. It was indeed a misfortune that we came to Vienna clogged by the Treaty of Paris. However, the evil was not altogether irremediable, and it was still possible to profit of the new state of things. It was evident that the discussion would be warm, for both Russia and Prussia seemed prepared to proceed to every extremity in order to obtain Poland and Saxony. If it went so far as the forming of new alliances, or preparing for war, it is not likely that the Treaty of Paris would prove a greater restraint than that of Chaumont had been. Of course, we could not ourselves proclaim an intention of not abiding by the Treaty of Paris; but by prudence in our expressions, and giving hope of our support, whilst we lingered in according it, Russia and Prussia were both so ardent, that they would probably pronounce the words we dare not utter, and offer us what we could not venture to demand. We cannot say how much our condition may have been improved, but undoubtedly it would have been ameliorated, and that in proportion to the seriousness of the conflict. We may add that, united with Russia and Prussia, we should have nothing to fear from the dispute, however violent it may be. It is even probable that England and Austria, not daring to venture on war, would have yielded, and we should have become the arbitrators, the well-recompensed arbitrators, of the conten-

tion. Consequently, the Treaty of Paris was not an insurmountable difficulty, but only an obstacle that may be overcome by a little address; and it must be allowed that address was quite permissible against adversaries who had both used and abused force in dealing with us.

This line of conduct supposes our consent to the wishes of Russia and Prussia; and what loss would be incurred by these concessions? Had Russia obtained Poland, of which she already possessed the greater part, she would have advanced from her long-established position on the Vistula as far as the Wartha. Prussia, in getting Saxony, would have come nearer to Austria. By these movements Russia would occasion more uneasiness to Germany, and Prussia more jealousy to Austria. Ought France to become uncomfortable at such results? Was it our duty to guard the union of the three continental powers that had helped to conquer us, and after our defeat had imposed on us the treaty of the 30th of May; and that for forty years has held our policy under the yoke of a permanent coalition? If the Prussians were to be an inconvenience to any one, was it not better that they should be so to Austria by getting possession of Dresden, than to us by getting Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle? It is true, that had the house of Saxony been removed from the banks of the Elbe to the left of the Rhine, as Alexander and Frederick William proposed, the Germanic equilibrium—a component part of the European balance of power—would have been shaken. But what was the use of this Germanic equilibrium, which had been so largely encroached on during our century? What was its use either to us or the rest of Europe? It was only interposing small States between greater, in order to break the shock of their collision. Would it not be more to our interest that German States should be interposed between us and Prussia, in order to prevent collision between us, than that they should be placed between her and Austria, to spare the latter a shock? And Saxony having abandoned us on the field of battle, and Europe having lost all sense of moderation in her dealings with us, were we not justified now more than at any other time, or under any other circumstances, in thinking of ourselves, and of ourselves alone?

These questions contain their own reply; and now, at the end of half a century, one is surprised at the strange view that was taken of them at the period of which we are relating the history. Unfortunately, at that time our foreign was as defective as our home policy, and these questions were not even raised in the royal council. In the same manner, as it was not even asked whether it would not be better to defer for two months that convention of the 23rd of April, by which

we surrendered such important pledges, without hastening the departure of the allied armies by a single day, so it was not asked whether it were not better to put off the Treaty of Paris for six months—that is, to a time when the powers assembled for our spoliation should quarrel over the division of the spoil—nor was it even decided what line of policy should be adopted at Vienna. The defective organisation of the royal council was the cause of this, and not a want of intelligence in the men who composed it. This council consisted, as we have already seen, of a confused mixture of princes and of ministers, with and without portfolios, acting under a literary king, who was both inattentive and idle, quite willing to allow himself to be governed, but not to allow a head to his cabinet whose active vigilance would extend to every subject—such a council could only produce results as disconnected as itself. In any department provided with a special minister gifted with a real capacity for business, everything went on well. The finance department, which enjoyed this advantage, was admirably well administered. In the other departments, and particularly that of the interior, everything was left to chance, and was governed by the passions of the dominant party. As to foreign affairs, they were given up to the king, as king, and to M. de Talleyrand, who enjoyed the reputation of being more conversant in such matters than any man in France. We shall soon see what was the result of this state of things.

The views of Louis XVIII. with regard to foreign policy were, as in all things else, moderate, and tolerably wise, but as limited as his wishes.* Happy at finding himself again in

* There does not, perhaps, exist any subject within the history of our times on which both French and foreign historians are worse informed than the Congress of Vienna, nor is there one more important, since it was in this Congress that modern Europe took its present proportions, and that state of things was established which has now lasted nearly fifty years. Whilst I write, I have before me the most authentic documents, both French and foreign, together with the private correspondence of Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand. The letters of the minister contain the personal anecdotes of this great scene, with every detail that could interest an intellectual, sarcastic king, who was fond of scandal, and free from every prejudice but what regarded his own descent, which he considered superior to any other upon earth. The materials for this correspondence were furnished by M. de Talleyrand to M. de la Besnardière, who put them into proper form, and M. de Talleyrand then copied them. The king generally wrote his own replies, though he sometimes employed M. de Blacas. Business, properly so called, was transacted by the Duke de Dalberg, who corresponded with the cabinet, and this correspondence was directed by M. de Jaucourt during M. de Talleyrand's absence. The latter correspondence, less piquant but more serious than the other, leaves nothing to be desired with respect to matters of business, which are set forth with clearness, precision, and a remarkable knowledge of things, all regarded, be it understood, from that point of view in which the French legation was placed. I cannot quote all the foreign documents from which I have drawn information, but they are equally authentic, and justify me fully in considering the following recital as true and complete.

the kingdom of his fathers, which he got back not alone entire, but increased by the addition of two or three fortresses, and a magnificent museum, in which he took little interest, he felt no desire to increase his dominions, and did not make the very simple reflection that if France remained the same as she had been in 1792, whilst the other States extended their possessions, she became relatively less, and that if she succeeded in recovering her superiority, she would be indebted for it to the Revolution, the benefits of which he was far from appreciating. Louis XVIII. possessed a certain dignified self-respect, but no ambition, and would not lightly risk the public peace, which his age, infirmities, and misfortunes, added to the exhausted state of France, made him value dearly. Besides, the desire of interfering in foreign affairs, being an imperial tradition, was not agreeable to him, and he desired that the attitude of France at Vienna should be dignified and pacific. There was only one point about which he felt anxious, it was that Murat should be removed from the throne of Naples. To allow a lesser usurper to hold possession of a European throne after the greater had fallen, was, in his eyes, an inconsistency, a disgrace to all the powers, and a real danger for France. *Flagitio addit damnum*, said he, in his usual fashion of expressing himself in Latin adages. He considered Naples as a stepping-stone on which Napoleon might descend at any moment, and march to the Alps with 80,000 Italians, and thence excite all those elements that still fermented in France. As he attributed the difficulties he met in the internal government of his kingdom to Napoleon's intrigues and money, he refused to pay him the income of two million francs which had been stipulated by the treaty of the 11th of April, and even demanded that Napoleon should be transported to the Azores. Besides this removal of Napoleon and dethronement of Murat, he wished that the Duchy of Parma should be taken from Marie Louise, as he considered her holding it another source of danger, and another inconsistency of the European policy. He wished that the duchy should be given to the house of Parma, an ally of the Bourbons. As the son of a Saxon princess, he considered it becoming his crown to save the King of Saxony. But this last consideration yielded precedence to all the others. He would not venture on a war, nor even incur a disquietude, for the accomplishment of any of these objects, but he desired that everything should be done that diplomacy could effect. He thought alliances admissible for political reasons, but he would not ally himself too closely with any power, for he considered that close alliances often entailed war. Amongst the four great European powers with whom he could seek an alliance he preferred England, for he found in each of the others something that displeased him. In Russia, he

disliked the imprudence of the sovereign ; in Prussia, the too liberal opinions of the nation ; and in Austria, her relationship with Napoleon. He carried this prejudice so far as to refuse an alliance with Russia, which might have had the most beneficial results. As he had no heirs but his nephews, and one of these, the Duke d'Angoulême, being married and having no children, it was necessary that the Duke de Berry should marry, in order to keep the crown in the elder branch of the family. Count Pozzo di Borgo proposed that the Duke de Berry should espouse the Grand Duchess Anne, the same whom Napoleon was once about to marry, and entering into this project with all his wonted ardour, he extolled the services that Russia had already rendered and could still render to France, and dilated upon all the advantages that would result from such a union. But Louis XVIII. considered an alliance with the Romanoffs a degradation to the house of Bourbon, and would not bind himself either to Russia or Alexander ; he therefore made some objections on the score of religion, about which he cared little, required that the princess should abjure her faith before coming to France, and in fact, put a thousand obstacles in the way. He would have preferred an alliance, as we have said, with England, but even with that power he would not form an unreserved alliance. His whole policy was limited to being on good terms with England, without being too closely united to her, and by her help to get rid of Murat and the prisoner of Elba, to obtain Parma for the house of Etruria, and ameliorate in some sort the King of Saxony's fate. But for the accomplishment of none of these projects, except, perhaps, for the dethronement of Murat and the removal of Napoleon, would he have consented to brave any serious difficulties. Having explained his moderate wishes to his negotiator, he left him free to do as best he could, and hardly bestowed a glance on a voluminous memoir drawn up at the foreign office, entitled "*Instructions*," in which the political position of Europe was minutely detailed. He signed almost without reading it.

It was M. de la Besnardière who drew up this memoir, and being intimately acquainted with all the details of European affairs, he had added to the wishes of Louis XVIII. the desires of France on a few points. As the fortresses of Luxemburg and Mayence had passed from our possession, it was necessary to take care that they should not become the property of Prussia or Austria. They could only be left with safety in the hands of Holland or Bavaria. With regard to Italy, there was a more important question to be resolved than dispossessing Murat in favour of Ferdinand IV., or Marie Louise for the ancient Queen of Etruria ; and this question was the regal succession in the house of Savoy. The old King of Sardinia had no children,

neither had his heir. It was therefore necessary that the succession should be secured to the Carignan branch, lest by marriage Piedmont should fall under the yoke of Austria. In fine, it was necessary to see that the French donees, the principal of whom were marshals, should not lose their emoluments in the general wreck. These were the secondary but very important points added by the framer of the instructions to the task of our negotiator.

This negotiator, so fashioned by circumstances that no other could possibly be chosen, was M. de Talleyrand. Associated with him was the Duke de Dalberg, who, from his vast connections in Germany and great sagacity, was very well suited for the office. Indeed, the moderate wishes of Louis XVIII. made the task of his two representatives at Vienna very simple. If, abiding by the treaty of the 30th of May, they only demanded Murat's deposition, the concession of some lands to the house of Parma, and that the King of Saxony should retain some part of his dominions, everything was in their favour, and they were almost certain to succeed. It was evident that Murat—whose position was a monstrous anomaly in the actual state of Europe—unsupported, except by Austria, whose protection he forfeited on the commission of a single fault, would soon free her from her engagements with him, and he would consequently sink beneath the combined influence of the two houses of Bourbon. In a congress in which Francis II. held a preponderating influence, it would indeed be more difficult to dispossess Marie Louise in favour of the house of Parma. But it was not impossible that Italy, in its vast extent, would offer some compensation to her. And as for Saxony, it was certain that Austria would never consent that the Prussians should take possession of Dresden, or that the Russians should establish themselves at the foot of the Bohemian mountains. It was equally certain that the secondary powers of Germany would rise at the mere suggestion of suppressing a State like Saxony; that England would not be deaf to their complaints; and that, above all, the British Parliament would become indignant at the idea of seeing Russia take possession of all Poland. And if to all this opposition France should join hers, Russia and Prussia would certainly be obliged to yield. It was therefore only needed to let things take their own course, and the moderate wishes of Louis XVIII. would be fulfilled. On the other hand, if France wished to annul the Treaty of Paris by joining Russia and Prussia, the task would be more laborious and difficult, though not very dangerous, and almost certain of success; for, in truth, Austria and England would never venture on war, if in addition to Russia and Prussia they had France to contend with. In adopting either course, that of tranquil resignation to the Treaty

of Paris, or seeking a change of frontier through the disunion of the other powers, there was every prospect of success. Still, whichever line of policy we adopted, a difficulty would be found in Europe's repugnance to reveal her internal disunion to us, or to allow us to interfere in her affairs; for it would be unwise to acknowledge her divisions, and allow us to assume the important part of arbitrator. So long as this feeling lasted, there was but one course to be pursued at Vienna—to wait patiently, without putting ourselves forward, until the other powers, becoming disunited, should have recourse to us; in fact, to let our intervention be sought, not offered. Should we offer to interfere, we should only awaken distrust, and obtain less remuneration afterwards. Patience mingled with pride was the attitude best suited to us, and that most likely to produce a good result; for two things were certain, the division of interests, and the necessity the three powers would feel of France's aid; and considering these two inevitable results, our expectant policy would inevitably succeed.

If ever man was eminently fitted for this task, it was M. de Talleyrand. Noble by birth, and eminent by the position he had held for thirty years; distinguished by his style of living, and by the imposing and disdainful grace of his demeanour, he had almost transformed inertia into a virtue, and even an epigram, under a prince who seemed to consider activity a vice; and if an error should ever result from over-eagerness in action, that error would certainly not be committed by M. de Talleyrand at Vienna. But, however, temperament will yield to passion, and he who appears the most phlegmatic of men becomes the most impetuous when goaded by self-love or ambition. Of this truth M. de Talleyrand was about to give an extraordinary proof.

During the last fifteen years, M. de Talleyrand had played the principal part in all European assemblies; and those very men who were now to appear before him as the ministers of the victorious powers of Europe had always held a rank inferior to his, and yielded to his opinion. Under the empire, M. de Metternich had come to Paris as the modest minister of a vanquished and oppressed court; M. de Nesselrode was a simple secretary to the embassy. It must have been painful to M. de Talleyrand not to find himself at least on a level with these men, formerly so submissive and so deferential; and the result of this consciousness was an uncomfortable feeling, which could not fail to produce an injurious effect upon his deportment at Vienna. Averse to the trouble of reflecting or anticipating events, he had not paused to consider whether the divisions amongst the European powers might not afford an opportunity of ameliorating the condition of France. He only thought what

attitude that long dominant country would assume at Vienna, now that she was herself conquered; and in what position he would appear as her representative. He said to himself that to represent justice—which he defined by a happily chosen word, “legitimacy,” and which was universally adopted—would be a very dignified and becoming part, and by no means inferior to that he had already acted as the representative of all-powerful genius.

He set out for Vienna, determined to assure himself a suitable position by means of the talisman of legitimacy, which, though powerful for many purposes, was not equal to all. It would be very efficacious in the dethronement of Murat, or in exciting sympathy for the King of Saxony, but could not be made universally applicable; for were legitimacy adopted as a principle, it would not be possible to treat with Bernadotte, whom the allies were anxious to flatter: negotiations should be entered into with Gustavus IV., who was wandering through Europe as a fugitive. Nor, were legitimacy admitted as a principle, could the representative of Ferdinand VII. be received at the Congress of Vienna, for he was king only in prejudice of his father, Charles IV., who, far from renouncing his rights, was quite ready to assert them. The admission of this principle would also necessitate a summons to the representatives of Genoa, Venice, Malta, to the ancient electors of Cologne, Treves, and Mayence, and many other victims, whose spoils were about being divided. The Congress would, under such circumstances, be filled with phantoms, to the exclusion of actual and powerful existences. This word “legitimacy,” therefore, however true and respectable, was not at this moment sufficiently powerful to defend the more serious interests of France; it awakened a smile on the lips of the practical men who were about to assemble at Vienna, and who used or rejected the word as suited their purpose. But this assertion of legitimacy entailed one inconvenience—it placed us in the same category with England and Austria, and bound us to their policy, and in presence of the two great parties that were about to divide Europe, deprived us of our principal strength—freedom of choice.

With incontestable superiority as a negotiator, M. de Talleyrand arrived at Vienna in a frame of mind not the best suited to profit of the circumstances arising from our new position. That he would assume a dignified position, there could be no doubt; that he would act prudently was not quite so certain. In any case, France was certain, when represented by M. de Talleyrand, not to play the part of a conquered, and far less of a humiliated power.

Be this as it may, M. de Talleyrand left Paris on the 15th

of September, and arrived at Vienna on the 23rd. It was two days before the arrival of the sovereigns, but their chancellors and staffs had arrived some days before, and from the time of their arrival their tongues had been very busy. Many points that had hitherto been left in doubt now began to be cleared up. The Russians and Prussians, who were informed of their masters' designs, were by no means anxious to conceal them. The Russians boastfully declared that they would have all Poland; and the Prussians, with equal lack of modesty and prudence, said that they should have Saxony. Both seemed to think that these concessions could not be refused in return for their important services.

These desires, announced with so much confidence, had from the very first day excited the greatest commotion in the Congress. The lesser princes of Germany and other countries were offended that a State of their own rank should be suppressed to gratify an ambitious neighbour, and for a fault that was common to them all—an alliance with imperial France. The representatives of the other States were alarmed at seeing Russia, with the connivance of Prussia, boldly advancing from the Vistula—her boundary at the commencement of the century—to the Wartha and the Oder. They spoke openly on the subject, and said that it was not worth the trouble of overturning the power of Napoleon, if it were to be replaced so quickly and so completely by another equally dangerous tyranny. This ambitious design, so boldly announced, was not less offensive than the avowed design of leaving the entire management of affairs between the four legations of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, to the exclusion of all others. The French legation was consequently expected with the greatest impatience; and although no love was felt for France, especially in a place abounding with Germans, all were ready to place themselves under her direction, provided that, putting forth no pretensions for herself, she lent her aid to the oppressed, the excluded, and the offended. The aggrieved were, in short, willing to be defended, saved, and avenged gratuitously by France.

The exercise of a little of M. de Talleyrand's habitual phlegm would have allowed these desires time to ferment until they became converted into passion; but from the moment of his arrival at Vienna he yielded to the influence of the scene of which he was witness. The ministers of each court received him with all the attention due to one of the most illustrious personages of Europe—the representative of legitimacy, as he had once been of victory; and besides, the last type of the elegant dignity of the past, so much admired at that time. His house was frequented by diplomatists of every grade, by whom he was treated with profound respect; but when business came

to be discussed, a different line of conduct was pursued towards him. The Four—that is, the representatives of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia—whilst they treated him with the greatest deference, conversed very little on business, and showed only too plainly that his influence was not as welcome as himself, and that they intended to arrange everything themselves, though there was less unity in their interests than in their intentions. The representatives of the lesser courts, generally restless, well informed of passing events, and accustomed to excite the ministers of the greater courts against one another, because they derived advantage from such disunion—all these assembled round M. de Talleyrand, and either directly or through M. de Dalberg revealed to him the project which the Four had formed of retaining the direction of affairs in their own hands, and of giving Saxony to Prussia, who would deliver Poland to Russia. These revelations were accompanied by malicious commentaries on the good understanding subsisting between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia; the incompetency of Lord Castlereagh, and the want of firmness of M. de Metternich, both of whom were ready to allow the most violent outrages on public justice—the one because he had not the ability, and the other because he had not the courage to prevent them.

M. de Talleyrand need only to have waited a few days and he would have seen the project of the Four disappear before the general disapprobation. But the resolution which the greater powers had formed, of excluding him from their councils, and which had been revealed to him by the lesser States, piqued him to the quick. He immediately declared, that as France was now under the rule of true equity, she would at Vienna, if necessary, be its disinterested and only representative; that there were improprieties she would not suffer, and iniquities which she would not sanction. These resolutions being publicly proclaimed, produced a great sensation, delighted the lesser German powers, irritated Russia and Prussia, and very much embarrassed England and Austria, who though they were undoubtedly dissatisfied at the eagerness shown to seize on Poland and Saxony, still were alarmed at the prospect of the storm which France, at the head of the inferior German States, seemed about to raise.

The diplomatists, especially the Prussians, who were offended by the position we had so suddenly taken, began to say, that France had already thrown off the mask; that at first she seemed resigned to her new condition, though she was not so in reality; that she still wished her frontier to extend along the Rhine—a boundary which she sought to recover by exciting disunion amongst the allies; and that if a strong combination

were not formed against her, that she would still do great harm. These calumnies were answered by our legation, and by its most active member, M. de Dalberg, who was on the best terms with the Germans, by saying that France desired nothing for herself; she was no longer ambitious; that she was not thinking of her own aggrandisement, but of checking the excessive ambition which threatened the safety of all Europe. It was very annoying to be obliged to make such protestations thus early at Vienna, and be forced to declare ourselves satisfied, after the manner in which we had been treated in the negotiations at Paris. If, on the contrary, we had waited a little, and not revealed our plans so soon, each power, in order to gain our support, would rather have fomented our ambition than blamed it, and offers would have been made us, instead of our being obliged to make protestations of disinterestedness which bound us to our existing condition even more than did the Treaty of Paris.

Be this as it may, before the lapse of a week the secret project of each power was bruited about Vienna. It was well known that Russia wished to get the whole of Poland, that Prussia demanded Saxony, that the second-rate States of Germany were indignant, and eagerly sought the support which France as eagerly offered, and that Austria and England, embarrassed by this tumult, were still determined, although suspecting the designs of Russia and Prussia, to transact all business with these latter, to the exclusion of all the other powers. The splendour of public fêtes only threw a veil over agitation the most intense, and anxiety the most profound.

It would be impossible to describe the Emperor of Russia's irritation and astonishment. He was so convinced of Europe's great obligations to him that he could hardly understand his wishes being opposed. In his anger he considered every one ungrateful: the Germans, because they would not allow him to advance as far as the Oder; the Bourbons, because they refused to give him up their cousin, the King of Saxony; and even England and Austria, because by their silence they seemed to approve the clamour that was raised against him. All this had such an effect on Alexander that he, who was usually so mild and affectionate, became all at once cold, haughty, and severe. His anger was strongest against us. He had, he said, saved France as far as he could from the hands of the conquerors, he had placed the Bourbons on the throne, and M. de Talleyrand at the head of affairs. He had bestowed innumerable favours upon the country, king, and prime minister, and had met with ingratitude from all. Louis XVIII. had shown as little personal respect for him as consideration for his advice; he had not followed his counsels;

he had not even thought of offering him the *cordon bleu*, which he had so eagerly offered to the Prince-Regent of England; had even refused him to raise M. de Caulaincourt to the peerage, and had put almost offensive obstacles to the marriage of the Duke de Berry with the Grand Duchess Anne. The Emperor Alexander recounted these offences with great anger and very little discretion, and he considered them even exceeded by the attitude which M. de Talleyrand had so suddenly assumed at Vienna. The prudent Count Nesselrode, constantly occupied in extinguishing the flames that others kindled, sought to calm the emperor's feelings towards everybody, but more especially towards France, for whose alliance he was extremely desirous. He advised M. de Talleyrand to ask an audience of the emperor. This was almost a duty incumbent on M. de Talleyrand on his arrival at Vienna, and one by no means disagreeable to him, for he was more anxious to extend than limit his sphere of action. He did ask this audience, but Alexander made him wait several days for an answer. At last the czar replied, and received the representative of France at the imperial palace of Schönbrunn, where he was staying. Instead of receiving M. de Talleyrand in his usual affectionate and familiar manner, he treated him with the greatest haughtiness, which, however, did not at all embarrass the illustrious diplomatist, an accomplished master in the art of preserving his self-possession in the presence of the highest earthly potentates. The czar questioned him rudely and rapidly about the state of France, like one who did not expect to hear a good account of what was doing there, and who almost doubted whether Europe had acted wisely in recalling the Bourbons. M. de Talleyrand replied respectfully but firmly to all the emperor's questions, and the following sententious conversation took place between them:—"In what state is your country?" "Very good, sire; as good as your majesty could desire, and better than could be hoped." "And the public mind?" "Becomes calmer every day." "And the progress of liberal opinions?" "These opinions do not make a more regular or truer progress anywhere." "And the press?" "Is free, with the exception of a few restrictions which are necessary at first." "And the army?" "Excellent; we have thirty thousand men under arms, and can raise our numbers to three hundred thousand within a month." "And the marshals?" "Which, sire?" "Oudinot." "He is most loyal." "Soult?" "At first he was a little out of humour, but he got Brittany, and is satisfied, and expresses the greatest loyalty." "Ney?" "He is depressed from the loss of his emoluments, but he depends on your majesty to redress his grievances." "Your chambers?"

It is said that they are not on good terms with the government." "Who could have said such a thing to your majesty? As in every commencement, we have met some difficulties, but after twenty-five years of revolution, it is miraculous to have attained such a state of calmness as we enjoy at present." "Are you content with your position?" "Sire, the king's confidence and goodness exceed my hopes." As Alexander heard each of these replies, which he scarcely allowed M. de Talleyrand time to finish, an expression of ironical incredulity played over his features. But he soon discontinued these inquiries as to the state of France, inquiries that might have become offensive, had not M. de Talleyrand's respectful haughtiness sustained him in the difficult part he had to play. The emperor then said quickly, "Let us speak of our affairs. Shall we finish them?" "It depends on your majesty to terminate them to your own glory and the advantage of Europe." The czar could scarcely restrain himself, and expressed as much surprise as displeasure at the resistance he met from France; he said to M. de Talleyrand, "I think the Bourbons owe me something." Without disputing his master's obligations to Alexander, M. de Talleyrand spoke of the rights of Europe, which ought to be respected, especially after the fall of a man who was accused of trampling them under foot. "These European rights," said Alexander, "that you raise up to oppose me, I know them not; between sovereigns, right means that which suits each, and I recognise no other." M. de Talleyrand turned away his face, and raising his hands above his head, cried, "Hapless Europe! hapless Europe! what will become of you?" The emperor was more irritated than restrained by this significant exclamation, and said in a tone that M. de Talleyrand had never before heard him use, "If that be the case, war! war! I have two hundred thousand men in Poland; come and expel me from it. Every power has consented to my holding it; you alone oppose and break an agreement that was nearly universal." M. de Talleyrand had under the empire sustained the attacks of a more formidable lion than Alexander. He appeared more afflicted than disturbed by the emperor's violence, and replied that France neither desired nor dreaded war, but if, unfortunately, she should be forced to it, she would support the rights of all, aided by the sympathy of all, and the assistance of many allies, for he was certain that the universal agreement, the thought of which was so flattering to the emperor, did not exist. At the termination of this painful conversation, M. de Talleyrand bowed coldly but respectfully, and proceeded towards the door of the imperial cabinet. Alexander then advanced towards him, took his hand, and pressed it with a convulsive

movement, which revealed both his excitement and irritation. It was in such situations, as the representative of one great power before another, that M. de Talleyrand was unrivalled. And had the true interests of France lain at that time in the direction of the Elbe and the Vistula, instead of the Rhine and the Alps, never could they have been more proudly asserted or more thoroughly served.

The end of September was devoted to fêtes and desultory discussions. But it was time that the Congress should assemble officially under some form or another, either fully or in part. The representatives of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England—that is, MM. de Nesselrode, de Hardenberg, de Metternich, and Lord Castlereagh, the Four, as they were called—arrived first. The more complicated matters became, the more anxious were they to keep the management in their own hands. They proceeded to debate the conditions that should regulate the proceedings of the Congress, whilst they secretly agreed upon what they considered the best mode of proceeding.

The most celebrated congresses of past times offered contradictory precedents, none of which was wholly applicable to actual circumstances. Never before had representatives from every nation assembled to decide the fate of almost the entire civilised world, not alone with regard to its territorial, but its legislative interests. The plenipotentiaries who composed the Congress of Westphalia had only to decide on the affairs of Germany, whilst those assembled at Vienna were called upon to arrange not alone the affairs of Germany, but of Europe, and even of the two hemispheres. It would seem that nothing could be easier and simpler than that the ministers of the several States should assemble and deliberate in common. But how could they deliberate together on subjects that concerned some directly and others indirectly? How, for example, could Berne decide on the affairs of Portugal, or Portugal on those of Norway, or both on the constitution of Germany and Italy? How attach the same value to the vote of those who represented fifty millions of men, or to the vote of those who represented but a million or less? If all these difficulties were taken into consideration, how could they be calculated with sufficient precision? It was evidently impossible to define such distinctions, and the plenipotentiaries of the different powers could not be assembled in a kind of constituent European assembly; for if there were some, like Austria, Prussia, France, England, and Russia, who were interested in all the questions, great and small, the greater number represented interests either too exclusively local or too trifling to give their votes either the disinterestedness or weight that could influence the assembly. Besides, there were plenipotentiaries whom some

would admit and others reject. Prussia and Russia refused to admit the minister of the King of Saxony, having already declared that this monarch ought to be deprived of his crown; the two houses of Bourbon rejected the envoy of the actual King of Naples, as the representative of a usurper; and none would admit the representative of the ancient republic of Genoa, whose existence was not recognised. A general assembly was therefore impossible, and it was more natural that those who had signed the Treaty of Paris, and who had adjourned their meeting to Vienna, should now assume the part of the mediating powers of former congresses, and constitute themselves mediators, or, if necessary, arbitrators between the interested parties. Therefore the eight powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris could open the Congress, examine credentials, form committees of the interested parties to discuss individual questions, reserving to themselves the right to decide all difficult points, and thus establish a kind of unity. Special treaties being drawn up on each point, all should be afterwards combined into one general treaty, which should be signed by all the States without exception, to render it binding upon all Europe. It is true that amongst the eight States that had signed, two—Portugal and Sweden—found themselves called upon to play the part of first-rate powers, a part by no means due to their real influence, but which arose from the accidental circumstance of their being authorised as belligerents to sign the treaty of the 30th of May with France. But this was a very trifling inconsistency, and was compensated by the advantage arising from the apparent legality of the mediation of the eight who had signed the treaty, and convoked the Congress.

This was the only good and practicable form of holding the Congress, provided, however, that certain powers did not take advantage of it to arrogate all authority to themselves; and this mode was adopted by the plenipotentiaries of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, who were secretly occupied in arranging the mode of proceeding. They therefore agreed to do all they could to make this arrangement acceptable to the numerous representatives of Europe actually assembled at Vienna. The question of formalities being decided, there still remained two important questions unsettled—the partition of the immense territories lately vacated, and the definite constitution of Germany. Italy and Switzerland gave rise, of course, to important considerations, but of restricted interest, as concerning only France, Austria, and Spain. It was agreed that this question could be decided later, when the two more important had been arranged. It was then agreed by the Four, that the eight States that had signed the Treaty of Paris should take the initiative in opening the Congress, and that two committees

should be afterwards formed, the one to regulate the division of territory and the general affairs of Europe, and the other to fix the condition of Germany. The first, which was to be the great European committee, was to include the Four; but it would be impossible to exclude France, the representative of the elder branch of the Bourbons, and with her Spain, the representative of the younger—Spain, on whose support the allies reckoned, because that she was Spain; because that she was under the sway of Ferdinand VII.; and because that they knew that the two houses of Bourbon were disunited. It was agreed at last, that whilst for form's sake these six powers were to constitute the great European committee, all important questions should be secretly decided beforehand by the Four; by which means, whilst apparently dividing authority, they should retain it all to themselves.

The affairs of Germany were to be entrusted to Austria and Prussia, who would play the same part in this question that the Four did in European matters; that is, they would, after deciding all the points between themselves, submit them as a matter of form to the inferior German States, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover. (The latter had been formed into a kingdom for the advantage of the reigning house of England.) Saxony, being more or less condemned by the Four, and lightly esteemed by all, was to have no part in this German committee; nor the two Hesses, which were not yet re-established; nor Baden, considered too unimportant to be taken into account.

Such was the result of the first conferences, at the opening of the Congress, between the ministers of the four great courts, as to the mode of dividing the authority. It was strange, and even ridiculous, to see these Four arrogate to themselves universal sovereignty, in virtue of a union which their rapacity made impossible, and which was sure to be violently dissolved at the bare announcement of their reciprocal pretensions. There was therefore no reason for serious alarm at their intrigues. However, a general commotion was excited in a few days by the first glimpse of their projects. All those excluded from the deliberations, and who considered their exclusion only as preparatory to their ruin, complained loudly; and asked why every question should be decided by four, by six, or even by eight powers; and why the Congress was not formally assembled? The French legation, highly offended at being excluded from these preliminary and secret arrangements, propagated the idea of a general assembling of the Congress—an idea very acceptable to all the excluded, that is, to almost every one. This idea was warmly supported by the Spanish representative, M. de Labrador, a very sensible man, who, notwithstanding the bad feeling existing between the

courts of Paris and Madrid—which he did not consider right to announce at Vienna—was most anxious that as the two houses of Bourbon had the same interests to support, they should adopt the same attitude, conduct, and language. He followed M. de Talleyrand in everything, adopted his ideas, and repeated his words. Thus, under the influence of the French legation, but more especially under the influence of self-interest, but one question was heard in the salons of Vienna—"When will the Congress assemble? when will it be summoned?"

The Four were alarmed at the idea of assembling the entire Congress in the present state of the public mind. However, they must show some symptom of life, and communicate with the many diplomatists assembled for some weeks past at Vienna, and who waited vainly for some communication. The Four, therefore, conformably to their private arrangement, resolved that the eight who had signed the Treaty of Paris should, at least apparently, take the initiative in the operations of the Congress, and publish a declaration announcing that, conformable to the 32nd article of this treaty, which convoked the assembly of the representatives of Europe at Vienna, they had now assembled there, and were occupied in a preliminary examination of the important questions that were to be decided, but had not yet come to perfect understanding; that consequently they would adjourn for a month, and employ that time in endeavouring to assimilate the general interests, and reconcile contending opinions; that afterwards the Congress should be assembled after whatever fashion was judged most suitable, in order to give an authentic and official form to the resolutions previously decided on.

Pursuant to this arrangement, M. de Metternich determined to assemble at his house, not the eight who had signed the Treaty of Paris, but the six principal plenipotentiaries—that is to say, the representatives of Austria, England, Russia, Prussia, France, and Spain, who, according to the plan previously arranged in secret, were to form the European committee, and to these he resolved to submit the proposed declarations. This reunion—for the invitations having been sent in confidential notes, the character of the assembly was strictly private—seemed to imply no other desire than that the invited guests should come to a private understanding about a manifestation that had become indispensable. The invitations were issued on the 29th for the 30th of September, in order that the declaration might be dated the 1st of October, and the meeting be adjourned to the 1st of November.

M. de Talleyrand having previously come to an understanding with M. de Labrador, repaired to this meeting, which,

instead of eight, only comprised six of those who had signed the Treaty of Paris. He was the last that arrived, and entered with his wonted air of haughtiness and indifference; on his habitually inexpressive countenance a slight shade of irony was discernible. Around M. de Metternich's table were assembled, M. de Nesselrode, the representative of Russia; Lord Castlereagh, of England; M. de Metternich, of Austria; MM. de Hardenberg and de Humboldt, of Prussia; M. de Labrador, of Spain, and M. de Gentz, the celebrated pamphleteer, who was to draw up the resolutions. M. de Talleyrand took his place between Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich, as though he were at home, and then with a careless air demanded what was the object of the meeting, and in what character the persons present were summoned. M. de Metternich undertook to reply to the French plenipotentiary, and said that he wished to assemble the members of the cabinet, in order that they might come to an understanding concerning a declaration that was not only necessary, but indispensable. "The heads of the cabinet," said M. de Talleyrand, as he looked at those present; "M. de Labrador is not one, nor is M. de Humboldt." M. de Metternich, a little embarrassed, replied that as Spain had no other representative than M. de Labrador at Vienna, they had been obliged to summon him, and that M. de Humboldt was there to assist M. de Hardenberg, who was very deaf. "If infirmities confer a right," said M. de Talleyrand, "I, too, might have brought some one to aid me." He then asked why their number was but six and not eight; if it were those who had signed the Treaty of Paris that were to meet, why he did not see assembled around this table all those interested in the questions that were to be decided at the Congress; and in a word, why were six to decide upon the interests of all? He was told that the point about to be considered was merely a preliminary declaration, which especially concerned those who had signed the Treaty of Paris, because they were the originators of the Congress, and that to judge of the merits of the declaration it should be read. The declaration was then read.

In this document the word *allies* was repeated several times, and employed so that it evidently referred to the belligerent powers that had concluded the Treaty of Chaumont against France. When this word was pronounced, M. de Talleyrand interrupted the reader, and said, "I know of no allies here, for allies imply war, and the war ended on the 30th of May 1814." He listened to the remainder like one who did not comprehend what he heard, and yet could not be accused of want of intelligence. He disconcerted all present by his expressions of surprise, by his numerous questions, and at last

succeeded in throwing them into indescribable confusion. "I do not know," he repeated, "in what character we are here, or by what right we represent all the European powers. I do not know who these are that call themselves 'allies,' who take upon them to adjourn the Congress for a month, instead of assembling it immediately, in order at least to examine credentials, and afterwards decide on matters of form and the time for commencing deliberations." M. de Metternich replied that a word was of no consequence, and that "allies" had merely been used from custom. "It is a custom that must be changed," interrupted M. de Talleyrand. M. de Metternich resumed, and said that a deliberative assembly could not be convoked without first deciding who were to be summoned, by what title members were to be admitted, and the amount of influence that was to be allowed to each; that the power of deciding on the interests of Russia, which possessed fifty million inhabitants, could not be confided to a prince who had but as many thousand subjects; and besides, that this declaration was merely to announce the opening of the Congress, and to ask a month's delay, in order to make amicable arrangements between the interested parties by means of friendly and confidential communications.

These reasons, which were extremely good, if they did cover the intention of restricting all power to four, did not seem to make the least impression on M. de Talleyrand, whom no argument could move. "But we cannot," said M. de Hardenberg, "allow the affairs of Europe to be decided by the princes of Lippe and Liechtenstein." "Nor can we," replied M. de Talleyrand, "allow them to be decided by the representatives of Russia and Prussia." Somebody happening to mention Murat as a proof of the difficulty of deciding who should be admitted to the Congress, "We do not know that man," replied M. de Talleyrand, with a peculiar expression of contempt, and the air of one who was not much inconvenienced by the remembrance of his past career. In fact, he threw all present into the greatest embarrassment, and the conference broke up without coming to any decision.

It was undeniably a success to prevent the chariot of the four great allied powers from rolling unimpeded over the soil of Vienna. But this success ought not to be carried too far, for whatever policy France might adopt, whether she joined Russia and Prussia in the hope of ameliorating her own condition, or sided with Austria and England to save Saxony, there were two powers of the four whom it was important to separate from the others, and whom it would not be prudent to irritate, or even embarrass too much. There would have been sufficient publicity given to this scene by the eagerness of those who

feared being excluded from the Congress, and who were delighted at seeing the project of the exclusives defeated. They told everywhere of the attempt that had been made to defer the assembling of the Congress, and to restrict the entire direction of affairs to four powers, and the resistance which had defeated these designs. The Four, Prussia especially, were most active in repeating what they had already said, that it was useless for France to try to conceal her secret wishes, that she only affected to be satisfied with the Treaty of Paris, that she regretted the Rhine frontier, and sought to regain it by causing general disunion; a most unmerited calumny, which necessitated fresh declarations of disinterestedness, which were a new engagement neither to desire or demand anything beyond the terms of the Treaty of Paris.

This state of excitement was increased by a note drawn up by M. de Talleyrand, of which the reasoning was most logical, and such as could not easily be answered. In this note he proved that six powers were no better qualified than eight to decide for all, that, of course, as these powers had by the Treaty of Paris appointed Vienna as the place where the Congress was to be held, it was only natural that they should take the initiative in the first declaration, but that this declaration should be conformable to the claims and rights of all the States; that to fulfil this condition the plenipotentiaries of all the States ought to be summoned, were it only that their credentials might be examined, and the Congress constituted according to the proper formalities. The different members might afterwards be divided into committees to examine questions individually interesting to the different powers, or the Congress might be adjourned were confidential communications needed to bring about a better understanding; that this first meeting would not present the difficulties that were apprehended, for the lesser States did not pretend to decide on the affairs of the greater, and were only anxious to protect their own interests; that even did these alleged inconveniences exist, they would present as great obstacles at the close as at the commencement of the Congress; that consequently all the plenipotentiaries ought to be assembled, were it but once, in order that their credentials might be examined, if even the Congress should be adjourned next day; that the prerogative of the eight who had signed the Treaty of Paris consisted exclusively in the right, first, to convoke this first meeting; and second, to determine by what title members should be admitted.

The entire aim of this logically irrefutable declaration was contained in the last proposition. M. de Talleyrand's object was, that the right of admission should be determined in such a manner that the King of Saxony's representative should be

admitted, and Murat's rejected. England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia made a terrible outcry upon reading the French note. In the first place, they desired that everything should be done in a friendly, quiet manner, for fear of warning or exciting the interested parties. Secondly, the very idea of assembling the Congress terrified Prussia, who expected a storm, should only two Germans be present, at the proposal to suppress Saxony. But this was doing more than speaking on the subject, it was solving the question by admitting to the Congress the representative of King Frederick Augustus, as it would be solving the Neapolitan question to reject Murat's representative.

Though nobody felt an interest in the last-named sovereign, his interests were carefully considered by M. de Metternich, on account, it was maliciously said, of this statesman's great friendship for the Queen of Naples; but that was a mistake; his real motives were very different. M. de Metternich had used his personal influence at the court of Naples to induce Murat to join the coalition, and he considered himself morally bound to protect him, unless Murat compromised himself by some crime against the general interest of Europe. It was not difficult to foresee that Murat would commit some error, and M. de Metternich waited the event, to avoid doing what might seem an act of treachery. Besides, having assembled two hundred and fifty thousand men in Bohemia, Galicia, and Moravia, in order to support his policy against the pretensions of Russia and Prussia, and having but fifty thousand in Italy, where the public mind was in a state of ferment, and where Murat had eighty thousand men, principally commanded by French officers, M. de Metternich did not wish, as he very sensibly said, *to set fire to both ends of the house*. However anxious the members of the French legation might be to gratify the wishes of Louis XVIII. with regard to Naples, they might have adopted the policy of the Austrian minister; for it was not because his views were so different from ours that he sought to gain time, but because he knew better than we how to attain his object.

Though M. de Gentz was very violent when he wielded his pen, he was very moderate in action. In his efforts to bring about a conciliatory state of feeling he hurried from one embassy to another—to the French especially, for he was convinced, as was everybody else, that it was necessary to soothe the discontented parties if an outbreak was to be avoided. Another meeting was agreed to, and the six plenipotentiaries assembled at M. de Metternich's. The first thing asked of M. de Talleyrand was to withdraw his note, as it would be difficult to avoid answering it, and still more difficult to answer it without touching on very delicate questions. Whilst M. de Talleyrand was alleging reasons for not complying with this demand, M. de

Labrador said that the suppression of the note was no longer possible, as he had sent a copy of it to his court. In a momentary burst of ill-humour, M. de Metternich, turning to M. de Nesselrode, said, "I think we should have done better by arranging our affairs amongst ourselves." "As you please," said M. de Talleyrand; and when M. de Metternich pressed for a further explanation, he added, "I shall not again attend any of your meetings, but as a member of the Congress I shall await the convocation of that assembly." This was announcing that France, heading the dissenting party, would demand the general assembling of the Congress, by refusing to recognise all that should be decided without its precincts. This was a serious threat. Therefore, all present, anxious to avoid coming to extremities, endeavoured to restrain themselves and conduct the deliberations with more moderation. M. de Metternich remarked to M. de Talleyrand, as was very true, that nothing was yet prepared; that not a single question had as yet been touched on; and that it would be very embarrassing to meet the Congress in such a state. M. de Talleyrand replied that he was quite willing to yield as to the time for assembling the Congress, and concede the three or four weeks that were thought necessary for preparation, but on condition that this general assembly should be decided on, and that the terms of admission should be pretty nearly the following:—"That the representative of every prince should be admitted whose territories had been involved in the late war—territories of which he had been anteriorly and universally recognised as sovereign, and which he had not abandoned either by cession or abdication."

This was coming back to the old difficulty, for this principle excluded Murat, who had not been universally recognised as sovereign, and admitted the King of Saxony, who had not yielded his territories either by *cession* or *abdication*. This was deciding by a question of form a fundamental principle with regard to the two most difficult questions that were to be brought before the Congress. The plenipotentiaries could not agree, and the meeting consequently broke up. As the members were retiring, Lord Castlereagh endeavoured to bring M. de Talleyrand to reason, by insinuating that his obstinacy was unwittingly injuring those interests that he had most at heart. Unfortunately, not wishing to avow that England and Austria were ready to abandon Russia and Prussia, and unskilled in that art which expresses much in half a word, he did not succeed in making himself understood. On the other hand, M. de Talleyrand had committed himself too far to draw back easily.

However, all parties felt the necessity of coming to an understanding, for the Four saw how impossible it was to realise

their project of transacting all the business themselves, even though, for form's sake, they should increase their number to six or eight, whilst so many interests were arrayed against them; and M. de Talleyrand, although more excited than usual, felt that by constantly piquing Lord Castlereagh, and more particularly M. de Metternich, whom he did not like, he would end by uniting the Four more closely, who, driven to extremities, would perhaps end by sacrificing all those interests which the French legation was commissioned to defend. All were therefore disposed to make concessions, and after three or four days' negotiations they finally came to terms, making use of the skilful pen of M. de Gentz, and deducting something from the declaration of each party. A document was drawn up, couched in very general and evasive terms, which conceded one important point to M. de Talleyrand—the assembling the Congress within a month; and yielded one equally important to MM. de Metternich and de Hardenberg—that the principle of admission should be passed over in silence. This document declared that the representatives of the eight powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris, having promised to meet again at Vienna, had kept this promise, and were come there; that they had already conferred with the representatives of the different courts interested in their proceedings, but that to come to an amicable understanding, longer confidential communications were needed; that they therefore deferred the opening of Congress for a month, when they would be in a position to accomplish their task in a manner more suitable to the interests of Europe, the expectation of contemporaries, and the esteem of posterity.

This declaration being drawn up, it was agreed that the plenipotentiaries should again assemble on the 8th of October, at M. de Metternich's house, their number increased from six to eight by the addition of the representatives of Sweden and Portugal to those of Russia, France, Prussia, Austria, England, and Spain. M. de Metternich invited M. de Talleyrand to come an hour before the others, in order to decide about the final form of the declaration. M. de Talleyrand kept the appointment, and M. de Metternich told him that he had desired this *tête-à-tête*, in order to concert with him concerning the declaration that was about being proposed, and which he was certain would satisfy him. M. de Metternich looked for the document, but not finding it, M. de Talleyrand said, with the ironic smile that sometimes enlivened his hueless countenance, "Probably the declaration is being discussed by the *allies*." "Let us make no further mention of allies," replied M. de Metternich. He then exhorted his interlocutor to act with confidence, and putting all bickerings aside, seek by their

common efforts to secure the common interests. M. de Talleyrand replied by asking how it happened that M. de Metternich left to him the task of defending Dresden from Prussian, and Cracow from Russian cupidity. M. de Metternich might have replied, that it was quite as strange to see M. de Talleyrand so anxious to espouse the interests of Austria, and not leave her to take care of herself. But his purpose was to come to terms, and not to offend. M. de Metternich endeavoured to persuade M. de Talleyrand, that were he allowed to act, he would defend those interests that seemed most in danger. M. de Talleyrand sought, by being more explicit himself, to induce M. de Metternich to explain himself further; he declared that France desired nothing for herself, that she was quite ready to sign the declaration, but that there were some things to which, considering the common interest, she could never consent. For example, she would never consent that Prussia should have Luxemburg and Mayence, that she should get Dresden, or that Russia should extend her frontier beyond the Vistula. He added, that the King of Saxony should be satisfied to make some sacrifices, but that France would never consent to his being deprived of all his dominions. Here M. de Metternich interrupted him, and taking his hand, said, "We are nearer to coming to an understanding than you think. Prussia shall have neither Luxemburg nor Mayence; we shall do our best to preserve the greater part of his dominions for the King of Saxony, and to keep Russia as far as possible from the Oder; but have patience, and do not raise useless obstacles." He then spoke of that which M. de Talleyrand had not mentioned, although it was his essential interest. "I know," he said, "your principal aim" (he alluded to Naples); "everything is in your favour, but do not be in a hurry; you would only involve consequences that neither you nor I, nor indeed any of us, could control.

M. de Talleyrand affected a perfect indifference about Neapolitan affairs; it was a question of principle, and not of family interest; and he felt assured that Europe, for her own honour, would no longer support a state of things in Italy that was at once a scandal and a danger.

This short explanation had a very mollifying effect on M. de Talleyrand, who from that time showed a greater inclination to negotiate. The other plenipotentiaries having arrived, MM. de Talleyrand and de Metternich joined them. M. de Nesselrode represented Russia; M. de Talleyrand, France; M. de Metternich, Austria; MM. de Hardenberg and de Humboldt, Prussia; Lord Castlereagh, England; M. de Labrador, Spain; M. de Palmella, Portugal; and M. de Loewenhielm, Sweden. M. de Gentz acted as amanuensis. The two declarations were read—

that first proposed by M. de Talleyrand, and that drawn up by M. de Metternich, in which he adopted part of the French note. The latter was generally preferred, because, whilst it announced the general assembling of the Congress at the expiration of a month, it did not decide as to the right of admission. M. de Talleyrand felt that he must yield, since he had gained the most important point—the promise of assembling the Congress; but wishing to gain another advantage before giving up, he declared that he was ready to adopt the proposed project, if to the phrase, which declared that by the delay of a month the proceedings of the Congress would be more conformable to the *expectation of contemporaries*, these words should be added, *and to European international law*, a phrase which he believed to possess a most useful signification without particularising anything.

These words raised a storm. The Prussians saw in them an allusion to Saxony and its preservation, and were filled with fear and anger. It is true that international law was invoked as a shield for Saxony. Evident as the allusion was to some, others were quite unconscious of it, and indeed, in any case, the question could not be decided by allusions. M. de Hardenberg rose, and in that excitement usual to persons who do not comprehend clearly either their own meaning or that of others, he exclaimed, "What need is there to speak of international law? Nothing, of course, will be done contrary to it. There can be no doubt of that." "If there is no doubt of it," replied M. de Talleyrand, "it will be still better to declare it." "But what influence has international law here?" persisted M. de Humboldt. "It is owing to international law that you are here," replied M. de Talleyrand; "you and the other plenipotentiaries." This tumult lasted some minutes, and these ten grave diplomatists made as much noise as the most numerous assembly. Lord Castlereagh, anxious to put an end to this scene, took M. de Talleyrand aside, and said to him, "Will you be more compliant if this point is ceded to you?" "I will," replied M. de Talleyrand; "but you must do me one service. You have influence with M. de Metternich—promise me to use it against Murat." "I promise you," replied Lord Castlereagh. "Give me your word." "I give it." After this short dialogue the British minister returned to his colleagues, and said that it would be difficult to refuse the insertion of so inoffensive and respectable a phrase as international law. M. de Gentz and M. de Metternich said the same to the others, and the phrase was accepted. The following form of declaration was then adopted, dated October 8.

DECLARATION.

The plenipotentiaries of the different courts that signed the Treaty of Paris on the 30th of May 1814 have taken into consideration the 32nd article of that treaty, which says that the powers engaged on both sides in the late war should send plenipotentiaries to Vienna, in order to regulate in a general Congress the arrangements for carrying out the designs of the said treaty; and after mature deliberation on their position and duties, they find that they cannot better fulfil their obligations than by establishing, in the first instance, free and confidential communications between the plenipotentiaries of the several powers. They are also convinced that it will be to the advantage of all parties concerned to defer the general meeting until the questions to be decided on shall be so matured as that the result shall correspond with the principles of international law, with the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, and the just expectation of contemporaries. The formal opening of the Congress is therefore deferred until the 1st of November; and the afore-said plenipotentiaries flatter themselves that the labours to which the intermediate time will be devoted, by determining views and conciliating opinion, will essentially advance the great work which is the object of their common mission.

VIENNA, 8th October 1814.

Nobody at Vienna misunderstood the import of the words *principles of international law*, which were looked upon by all as a first step gained in the cause of Saxony. It was a source of great joy to the Germans, who all, perhaps with the single exception of Prussia, were most anxious for the conservation of this State. And even among the Prussians there were many who considered that Saxony would be dearly bought should the acquisition be paid by abandoning Poland to Russia. Great gratitude was felt to the French legation for having checked the ambition of certain powers, and having established the principle that each State had a right to be heard at the Congress. France ought to have rested satisfied with a success which had only been obtained at the expense of very great inconvenience, especially the being obliged to repeat to absolute weariness that we were satisfied—that we had nothing further to desire; and we besides ran the risk of embarrassing and offending England and Austria, of whom we were in absolute need in the limited policy we were forced to adopt.

Undoubtedly, had we boldly joined Russia and Prussia—a measure that policy suggested, and which, as far as we were concerned, was not forbidden by justice either towards Saxony

or Europe—we should not have been forced to take so many precautions; for both Russia and Prussia were so eager and unreserved, that we needed not to be more cautious than they; and besides, prudence might have been thrown aside were the swords of France, Prussia, and Russia united. But by taking the other side, and merely seeking to save Saxony, or at the utmost, to dispossess Murat and Marie Louise, we were obliged to accommodate ourselves to all the susceptibilities and weaknesses of the over-fastidious party we had joined, and even to avoid causing embarrassments by showing too great a disposition to be of use. Both Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich feared to compromise themselves by uniting their interests to ours. M. de Metternich especially, dreading that we should advance too rapidly, and having, as we have said, left but 50,000 men in Italy that he might be able to keep 250,000 in Moravia, Bohemia, and Galicia, he would not allow the question concerning Murat to come on until the fate of Saxony had been decided. And even the Germans, spite of their gratitude, had to be treated with great precaution; for owing to their old mistrust of France, they soon took the alarm if they saw us very much interested or very busy. The fear of co-operating with us was such that both Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich reproached M. de Labrador severely for having modelled his policy on ours, and told him that such conduct on the part of Spain was the blackest ingratitude to Europe. Now that M. de Talleyrand had so skilfully succeeded in outwitting those who wished to make such offensive exclusions, he ought to have proceeded cautiously, for fear of anticipating persons who dreaded almost as much being saved by us as being swallowed up by Russia and Prussia. It is often in politics as in commerce, where an offer lowers the price of an article which a demand will cause to rise if the owner has patience to wait. Had we delayed giving our assistance in the affair of Saxony, in which we were but slightly interested, we should have been more certain of carrying our point in the concerns of Naples and Parma, which were of essential importance to us, at least according to the views of the French cabinet. The most dignified and most profitable policy for us would have been to follow, instead of anticipating, the interests of the German policy.

These German interests had not, however, slumbered. The German States of the second rank opposed with great animation what they called the avidity of Prussia, the tyranny of Russia, the incapacity of England, and the weakness of Austria. These States were headed by Bavaria, the most excited of them all. This latter State had many reasons for opposing the sacrifice of Saxony, whose existence was necessary to preserve

the equilibrium of Germany, and whose only crime was having suffered the alliance of France, which Bavaria, instead of suffering, had actually sought. It is quite certain that were Saxony suppressed, Bavaria and the other States would be too weak to resist the influence of Austria and Prussia, that were always ready to unite when an opportunity arose of bringing the Germanic body under their domination. Bavaria had not only good reasons for defending Saxony, but she also possessed the means of doing so. She was well represented at Vienna. Besides that the king had come there in person, she had as minister at Congress the Prince de Wrède, who, spite of more than one military fault, was one of the most esteemed generals of the coalition, and possessed considerable influence.

The Prince de Wrède did not hesitate to say—and he was not contradicted by his king—that Saxony should be saved even at the expense of a war; nor ought any objection be made to accepting aid from France, in order to keep Prussia within the limits of Brandenburg, and Russia on the other side of the Vistula. He offered 50,000 Bavarians to support his views, and visited M. de Talleyrand and the Duke de Dalberg constantly, urging them to bestir themselves more than they did. But whilst the King of Bavaria sent the most affectionate and pressing messages concerning their common interest to M. de Talleyrand, he did not dare to meet him personally, lest it might give offence on account of his old intimacy with the French.

This policy was also supported by another German State—Hanover—which had become independent again in 1813. The King of England, with universal consent, had assumed the title of king, instead of Elector of Hanover, because he did not wish to bear in Germany a title inferior to that of the sovereign of Wurtemberg, who had been created king by Napoleon. Hanover was represented at the Congress by M. de Münster, who formally declared himself on the side of Saxony. But though the two countries had been united for more than a century, the Hanoverian minister did not find that his views always coincided with those of the representative of England, who was guided exclusively by the interest of his own country, and that of his cabinet with the Parliament. Still, Hanover could be of great service to Germany by inducing the Prince-Regent of England to use his influence with the British ministers, and induce them to adopt views more favourable to Saxony; and this influence, as we shall presently see, was of great utility. Hesse, Baden, and almost all the lesser German States were ready to join Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, and only waited for a signal from the more important ones to make a decisive manifestation in favour of Saxony. In order to occupy the German princes during the suspension of the Congress and

the adjournment of public business, a committee was formed of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, for the purpose of drawing up the plan of a German constitution. Bavaria presided in this committee, a privilege accorded to her as a compensation for her exclusion from the great European committee. This German committee, in which the lesser princes had a preponderating influence, manifested on every occasion a strong determination to defend the existence and independence of German States against the cupidity of their too powerful and too ambitious confederates.

To all this Germanic fervour was added Austrian zeal, which, dissimulated for reasons we have already mentioned in the cabinet of Vienna, was openly declared by the nation, the court, and the army. The Austrian staff especially felt and expressed the greatest indignation at the twofold project of Russia and Prussia, each of which was equally alarming to the country. The military men of Austria asserted that the cause of Europe had at least been as much advanced by them as by the other allied armies; for they said that but for them the Russian and Prussian armies after the defeats of Lutzen and Bautzen would have been driven back upon the Vistula; and they now demanded whether all the blood they had shed was to be repaid by placing them in a worse position than they had been in under the rule of Napoleon; and whether it was really intended to surround the Bohemian mountains with Russians and Prussians—the one on the left, the other on the right—and thus abandon to the common enemy those defiles whose importance had been proved both by Napoleon and Frederick the Great. Little inclined as they were to recommence the war, they declared that as they were prepared for it, it was better to have it now than later, and thus prevent a disastrous and twofold usurpation. Austria had two hundred and fifty thousand men ready for action in Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia; the other German States could add one hundred thousand; and though England, on account of the American difficulties, could furnish no assistance, still they were sure of one hundred and fifty thousand from France, making altogether five hundred thousand men, and with this force, they said, there could be no doubt of success.

By leaving all these feelings to ferment, and by not interfering too much ourselves, we should have been certainly soon called on to play an important and decisive part, according to the policy adopted by France. The two men to whom were committed the task of unravelling the tangled skein of European politics—Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich—the one simple-minded, sensible, and firm, though sometimes deficient in tact; the other profound and deeply versed in German

politics—though anxious to untie the Gordian knot, did not wish to employ the sword of Alexander, for this sword would be that of France; such a line of conduct would be to conduct the French armies again into Germany—a proceeding that seemed to them to present a singular contradiction, and be fraught with serious peril. But though agreed as to their ultimate object, they were not agreed as to the means to be employed in attaining it. M. de Metternich would not yield either to Russia or Prussia, but wished to avoid a rupture by employing the greatest patience in his opposition. Lord Castlereagh, on the other hand, was willing to gratify Prussia, win her over to his views, and make use of her against Russia, which would be to save Poland at the expense of Saxony. These opinions of Lord Castlereagh arose from a mode of viewing British interests peculiar to the ministers of that time, and which must be explained to be understood.

The continental blockade had caused so much terror to the English that they were in constant fear of seeing it renewed by the Bourbons, if not by Napoleon; an apprehension as irrational as the suggestions of terror generally are. It was this apprehension that induced them to give Holland and Belgium to the house of Orange; and lest the new kingdom should not be sufficiently strong, the English secured it as allies—Hanover, which they intended to strengthen, and even Prussia, whom they had in some measure forced to accept the Rhenish provinces, in order to render her of necessity our enemy. And still fearing that Prussia was not thoroughly won, they were anxious to give her Saxony, and hoped to justify the abandonment of this country to their Parliament by pleading the usual system of Britannic alliances. But as they saw that there was no possibility of inducing the Parliament to agree to abandoning Poland, they resolved to oppose Russia, and on that account wished to alienate Prussia from her by the cession of Saxony. They hoped by these means to isolate Russia so completely that she would be obliged to abandon her prey.

This intricate policy was very displeasing to M. de Metternich, who was equally anxious to save Poland and Saxony. But as it is not easy to change the English when they once see their interests in a certain light, M. de Metternich, seeing that nothing but experience would convince Lord Castlereagh, let him go on, convinced within himself that defending one of the threatened States would be sufficient to save both. In fact, Alexander and Frederick William had promised each other Saxony and Poland, and the King of Prussia would be a traitor both to honour and friendship if he occupied Saxony when Poland was not given to Russia. Add to this that Frederick William being

allowed to retain Posen, if all Poland were not given to Russia, he would lose the only specious argument he could adduce for demanding Saxony. Therefore refusing to abandon Poland was refusing to abandon Saxony, and the safety of the one was the safety of the other. Perfectly conscious of all this, M. de Metternich offered no opposition to Lord Castlereagh, but let him act as he thought fit, knowing that he could not oppose a more formidable rival to Alexander. Independent of his own obstinacy of temper, Lord Castlereagh had the advantage of representing the power that had least interest in the disposal of continental States, and the one, besides, that paid all the others. The superiority which the giver has over the receiver was always evident in the intercourse of England with her allies. Lord Castlereagh, in pursuance of his policy, demanded an interview of Alexander, and immediately obtained it.

The czar had at that time overcome his first feeling of surprise and anger. He was impressionable, though wily as an Asiatic, and at the same time amiable and good, and so influenced by his desire to please that he could not possibly long sustain the part of an irritated man. Yielding as much to his natural inclination as to circumstances, he was most affectionate in his manner to every one at Vienna, but more especially to military men. He visited the scenes of all the battles that had been fought during the campaign of Wagram; and though conversing with the conquered, he paid them many a compliment. He was to be seen almost constantly on foot, leaning sometimes on the arm of a diplomatist, sometimes on the arm of an officer. He appeared as a private individual in all the salons of Vienna, made himself acquainted with persons of every grade, and by every means sought to avoid obtruding his rank upon the numerous princes who thronged to the Congress. In a word, he sought in every way to please, and succeeded; for nobody possessed the power of doing so in an equal degree. Every one noticed his intimacy with Prince Eugène, whose mother and sister he had protected at Paris, and who was come to solicit the principality that had been promised him by the treaty of the 11th of April. Alexander presented him everywhere, praising his fidelity to Napoleon—which, indeed, he did not find so great an obstacle as the difficulty of obtaining a small portion from the universal cupidity. Alexander exerted all his powers to make himself agreeable, and these exertions were needed to counterbalance the bad effects of his policy.

He replied to Lord Castlereagh's demand of an audience by immediately repairing to the British minister's residence. The latter was touched by this, and testified all the gratitude and respect that such a proceeding was calculated to inspire; but at the same time he remained an Englishman—that is to say,

fixed in his determination ; and though he wished to conciliate all parties, he did not conciliate any.

He endeavoured, in the first instance, to prove to the czar that England had always sought to please him. In 1812 she had assisted him to conclude the peace of Bucharest with the Turks, and to obtain Bessarabia ; that she had induced Persia to yield him a better frontier in the direction of the Caspian Sea ; that, in short, notwithstanding her repugnance to abandon Norway to Sweden, she had consented to the measure, in order to secure the conquest of Finland to Russia. Having thus proved his claim to the gratitude of Russia, he cited, one by one, the Treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Töplitz, which had been concluded in the February, June, and September of 1813, and showed how they formally prescribed the partition of the Duchy of Warsaw by the three continental powers, which certainly did not imply that one should have it all. He then passed on to general considerations ; showed what anxiety Russia caused all Europe ; spoke strongly of the fears she had already excited amongst the allies ; and did not hesitate to say that the Congress of Vienna, from which it had been hoped to date the reign of justice and moderation amongst civilised nations, would soon, if care were not taken, present a scene of ambition sufficient in itself to make Napoleon regretted. Lord Castlereagh said all this in that simple and positive manner which neither exaggerates nor softens anything, and which, by representing things as they really are, makes their importance more evident.

Unfortunately, not one of the four powers who were disputing the remnants of the European continent could read the others a lesson of morality without running the risk of retaliation ; and Alexander might have seriously embarrassed the British minister by tracing the chart of English ambition from the occupation of Malta to that of the Cape and the Mauritius. He restrained himself, although very much excited. However, he did not wish to lie under the weight of England's pretended services, and with much tact and raillery, showed Lord Castlereagh that, if the peace between Persia and Russia, and between Russia and Turkey, had been facilitated by England, it was that the Russians might be free to turn their arms against France ; and that if Norway was ceded to Bernadotte, it was to win him from his engagements to Napoleon ; and that, consequently, in considering the motives of her benefactor, Russia might feel herself justified in lessening the amount of her gratitude. Then passing to the Treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Töplitz, he showed how they were drawn up under conditions that no longer existed ; that at the time these treaties were formed the utmost that had been hoped was to offer some

opposition to Napoleon's then almost unlimited power, but that no expectation was entertained of driving him back to the Rhine, much less of hurling him from his throne; that by the unexpected success of the common efforts, Austria had gained the Inn, the Tyrol, and Italy; England, Holland and Belgium; and that it was not just that Russia and Prussia, that had encountered greater dangers than England, should have no part in this unexpected increase of good fortune; and besides, that as to what concerned Saxony, he was pledged to his friend the King of Prussia, and for Poland to the Poles themselves. Alexander declared that, in his opinion, the partition of Poland was a crime, whose moral effects were still felt in Europe—a crime for which it was both honest and politic to make atonement. Russia alone, he said, possessed the means of making this reparation, for she possessed the greater portion of the Polish provinces, which was not the case with France, that had vainly sought to reconstitute Poland, nor of Prussia nor Austria, neither of which powers had ever conceived such a project. Russia, by stripping herself of the provinces she possessed, could, by a slight sacrifice on the part of Prussia—a sacrifice for which the compensation was already provided—establish a separate kingdom, endow it with liberal institutions, whose operations she could moderate, and accomplish a work which would be the glory both of Europe and of the Congress of Vienna. This was the noble aim he had proposed to himself; he was on the eve of attaining it, and he did not intend to turn aside from his purpose. Besides, on entering Poland, he had made promises to the Poles in order to detach them from Napoleon, and these promises he was determined to keep. He was not one of those sovereigns ready to make promises in time of need, and retract them when the emergency had passed. He had made a promise, and would keep it; and he considered that he had rendered sufficiently important services to Europe to expect some concession on her part.

The Emperor Alexander possessed both subtlety of understanding and romantic exaltation of feeling, a combination which prevented his pursuing at once the paths of ambition and sincerity. It is true that his nobler feelings were flattered by the glory of re-establishing the kingdom of Poland, and he almost persuaded himself that he was making a sacrifice in giving up Lithuania and Volhynia for its formation, as though the new kingdom were not to belong to him but to another. The indignation he expressed at the resistance offered to his project was not altogether insincere.

His indignation had very little effect upon Lord Castlereagh, who returned to the charge, armed with all the reasons, good and bad, that his position afforded. He could make no valid

reply with respect to the three treaties of 1813, for they had been concluded when but a small success was expected, and Russia had as good a right as the others to a share of the unhoped for spoils. Lord Castlereagh could only meet Alexander on this point by adducing motives of moderation and justice, most excellent reasons, indeed, but which could have but little weight coming from him, unless Austria should resign Italy, and England give up her claim to Belgium. But many reasons could be adduced in favour of the reconstitution of Poland, and on these he expatiated with all imaginable emphasis.

The partition of Poland, he told the czar, was a crime, and it was not England, who had always opposed it, that would now assert the contrary. She was therefore prepared to consent to the restoration of Poland, if it were done completely, honestly, and with suitable conditions. If, for example, Austria, Russia, and Prussia gave up the Polish provinces they held, and that an independent kingdom was formed, with a Polish king, and if not a Pole, at least somebody not under the control of either of the three sovereigns who now shared the country between them, and if, in addition, the new kingdom should be endowed with liberal monarchical institutions, England was ready to approve and even to assist in the work, at any expense to herself. But would the three co-divisionists consent to such sacrifices? Would a suitable king be found? And finally, would the reunited Poles live together in amity, and comport themselves like a rational people, worthy of the liberty conferred on them? This was not only doubtful, but almost impossible, and the much talked of reconstitution of Poland was a nullity—a mere dream. And if instead of this truly moral and European reparation, a false and incomplete kingdom was to be formed, called Poland for the sake of increasing its extent as much as possible, whilst in reality it belonged to Russia, this would be a mere illusion, to which Europe would never submit.

Lord Castlereagh then spoke to Alexander of the alarm his project had excited; he told him that but for his well-known principles of honour, these alarms would have already dissolved the Congress, and he implored him for the sake of his own fame, as well as for the general tranquillity, to give up a project that could never be permitted to succeed. It was with great difficulty that Alexander restrained himself during this conversation, for with all his power of pleasing, he could not produce the least impression on the solid English minister, who, on his side, with his personal awkwardness, was as incapable of influencing the plastic and mobile disposition of the czar. They parted, with no other result arising from their interview than mutual dissatisfaction.

Lord Castlereagh, fearing that he had not said all that he

had to say, and desirous to impress the memory of his august interlocutor, at the same time that he was anxious to take every precaution for his own justification before Parliament, drew up a long note on the following day, and sent it to the czar, together with a confidential letter, making a formal declaration of his opposition to the pretensions of Russia. He was not satisfied with this, and notwithstanding the system of secrecy that had been resolved on with regard to France, he sought to obtain her approbation for his firmness, and informed M. de Talleyrand both of the conversation and note. The latter was delighted to see Lord Castlereagh, although he was very little pleased by England's indifference in the cause of Saxony. The singular tactics of England inspired him with the idea of adopting a similar policy, though in an opposite sense. Desiring to restore as far as possible the balance in favour of Saxony, which had been disturbed by Lord Castlereagh's desertion, he profited of the frequent visits of Prince Czartoryski to the French legation, to inform Alexander, through him, that France would never yield Saxony, but was quite willing to give up Poland. This was a skilful manœuvre, for while one party refused what the other was willing to concede, the unity of opinion which would be needed to satisfy both Russia and Prussia was impossible.

All this time the lesser German princes continued their opposition. In the committee, where they were assembled to decide on a constitution for Germany, they opposed all Prussia and Austria's efforts to assume the domination in the confederation. It would be impossible to revive the ancient title of Emperor of Germany, which the house of Austria had so long borne, and which Francis II. had abdicated in 1806 when Napoleon instituted the Confederation of the Rhine. Austria would certainly have accepted the title, were it made hereditary in the house of Hapsburg; but she would never consent to make it elective, for that would subject her to a disagreeable dependence on the electors, and perhaps expose her to the possibility of one day seeing a Prussian prince styled Emperor of Germany. The last consideration would be sufficient to make her reject such an offer. As the title of emperor, to which the direction of the Confederation naturally belonged, was to be given up, it was necessary that there should be directing States, as in Switzerland, and to this Prussia was quite willing to agree, provided that the authority alternated between herself and Austria. Austria did not approve this arrangement, and Bavaria, Hanover, and Wurtemberg declared that they would not agree to it unless the directing authority was limited to the two great German powers. It was thus that the condition of German affairs was commenced which

continues still—a simple presidency of the Diet given in perpetuity to Austria, as an emblem of the old imperial authority resident in her house, lessened, however, by the suppression of the title, but enhanced by the condition of perpetuity. But this arrangement still left undecided the serious question of the military command.

A no less important question than that of the direction of the Germanic body was the condition of the confederate States, and the nature of their relations with the European powers. Up to the present time the confederate States, although united by a federal bond, had enjoyed an independent sovereignty, that is, they possessed the power of sending ambassadors to foreign courts, and of raising armies and employing them as they pleased. This twofold privilege had often led to the formation of alliances contrary to the interests of the two predominating German powers, if not to the Confederation itself; and if this had sometimes induced foreign intervention, it also secured the safety of their common independence. Prussia would have the confederate States deprived of these advantages; but she was alone in her opinion, and met with the greatest opposition in the committee. On almost every occasion the three kingdoms of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover declared that they would give no opinion on the points in dispute until Saxony's fate should be decided. They even threatened to draw up a protestation, signed by all the German States, against the projects attributed to certain powers with regard to Saxony. The committee broke up, resolved not to meet again unless this great question should be decided.

As the adjournment had been signed on the 8th of October, the 1st of November was not very distant. It was to be feared that the appointed day would arrive before the different powers should come to an understanding. Bavaria, the most important and the most active of the lesser German States, had declared her intention of taking up arms in defence of Saxony. Her army had been recruited, and now amounted to seventy-five thousand men; she urged on M. de Metternich, whom she denounced for what she called his weakness, and offered to furnish twenty-five thousand men for every hundred thousand furnished by Austria. From M. de Metternich, her emissaries hastened to M. de Talleyrand, who certainly needed no urging, and begged him not to confine himself to mere words, but to use threats, and effective threats, by declaring, for example, that the King of France was determined to use force if necessary. They declared that if M. de Talleyrand acted according to this advice, that neither England nor Austria could have an excuse or motive for subterfuge, and would formally declare themselves, and save the independence of Germany and Europe.

M. de Talleyrand replied that France was ready, but that it did not become her to undertake alone what should be done by powers more interested in the question, and who should at least explain their intentions, and express some desire on the subject: that then France would answer their first cry for assistance; but that hitherto scarce a word was addressed to the French legation, that was excluded from all negotiations; and that, in fact, France could not force her assistance on persons who did not seem to desire it.

Bavaria was not slow to repeat these remarks to M. de Metternich, who did not refuse to act, but would not come forward immediately, alleging, as an excuse for his dilatoriness, the strange policy of England, who wished to save Poland by sacrificing Saxony, together with the intentions of France, whose ambition, in his opinion, ought always to be distrusted. This was strange reasoning when France was the only one amongst the powers assembled at Vienna that did not show any symptoms of ambition! M. de Metternich added, that it would be assuming a most serious responsibility to introduce a French army into Germany, especially as Frenchmen had been so recently despotic and detested there; and he added that a French army did not exist, at least for the Bourbons, who were incapable of assembling or conducting one; that France spoke a great deal, but neither could nor would act; that she only wished to cause disunion and dissension, and recover her position by promoting a misunderstanding between the allies, who had conquered her. These replies were made to the Prince de Wrède, who immediately communicated them to us; and these remarks had not only been made by the minister, but by the emperor and several of the archdukes, with the evident intention that they should be transmitted to us, and provoke us to come to an explanation. This tone, which was unwillingly assumed by the Austrians in their own defence, took the form of raillery and boasting when uttered by the Prussians, who wished to impress every one with the idea of the impotency of France; nor was it less offensive in the Russians, who were no less anxious to propagate a belief in the weakness of the Bourbons.

Such language could not be heard with indifference, and it was become necessary to put an end to it by some decided and convincing manifestation. M. de Talleyrand declared that France was both able and willing to act, which she would prove when occasion required, but that, in any case, she would soon show both her determination and her resources. He wrote immediately to the king, and desired the Duke de Dalberg to write to the cabinet, and proposed to both the double resolution of taking arms, and publicly announcing why. Knowing

that neither Louis XVIII. nor the council had any wish for war, though the Duke de Berry was well inclined thereto, he told them that there was no probability of war (which was true), but that the terror of war was such that whichever power would make a demonstration would be sure to rule the others; that at Vienna things would not go beyond a simple declaration, but that it was necessary to be in a position to make these demonstrations, and to make them after a serious fashion; that the consideration in which France would be held depended on this, as also her influence and the accomplishment of her wishes; that, for example, what she desired in Italy depended on what would happen in Germany, and that she would possess no power on one side if she did not strengthen herself on the other.

To speak of Italy—that is, of Naples and Parma—was attacking the king on his weak side, and the surest way to gain his attention. The council was sensible and sincere, although by a strange chance, as we shall presently see, these qualifications did not render it profitable to the Bourbons.

When these despatches, written about the middle of October, reached Louis XVIII., they did not fail to excite him greatly. As we have said, he was very anxious for peace, of which France was in great need, because it was his family's principal title to popularity, and because it was the condition best suited to his age, his infirmities, and his turn of mind. He was grateful to his representative at Vienna for so loudly asserting the principle of legitimacy, and for having defeated the project of excluding France from the common deliberations; he saw, with delight, that there was a possibility of Murat's downfall, and felt a certain pleasure at the prospect of saving his cousin of Saxony; but he thought the French legation had been too busy, and feared it would lead him further than he wished to go. He deliberated on what was proposed him, first in his family circle, and afterwards in full council. There could be no doubt as to the resolution to be taken—a resolution in favour of which were combined so many reasons, great and small, good and mediocre. In the first place, France's position at Vienna was in question, and it would not be wise, either for her sake or that of the Bourbons, to allow the opinion to gain ground that she had become powerless since the restoration of the old dynasty. Such an opinion would be as injurious to the country as to the reigning family. Secondly, on our influence at Vienna the favourable solution of the Italian question depended—a solution to which Louis XVIII. attached so much importance, and which ought to be as dear to his ministers as to him, for the security of France depended on that of the Bourbons. Thirdly, the safety of the Saxon monarchy had

a certain importance for France, once she had renounced the pursuit of territorial possessions at Vienna. The King of Saxony was considered, whether justly or unjustly, as the victim of his attachment to us, and saving him would doubtless do us honour in the eyes of all those who piqued themselves on their patriotism. Success would therefore secure popularity, without taking into account the rights of legitimacy. Finally, it was absolutely necessary to increase the army, which had been allowed to fall below the contemplated proportions, in consequence of the financial restraints imposed on the war minister, and the accessory expenses unwisely added to the budget. The different regiments were no more than skeletons, incapable of effective service. How this happened will be better understood if we consider that the army of two hundred thousand men, which had been expected to be supported with a budget of two hundred million francs, had been first reduced to one hundred and fifty thousand, and afterwards, from want of resources, to one hundred and thirty thousand men. Limiting France to such an effective force in the existing state of European armies was consenting to her annihilation. These reductions had also caused great discontent amongst military men; and it would be advantageous both to the home and foreign policy to put the army on a better footing. For all these reasons the proposals of the French legation were taken into serious consideration, and presented with strong recommendations to the king's council.

The difficulties of this question had never been other than financial. When the council was assembled, the king appealed to the patriotism of the minister of finance. The latter, though most rigorous in the expenditure of money, and perhaps, in consequence of it, had always declared that, in case of necessity, he could place a hundred millions of francs at the king's disposal. He had indeed secured a vast resource by the restoration of public credit, and by the firmness of his financial policy. His *reconnaissances de liquidation* had had immense success on the exchange, bearing an interest of seven or eight per cent. Besides, thanks to his perseverance, the indirect taxes began to come in, and he was consequently not embarrassed by having to meet an unexpected demand of fifty millions.

M. Louis, however, was astonished at being so quickly taken at his word, and called on to prove the extent of his resources. But he was no less skilled in diplomacy than finance; and the war minister having declared that forty millions would suffice, he said that he was prepared, and would give them as needed. Here was an immediate recompense for the good sense shown by the government in following the advice of the upright and vigorous mind that directed the financial department.

The funds for military expenses being secured, it only remained to consider how they should be employed. General Dupont, who was still war minister, wished that this money should be spent on the two hundred thousand old soldiers who had returned from abroad and been dismissed on leave of absence, pursuant to the system of forming a reserve by allowing the soldiers to remain at their own homes and exercising them from time to time. The introduction of this system would be facilitated by the existence of thirty thousand officers on half-pay, who thus obtained a means of employing their energies, whilst they received additional pay. This system had not yet been well tried, nor was its nature understood even in Prussia, where it was an administrative ruse employed to exceed the limits appointed by Napoleon for the Prussian army. Still, the Bourbon government dreaded to employ so many men—officers and soldiers—of suspected opinions, and whose operations would be slow, when immediate and certain results were required. Influenced by all these reasons, and by the wise advice of the Duke de Berry, it was thought better to recall seventy thousand soldiers, a measure that would increase the army from one hundred and thirty to two hundred thousand men, and put the regiments on a better footing. To raise this number, it was not necessary to employ conscription, which was nominally suppressed, but merely to call out some of the men considered on leave of absence, which had either been given them, or had been taken by themselves in deserting.

In addition to the official despatches in which M. de Talleyrand was informed of the resolutions of the government, the ministers of war and finance were to send him private letters that he might show in confidence, and in which they informed him of the flourishing state of the finances and army. The war minister was commissioned to tell him that he was about raising two hundred thousand men, and if necessary, could raise three hundred thousand, all old soldiers, and well inclined to fight, which was true, provided it was against a foreign enemy. The king wrote to M. de Talleyrand to express his personal feelings. He said, that notwithstanding his desire for peace, he would not have France sink below her natural position, or appear unable to support the cause of legitimacy, but he recommended him expressly not to enter into any coalition in which he would have but Austria and the lesser German States as allies. He was desirous that England should be included in the alliance, for he wished to continue on good terms with that country, as with such an ally the result of a war would be more certain, should so disagreeable a necessity arise. He again directed his attention to the two essential objects of his mission—the expulsion of Murat from the throne of Naples, and the

translation of the prisoner of the isle of Elba to one of the Azores.

Whilst these replies were coming from Paris to M. de Talleyrand, the excitement continued at Vienna, as did also the debate between the Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh, the latter persisting in his efforts to save Poland at the expense of Saxony. It was well known that the Prince-Regent of England, as future King of Hanover, did not approve of this sacrifice, and was even very much opposed to it; and great exertions were made to induce him to demand a modification of Lord Castlereagh's instructions. Meanwhile, Lord Castlereagh pursued his plan, in the hope of detaching Prussia from Russia, and by this isolation inducing the latter to yield. Although it was so difficult to detach Frederick William from Alexander, the Prussian ministers were not as inflexible as their king, and some of them were disturbed by the idea of Russia's advancing into the centre of Europe, and by the bad effect produced in Germany by the annexation of Saxony to Prussia. In a word, they did not admire the Russian alliance as much as their master did. Lord Castlereagh perceived the difference of opinion that existed between Frederick William and his ministers, and flattered himself that he could induce an alliance between Prussia and Austria, and make use of these two powers to force Russia to remain at the other side of the Vistula, without having recourse to France, that would be thus still excluded from participation in all the great European affairs. He hoped that, with England, Austria, Prussia, and all the German States, he could form a central power in Europe, which would restrain Russia, be independent of France, and become the supreme arbitrator in European questions.

M. de Metternich, compelled by the cries of Germany and the Austrian army, declared his intentions sooner than he wished; but abandoned by England on the Saxony question, he had been compelled, in a certain degree, to yield to Lord Castlereagh's policy, and send a despatch to Prussia, in which he announced the intentions of the Emperor Francis and his cabinet. In this despatch, dated the 22nd of October, some days before the official opening of the Congress, M. de Metternich, addressing Prussia with the greatest cordiality, recalled how, in the commencement of 1813, even before Frederick William had broken with Napoleon, Austria had advanced the principle of the complete reconstitution of Prussia, and made it an essential condition of her policy; and that, consequently, she could not be considered as affected by the old jealousy which had formerly divided the cabinets of Berlin and Vienna. He then requested Prussia to consider whether it would not be for her own interest to give up the idea of adding Saxony to

her dominions, since it should be purchased at the expense of allowing Russia to establish herself on the Oder—a project that was blamed by every German, and so hateful that Austria by merely consenting to the measure would perhaps become as unpopular as Prussia, who would effect the deed. M. de Metternich asked whether it would not be better, by punishing King Frederick Augustus by depriving him of some of his territories, and allowing the nucleus of the kingdom of Saxony to exist, to get rid of the unwise promises that had been made to Russia concerning Poland, and thus gratify the wishes of all Germany, and at the same time act in conformity with the spirit of political reparation, which had been so boastingly promised to Europe, but which had not as yet been put in practice. Having thus expressed his opinion in the form of an advice, M. de Metternich added, that if, contrary to his inclinations, he should be induced to sacrifice Saxony, it would be only on conditions from which Austria would not recede. First, Prussia should promise to break her engagement with Russia concerning Poland, and join Austria and England when this question was to be decided on. Secondly, that notwithstanding the desire to preserve the most perfect cordiality between the courts of Berlin and Vienna, it would be necessary to maintain a certain equilibrium between them by establishing a just proportion between the mass of States in the north and in the south which constituted their dependencies. Austria desired that the Main on the right of the Rhine, and the Moselle on the left, should constitute the territorial boundaries of the northern and southern States, in order that Mayence should not belong to the north, that is, to Prussia.

M. de Metternich could not have extricated himself more skilfully from the embarrassing position in which Lord Castlereagh's strange policy had placed him than by this note; though the conditions proposed to Prussia relative to the boundaries of the northern and southern States might be accepted, Frederick William could scarcely agree to that which required his abandoning Russia on the Polish question; and so whilst M. de Metternich pursued the path traced out for him by England, he was not the less likely to gain his own ends, and save both Poland and Saxony.

The Emperor Alexander was greatly irritated by the position Austria had taken, for he saw that everybody was turning against him, and endeavouring to separate him from Prussia. With the intention of striking his opponents with awe, he determined on a decisive step that would prove that his and Prussia's determination was irrevocable. Saxony was still occupied by Russian troops, and he advised the King of Prussia to replace them by Prussians, and immediately commence the

administrative and political organisation of the country. On his side, he sent the Russian troops which had evacuated Saxony into Poland, so as to concentrate all his forces on the Vistula, and present an iron barrier to all who should seek to deprive him of his prey. At the same time he sent into Warsaw his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, who, report said, was to be made King of Poland, in order to commence the organisation of the new kingdom. He could not more boldly defy the opinions and dignity of the powers assembled at Vienna, for, without waiting for their decision, he had taken possession of States of which they alone could confer the sovereignty.

There was a universal outcry against such daring and arrogant conduct. All the Germans blamed the weakness of M. de Metternich; but he replied, that instead of annoyance, it ought to be a subject of rejoicing to see the Russians return to the north, and free Germany from their presence. This excuse was not well received in the diplomatic circle, and it was said that France was right in demanding the assembling of the Congress, for had it been assembled, such audacious conduct would not have been attempted. Even Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich almost admitted the same. Many persons who were discouraged by this state of affairs asserted that there was but one way of acting with the two usurpers, which was to abandon them to the public opinion of Europe, and convoke a new Congress, which, authorised by a special mandate, would become the organ of the universal feeling. More determined spirits declared that there was no occasion to retract, that the only course that remained was to fulfil the declaration of the 8th of October, and assemble the Congress on the 1st of November, when it would be seen whether these two august monarchs would retain their hardihood before the assembled Congress. The latter was the prevailing opinion: the 1st of November was at hand, and the efficacy of this plan would soon be tested.

The Emperor of Russia, who, though very simple in his own person, always kept up great state, which added not a little to the expense that Austria incurred for her guests, determined to go to Ofen, in Hungary, to assist at the funeral solemnities of his sister, the deceased wife of the Archduke Palatine of Hungary. He wished to appear in Hungarian costume, and for this purpose summoned many Greeks, both lay and clerical, from the adjoining provinces, for at this time his attention was as much directed to the east as to the west. The Emperor of Austria and several princes promised to accompany him, and as the journey would take up four or five days, they would be thus brought to the end of October. Before he left he had two conversations with M. de Talleyrand and M. de Metternich,

which caused a great deal of excitement, and contributed not a little to fixing definitely the opening of the Congress for the 1st of November.

We have already seen how M. de Talleyrand, in order to counterbalance Lord Castlereagh's policy of saving Poland at the expense of Saxony, had insinuated to Alexander, through Prince Czartoryski, that France attached more importance to Saxony than to Poland, and was willing to sacrifice the latter to him, provided the former could be saved. In fact, this was not yielding anything to Russia, for the destinies of Saxony and Poland were indissolubly united. However, it was a new point of view that had struck M. de Nesselrode, and which became the subject of a conference between Alexander and M. de Talleyrand. It was only for mere form's sake that M. de Talleyrand consented to demand an interview, for, in truth, it was made at M. de Nesselrode's evident insinuation. This was the second interview that the French plenipotentiary had with the czar during the month and a half they were at Vienna; he had, of course, met him in public, but had not had a private audience since the interview we spoke of before.

The Emperor Alexander was more complaisant on this occasion to the representative of France. He regretted that he did not see M. de Talleyrand oftener, to which the latter replied with gratitude and dignity, and then, without loss of time, entered on the important subject that occupied all minds. The czar wished to discover what the French really thought, and why they were so indifferent to the fate of Poland. "At Paris," he said to M. de Talleyrand, "you expressed yourself favourable to the restoration of Poland." "Certainly, sire," replied M. de Talleyrand, in a firm and respectful tone; "both I and every Frenchman would rejoice at the restoration of Poland, but it should be really Poland. But the restoration now contemplated interests us very little. It is now only a frontier question between you and Germany, and it is for Prussia and Austria to consider whether it suits them that you should advance as far as the Oder. In this state of things we, the constant defenders of public justice in Europe, can only espouse the cause of Saxony." Alexander, who had restrained himself at first, replied in bitter terms, quite unworthy of him, that justice and treaties were mere words that every one used as suited him; that he was not deceived by them, and the question was not one concerning principles or justice, but of different interests, which each State interpreted in its own fashion. Alexander added, that he had promised Saxony to Frederick William, and would not break that promise, for he esteemed his word more than treaties, which were mere falsehoods; that the King of Saxony was a traitor to the cause of Europe, and would end

his days a prisoner in Russia, nor would he be the first Saxon prince who had thus expiated his pretensions to Poland. M. de Talleyrand expressed as much horror at the announcement of such principles as respect would allow. "The epithet of traitor," he said, "should never be applied to a king (for in any case he could only be a vanquished enemy), nor should such an expression ever be uttered by lips so august as your majesty's. Justice is something very definite and very sacred, and is what preserves us from a state of barbarism, and I hope that your majesty will reflect more before you thus offend the unanimous opinion of Europe." Then Alexander replied abruptly, that both England and Austria gave up Saxony to him, and that his friend the King of Prussia should be King of Prussia and Saxony, and himself Emperor of Russia and King of Poland. M. de Talleyrand bowed respectfully, and said that he doubted it, for nothing could be more uncertain than the consent of Austria and England. Then Alexander, interrupting the conversation, said, "You have come here to advocate interests that you hold very dear (he meant Murat), and my complaisance towards France shall depend on her complaisance to Russia." "France," replied M. de Talleyrand, "does not need complaisance, she only asserts principles at Vienna." This was equivalent to saying that he would not seek the assistance of the czar.

Alexander met with so much opposition on every side that his resentment towards us abated. He spoke with less asperity to the French plenipotentiary, but he expressed himself in a more decided tone than on the former occasion, and affected in his manner the curtness and harshness of an unchangeable will. This inflexible will was met by M. de Talleyrand in his usual skilful manner, by mingling with his respectful tone a slightly ironical doubt, which seemed to imply that Alexander did not speak seriously.

The interview with M. de Metternich was also very violent, though in another fashion. The Prussians had informed Alexander of M. de Metternich's despatch containing the intentions of Austria, and which plainly showed the efforts of the Anglo-Austrian diplomacy to isolate Russia by gratifying Prussia. The czar, though he had determined to be calm, could not control his excitement. As his conversation with M. de Metternich could only refer to Poland, Saxony being conceded for the time, he expressed himself at great length, repeated his former remarks upon the shamefulness of the original partition of Poland, and the utility and morality of restoring this kingdom, as if the reconstitution of a Poland subject to the most dangerous of her co-partitionists could be considered a reparation made to Europe. When Alexander

repeated that Russia, by the extent of her Polish possessions, was called upon to make this reparation, M. de Metternich very simply remarked that Austria also possessed a great many Polish provinces, and would undertake as well as any one to make a reparation that would cost so little. At these words Alexander could contain himself no longer, and did not hesitate to apply the terms false and unbecoming to the minister's remarks. He forgot himself so far as to tell M. de Metternich that he was the only man in Austria who would dare to assume so rebellious a tone in addressing Russia. Excepting the absence of genius, M. de Metternich might have thought himself in the presence of Napoleon, when at Dresden he threatened him during several hours with the exercise of all his power, after having sought to overwhelm him by the force of his intellect. M. de Metternich was not to be moved; but deeply offended by the language of the czar, he said that if such were the terms which in future were to exist between the cabinets, he would request his emperor to appoint another representative for Austria at the Congress. He parted from Alexander in a state of excitement such as he had never before exhibited.

When this strange scene became known it caused loud murmurs. "Why," it was said, "did we cast off the yoke of Napoleon if we are to submit to another as harsh as his, and far more humiliating, for Alexander does not possess that prodigious ascendancy which had been Europe's excuse for her ten years' subjection." On the same day the Emperor Francis set out to join Alexander at Ofen. He felt himself in a very strange position with regard to him. The czar, as well as the other sovereigns that had come to Vienna, had been the Austrian emperor's guest for more than a month. He was consequently bound to him by all the duties of a host, and had often been obliged to meet him with a smiling countenance, that was far from expressing his real feelings. However, the Emperor Francis, with great tact, gave the czar a well-deserved lesson, with all the appearance of the greatest simplicity. "After long experience," said he to him, "I think it better to leave the management of business to my ministers. I consider it a good plan, for our ministers can act with more freedom, perseverance, calmness, and possess more knowledge of business than we ourselves. Mine act under my orders, according to their own fashion, of course, but always according to my intentions, and at all times you may consider their will as mine." He could not have chosen a better mode of confirming what had been done by M. de Metternich, or reproach the czar in a more delicate manner for the impropriety of his conduct. In general terms, but with the greatest tact, he then spoke to him of the

state of affairs. He was bound, he said, to his people. He had sacrificed everything to them, even his very daughter, and whenever he found them disturbed, he was obliged to attend to their anxieties, and endeavour to remove the cause. Alexander remarked that the known and tried sincerity of his character ought to be sufficient security for the Austrian people. "Yes," replied the Emperor Francis, "the sincerity of a prince is an excellent guarantee, but a good frontier is still better."

Whilst these monarchs continued their travels in Hungary, mingling worldly festivities with funeral solemnities, and whilst Alexander lavished not altogether disinterested caresses on the Hungarians and Greeks who thronged to meet him, the diplomatists at Vienna were occupied in fulfilling the engagements they had made for the 1st of November. Each day public opinion declared itself more decidedly in favour of the assembling of the Congress, though great disunion prevailed on the most important questions. But the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia had exhibited so much audacity in their actions, as well as in their words, that it was absolutely necessary to make them feel the authority of Europe, which could not be done in a better, more natural, or more regular manner than by assembling this same Europe in the persons of her representatives. It certainly would not be possible, as we already remarked, to summon them to a kind of European constituent assembly, for they did not possess an equal right to inquire into and decide on each other's affairs; but there were some questions on which the advice of all should be taken, whilst there were other special questions on which it was necessary to hear, and if possible, to conciliate those interested in them. In short, since an assembly had been appointed at Vienna to regulate the affairs of Europe, it was necessary, in whatever manner the conference was to be carried on, that the representatives of Europe should be assembled, their credentials examined, and the mode of proceeding arranged, and this was, in fact, to assemble the Congress, and proclaim the existence at Vienna of a legitimate, incontestable, and European authority, whose moral influence might, under certain circumstances, avert dangerous disturbances.

On the 30th of October, M. de Metternich assembled at his house the eight representatives who had signed the Treaty of Paris, in order to consult as to the execution of the engagement contained in the declaration of the 8th of October. He said that the important questions which divided certain cabinets had not yet been solved, though their solution had been an object of incessant consideration, but that they would yet be arranged, that the important question of the Germanic constitution was already far advanced, and that it was hoped that a Germanic

equilibrium would be established, which would contribute not a little to fix the balance of power in Europe, but that meanwhile there was no reason why the representatives assembled at Vienna should not be convoked, their credentials examined, and committees formed, to whom might be submitted the questions on which they were to decide.

This opinion was universally adopted. But as M. de Metternich took, perhaps, a little too much pains to impress on those present that it was not intended to form a single assembly, where all, on the mere authority of being present, as in the British Parliament, should deliberate in common on the universal interests, and that the committees were only intermediate powers meant to conciliate the interested parties, M. de Talleyrand, who felt no affection for the Austrian minister, and thought him too desirous of restraining the sovereignty of the Congress, replied with asperity, and some harsh words passed between them, which was to the advantage of Russia and Prussia, and by no means to ours, for having adopted a policy opposed to that of these two countries, it was our interest to conciliate Austria. Fortunately, these personal misunderstandings went no further. It was agreed to call successively the plenipotentiaries of the several powers, demand their credentials, and submit these to a committee of three powers, chosen by lot. Chance favoured England, Russia, and Prussia. Should any doubt arise about the credentials of a plenipotentiary, the matter was to be referred to the eight powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris, and who, having convoked the Congress at Vienna, would naturally consider themselves the directing authority, and accept the responsibility of such a position.

M. de Talleyrand did not again refer to his principle of admission, which was no longer of importance, as the preservation of Saxony and the expulsion of Murat had become subjects of serious negotiation, and could no longer be resolved incidentally by the decision on a mere question of form. It was then agreed that those plenipotentiaries whose credentials would not be admitted, should, however, attend the conferences, and be summoned on committees, to give information, or express the wishes of their sovereigns, but should not be permitted to vote.

As the question of precedence amongst the different courts might give rise to embarrassing difficulties, it was agreed that every question of this nature should be deferred to the end of the Congress, and that during the sittings there should be no distinction, except that Prince Metternich, as representative of the monarch in whose capital the Congress was held, should exercise the functions and prerogatives of president.

The succeeding day's meetings were held, to decide the

manner of proceeding on each subject. In all that concerned convocations, the distribution of labour, the arrangement of committees, and their mode of deliberation, it was evident that the eight who had signed the Treaty of Paris, as they had taken the initiative in assembling the Congress, would be the directing authority; but on fundamental questions, where the decisions might become the subject of public or private treaties, the unrestrained agreement of the interested parties should be the only deciding power. As the eight who had signed the Treaty of Paris were universally accepted as an authority in all that referred to matters of form, it only remained to appoint committees for fundamental questions, and which were to be composed not only of those immediately interested, but of mediators, who might reconcile the adverse parties.

The questions relative to the future constitution of Germany were still confined to the committee that represented Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, with the proviso, that the representatives of the other sovereigns of Germany should be admitted when their presence became necessary.

The great territorial questions of Europe were of two kinds—those that referred to the north, and those that related to the south. Those of the north, concerning Holland, Germany, Saxony, and Poland, were the most important and the most complicated. The consideration of these questions could only be confided to the principal of European powers, some having a direct territorial interest in them; the others, being interested in the preservation of the balance of power, were consequently in a position to exercise a conciliatory authority. These questions were therefore laid before the five greatest European powers—Russia, Prussia, Austria, England, and France. These were to decide on the questions of Saxony and Poland, besides many referring to the Low Countries, Hanover, Denmark, Bavaria, &c., &c. Theirs was consequently the most difficult task; and should they agree amongst themselves, nobody possessed the right or power to dispute their decisions.

The affairs of the south referred almost exclusively to Italy. The two powers most interested in Italian affairs were Austria and Spain. The latter demanded the patrimony of the house of Parma from Marie Louise, and Naples from Murat. France also felt an interest in Italy, principally on account of Naples; nor were the other great European powers altogether indifferent. It was therefore thought better to join France, England, and Russia to Austria and Spain; the three former, being free from all territorial pretensions, were less inclined to dispute, and better suited to act as mediators.

All Europe felt the greatest interest in Switzerland. A committee that represented Austria, France, Russia, and Eng-

land was appointed to hear the cantons, and endeavour to reconcile them. Another committee that represented Prussia, France, Austria, and England, was appointed to consider the free navigation of rivers; and finally, one exclusively composed of maritime States, to decide upon the slave trade.

This division of labour once effected, the negotiations concerning Saxony and Poland, which had been commenced with so much warmth, were still continued; and negotiations commenced about the affairs of Italy and Switzerland, which had been already talked of incidentally, but not formally debated.

The affairs of Italy presented difficulties of every kind. There was Genoa to be reunited to Piedmont, as had been promised to the King of Sardinia; there was the house of Parma, supported by Spain, to be reconciled with Marie Louise, who was supported by her father and the Emperor Alexander; there were the Legations that had been occupied by Murat, and which were to be restored to the Pope; and lastly, there were the two houses of Bourbon to be satisfied concerning Naples—France especially, who almost considered her safety depended on the downfall of Napoleon's brother-in-law.

This last subject was very important. M. de Talleyrand felt an extraordinary interest in it, as he had received a special mission on that subject from Louis XVIII., and was every day further stimulated by that monarch's pressing letters. Every State wished the fall of Murat, and Austria no less than the others, for she saw clearly that he would never remain quiet, and would in his constant excitement seek the support of the liberal party in Italy, and thus become a perpetual source of disquietude. However, as M. de Metternich was personally pledged to the court of Naples, he wished to be freed from his promises by the errors of this court, and besides, as he had thought proper to assemble 250,000 men in Bohemia and Galicia, he did not wish to be obliged to keep 150,000 more in Italy. He therefore constantly repeated to the representative of Louis XVIII., who was become the most impatient amongst the diplomatists, "Wait a little, many months will not pass before your wishes are accomplished. You support the cause of Saxony even more warmly than we; let us decide that question, and do not oblige us to solve too many at once." This advice was certainly very wise, for in the existing state of Italy, and the discontent that reigned there from the Julian Alps to Calabria (Tuscany excepted), and having to do with so rash a man as Murat, who had been lately reconciled with Napoleon, and had 80,000 soldiers at his disposal, 50,000 Austrian troops were not sufficient in Italy, and yet that was all she could send at the moment. M. de Talleyrand took no heed of these reasons, and declared that a few thousand Frenchmen would

suffice to terminate the affair. M. de Metternich replied that French soldiers would be faithful to their standards beyond the Rhine against Russia and Prussia, but that their fidelity could not be relied on when fighting against Murat, and perhaps against Napoleon. M. de Talleyrand only replied by complaining of M. de Metternich's weakness, and by filling Vienna with unpleasant remarks upon that minister himself, and the motives of his leniency to the court of Naples, remarks which were very offensive to the Austrian premier, and very injurious to the interests of the French legation, and even to the success of her fondest wishes.

M. de Talleyrand's zeal was greatly excited on another point, because of the importance attached to it by Louis XVIII., and this was, the translation of Napoleon to the Azores. M. de Metternich, bound by no engagement here, agreed as fully with M. de Talleyrand's opinions and wishes on this question as he did on that of Naples. He had always considered it highly imprudent to send Napoleon to the isle of Elba, where he was within four hours' journey of Italy, and but forty-eight hours distant from France. But if uncontrolled by any engagements, he was shackled by the essential difficulties of the affair itself. The Emperor Francis had not allowed his policy to be restricted by any ties of relationship, but he was not altogether insensible to family affections; and although he did not love his son-in-law, he would not consent to become his executioner by sending him to a climate acknowledged to be fatal to human life. He might not perhaps have resisted a prudential measure resolved on by his allies, but he would not take the initiative. England also considered that Napoleon could not be safely left so near the coasts of Europe, and Lord Castlereagh had unhesitatingly said so; but he considered the treaty of the 11th of April an obstacle, because of the British Parliament, an assembly that could not be easily brought to approve a breach of faith. He therefore wished to wait some act of Napoleon, or of those who were supposed to be his accomplices, which would justify the precautions that might be taken against him. He frequently demanded from France the payment of the two millions stipulated by the treaty of the 11th of April, in order that the European powers might not be the first to infringe this treaty. His colleagues at Vienna addressed the same entreaties to M. de Talleyrand, who transmitted them to Louis XVIII., but without effect. Prussia had no objection to any personal violence that might be offered to Napoleon. The true obstacle was elsewhere: it lay in the generosity, honour, and if the truth must be told, in the calculations of Alexander. This prince was the real author of the treaty of the 11th of April, with which he was too often

reproached to be able to forget it. Regardless of reproaches, he considered it a point of honour to insist on the execution of this treaty, and daily urged its observance, sometimes by demanding a princely allowance for Prince Eugène, sometimes by supporting Marie Louise in Parma, and sometimes by bitterly blaming the French exchequer for not paying the subsidy of two millions. Besides, he was not so well pleased with Austria as to be desirous of freeing her from the redoubtable neighbour he had given her when he placed Napoleon in the isle of Elba. His language even on this subject had been most imprudent since his late irritation against M. de Metternich. "If it is necessary," he said, "we must only unchain this monster, who terrifies Austria and the others so much." This expression was soon repeated, and with bad effects, through all Vienna. But it would be calumniating one of the noblest characters of modern times to suppose this Alexander's sole motive in opposing any violence offered to the prisoner of Elba. It was so well known that both his honour and generosity would prevent his ever consenting to such a proceeding, that nobody ever ventured to address him on the subject. It was a measure of prudence that was contemplated but not spoken of, lest its publication should prevent its accomplishment, but to which all the allies, with the exception of Alexander, were very much inclined, though they had not yet come to a decided resolution. It was one of those numerous points which M. de Metternich said should be left to time.

Murat's deposition, and the removal of Napoleon to the Azores, were the most delicate of the Italian questions. M. de Metternich was very much embarrassed when the representatives charged with the consideration of Italian affairs first introduced this subject. He alluded to the complications that he dreaded in Italy, and which great prudence alone could avert, a remark that elicited more than one disagreeable observation from M. de Talleyrand. In following a geographical order, Naples would be the last Italian question to be decided; and the only concession that could be obtained from the French plenipotentiary was, that this classification should be made. By following this order, the question of Genoa and Piedmont took precedence of all the others. It was consequently the first taken into consideration.

It was generally agreed to carry out the Treaty of Paris, and abandon Genoa to the King of Sardinia as a compensation for Chambéry. But the Genoese did not approve of this. Their representative at Vienna was the Marquis de Brignole, a person distinguished both by birth and by his personal qualities, to whom the greatest respect was paid at Vienna, but whose credentials had not been recognised, because such a

recognition would be admitting the political existence of the republic of Genoa, which the other powers had determined to ignore. This ancient republic was told, "You gave yourself up to France in 1805; France accepted you, and became your sovereign, and in right of the power thus obtained she bestowed you on Piedmont in 1814. You could only claim existence as a French province—a province which France resigned—an act which we both approve and confirm." Genoa objected to this mode of reasoning; said that she had given herself to France, and not to Piedmont; and added, what was perfectly true, that she had admitted the English only on Lord Bentinck's express promise that her independence should be restored. Lord Castlereagh took great pains to bring the Genoese to reason; but the committee, caring little whether the inhabitants were satisfied or not, decided that Genoa should be united to Sardinia, with a promise that her liberty and commerce should be guaranteed. As the Treaty of Paris spoke only of the city and not of the territory of Genoa, new difficulties arose, but these were soon settled in virtue of the authority which had been assumed over all European States; and the committee charged with the consideration of Italian affairs finished the Genoese question in two or three sittings.

Next came on the question of the order of succession in the house of Savoy. It was evident that this throne would become vacant unless the succession were secured to the branch of Savoy-Carignan, as all the princes of the elder branch were childless. Austria alone, influenced by the hope of gaining this crown by marriage, could be expected to raise objections to the proposed arrangement. But she would not dare to put forth such pretensions at a moment when she was taking possession of the greater part of Italy. As no objection was made, France carried her point, and the succession was fixed in the Savoy-Carignan branch.

The third question in the adopted order was that of Parma. Spain, supported by France, demanded, as a consequence of the universal restoration going on in Europe, that the house of Parma should get back its ancient Duchy of Tuscany, which, under the title of the kingdom of Etruria, it had obtained from the First Consul, at the request of Charles IV., whose daughter married the Prince of Parma. No objection could be made to so well-founded a demand. As Etruria, in virtue of the principle of universal restoration, had been given back to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, it would only be just to restore Parma and Placentia to the Queen of Etruria. In that case, what would become of the treaty of the 11th of April, or of Marie Louise, whose revenue depended on it?

This princess, as we have already mentioned in the com-

mencement of this book, was residing in the palace of Schönbrunn, where, from the apartments she occupied, she could hear the noise of the fêtes that celebrated her downfall; and can it be believed, she almost felt annoyed that she could not participate in these festivities, so completely was her weak and frivolous mind already a prey to ennui.

Flung, without her own consent, into the chasm of revolution, in the expectation that her marriage with Napoleon would close the gulf; in this fearful trial her memory, consciousness, and strength gave way. The poor creature was exhausted; she retained but two sentiments—her affection for her son, and the desire to obtain the Duchy of Parma, whither she wished to retire and fulfil her maternal duties in peace.

For a moment she thought of going to Elba, but she quickly abandoned the intention on being told that her son should not accompany her. It would have been too great a risk to leave that child in the hands of Napoleon. Compelled to choose between her duties as a mother and a wife, she unhesitatingly preferred the former, and whatever regret she may have felt decreased daily beneath the influence of M. de Neiperg, who, as we have said, was become the recipient of her entire confidence. As the reward of her submission to the wishes of her father and the allied sovereigns, she only asked the patrimony promised to her son, where she begged to be allowed to live in peace, forgetful of the brilliant dream that for a moment had dazzled her youth. We might certainly wish that Napoleon's wife had exhibited more energy of character; but if the consort he chose from political motives abandoned him through weakness, he had little right to complain, and we ought to deal mercifully with this victim whom kings and peoples immolated to their repose, at one time elevating her to the noblest of thrones, and then flinging her from it, to secure themselves momentary advantages, without caring to inquire what she thought or suffered; like the worm on whom man heedlessly tramples, and on which he does not even bestow a glance. She was at Vienna, interceding with her father, who demanded in her name the execution of the promises contained in the treaty of the 11th of April.

Who would not experience an emotion of pity for this unfortunate creature? And when M. de Metternich told Russia, England, France, and Spain, that Francis II., who had already sacrificed so much to the common interest, could not be expected to rob his own daughter, all present, even the representatives of France and Spain, were embarrassed. Russia, that is, Alexander, wished that the promises which had been made should be fulfilled. England thought it would be difficult to annul them altogether. As to France, Louis XVIII.

would have yielded everything provided he was promised the expulsion of Murat; and it was rather from a feeling of family respectability that Ferdinand VII. of Spain demanded a portion of the Italian States, however insignificant, than from attachment to a sister for whom he had never felt any affection. In this state of feeling an accommodation was proposed, which consisted in giving Parma and Placentia to the Infanta, the former Queen of Etruria, and one of the Legations to Marie Louise, reversible to the Pope, who would thus be obliged to wait the death of the archduchess to obtain the sovereignty of a territory that legally belonged to him. However, the Catholic feeling of the time, and the desire of securing the prosperity of the Holy See, to whose financial prosperity the Legations were indispensable, prevented the adoption of this plan. Still, everything tended towards an arrangement of almost all the Italian questions, even that of Murat, who had always been suspected, and now began to appear guilty, and was about to become a political criminal in the eyes of Europe.

The committee charged with the consideration of the affairs of Switzerland found them in the state we have already described. Ten cantons, of which some were modern, and formed from what had been once independent territories, and others of ancient date, but influenced by a spirit of equity, demanded the maintenance of the nineteen cantons, and the confirmation of the liberal principles contained in the Act of Mediation. These were opposed by the nine other cantons, partisans of the old régime; amongst which were found the aristocratic canton of Berne, and the democratic cantons of Schweitz, Uri, and Glaris, for democracy does not always imply justice, and is often as conservative as aristocracy itself. These nine cantons at first refused to acknowledge the Diet of Zurich, but afterwards admitted its authority, and demanded that the territories they had formerly possessed should be restored to them, by which the cantons of Vaud, Argovia, and Tessin would become dependent. Both parties had continued in arms, Berne as well as Vaud, Argovia, and Thurgovia.

At first, the other powers wished to exclude France from this complicated negotiation, as well as from every other, because they wished to annihilate her influence in Switzerland as well as in Germany and Italy. But by a strange peculiarity of the existing state of affairs, Berne, an essentially aristocratic canton, together with Fribourg and Lucerne, where the spirit of reaction was strongest, were at the same time those that felt most attachment to France, that is, to the Bourbons. This was principally owing to the great number of Swiss that had formerly served in France, and who felt sincere gratitude for the rank, honour, and emoluments they had gained there.

They had consequently demanded most decidedly that a French plenipotentiary should take part in the consideration of Helvetic affairs, and this it was found impossible to refuse. The Duke de Dalberg was appointed to represent the French legation in this committee.

This French intervention produced most excellent results. When Berne, Uri, Schweitz, Lucerne, and Fribourg saw that however warmly MM. de Talleyrand and de Dalberg might espouse their cause, they still dared not demand that Vaud, Argovia, and Tessin should be flung back into a state of dependence, and that distinctions of class should be revived in a republican state, these cantons, the most desirous of the restoration of the old system, lost all hope of gaining what they sought. The Emperor Alexander, faithful to his liberal sentiments, also insisted that the nineteen cantons and the Act of Mediation should be maintained, with the exception of some slight alteration, and as France did not contest the justice of this resolution, Berne and her associate cantons began to yield, and a pacific arrangement of the affair was almost certain. It was decided, that the nineteen cantons should be preserved, that the principles of civil equality should be maintained in the confederacy, that four or five of the principal cantons should be alternately invested with the federal authority, and that Berne should be compensated either in Porentruy or the bishopric of Basle (both of which had been taken from France) for the sacrifices required from her. Pecuniary compensation was to be made to the other cantons for the territories which they demanded, but which it was impossible to reduce again to a state of dependence.

The Italian and Swiss questions were in a fair way of being arranged; the greater number was even decided, except that of Naples, which, it was expected, Murat himself would solve. In this state of things Saxony and Poland were the only subjects of abiding anxiety; but the interests involved were so serious that a universal commotion was dreaded.

Lord Castlereagh had not relaxed in his endeavours to detach the Prussian ministers from their king and the Emperor of Russia. He was unwillingly assisted by M. de Metternich, who, obliged to adopt Lord Castlereagh's tactics, regretted the sacrifice of Saxony, although conditional on his part, for it was extremely displeasing to the Austrians, who considered the sacrifice of Saxony as even more dangerous than that of Poland. However, Lord Castlereagh's warm entreaties and M. de Metternich's cold counsel had a certain degree of success. The Prussians were told that the abandonment of Poland would be a misfortune for all Germany, and a serious risk for Prussia, lying so near Russia; that the last partition of Poland had not

been so dangerous, as it had at least left the Vistula as a barrier between Germany and Russia; that to allow Russia to pass the Vistula, and above all, allow her to take possession of Warsaw, the head and heart of Poland, would be to furnish her with the means of reconstituting that country, not, indeed, as an independent, but as a subject, Poland, that would be in the hands of the czars a valiant slave, fighting bravely for her masters, who would not fail to restore her scattered members by taking Galicia from Austria, and Dantzic, Graudentz, and Thorn from Prussia. They were told that if Frederick the Great had eagerly taken possession of a portion of the Polish provinces at the time of the first partition, it was with the intention of uniting Old Prussia with Silesia, which would otherwise remain separated, and resemble the two sides of a right angle, only joined at the apex; that Russia, once established on the Netz and Wartha, between Thorn, Bromberg, Posen, and Kalisch, she needed to take but one step and divide Prussia in two, leaving Old Prussia and Pomerania on one side, and Silesia on the other, like two branches of a tree separated from the parent stem; that all that Prussia could gain on the Elbe from Wittenberg to Dresden would not compensate for the danger of having the Russians at Posen; and that the Prussians ought for their own sakes to oppose the czar's designs on Poland. The Prussians were moreover told that the territories they desired on the Elbe would not be refused; that England and even Austria would abandon Saxony to them, but on condition that they should join the European cause, and separate from the ambitious ally to whom they were so unfortunately bound. They were lastly reminded that this bond consisted only in their king's friendship for the czar, but that the destiny of States ought not to depend upon the affection of princes, and that it was the duty of the Prussian ministers to enlighten Frederick William as to the interests of his kingdom, and to oppose if they did not convince him.

These considerations had great weight, particularly with military men, who considered the establishment of Russia on the Lower Wartha as extremely dangerous, and also produced a certain impression on the Prussian ministers, who, in their turn, did not fail to influence their king a little. At least Alexander thought so, and was very much affected by it; for if Prussia abandoned him, he would be left alone in opposition to all Europe, without being able to count on the assistance of France, who had adopted the German policy, and whom there was no longer time to gain over. Thus reduced to the limits of the old partition, he would be humbled in the eyes of Poland, and obliged to hear his own subjects say that he had gained nothing by the late wars, although he had run such risk

in undertaking them. It is true that he had gained Finland and Bessarabia, but as these conquests were due to his alliance with France, they would only be a condemnation of his policy in joining the allies, and would afford no greater satisfaction to the national ambition than what a hungry man feels in the recollection of a dinner eaten in bygone days.

In this disagreeable position of affairs, Alexander brought about an explanation with the King of Prussia, by means of a *tête-à-tête* dinner, on which occasion he gave vent to his feelings with the greatest vehemence. He reminded Frederick William of the mutual vows of friendship they had made in 1813 at the time of their meeting on the Oder, when, after some years of coolness, again united by a common danger, they had promised to fall together, or, united, save at the same time their own dominions and Europe. He reminded him of the devotedness with which he (Alexander) had held out his hand to free the Germans at a time when his most faithful subjects advised him to remain on the Vistula and treat with Napoleon. He told him that but for this devotedness on his part, Germany would be still enslaved, and Prussia reduced to five million subjects; that to their union alone so favourable a change was due; that the allied powers wished to profit of their improved position, to exclude Russia, to whom they were indebted for the advantages they enjoyed; that confining the Russians to the Vistula would be to leave them unrecompensed for all the blood they had shed from the Oder to the Seine; for Napoleon, after the disaster of Moscow, had offered them the frontier of the Vistula, and they might have returned to their homes without exposing themselves to new dangers, without sacrificing two or three hundred thousand soldiers to continue the war of 1813, having rid themselves of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and possessed themselves of Bessarabia and Finland; but now nobody seemed to remember the heroism of their determination in passing the Vistula, in opposition to the prudent Kutusof; that some of the allies, Austria in particular, who had been compelled to join this European crusade, and who had not shed one quarter of the blood lost by the Russians, wished to enjoy the fruits of victory alone; they who had not had a single village burned, refused compensation to Russia for the ruins of Moscow; that it was very well for diplomatists to act in this way—it was their trade—but that princes, like Alexander and Frederick William, actuated by principles of honour, united by similarity of age, and the vicissitudes of their lives, by their common reverses and successes, should not allow themselves to be disunited by the ingratitude of others; that they, who were always fortunate when united, and unfortunate when separated, might be allowed to entertain a superstitious belief in the necessity

of being allied, and for their own happiness as well as for that of their peoples, ought to live and die united.

There was a great deal of truth in all this, at least when seen from the Russian or Prussian, but not from the European point of view; for it is certain that if Prussia separated from him, Alexander would be forced to remain on the other side of the Vistula, and would have good reason to regret having passed it at the end of the year 1812, and not treated with Napoleon in the beginning of 1813, except that he had the glory of having entered Paris, and behaved there as a generous and courteous conqueror.

Frederick William was sensitively alive to the duties of honour and friendship, besides that he was perfectly conscious of all the obligations that Germany was under to Alexander; for very different would have been the course of events if the latter, after the passage of the Beresina, had followed Kutusof's advice and treated with Napoleon. He was also moved by Alexander's vehemence, which (according to M. de Hardenberg's account) was extraordinary. Touched to the very heart, and entertaining a kind of superstitious belief in the potency of the czar's friendship, he flung himself into his arms, and swore to be faithful to him. But Alexander told him that the king's fidelity was of little value without that of the ministers, of which he had every reason to doubt. To make sure of this, M. de Hardenberg was called, and the explanation that was commenced with the king was concluded with his prime minister. The czar exhibited as much vehemence of manner with the latter as he had done with the sovereign himself. When the minister alluded to the reasons adduced by the English and Austrians for opposing the approach of the Russians to the Prussian frontier, he was fiercely contradicted; and after a vain attempt at resistance, was compelled to yield, and promise to support the policy to which Alexander and Frederick William had again most solemnly engaged themselves.

The project which both agreed to defend was, that the greater part of the Polish provinces should be delivered to Russia, on condition that Prussia should get all Saxony. In pursuance of his ambitious and romantic plan of reconstituting Poland, Alexander was most desirous of getting possession of Warsaw, which in the last partition had been allotted to Prussia, in order that the head might be severed from the body, and that this hapless country might for ever remain deprived of existence.

In fact, the three partitions of Poland, which had taken place in 1772, 1793, and 1795, had successively disjointed that country in such a manner that a recombination of the parts was impossible. In the first partition (that of 1772, devised and carried out by Frederick the Great), each of the co-partitionists

took the part that suited him best. Prussia took the mouths of the Vistula, and both banks of that river as far as Thorn exclusively, in order to unite Old Prussia and Pomerania by the suppression of the intervening Polish territories. Austria took Galicia, lying at the foot of the Crapach mountains. Russia seized the territory so warmly disputed in the middle ages by the Muscovites and the Poles—that is, the country opening between Smolensko and Vitebsk, between the sources of the Dwina and the Dnieper, and a territory further on between Jacobstadt and Rogaczew, forming the eastern part of Lithuania.

In 1793 and 1795 the entire country was portioned away, each spoiler, in seizing what suited himself, taking especial care so to dismember hapless Poland that a reunion of the scattered parts would be impossible. Thus Prussia took the Grand Duchy of Posen, in order to unite Silesia to Old Prussia, to which latter she also added all that part of Lithuania which extends to the Niemen from Drogitchin to Kowno; and lastly, Warsaw itself, which was refused to Prussia, because as she was to have the greater part of the body, it was not thought advisable that she should also have the head. Austria had descended the left bank of the Vistula as far as the Pilica, and the right as far as the Bug. Russia had all the rest—that is, all Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, &c. When in 1807 and 1809, Napoleon thought of reconstituting Poland under the name of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, being under the necessity of conciliating Austria and Russia, but not Prussia, he deprived the latter of the mouths of the Vistula, of Dantzic, which he erected into a so-called free city, of the Duchy of Posen, the territory to the left of the Niemen, and above all, of Warsaw. He next deprived Austria of both banks of the Upper Vistula as far as the Pilica and the Bug, leaving her only Galicia; but he took nothing from Russia, because having made her the pivot of his policy, he was still more anxious to conciliate her than Austria. From these different acquisitions he formed the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which comprised the basin of the Vistula from its source, near the Carpathian mountains, to its embouchure in the Baltic, and almost touched the Oder on one side, and extended to the Niemen on the other; but it did not comprise Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, and Galicia, that is, more than two-thirds of the Polish territory.

When Russia, in 1814, thought, in her turn, of reconstituting Poland, she had a great advantage over Napoleon, inasmuch as she possessed a far larger portion of the Polish territory; but should Alexander be compelled to pause in his progress at the Vistula, he could have but one shore of this river; nor could he have Warsaw if the partition made by the Treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Töplitz was rigorously adhered to.

But Alexander was desirous of having both banks of the Vistula—in the first place, that he might get possession of Warsaw, which was the head and heart of the body he sought to resuscitate; and next, that on the left bank he might have sufficient territory to prevent the capital of his new State from being a frontier town.

On this account he wished to obtain possession of the Duchy of Posen, by which he would become master of both banks of the Wartha. He also wished to be master of both shores of the Vistula as far as Cracow inclusively. But this would be asking Germany, and especially Prussia, to allow Russia to advance to the Oder, which would bring her very near Dresden and Berlin; and it would be asking Austria to let her approach the Carpathians, a movement by which Austria would entirely lose her portion of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which it had been agreed to divide as formerly. It is true, as Alexander said, that when the partition of this duchy was agreed on, neither the Tyrol, Italy, Holland, or Belgium had been reconquered, and as Austria had gained so much by these acquisitions, she might very well leave him her share of the Grand Duchy.

As Russia had now renewed her alliance with Prussia, it was again decided that she should cross the Vistula, and get possession of the left bank as far up as possible. Her progress towards the Wartha should be regulated by what Prussia should obtain in Central Germany—that is to say, in Saxony. This was a point to be decided after the settlement of the Saxony question, and would be dependent on the success of that negotiation. With regard to Austria, Alexander meant to leave her Galicia, which she had possessed since the first partition; but he intended to take those portions of Poland which fell to Austria in the second and third partitions—that is, the left bank of the Vistula as far as the Pilica, and the right as far as the Bug; and in this he was right, for without these territories Warsaw would be on the east a mere frontier town. But this was, in plain terms, asking Austria for her entire portion of the Grand Duchy, which, according to agreement, was to be restored to the ancient co-partitionists. It was possible, indeed, by insisting on the acquisition of the Tyrol and Italy, which had not been anticipated in 1813, to mollify the sacrifice required from Austria, and by giving her the salt-mines of Wieliczka, upon which she set great value. If Cracow could be made a free city, as was intended to do with Thorn and other disputed towns, to Austria might also be given the rich and populous district of Tarnopol, constituting Eastern Galicia, and which had been given to Russia by Napoleon in 1809. Besides, necessity might be adduced as a reason for the contemplated changes, as Warsaw would have no suburbs

without the annexation of the territory situated between the Pilica and the Bug.

In the negotiations between Austria and Russia, Prussia was to act as intermediary in the concessions offered by Russia to Austria in exchange for the Upper Vistula, and would thus fulfil, as far as possible, one of the conditions which M. de Metternich attached to the sacrifice of Saxony—that of joining the western powers in the question of Poland. We have already said that M. de Metternich, forced to co-operate in Lord Castlereagh's policy, had consented to give up Saxony to Prussia, but on certain conditions, which he hoped would not be complied with. These were, that Mayence should belong to the Confederation; that the Main and Moselle should separate the northern from the southern States of Germany; and lastly, that Prussia should join England and Austria in the Polish question. As Prussia was determined to yield the points concerning Germany by affecting to assist Austria in tracing the Polish frontier in the direction of Galicia, she might say that she had fulfilled the conditions required for obtaining Saxony, and considered the cabinet of Vienna pledged to her. The success of this comedy was of great importance to Alexander, for Russia's progress into Posen would be measured by Prussia's acquisitions in Saxony.

Alexander and Frederick William having renewed their friendship, were become more fixed in their ambitious views, and more determined in their language. However, Prince de Hardenberg, whom Lord Castlereagh had hoped to win over by yielding Saxony to Prussia on the above-mentioned conditions, could not conceal from the English representative the new bonds that bound Russia and Prussia. He related the scene that had taken place between Alexander and Frederick William, declaring that he had never witnessed the like, and that it would be impossible to withstand its influence. Lord Castlereagh saw all his calculations disappointed, and M. de Metternich saw his hopes realised, for he had only affected to consent to the sacrifice of Saxony under the conviction that Prussia would never fulfil the proposed conditions. Lord Castlereagh reproached Prince de Hardenberg most bitterly, and told him that he ought rather to have resigned office than yielded; but he did not induce him to take this step, and Prussia continued more closely bound to Russia than ever.

Meanwhile an unexpected event contributed to show the fallacy of the English policy, and even brought about a crisis. We have already seen how Russia and Prussia had ventured to take possession of the disputed provinces; Russia, by evacuating Saxony in favour of Prussia, and concentrating her forces on the Vistula, and by sending the Grand Duke Constantine to

Warsaw to organise the new kingdom of Poland; Prussia, by ostensibly occupying all Saxony, and sending thither civil officers empowered to establish the Prussian rule. This double occupation had given great offence, and had not a little contributed, as we have already said, to the immediate assembling of the Congress. An accidental announcement, the inevitable consequence of Russia and Prussia's imprudence, completed this ill-feeling, and excited their adversaries to the highest degree of exasperation.

When Prince Repnin, the Russian governor of Saxony, and who had fulfilled the duties of his office with great prudence, was about to leave, he thought he ought to take a formal leave of the Saxons, and in a declaration that was afterwards published told them that, in consequence of an arrangement with England and Austria, they were about to pass under the rule of Prussia. He added that their country would not be divided, but should remain entire, as had been promised, under one sovereign, and this sovereign, Frederick William, well known for his virtues, would ensure their rights and happiness, as he had done that of his other numerous subjects. He said that undoubtedly the Saxons ought to regret their old king, who during forty years had secured their happiness, but now the fiat of a superior destiny had gone forth, and after having paid a just tribute of regret to Frederick Augustus, they would be faithful to Frederick William, and prove themselves worthy of his benefits by their submission and loyalty.

The sincerity of this declaration, and the excellent sentiments it contained, heightened the effect it produced, because they showed how far things had advanced. It produced an extraordinary effect on all the Germans assembled at Vienna. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich were assailed with questions. They were asked whether it was with their consent that Saxony was become a Prussian province, and whether the Congress so solemnly assembled at Vienna had only been summoned to consummate an usurpation no less odious than those for which Napoleon was so much blamed. The general excitement was fearful, and Lord Castlereagh feared that a policy which had been willing to sacrifice Saxony to save Poland would not be understood in England, whilst M. de Metternich was quite certain of the bad impression it would produce upon the Austrians; consequently both hastened to contradict Prince Repnin's assertions. They denied the truth of what he said, both verbally in private, and in public through the medium of the press, asserting that the Russian governor had announced as done what had not even been resolved on, and which depended on very difficult negotiations that were far from being completed. The Russians and Prussians replied

with much asperity that this was only playing on words; that certainly no document had been signed, but that in a formal note Austria had approved of the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, and that England had made no opposition. In reply to these assertions, the Austrians said that they were only calculated to mislead the legations assembled at Vienna; that Austria had always considered the sacrifice of Saxony a misfortune for Germany, and consequently for Europe, and had constantly advised Prussia to renounce her designs on Saxony as eventually inimical to her own interests; and that, in any case, Austria's consent to this sacrifice had been fettered with conditions, the chief of which was yet unfulfilled; namely, that the Prussian cabinet should abandon Russia on the Polish question. The public mind was still more exasperated by a new event that occurred in the midst of these contradictions and denials. This was a proclamation which the Grand Duke Constantine addressed to the Poles, and in his brother Alexander's name called on them to rally round the old standard of Poland to defend their existence and threatened rights.

This last manifestation completed the general indignation. Those who were opposed to the views of Russia and Prussia considered that such effrontery ought to be met by something else than newspaper articles and remarks made in the drawing-rooms of Vienna, and they did not hesitate to say that it was imperatively necessary to summon a military force and prepare to restrain those ambitious men who sought to parcel out Europe as they pleased. The Bavarians and Austrians were the most excited of all; the former, because that the suppression of so important a State as Saxony was a terrifying example for all the princes of the Confederation; the latter, because that the intimate union of Russia and Prussia, and their establishment at the foot of the Bohemian and Carpathian mountains, were calculated to endanger the security of Austria. The Austrians in particular were most indignant at the arrogance of Russia and Prussia, and asked what would have become both of the one and the other if the Austrian army had not come to their assistance after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen? or if the Austrians had not borne the principal burden of the war at Dresden and Leipsic? "If," they said, and with perfect truth, "if the safety of Europe, as some insolently assert, was exclusively the work of one portion of the allies, would it not be more just to attribute the good work to those who in 1813 had, at the risk of their existence, declared themselves, and who, breaking the bonds of family affection, had decided everything, than to those who, when left to themselves, were not able to defend either the Saale, the Elbe, or the Oder?"

Prince Schwarzenberg was generally esteemed, and though

not in the habit of arrogating to himself the exercise of authority, he was rough, and even harsh, when urged too far. He had several conversations with Alexander, by whom he was always treated with consideration and courtesy. He did not spare the emperor, and was so excited by the general complaints as to say that he almost repented the blind confidence he had felt in the emperor's personal sincerity. He added, that had he foreseen what had occurred, he would neither have advised his sovereign to unite the Austrian forces with those of Russia or Prussia, nor would he have accepted the command of these armies, nor have so freely shed his blood, borne so many affronts, or assumed so much responsibility to secure the success of the common cause. He recalled the entreaties and supplications employed by the allies to win the support of Austria, and the ingratitude with which she had been afterwards treated; he pointed out the bad effects of these audacious pretensions, pretensions that fully justified Napoleon's conduct; he also pointed out the danger of letting Europe see that she had only made an exchange of masters. "Napoleon," continued Prince Schwarzenberg, "though secluded in his island, is still all-powerful in his influence over the public mind, and what would be the consequence if, whilst the European courts present so scandalous a spectacle of disunion and cupidity, he suddenly appeared in either camp?"

The Austrian generalissimo was violently excited, and embarrassed the czar by the vehemence of his language. Alexander endeavoured to exculpate himself, denied the ambitious designs of which he was accused, again appealed to his well-known sincerity and generosity, said that he was bound both to the Poles and Prussians, and expressed his surprise at the indignation exhibited against an arrangement that he considered quite natural. He expressed some regret that things had proceeded to such extremities, or that he had gone so far. Still, notwithstanding his apologetic tone, it was evident that he had not renounced his plans.

However much the allies might desire to avoid war, or have recourse to the interference of France, which would be inevitable in case of a rupture, they began to think of such a necessity. Lord Castlereagh found his position changed by instructions he had just received from England, and which modified his conduct not a little. Hitherto he had acted like all British ministers, and made little account of Hanoverian interests, which were dearer to the reigning family than to the English nation. He had taken little heed of the wrongs of German princes, and in the question of Saxony seemed to forget that he was minister of the King of Hanover as well as of the King of England. The true motive of his conduct was, that he believed a stronger

sympathy existed in the English Parliament for Poland than for Saxony. However, it was not possible that he would be long allowed to follow such a policy. A number of letters, principally by the Coburg princes, had been addressed to the Prince-Regent of England from Vienna. Although these princes had during the late wars espoused the cause of Russia, and served in her armies, they had not forgotten their duty to the King of Saxony, the head of their house, who had always protected them against Napoleon, and they now pleaded his cause with a most honourable fidelity. One of these princes was at Vienna, daily braving the rage and threats of Alexander; the other was at London, making preparations, it was said, for his marriage with the Princess Charlotte of England. Both, aided by the Austrian ministers, had impressed on the prince-regent, the future monarch of Hanover and of England, the danger of sacrificing Saxony; and the prince, in his turn, had insisted that the British cabinet should formally command Lord Castlereagh to defend the interests of Saxony. The order was issued, and arrived at Vienna in the beginning of December.

This order could not have come more *à propos*. It obliged Lord Castlereagh to change his policy, and at the same time furnished him with a most natural excuse for this change. Had these instructions arrived a few days earlier, he might perhaps have been annoyed; but now that he saw himself the dupe of his complaisance to the Prussians, he was very well pleased to receive them. He consequently agreed perfectly with M. de Metternich in his absolute refusal to sacrifice either Saxony or Poland, and showed the two allied sovereigns that he was determined to oppose them by every means. Prince de Wrède, the ever active and useful representative of Bavaria, was constantly advising the adoption of energetic resolutions. He offered in the name of his court twenty-five thousand men for every hundred thousand furnished by Austria, and also advised a good understanding with France, for without her aid the balance of strength would be uncertain. Austria had three hundred thousand men, of whom she could employ two hundred thousand against Russia and Prussia; Bavaria could furnish about sixty thousand, though she promised to raise more; and the other German princes, who were removed from Prussian and Russian influence, could furnish about forty thousand, and the Low Countries perhaps as many more; but a greater number could not be reckoned on, as all England's forces were still engaged in the American war. The whole, thus collected, would not amount to more than three hundred and fifty thousand men, a number not exceeding the combined armies of Russia and Prussia, as the one could easily assemble two hundred thousand, and the other one hundred and fifty

thousand men. The numbers being equal, and their valour and resources assumed to be so, the event would be most uncertain, and they might continue slaughtering each other for years without any result, whilst France would be a mere spectator of a conflict so beneficial to her. To secure a certain result France should be engaged in the quarrel, and furnish one hundred thousand men, who would attack Prussia either in the Rhenish provinces or in Franconia. Certainly the price of this assistance might be something alarming were it solicited, but here it was freely offered by the French legation, and not only offered, but urgently pressed upon those who needed it.

These reasons adduced principally by Bavaria were decisive, and had risen spontaneously in everybody's mind. It would have been folly to refuse the proffered aid of France, which would be most valuable, though some had affected to doubt it. Intelligence of our warlike preparations, instigated by M. de Talleyrand, was now noised in every direction, and Vienna was filled with letters from Paris relating all that was going on there. These letters spoke of the internal state of France, and the discontent felt at the proceedings of the Bourbons; but whilst mentioning the discontent that prevailed amongst the military, the writers added that the army was increasing daily, that it had never been composed of better soldiers, and that employed on foreign service, the French soldiers would sustain the glory they had already acquired. The letters received by the Russians and Prussians were less flattering to France, and still less to the Bourbons; but those written by the Duke of Wellington and M. de Vincent, the English and Austrian ambassadors at Paris, though they admitted the political errors of the restored dynasty, agreed in admiring the French army, and admitted the advantages that such a force could offer. These letters also mentioned the flourishing state of our finances, whose prompt re-establishment appeared inexplicable, though from the ease with which each department was carried on there could be no doubt of their good condition.

There was no longer any reason to doubt, as Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich had appeared to do, of the efficacious assistance that France could offer. Nor could there be any doubt of her willingness to furnish aid, since M. de Talleyrand's entreaties to be allowed to take part in this European crusade in favour of Saxony, and the constant communications exchanged between the French and Bavarian legations, left no doubt on this point. However, no anxiety was felt to take France into confidence, or let her know that the allies were making warlike preparations against each other. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich were restrained by a certain party

feeling, and did not wish to make advances to M. de Talleyrand, whom they knew would come forward on the slightest hint. Besides, they knew that he would learn sufficient from Bavaria to hold himself in readiness. A plan was drawn up, to be put in execution in the month of March 1815, in which the French forces were disposed of as though their aid was certain. In virtue of this plan, proposed by Prince Schwarzenberg and Marshal de Wrède, three hundred and twenty thousand Austrians, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, Badeners, Saxons, &c., were to be divided into two armies, and sent into Moravia and Bohemia. One of these armies, consisting of two hundred thousand men under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg, was to proceed through Moravia to the Upper Vistula; and the other, consisting of one hundred and twenty thousand, under Marshal de Wrède, was to pass through Bohemia to the Oder; whilst fifty thousand French, entering Franconia, would prevent the Bohemian army from being outflanked; and another force of fifty thousand men was to proceed to the Rhenish provinces, to act in concert with the Hollando-Belgians. There was no doubt but that Prussia would be overwhelmed by such a mass, and Russia forced to retreat beyond the Vistula. No soldiers were to be required from England until the end of the American war, but she was to subsidise the new allies, with the exception of France, that no longer needed either the purse or sword of strangers. These plans, which were to be further matured before being put into execution, were to remain a secret between England, Bavaria, and Austria, and not communicated to the French, except through the officious indiscretion of Bavaria. As a preliminary precaution, Austria sent a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men into Galicia, where she already had forty thousand.

On the strength of these arrangements, M. de Metternich entered into a categorical explanation with the Russians and Prussians, and in a note dated 10th December declared that, in consequence of the unanimous opinion of Germany, and the definite resolutions of England, announced in Lord Castlereagh's late instructions, and the opinion of all the great European powers, France in particular, and in consequence of the non-compliance with the conditions imposed on Prussia at a time when her wishes were about being complied with, Saxony was to be maintained in her actual state, with the exception of some territorial sacrifices deemed necessary for defining more accurately the Prussian frontier, and which, in any case, would be the punishment of the faults committed by King Frederick Augustus.

This positive declaration of Austria produced a great effect at Vienna. She would never have used such language without

having taken a decided determination to proceed to extremities, without having calculated her resources, prepared the means of executing her plans, and formed new alliances. Besides, even a superficial glance seemed to show that Austria, England, and France were united, and determined to act in common. The union of all the other European powers had scarcely sufficed to conquer France, and what was now to become of Russia and Prussia alone against united England, Austria, and France? The two northern powers would not be able to hold their ground. The Prussians, against whom this manifestation was principally directed, were violently indignant. King Frederick William, then at Vienna, was surrounded by the principal Prussian generals, amongst whom Marshal Blücher was conspicuous, and who besieged him with their haughty demands, asserting in the loftiest terms that they were the sole conquerors of Napoleon, the sole saviours of Europe. If they were to be believed, nothing ought to be refused them, and whoever opposed their pretensions should be prepared to feel the temper of their swords. Influenced by the same sentiments, the Prussian ministers prepared to reply immediately, and in the same tone, to the Austrian despatch. They were about to embody in their reply all the vehemence of the Prussian staff, and intended to retort upon Austria the charge of faithlessness, when the Emperor Alexander, who although much excited was not inclined to urge things so far, prevented them from yielding to their first emotions of anger, or using such violent language in their reply. He restrained them, and proceeded to act with all that tact that was natural to him when not thrown off his guard. He first visited the Austrians, commencing with Prince Schwarzenberg and the Emperor Francis. He found the former, not indeed excited like the Prussians, but severe and determined, and was so dissatisfied with him that he complained to M. de Metternich, whom he accused of inspiring the commander-in-chief of the Austrian army with false ideas. He next visited the Emperor Francis, who treated him with all the urbanity due from a host to his guest, but with a calm determination that often produces a greater effect than anger. His next interview was with M. de Talleyrand. This was their third meeting, for since Alexander had come to Vienna he was chary of his interviews with the illustrious diplomatist, at whose house he had not hesitated to take up his abode at Paris. He now almost solicited an interview; for meeting M. de Talleyrand in a drawing-room of the Austrian capital, he took his arm, and made an appointment with him. When M. de Talleyrand appeared on the appointed day, the czar received him, if not with the seductive charm of former times, at least with a gracious friendliness which invited

intimacy; the emperor now spoke with the greatest moderation on subjects whose discussion a little before deprived him of all self-command. He asked M. de Talleyrand how it happened that he, who at Paris had expressed himself in favour of the restoration of Poland, was now so much opposed to it. M. de Talleyrand replied that he was still favourable to the project, but it should be the restoration of a free and independent Poland—a European, and not a Russian Poland. The French diplomatist, in conformity with the policy already employed, added, that Poland no longer interested France, that since it was not Poland that was to be restored but a frontier to be decided on between Russia and Germany, he left the business to those interested in it, and that as far as this question was concerned, Russia would meet with no opposition from France. This was certainly a concession, but it was no advantage to the czar to gain Poland unless he got Saxony at the same time. M. de Talleyrand appeared inflexible on this latter point; and no longer adducing arguments based on the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, he endeavoured to prove to Alexander that the peace of the world, and the glory of Europe, depended on the recognition of the principle of legitimacy under all circumstances, and in every place. Such opinions had little influence with the czar, especially coming from the lips of M. de Talleyrand. He did not seem to attach much importance to these professions of faith uttered by the ancient minister of the usurper, and repeated to him that he was bound to the Prussians, that his policy was to be faithful to his word, but that if M. de Talleyrand could induce the Prussians to release him from his promise, he would yield. M. de Talleyrand replied that some other than he should be employed to influence the Prussians, and that Alexander himself possessed the means of doing so by restoring them their portion of Poland. “You wish, then,” replied Alexander, “that I should despoil myself to satisfy you. That would not suit me. But,” he added, “let us make a bargain. I know your secret; I know your principal object here; you are seeking to dethrone Murat. Well,” he said, extending his hand to M. de Talleyrand, “let us form a contract; I will take your side on that question, and it will be soon decided according to your wishes, provided that you yield Saxony to me.” At this moment the expression of Alexander’s countenance was animated and insinuating, showing how anxious he was to gain his end; and it is quite evident that had France pursued a different policy at Vienna, and not confined herself to seeking the safety of Saxony, she could have obtained every concession from Russia. But as M. de Talleyrand’s course was marked out for him, he remained

unmoved by Alexander's seductive proposal, and said he could not entertain such a proposition, which was no other than to tolerate usurpation in one quarter of Europe in order to secure the triumph of legitimacy in another; that for his part, he desired to see the rights of legitimacy universally maintained. M. de Talleyrand delivered these sentiments with a pontifical air, which unfortunately made Alexander smile.

This proposal not having succeeded, the czar, wishing to derive some advantage from the interview, sought to learn from M. de Talleyrand what were those warlike preparations going on in France so much spoken of at Vienna, and for what they were intended. Without seeming to attach much importance to these questions, though he turned his good ear to M. de Talleyrand (he heard badly in one), he asked him in what condition was the French army, and whether it had been considered necessary to reorganise it, as was reported at Vienna. Then with all that art which he possessed in so high a degree, and with an expression of the greatest indifference, M. de Talleyrand related what had been and what was still being done to reform the French army, to attach the soldiers to the new government, and above all, to render the army as fit as ever for foreign service. He said quite carelessly that at present France had 200,000 soldiers, and would have 300,000 in March, all veterans, who had returned from abroad and taken the place of the conscripts drawn for 1815. He gave those details like one who was neither desirous nor conscious of producing an effect. Alexander could not conceal his feelings as well as M. de Talleyrand, and they parted with formal politeness, the czar deeply impressed by what he had heard, for he had no doubt but that these newly raised French troops would be at the service of England and Austria should a war arise on the Polish and Saxon question.

However, in order to be still more certain Alexander sent Prince Czartoryski to M. de Talleyrand. This prince was deeply interested in the fate of Poland, for whose sake he was most anxious to bring about a union between France and Russia. The motive of this visit was a phrase in M. de Metternich's despatch, in which he alleged that all the European States, and France in particular, were opposed to the sacrifice of Saxony. Prince Czartoryski was commissioned to discover the true meaning of this phrase, which seemed to indicate a formal compact between France and Austria. As M. de Talleyrand divined this motive, he persisted in his tactics of making a greater show than the reality justified, and of intimidating Alexander by the idea of a coalition existing between France, England, and Austria, but took care at the same time, that of the three powers France should appear the least

opposed to Russia. He expressed a decided preference for the latter power, and an extreme desire to be on good terms with her; but at the same time, he did not deny that, with regard to Saxony, France would join those who defended her, even to the shedding of blood. He boasted, indeed, a little; for Prince Czartoryski was led by this conversation to believe that M. de Talleyrand enjoyed more of England and Austria's confidence than was really the case. But the desired effect was produced, and this was the essential point considering the policy that was adopted.

Every species of opposition now rose against the projects of Alexander and Frederick William. The German princes of the north and south, most of whom were assembled at Vienna, were desirous of making a protestation in common against the annexation of Saxony to Prussia. One prince alone dissented—the son of the King of Wurtemberg, who had served with the French in Russia, and who, whether fighting with or against us, always distinguished himself by his bravery and brilliant daring, and who, now captivated by the charms of his affianced bride, the Grand Duchess Catherine, was entirely devoted to the Russian policy. This prince, who seldom agreed in opinion with his father, used all his influence to prevent the intended declaration. He succeeded in restraining the lesser princes, by threatening them with the anger of Prussia if they signed the declaration.' However, the result was the same; and the members of the committee entrusted with the consideration of German affairs declared that they would suspend their labours until the fate of Saxony should be decided, which meant that their resolutions would entirely depend on the decisions made with regard to this kingdom, in whose fate the German States felt as much interest as in their own.

Opposed by so many difficulties, both moral and physical, Alexander felt that he should make some concessions, and he reluctantly yielded to necessity. In the first exaltation of his feelings he had intended to demand the entire territory of ancient Poland. But these pretensions he was obliged to renounce in consequence of the resistance he met on every side. Still he was determined to demand, and obtain at any price, all the territory that essentially constituted Poland—that is, the basin of the Vistula from Sandomir to Thorn.

He would thus have Warsaw, surrounded on every side with sufficient extent of territory. And in possessing Warsaw, he might boast of having reconstituted Poland, and in such a position he would have, so to speak, won the wager he had laid against all Europe, as much through self-love as from ambition or chivalrous feeling. He was ready to make some concession, the fundamental point of his project being gained.

The principal concession was to be made on the Prussian side in the Grand Duchy of Posen. Had Alexander taken all the territory of ancient Poland on this side he would touch the Oder, as these possessions extended nearly to the confluence of the Wartha and Oder, and terminated not far from Cüstrin, Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and Glogau. There remained consequently but a very narrow strip of territory on the right of the Oder to constitute the country of Silesia. Alexander would have thus penetrated through the junction of the angle formed by Old Prussia and Pomerania with Silesia, and would have made an angular advance into the heart of the Prussian monarchy, which would be most alarming to the Germans and even to the Prussians; for amongst the latter those who were more influenced by rational geographical considerations than by self-love considered that their country was in more need of being strengthened from Thorn to Breslau than extended from Wittenberg to Dresden. By leaving the actual Duchy of Posen—that is, the greater part of the basin of the Wartha—to the Prussians, they would get a fine territory more populous than that nearer to Warsaw; nor would it be impossible to trace a good frontier between Poland and Prussia. By following the Prosna to its confluence with the Wartha, a little below Konin, and by drawing a line from this point to the neighbourhood of Thorn, Prosna would form a first point of separation; and then from Konin to Inowracław the succession of lakes whence the Netze takes its rise would present a line of obstacles of real importance as a frontier. This formidable point being directed towards Prussia would not injure the Polish frontier, for the country around Warsaw would be still sufficiently extensive. Of the two millions and a half of Poles that Prussia might claim as her portion of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw if this Grand Duchy were restored to its ancient co-partitionists, she would get one million, and as many more in the centre of Germany. Therefore, if an arrangement could be made in Germany, as in Poland, by detaching a portion of territory from Saxony, Prussia might be restored to the position she held in 1805, which was what had been promised her.

The arrangements with Austria would not be so easy, as more was to be demanded than conceded. But here the demands of Russia were really well founded, at least if the principle of reconstituting Poland as a separate kingdom were admitted. Austria had always held Galicia since the time of the first partition, nor had even Napoleon thought of depriving her of it, except indeed in 1812, when he flattered himself for an instant to be able to overpower Russia and create a French Poland. This enterprise failed; Galicia still belonged to Austria, and not the most impassioned Pole, not even

Alexander himself, would have thought of demanding it from the cabinet of Vienna. But there were provinces on both banks of the Vistula, extending to the Pilica on one side and to the Bug on the other, which Austria had acquired in the last partition, and of which Napoleon had taken possession when about to create the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Were these territories restored to Austria she would possess the country on each side of the Vistula, even to the very gates of Warsaw, in which case it would be impossible to say that Poland was reconstituted. Austria saw this; and besides, she might be told that if the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Töplitz, which were concluded when but a limited success was hoped for by the allies; if these treaties required that the different portions of the Grand Duchy should be restored to their old possessors, still Austria had benefited so much in the Tyrol, in Italy, and in Bavaria by the unexpected success of the allies, that she could not deny the justice of Russia's claims to an equal advantage. Now this latter State could only pretend to acquisitions gained on the banks of the Vistula, therefore no very serious opposition was to be dreaded on the part of Austria. Besides, other concessions of a certain value were to be offered to Austria: she would be allowed to retain the salt-mines of Wieliczka, by erecting Cracow into an independent city (as Alexander thought to do with Thorn); and Galicia would get back the beautiful district of Tarnopol, of which Napoleon had deprived her in 1809 to punish Austria for having declared war against us at that time.

Russia, therefore, resolved to yield the important Duchy of Posen to Prussia, a concession which would render the latter power less exacting in Germany, and induce her to come to an amicable arrangement with Austria relative to the Polish frontier. M. de Hardenberg was consequently desired to address a very moderate reply to Austria, and endeavour to attain the principal objects of the Prussian policy without coming to a rupture which might be fatal to Russia and Prussia, and would certainly entail general disgrace.

Whilst Alexander, in consequence of these conciliatory resolutions, sought to come to an understanding with Austria concerning the frontier that was to separate them, M. de Hardenberg, pursuant to the instructions he had received, replied on the 20th of December to the note of the 10th by a note whose tone was exceedingly conciliatory, and the arguments, ably supported, considered from the Prussian point of view. In this document the Prussian minister expressed his surprise that after the formal consent of England, and the conditional approbation of Austria to the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia, that a discussion should now be resumed on a

subject that had been in some sort decided. The excuse, founded on the non-fulfilment of the conditions imposed by Austria, was not valid, he said; for Prussia agreed to all that she required concerning the limits of the northern and southern German States, to the destiny contemplated for Mayence, and to everything connected with the balance of power in Germany. As to the Polish question, Prussia had interfered, and would continue to do so, in order that everything might be arranged, as far as possible, according to the desires of the Austrian cabinet. M. de Hardenberg asserted that there was as little foundation for the principle of sovereignty, which was brought forward in favour of the King of Saxony. Saxony had been conquered in nine pitched battles, especially at Leipsic, where he did not hesitate to say that Prussia had borne the entire burden of the days of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of October, and that consequently the right of conquest, recognised by all publicists, might be confidently appealed to. The application of this right to the King of Saxony was founded on incontestable principles, and no less so on equity. Frederick Augustus, though pledged to the cause of Europe by the intervention of the Austrian cabinet, and received at Prague by the Emperor Francis, had left that retreat where he was in safety, abandoned the cause which he had promised to serve, and embraced that of the common oppressor, to whom he gave up Torgau, the Saxon army, and the Upper Elbe. He might therefore be punished without any scruple of conscience, and his punishment would serve as a good example. Besides, his chastisement would not be very severe; he would not be dethroned, but merely transferred from one country to another. A new State could be given him on the left bank of the Rhine, a State peopled with Catholics, an arrangement which would terminate the disagreeable disunion existing in Saxony between a Catholic government and a Protestant people. Prussia herself would furnish the materials for this new kingdom, by yielding a part or even the whole of the provinces destined for her on the left of the Rhine, for she attached little importance to possessions that brought her into such close contact with France, and had accepted them only *for the public good*, and in conformity to the wishes of Great Britain. This renunciation on the part of Prussia would put the King of Saxony in a position equal, if not superior, to that of the princes of Baden, Nassau, and Hesse. He should also have a voice in the Diet, and all these arrangements would tend to the maintenance of the Germanic equilibrium. Such transfers of sovereignty were not rare in history. Charles V. furnished an example in his dealings with this very house of Saxony, by transferring the actual reigning branch from a simple duchy to the throne of Saxony. Austria and

France afforded an example in the last century, when the house of Lorraine was transferred to Tuscany. The arrangement now proposed with regard to Saxony would be much better than cutting up that kingdom, which would be done were the design put into operation of only punishing Frederick Augustus by a diminution of territory. In the first place, this dismemberment would afflict the Saxons, who had been promised that they should not be separated; besides that, Saxony, reduced to the third or the half of her proportions, would not be in a position to support royal state, or her beautiful capital, the centre of art in Germany. A nest of malcontents would remain in the country, who, discontented with the new order of things, would be ever plotting the reconstitution of a revolutionary Poland governed by a Saxon prince. Considered in any light, the worst possible arrangement would be to partition Saxony instead of giving it entire to Prussia, and transferring Frederick Augustus to the left of the Rhine. Nor would there be any reason why Austria should take offence at Prussia's closer neighbourhood, for Saxony in her actual state would form but a feeble barrier between the two great German powers. This had been proved by Frederick the Great, for in his different wars one step was sufficient to bring him to Dresden, and enable him to establish himself at Königstein, and also more recently by Napoleon; and it was thus that the Prussian government would always act, should it unfortunately happen that war broke out between Austria and Prussia. In order that Austria might feel less anxiety on this point, her wish that Dresden should remain unfortified should be gratified. Finally, M. de Hardenberg recapitulated all that Europe owed to Prussia for contributing so much to the common welfare, and the promise made to her of reconstruction, which in securing her the same amount of population she possessed in 1805 would afford her a better geographical configuration. This latter point had been formally stipulated, for every one admitted her defective configuration, which would be only increased were she compelled for interests not her own to stretch from Königsberg to Aix-la-Chapelle, unless she were permitted at the same time to strengthen her centre by extending her possessions as far as Dresden. Acting otherwise would be treating Prussia with ingratitude, besides breaking a solemn promise, and neglecting the interests of Europe, which were involved in the well-being of Prussia. It should also be admitted, that the ambition of which she was accused was the result of a desire to correct her defective geographical conformation; and were her present demands gratified, she might be tranquillised for a long time, if not for ever.

Doubtless more than one reply might be made to these

assertions, some well founded, others specious, and they were put forth in a tone of moderation that showed more inclination to conciliate than to quarrel.

The question having assumed this form, a pacific arrangement was to be hoped for. Austria, on her side, determined to make some concessions. Having recovered the Tyrol and Italy, of which she had no expectation when the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Töplitz were concluded, it would ill become her to dispute any advantage that Russia might obtain, and where could Russia gain territorial advantages except in Poland. Had Austria been less apprehensive of war, or were she better supported on this point by France, she might have disputed the reconstitution of a Poland which would necessarily be only a Russian Poland. But as Prussia had promised to support Russia on this point, and France had only shown a disposition in favour of Saxony, Austria was not in a position to dispute a proposal which Alexander made an absolute condition, and in some sort a point of honour. The principle being conceded that Poland should be reconstituted as a vassal of Russia, Austria could not pretend to retain the country on each side of the Vistula as far as the Pilica and the Bug, which would be extending her dominions to the very gates of Warsaw. She consequently consented to negotiate on this subject, only claiming the Vistula as far as Sandomir. At Sandomir the San should become the boundary of Galicia, which would be restoring the old Galician frontier. Disputes arose touching Cracow, Tarnopol, and the salt-mines of Wieliczka; but Russia, delighted at becoming mistress of the basin of the Vistula as far as the Pilica and the Bug, was most accommodating on these points. She yielded a portion of territory lying round Cracow, and still more, recognised the independence of this city, so famous in Polish annals. Russia looked upon Cracow as a floating remnant of Poland, which might be at a later period absorbed into the new Russian Poland. Russia also gave up the salt-mines of Wieliczka, and lastly, she voluntarily surrendered the district of Tarnopol to Austria, as a compensation for provinces which she had been promised, but did not obtain.

The more yielding Austria was in the direction of Poland, where, however, by the annexation of Galicia to her dominions she secured a long strip of territory along the Carpathian mountains, the more firm she could and would be with regard to Saxony.

She persisted in asserting that the principal condition imposed on Prussia, that of joining England and Austria on the Polish question, had not been fulfilled; that she had not been bound concerning any particular frontier, but on the fundamental question; and that consequently Austria was freed from her

engagements. She reminded Prussia that it was against her will she had ever consented to the sacrifice of Saxony, and had only yielded through complaisance and a desire for concord, and had always advised Prussia not to take advantage of this sacrifice, for the suppression of Saxony would be a severe shock to the political equilibrium of Germany, and be a grave offence to the moral sentiments of her people. She added that England, having maturely reflected, had retracted her consent to the suppression of Saxony, and that consequently the idea of incorporating that country with Prussia could no longer be entertained. Austria declared herself formally on this point, and said that she would only consent to some slight dismemberment of Saxony, which in punishing Frederick Augustus for the faults he had committed would serve to define the Prussian frontier, and at the same time fulfil the promise made to Prussia to restore her the position she held in 1805.

Details being entered into, Austria took great pains to show that in order to restore Prussia to the position she held in 1805, it would not be necessary to sacrifice Saxony. Out of less than 10,000,000 subjects, Prussia had lost, through Napoleon, 4,800,000, that is, nearly half of what she possessed. Since the allies had victoriously crossed the Elbe and the Rhine, she had by the recovery of Dantzic, Magdeburg, Westphalia, &c., got back about 1,500,000. She still required 3,300,000 in order to be fully indemnified. She might claim as her share of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw 2,500,000 subjects; 500,000 for the principalities of Anspach and Bayreuth, which had been given to Bavaria in 1806, and were still held by that State; 300,000 for an addition that was promised to Hanover at the expense of Prussia; 50,000 for a recompense promised to the house of Saxe-Weimar, making altogether 3,350,000, which, added to the 1,500,000 she had already recovered, would amount to 4,850,000, being a little more than she had lost. By getting the Duchy of Posen from Russia, she would gain one million souls; the provinces on the left of the Rhine, and the Grand Duchy of Baden on the right, contained at least 1,600,000, and it was only necessary to find 750,000 more. These might by management be procured from the lesser princes, and the deficient 200,000 made up in this way: Hanover was willing to give up the 300,000 that had been promised to her. There were therefore but 200,000 or 300,000 more to be found in order to satisfy Prussian ambition; and by demanding these from Saxony, whose population amounted to 2,100,000, she would still retain her position, for she would not influence the Germanic balance less with 1,800,000 subjects than with 2,100,000.

These calculations, which were certainly true, excited great

indignation amongst the Prussians, and gave rise to the reproach, so often repeated since, that the Congress of Vienna portioned out human beings as though they were flocks of sheep. The Prussians denied the correctness of these calculations, and adduced others as difficult to admit as to contest. Without a competent authority invested with the power of giving a final decision on these estimates of men and territory, it was not possible to come to an agreement, for differences arose not alone as to the quantity, but the quality, of these human beings. It was said that a Pole from the neighbourhood of Posen, given by Russia to Prussia, was of greater value than one from Klodawa or Sempolno, which were still under her sway; and that an old Frenchman from Aix-la-Chapelle or Cologne was infinitely superior to a Pole from Kalisch or Thorn, for whom he was to be given in exchange. Consequently, the quality as well as the number of the subjects apportioned to each power was to be taken into consideration.

It was determined that besides the great Committee of Five empowered to deliberate upon the most important questions, a special committee should be formed to examine and pronounce upon the estimates brought forward on each side.

Towards the close of December Lord Castlereagh called on M. de Talleyrand to speak with him on the subject, and suggested this committee as an excellent means of setting aside the difficulties resulting from these contradictory calculations, and saving Saxony by reducing the question to one of arithmetic. M. de Talleyrand made no objection to this committee of valuation, but he told the British plenipotentiary that it would be degrading the subject to treat it so; that it was better to discuss principles than figures; and then introducing his favourite theme of legitimacy, he proposed that England, Austria, and France should conclude a short but precise convention, by which these powers would bind themselves to maintain the existence of Saxony on principle, though yielding some of her territory to Prussia. Lord Castlereagh recoiled some steps, like one taken by surprise. "You propose an alliance," he said, "and an alliance implies either certain or possible warfare. We do not desire war, and would only have recourse to it at the last extremity. Should we be compelled to make war, we shall then think of the means of carrying it on, and of the best alliances to form."

M. de Talleyrand thus repelled did not persist. It was agreed to form a committee of valuation, where France should be represented. The suggestion of this committee was well received by the parties most interested; but the proposal of admitting a French commissioner met with great opposition. This was considered an infraction of the promise made by the

allies to each other, that France should have no voice in the disposal of the territories taken from her, a promise renewed at Paris on the 30th of May, and again at Vienna during the first days of the Congress. It is true that since then they had been compelled to act conjointly with France, for the idea of deciding definitely on European questions without her participation was soon perceived to be as ridiculous as impracticable. But though she had been consulted on all important territorial questions, still the secret and formal engagement subsisting between the Four, of settling everything themselves, had not been revoked.

M. de Metternich and Lord Castlereagh ought to have acknowledged that in their great anxiety they had initiated France into the Saxony question, and could not decently reject her further interference. This avowal they had not the courage to make; and as Prussia showed an extreme repugnance to admit a power avowedly inimical to her to form one of a tribunal empowered to decide definitely on her claims, the others did not insist, and France was excluded from the committee of valuation.

Lord Castlereagh did not dare to carry this intelligence to M. de Talleyrand; he sent to M. de Talleyrand his brother, Lord Stewart, the English ambassador at Berlin, who presented himself at the French embassy with many excuses and embarrassed explanations. As M. de Talleyrand was not to be trifled with when the interests of the French legation at Vienna were at stake, he asked Lord Castlereagh's brother very drily who those were that opposed the admission of France to the committee, and added with bitter irony that doubtless it was the allies who did not desire her presence. Lord Stewart ingenuously admitted it was; and M. de Talleyrand, transported with rage, exclaimed: "Since you are still the allies of Chaumont, settle your affairs amongst yourselves. This very day the French embassy shall leave Vienna, and your future acts shall be invalid in her eyes, as in those of the kingdoms whose interests are sacrificed. Europe shall learn what has occurred. France shall be informed of the part she was expected to play, and England shall be told of the weak and inconsistent conduct of her representative. She shall be told that after abandoning Saxony and Poland he rejected the aid by which he might have saved them." These words contained serious threats against Lord Castlereagh, and implied that his position with regard to the British Parliament would be rendered very embarrassing. Lord Stewart was very much alarmed, and lost no time in informing his brother of the storm that was gathering. Though M. de Talleyrand's menaces were not taken literally, still the dread of their consequences not only

on the tranquillity of Europe, but still more on the British Parliament, when it should become known that Saxony and Poland might have been saved, and were not because of adhesion to a ridiculous system of exclusion carried out against France, influenced Lord Castlereagh so powerfully, that he spoke to the allies in a tone he had never before assumed. He assembled them immediately, and pointed out the danger of provoking an explosion that might set Europe in flames, and declared that, for his part, he would not assume such a responsibility in the eyes of England. He was warmly supported by M. de Metternich, and in spite of the Prussians it was decided that France should be represented in the committee. This intelligence was communicated to M. de Talleyrand the same evening in a polite note from Lord Castlereagh.

The Duke de Dalberg was chosen to represent France in the committee of valuation. The members met on the 31st of December. The Russian representative was appointed to state the Russian and Prussian pretensions, and he was in a position to do so with propriety, as Russia, by her arrangements concerning the frontiers of Galicia with Austria, and her abandonment of Posen to Prussia, appeared as a disinterested party in the question. He consequently spoke in the names of both countries, and made the following proposals: that Prussia, besides the Duchy of Posen, which Russia had resigned in order to smooth away the newly arisen difficulties, should also get the entire of Saxony as a compensation for the losses she had sustained. According to the Russian commissioner, less could not be done to restore Prussia to the position she held in 1805, or to fulfil the promise made to her that her geographical configuration should be improved. The King of Saxony was to be transported to the banks of the Rhine, where Prussia would give him a territory containing seven hundred thousand inhabitants, and with the pretty town of Bonn as a capital. He should also have a voice in the Diet. This prince, surrounded by a Catholic population, placed on the frontiers of France, would prevent all contact between that country and Prussia. As to Poland, the Russian government would bestow on her a separate existence and government, and would ultimately enlarge her dominions by the addition of the ancient Polish provinces in the actual possession of Russia, subject, however, to the will of the emperor, who would organise the kingdom of which he was the head according to his own views. The emperor would henceforth bear the title of Czar of Russia and King of Poland. The other powers, co-partitionists of Poland, who in virtue of the present peace would retain certain Polish provinces, should pledge themselves to give these provinces local governments calculated to secure them a certain

civil independence, a régime conformable to their national customs, and favourable to the development of their commercial and agricultural interests.

This project, supported by the most specious reasoning, was a last effort attempted by Alexander to gain Saxony for his ally, the King of Prussia. But it was very evident that his own wishes being gratified, he would not proceed to extremities to support his proposition.

The further consideration of these propositions was adjourned to the 2nd of January.

On the 1st of January Lord Castlereagh received important intelligence, which produced a very great change in his position. England had just signed articles of peace with the United States, and was henceforth at liberty to employ all her forces on the European continent. She had been very much occupied by this American war, in which she had employed all the troops that the protection of the kingdom of the Low Countries left at her disposal. Being freed from this anxiety, she was now in a position to assemble eighty-four thousand men in Holland in the spring of 1815, and thus furnish a large contingent, should it be necessary to form a new coalition against Prussia and Russia.

The committee of valuation reassembled on the 2nd of January to discuss the propositions presented in the Emperor Alexander's name. The Prussians had left the exposition of the common project to the Russians, but now undertook its defence themselves. This was an important juncture for them. It was their last attempt to get possession of Saxony; and should the verdict of a diplomatic tribunal decide against them, no resource was left but an appeal to arms. Their agents assembled in great numbers at Vienna, united great zeal to all the wonted animation of the military men of their nation, and were constantly boasting that it was they alone who had saved Europe, and that consequently they could not expect a refusal; that Saxony was their special conquest, won at Leipsic, on the fearful days of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of October 1813; that refusing to give them possession of it was depriving them of their own property; but that supported by their companions-in-arms, the Russians, they would not allow the price of their blood to be wrested from them; that, besides, they were not alone working for Prussia, but for Germany, as every territorial aggrandisement of the latter was a step towards German unity, which could only be accomplished by Prussia. It was M. de Stein especially, seconded by many German patriots, who repeated these assertions, and constantly recapitulated what he and those who shared his opinions had suffered in the cause of Germany.

Under the influence of this excitement, the Prussian legation exhibited in the committee all the ardour of the national feeling. Perfectly conscious of the opposition that these bold assertions and pretensions would meet, they became angry instead of calm, and even went so far as to say, that should what they asked be refused, they would, if necessary, obtain it by force. Lord Castlereagh, who possessed all the pride of an Englishman, and who was surprised at meeting such treatment from persons to whom he had shown so much favour, proudly met the declaration and threats of Prince de Hardenberg, and told both Russians and Prussians that England was not of a temper to submit to dictation, nor would she do it, but would meet force by force. He left the assembly in a state of excitement very unusual to him, and immediately hastened to the French embassy, where he was sure to find a response to his resentment. Forgetting now the allies of Chaumont, he told M. de Talleyrand all that had passed, and again declared that England would not suffer such insolence. Freed from the incubus of the American war, Lord Castlereagh had recovered his firm bearing, and showed a determination to brave the worst rather than submit to the arrogance of the Russians and Prussians. His adroit interlocutor skilfully flattered all his opinions, and reminded him of what he had said a few days before, that a few written words binding England, Austria, and France would put an end to the boasting of Russia and Prussia. "Put your ideas on paper," replied Lord Castlereagh; and M. de Talleyrand, without waiting for a second invitation, took up his pen. Between them they drew up a project, by which Austria, France, and England bound themselves to furnish 150,000 men each, to act in common should the defence of the balance of power in Europe expose them to the attacks of enemies. These enemies were not named, but very plainly indicated. Lord Castlereagh took this plan with him, promising to return the following day, when he should have seen and consulted with M. de Metternich.

M. de Talleyrand had attained the great object of his wishes. He came to Vienna apprehensive that the existence of the French embassy might be ignored, instead of which the French legation was called upon to play an important part in the dissolution of the alliance of Chaumont, and by the formation of a new alliance was destined to support the principle of legitimacy. An important point was certainly gained by placing France in such a position, and it was no less a gain to dissolve the coalition of Chaumont and substitute another in its stead; but it would have been well to consider what was the object of this new alliance; for if it were to support equivocal or inimical interests, there would be less reason for

congratulation, and the advantages gained might have been waited for a little longer, if by patience they could have been made more profitable to France.

Lord Castlereagh lost no time, for he seemed to hear already the cries of the British Parliament reproaching him with having passed under the Russian and Prussian yoke. He sought M. de Metternich, whom he found quite as ready as himself to throw aside his ancient alliance prejudices and accept the assistance of France against ungrateful and exacting allies. Having arranged all these points with the Austrian minister, he returned to M. de Talleyrand on the morrow—3rd of January—and brought with him the plan of the previous day, now skilfully elaborated. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich had taken great pains to give the project a pacific, and above all, a defensive character. In fact, no attack was to be made. But should one of the contracting powers, in all sincerity, and without any interested views, support a plan in conformity with the balance of power in Europe, and thereby incur the displeasure of other powers, in that case France, England, and Austria bound themselves to furnish 150,000 men each in defence of the party attacked. Lord Castlereagh wished to add to these stipulations, which were drawn up at great length, another which, in his opinion, was indispensable, and not to be disputed by any one. It was as follows:—

“As it was not now a question of ambitious projects, but rather of plans of conservation and the maintenance of a sacred principle—the preservation of legitimate princes on their thrones—there could be no objection to announcing beforehand that in case of war, *which God forbid, each power should consider itself bound by the Treaty of Paris, according to whose principles and text all States and frontiers were to be portioned out.*”

Now was M. de Talleyrand taken in a terrible snare. If in the commencement he had been less forward and less decided in declaring himself for Saxony, if instead of eagerly offering his aid he had waited to be asked, he would not have been obliged to submit to these conditions, and probably they would not have been proposed. A profound silence would have been observed, and war should have borne its own expenses, according to the issue and the services rendered by each power. But having so hastily declared his opinion in the case of Saxony, and blamed the different cabinets for their indifference, it was not possible for him to draw back now that he was taken at his word, nor avow that France could, in certain cases, seek her own interests, having previously asserted that she only sought the maintenance of a principle,

Had he sought any advantage for France, his proffered assistance would have been rejected, and England and Austria would have come to an understanding with Russia and Prussia, by yielding to their demands. In truth, this would have been no great evil, for the policy supported by these two powers was the most disadvantageous for us; the house of Saxony might have been transferred to the Rhine, and she would be our neighbour instead of Prussia.

And we might have done as well by striving to attain such a result in conjunction with the Russians and Prussians, who would have paid us in some way, and not asked us to make war for the sole honour of being their allies. But having so long supported the English and the Austrians, whom we were constantly urging and imploring to act, we could not now raise an objection and reject the proposed condition; and yet this condition was very hard! Now at the end of twenty years of desolating warfare, when we had hardly entered upon the enjoyment of peace—a peace that constituted the Bourbon's best title to popularity—to compromise that peace, and run the risk of again pouring forth French blood in torrents, merely that Germany might have less cause of uneasiness from Russia, or that Prussia might give less umbrage to Austria; and to act thus whilst those very powers for whom we were about to combat retained our spoils the more securely because of our aid, and we, recovering nothing of what we had lost, should be reduced to the honour of fighting gratuitously for the very conquerors who had contributed most to bring us back to our frontier of 1790! This was, indeed, a sad fate! But, we repeat, it was now too late to draw back, for after all that we had said and done, we could not refuse the Convention of the 3rd of January, nor the condition which, in case of war, bound us to make the Treaty of Paris the basis of a future peace. M. de Talleyrand signed without making a remark; and he was right, for it was only in silence that such a condition could be accepted. It should either be rejected with indignation and flung back to those who proposed it, or signed without a word of observation. So it was M. de Talleyrand acted. He did not even think of asking in return a promise of Murat's dethronement, an event that interested Louis XVIII. much more than the fate of Saxony. He feared to retard for one moment the accomplishment of a result he had laboured so hard to bring about; and this treaty, so much desired by M. de Talleyrand because of the importance it added to the French legation, was signed on the night of the 3rd–4th of January, and dated the 3rd. It must be confessed this treaty was of little advantage to the reigning French dynasty, whose prejudices at most it could be said to flatter. The contracting

parties pledged themselves to profound silence to avoid furnishing the Russians and Prussians with an excuse for a quarrel, and perhaps for war. Nor did they wish that the enemies of the coalition should enjoy the triumph of seeing it so scandalously divided. An exception, however, was made in favour of Bavaria, Hanover, the Low Countries, and Sardinia, whose adhesion was worth seeking, and was indeed almost certain. The Prince de Wrède, on the part of Bavaria, and the Count of Münster, as the representative of Saxony, immediately gave their sanction to what had been done. The Low Countries and Sardinia joined a few days later. The secret was still preserved intact. A plan of military operations was to be concerted between Austria, Bavaria, and France, as the powers most likely to take an active part in the war, and a wish was expressed that a skilful and friendly disposed French general should come to Vienna to take part in the arrangement of this plan. M. de Talleyrand thought of General Ricard, who had fallen into disgrace under the empire at the time of the unsuccessful attempt to obtain the sovereignty of Portugal for Marshal Soult. He was a man of talent as well as a distinguished officer, and very well calculated to figure at a congress composed of the highest personages of Europe. M. de Talleyrand immediately informed Louis XVIII. of the treaty he had concluded, and requested that General Ricard should be sent to Vienna.

Though the secret of the new coalition was scrupulously kept, still from the similarity of sentiments expressed by the courts of England, France, and Austria it was evident that they had come to an understanding, and were resolved to support their views to the last extremity. The attitude assumed by Bavaria was a no less significant symptom. Though all the German States, including those of the north, shared in her opinions, she alone—thanks to the strength she had acquired during the last fifteen years, and to her geographical position, which removed her from Prussian interference—dared to speak as she felt, or hint the possibility of war. It was all in vain that the Prussians, both publicly and in the committee, exclaimed and threatened; they were allowed to talk, but nobody swerved from the essential point—the preservation of Saxony—always excepting the loss of some territory, to be applied to improving the configuration of Prussia; and meant, as was said, to punish King Frederick Augustus. It was a mere concession to the passions of the moment to say that this unfortunate prince should be punished, for everybody knew that the fact of joining Napoleon for self-aggrandisement was a very general crime, which had been committed by the greater as well as the lesser German princes; and it was equally well

known that the unfortunate King of Saxony had only acted on compulsion; that the duplicity of his conduct in his dealings between Europe and Napoleon was the result of weakness of character; and could his conduct be compensated by defection from France, the Saxon army had seceded with sufficient éclat to obtain the pardon of its sovereign.

But though it was agreed that the King of Saxony should lose a certain portion of his States, nobody would consent that all the confiscated territory should be given to Prussia, and it was evident that on this subject a determination was come to that could not easily be shaken. The imprudent chiefs of the Prussian army were disposed to make the attempt; but their king did not wish it, nor would Alexander have sanctioned such temerity, which would be nothing less than a pursuit of the impossible. When Alexander asserted in the committee of valuation that all Saxony ought to be given to Prussia, and consented at the same time to resign the Duchy of Posen, he did all that his friend Frederick William could expect, nor would this friend have dared to ask him to engage in a war against France, England, and Austria, and almost all the German States. The state of opinion was soon evident in the committee itself from the attitude assumed by the different legations. Although Russia and Prussia still persisted in demanding Saxony, they did not hesitate to discuss arithmetical calculations when introduced by Austria. The latter power undertook to prove that, considering what Prussia had already obtained in Poland, Westphalia, and the Rhine provinces, she could not claim more than three or four hundred thousand inhabitants from Saxony to recover the position she held in 1805, and to which it had been promised she should be restored.

The Prussian diplomatists took part in this controversy, and opposing valuation to valuation, asserted that they ought to get more than half Saxony in territory as well as in population. Taking up this position was equivalent to admitting they were defeated, for they accepted the principle of their adversaries—the conservation of Saxony, with the exception of some sacrifices of greater or less extent. The treaty of the 3rd January, thought kept secret, had by combining the antagonists of Russia and Prussia contributed not a little to solve the fundamental question. And in fact, once the discussion was reduced to an arithmetical calculation, there could be no doubt of a good understanding being come to.

The month of January was devoted to discussions of this kind. One circumstance in particular contributed to bring about a definite result. The British Parliament was to assemble as usual in February. Lord Castlereagh had been recalled by his colleagues in order to justify his conduct, which

was not understood by the general public, and was in the opinion of the better informed subject to the charge of inconsistency; for though at the close he defended the cause of Saxony, he had at the commencement consented to sacrifice her. The Duke of Wellington was to leave Paris and replace Lord Castlereagh at Vienna. The illustrious British secretary of State, now certain of making Prussia submit on the fundamental question, was anxious to compensate her by smaller concessions, and so win her back by his favourite system of alliance, and at the same time facilitate the termination of the Congress by his compliance in ancillary points. He did not wish to leave Vienna until the principal questions should be decided, and until he had something positive to communicate to Parliament. The desire to return home was universal. The sovereigns, both those who received and he who gave hospitality (it had already cost the latter twenty-five million francs), were weary of this mélange of frivolous festivals and bitter discussions. They had passed two entire years—1813 and 1814—in all the anxieties of a fearful war and of an armed and agitated diplomacy. They were impatient to return home, to look after their own affairs, and enjoy the peace with their subjects. It is weariness rather than reason that terminates long disputes. Now everything tended to concord, when for two months past everything seemed to threaten a serious rupture, and a new war to determine the partition of the fruits of victory.

M. de Talleyrand, who was as anxious about appearances as essentials, even whilst he despised the former, had in order to flatter the imprudent party that preponderated in France persuaded the assembled sovereigns to mingle a funeral ceremony for Louis XVI. in the almost uninterrupted course of their festivities. This would naturally take place on the 21st January. M. de Talleyrand attached great importance to this on account of the double effect it would produce at Vienna and at Paris. At Vienna it would be an act of marked deference to the French legation, whilst it would please the royalists at Paris, and prove how much influence M. de Talleyrand exercised over crowned heads. Such a proposition, whether opportune or not, could not be rejected, for none could refuse a tribute of homage to the august victim of the 21st January, nor could it be unwelcome to the sovereigns, as it was a new malediction pronounced upon the French Revolution. The Emperor Alexander, though he offered no opposition, made a simple observation. He said that nobody could doubt the sentiments that all Europe entertained for the unfortunate Louis XVI., but that this was a display of party feeling which, impolitic at Paris, could only obtain a bad and unworthy

imitation at Vienna. He added, that should the ceremony be performed he would of course attend, as the members of the French legation must best understand the feelings of their government.

This assemblage of crowned heads, that had a little before incurred such ridicule by the excess of their amusements and luxury, now suddenly donned habiliments of woe, and repaired in a body to the beautiful cathedral of St. Stephen on the 21st January, to assist at a solemn service in honour of Louis XVI. Nothing was wanting to the pomp of this ceremony. All the sovereigns came, accompanied by their courts; a French priest pronounced the funeral oration of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, and after a few hours of political mourning, they returned to the festivities and business of the Congress, of which, indeed, the former are as celebrated as the latter.

MM. de Metternich, de Talleyrand, and Lord Castlereagh, seeing Prussia nearly conquered, concerted, under the direction of Prince de Schwarzenberg, the representative of Austrian military interests, how they could best divide Saxony and satisfy the cupidity of her neighbour without entirely destroying her existence. It was at first agreed to deprive her of her territories on the right of the Elbe, particularly of Upper and Lower Lusatia. Saxony proper was more on the left of the Elbe, the possessions on the right being only annexed provinces. However, though deprived of Upper and Lower Lusatia, she would retain the territories that bordered on Bohemia, that is, Bautzen and Zittau.

It was next decided to diminish the Saxon territories on the left of the Elbe, in the direction of Misnia and Thuringia—that is, towards the extensive and level, but least populous portions of the country, leaving her the mountainous districts inhabited by an industrious race, and interesting to Austria, whose frontier they touched. It was at first intended to take but four or five hundred thousand souls from the hapless monarchy, thus exposed to the spatula of the geographers of the Congress; but in compliance with Lord Castlereagh's entreaties, who was anxious to recover the friendship of the Prussians, and above all, to bring things to a speedy termination, it was decided to take seven thousand inhabitants out of the two millions one hundred thousand that the Old Saxon territory contained. She was thus deprived of a third of her population, and of very nearly the half of her territory. The places she held on the Elbe possessed a value far greater in proportion than the extent of territory. One—Torgau—was very warmly disputed. Having given up Wittenberg, it would be a serious loss to abandon Torgau, which in Napoleon's opinion—an opinion supported by his acts—was become the principal fortress on

the Upper Elbe. Prince de Schwarzenberg and M. de Talleyrand resisted this demand, but being abandoned by Lord Castlereagh, they were obliged to yield. A plan was finally arranged by which Prussia, in addition to the important fortresses of Torgau and Wittenberg, obtained one-half of the Saxon territory and a third of her population. It is true that Frederick Augustus retained the principal cities and the richest territories of Saxony.

This plan, decided on by Austria, France, and England, whilst the members of the committee were disputing, and often disputing violently, was presented to the committee of valuation in the beginning of February. This was evidently a concerted plan, and it was plain that the Russians and Prussians would not obtain much more, even if they proceeded to an open rupture. The promises made to Prussia were more than fulfilled, for she was restored to the position she held in 1805, and a better configuration was given to some of her frontiers. From a second, Saxony was become a third-rate German State. Russia having resigned Posen and run the risk of war for Prussia, could not be expected to do more. Prussia saw this, and determined to yield. But there was one point which touched her nearly, because it involved the self-love of her army and the commercial interests of her merchants, and this was the possession of the celebrated city of Leipsic. The acquisition of Leipsic would be an indemnification to the pride of the Prussians for the humiliation of being obliged to evacuate Saxony, which, they said, they had been allowed to occupy, which was equivalent to a promise of permitting them to keep the country for ever.

Consequently, on the 8th of February, Prussia presented a note in which she for the first time consented to the proposed arrangement, but demanded the city of Leipsic in consideration of having received the poorest and least populous portion of Saxony—a portion that did not contain a single important city. She insinuated, though in very moderate terms, that whilst she was restored to the position she held in 1805, Austria gained, in addition to what she possessed at that period, fifteen hundred thousand souls directly, and at least two millions indirectly, in her collateral branches at Florence, Modena, Parma, &c.

As it generally happens, the last day of discussion was one of the most stormy. King Frederick William had an interview with Lord Castlereagh, and told him that there was a combination to dishonour him, and render his return to Berlin impossible by depriving him of Saxony after having been allowed to occupy it, and that the possession of Leipsic could alone mollify the bitterness of such a sacrifice. It was easy to reply, that it was his own fault if evacuating Saxony was

so disagreeable, for he had taken possession of it by a kind of *coup de tête*, which it was impossible to support, and he had only to blame himself for the consequences. Lord Castlereagh communicated Frederick William's entreaties to his allies; but besides that England, for commercial reasons, would prefer that Leipsic should belong to a small rather than a large State, the British minister met with so much resistance that he yielded the point. But it was agreed that some further concession should be made to Prussia, who disputed obstinately, thousand by thousand, the souls in the contested territory. England, on Hanover's part, gave up 70,000 souls out of the 300,000 she was to get from Prussia, and 50,000 in the Low Countries, whilst Alexander, in his desire to satisfy all parties, made a still greater sacrifice. He had wished that Cracow from its moral, and Thorn from its military importance, should remain free and neutral cities. He abandoned this idea, and consented that Thorn should be given to Prussia, who would thus be put in possession of all the fortresses on the Lower Vistula—Thorn, Graudenz, and Dantzic—after having already obtained all the fortresses on the Elbe—Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, &c., &c. It was at this price that Leipsic was preserved to Saxony, and that Prussia agreed at last to the proposed arrangements. She certainly had no cause to complain; and yet the irascible Blucher, giving way to an exaggeration of expression unworthy his well-known bravery, exclaimed that no soldier could wear the Prussian uniform with honour. He had proved, and was fated to prove again, that it could be worn with honour.

The principal difficulties of the Congress were thus removed; and if the questions still to be solved called for exertion and even sacrifices, still none were of a nature to excite apprehensions of war, of which the sovereigns were so convinced, that they showed a disposition to return to their homes, and leave their ministers to settle the remaining business.

Still there was a final difficulty to be overcome with regard to Saxony, and one not to be despised even by the allies, powerful as they were; this was to obtain the consent of King Frederick Augustus. This gentle and affable prince, a prisoner at Berlin, had resolved never to give his sanction to any act inimical to his authority, and especially to any attempt to remove the seat of his power from Saxony. Now according to the principle laid down then and at all other times, no territorial possession could be justly and irrevocably acquired without the free and voluntary consent of the lawful sovereign. This principle, which had been constantly asserted by M. de Talleyrand with the intention of employing it afterwards against Murat, gave great moral strength to the King of Saxony at an epoch when the *definite* was the passion of the moment, and

when the common desire was to exchange the instability of the revolution for the stability of monarchy, all acquirers of new States were most anxious to obtain the consent of the old possessors. To obtain the King of Saxony's consent, it was determined to set him at liberty, and bring him to Austria; not, indeed, to Vienna, where he would find his despoilers as well as defenders, but to Presburg, whither the three principal ministers of the courts that had espoused his cause, M. de Talleyrand, M. de Metternich, and the Duke of Wellington (he had replaced Lord Castlereagh), should repair, and use all their influence to induce him to resign.

With the exception of Italy, almost all the European questions were solved. The formation of the kingdom of the Low Countries, which had been stipulated by England at Chaumont and Paris, was definitely agreed on at Vienna. It was decided that the Prince of Orange, the representative of this house, should receive the united sceptres of Holland and Belgium, with the title of King of the Low Countries. Some other territorial arrangements were added to this. It would not be allowed that Luxemburg and Mayence should become Prussian fortresses. The Duchy of Luxemburg was given to the future king of the Low Countries, together with the fortress of that name, which was to remain federal; and Prussia, who was already mistress of all we had possessed on that side, was to be compensated by the hereditary States of the Prince of Orange, which she could exchange with the house of Nassau. By these arrangements France would touch but a very small part of the Prussian frontier, that is, from Sarreguemines to Thionville, instead of from Sarreguemines to Mezières.

Many changes were made to give a better configuration to the Prussian territory. Under the title of the Rhenish provinces she got the old ecclesiastical electorates of Cologne and Trèves, together with the Duchy of Juliers, all which, since 1803, had composed a large part of the French territory on the left of the Rhine. There still remained of our possessions on this shore the old palatinate, called the Palatinate of the Rhine, comprising the country between the Rhine and the Moselle from Lanterberg to Worms, and from Bohrbach to Kreuznach. There was no great difficulty on this subject, as Austria and Prussia had agreed that the Moselle should be the line of demarcation between their dependencies. The Rhine Palatinate was given to Bavaria, and what remained of the territories of the Elector of Mayence was given to Hesse-Darmstadt, which had been restored together with Hesse-Cassel. Mayence, which had been given to Hesse-Darmstadt, was to be a federal fortress, in which the German States were to keep a common garrison. In return for these acquisitions, Hesse-Darmstadt

gave Prussia the ancient Duchy of Westphalia, by which Prussia, that was already in possession of the Grand Duchy of Berg, which we had held on the right of the Rhine, acquired a continuation of territory from the Rhine to the Elbe, and only interrupted by the territories of minor German princes dependent on her. Besides the principality of Hildesheim, Prussia gave Hanover Ostfriesland, which England ambitioned, because it lay contiguous to the sea, and Hanover gave her the Duchy of Lauenburg, on the right of the Elbe, of which Prussia intended to make a very important use by giving it to Denmark in exchange for Swedish Pomerania.

The unfortunate King of Denmark was little better treated than the King of Saxony. He had been faithful to France, because his maritime principles united him to her against England. He had acted honourably throughout; and when our defeat obliged him to abandon us, he did so without any duplicity. But badly recompensed in these days of violence for his honourable conduct, he was deprived of Norway, which was given to Bernadotte as an indemnity for Finland, in order to procure him a degree of popularity that might compensate for his want of birth. When these territories were taken from Denmark she was promised Swedish Pomerania, containing the fortress of Stralsund and the island of Rügen, trifling remnants of the old Swedish possessions on the German continent; she was also promised further indemnities. The king had come to Vienna to demand the fulfilment of this promise; but though he conducted himself with the greatest discretion and dignity, and defended his incontestable rights with the greatest moderation, and though his claim was fully allowed, still no notice was taken of him, nor were his ministers admitted to the Congress. The celebrated phrase, *Væ victis*, was never more completely verified; and out of the thirty-two million inhabitants taken from the French empire, a small number could not be found to compensate this prince for what had been taken from him; and this for the sake of the general good, as was said, which good consisted in giving Norway to Bernadotte. Besides, it was not even certain that he should get the miserable indemnity of Swedish Pomerania, as Bernadotte refused to give it up under the pretence that the allies had not fulfilled their engagement to give him Norway, as the Norwegians had resisted by force of arms.

The measure of iniquity would in all probability have been filled, but that Prussia wished to get Swedish Pomerania. In fact, the Prussian territory, which had not been formed by nature, but by the ambition of its princes, who had put it together by scraps and morsels, was now undergoing a general remodelling, and the time was well chosen, for after the short

opposition that had been made to the Prussians, they were now allowed to do as they pleased; by England, because she wished to recover their alliance for the sake of the Low Countries, by Russia through complaisance, and by Austria that she might not be disturbed in Italy. Prussia was, consequently, seeking exchanges that would secure her a continuity of territory from the Rhine to the Niemen. It was for this reason that she gave Luxemburg, as we have said, to the house of Orange in exchange for its hereditary possessions, in order that she might exchange these with Nassau for different places in Hesse. For the same reason she had demanded a portion of the old electorate of Mayence, which she meant to give Hesse-Darmstadt for the Duchy of Westphalia. Lastly, she wished to get Swedish Pomerania, that she might have all the mouths of the Oder and the shores of the Baltic from Mecklenburg to Memel. In return, she offered Denmark the Duchy of Lauenburg, which she had just got from Hanover, and which was contiguous to Holstein. But Denmark did not consider this as an equivalent for Swedish Pomerania, and anything but a fulfilment of the solemn promise made her of a full indemnification for Norway. Prussia thought to supply the deficiency by some millions of crowns, for territory she would have by purchase if she could not succeed by force. The King of Denmark, seeing the hopelessness of his case, and considering that a territory contiguous to his States in Holstein was better than one so distant as Pomerania, which besides he was not certain of getting, as Sweden refused to give it up, yielded at last to the wishes of Prussia. Denmark deserved better treatment, as well in consideration of the personal qualities of her sovereign and people, and the honourable manner in which she had acted, as for the guardianship of the Sound, which made her of more importance to the balance of power in Europe than many others. But she was conquered; and if, when the victor is one man, like Napoleon, the conquered have some chance of touching his generosity, they have none when subdued by many, as was now the case, for all, occupied with their individual interests, and seizing what they could, had neither feeling nor shame, because that, in a corporation, each member casts upon the entire body the responsibility of acts for which the individual would blush.

In order to complete her projects of exchange, Prussia was obliged to submit to the recognition of Bavaria's claim to the principalities of Anspach and Bayreuth in Franconia, and which had formerly belonged to Prussia, that she might in return obtain the Grand Duchy of Berg, which had formerly belonged to Bavaria.

Thanks to all these arrangements, Prussia was now as well circumstanced as she could expect. Her territories extended

without interruption from the Meuse to the Niemen, and expanded a little, though not as much as she desired, in the direction of Saxony; and by the restitution of Posen she was better enclosed by the provinces of Silesia and Old Prussia, at the same time that she got possession of the different fortresses on the rivers that watered it—Thorn, Graudenz, and Dantzic on the Vistula; Breslau, Glogau, and Stettin on the Oder; Coblentz and Cologne on the Rhine. She had but one thing to regret, which was being placed on the left of the Rhine; not because of the neighbourhood, which fortunately is not an infallible cause of hostility, but of the distrust she must feel in the possession of a territory that had belonged to France for twenty years. To the honour of her good sense, it must be admitted that she had never wished, and had only accepted it through complaisance to England, who wished to keep her at enmity with France as long as possible. Had Saxony been ceded to Prussia, she would willingly have abandoned the left bank of the Rhine, even though France should get the better part of what she left.

Now that the reconstitution of Prussia and the re-establishment of the two houses of Hesse were effected, and the account with Denmark so unjustly closed, the most important business of the Congress was the arrangement of the Bavarian territory. This had been commenced even in Paris. It was understood that Bavaria should restore the line of the Inn, the Tyrol, and Vorarlberg to Austria, who would give her in return the Grand Duchy of Würzburg, which was become vacant by the return of the Archduke Ferdinand to Tuscany, the principality of Aschaffenburg, which had been taken from the prince primate, the deposed head of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the greater part of the ancient Rhine Palatinate, which had formerly belonged to Bavaria. This, under the pretext of restoring each State to its old position, was a new plan of the allies of Chaumont for keeping Bavaria as well as Prussia at enmity with France. Once that the question of Saxony and Poland, by which a new war had been threatened, was decided, it would seem that a spirit of compliance had taken possession of all, and through the mediation of France, the courts of Austria and Bavaria, with both of whom she was allied since the 3rd of January, were on the eve of coming to an understanding. The sole remaining cause of disagreement was the old bishopric of Salzburg, which was necessarily to be divided as the line of the Inn and La Salza was taken as a frontier. Bavaria was desirous of retaining at least Berchtolsgraden, which had been formerly so contested on account of its salt-mines. To avoid giving a decision in this case, France urged the disputants to come to an arrangement, and they were about to do so.

Every question relating to the north of Europe was now settled. The principles of the new Germanic constitution were decided on. Austria, who had acted with great prudence throughout, had refused the revival of the Germanic crown, which would have been willingly conceded, nor would she accept the Belgian provinces, where her sovereignty was preferred to that of Holland, and which England would have willingly accorded in order to bring her, as well as Prussia and Bavaria, into contact with France. Though Austria was very well satisfied that others should commit themselves, she had no desire to compromise herself by taking possession of the Belgian provinces, which, though rich, beautiful, and well situated, were remote from her capital, and too near France. The Venetian and Milanese provinces, less industrial, but equally fertile, and better situated with regard to her, suited her better. She had already felt the weight of the Germanic crown, and did not desire to possess it again, should it be elective. But as Prussia, in hope of obtaining it one day herself, insisted on this condition, Austria had the good sense to refuse a cumbersome crown, which each successive emperor could only obtain by flattering the electors at the commencement of his reign, and which might possibly be transferred to Prussia. She preferred having this crown abolished, and converted into what was more useful to her, the perpetual presidency of the German Diet. It is true that by this arrangement a most important question—the military command of the Confederation—was left undecided, and would become a future difficulty. At this moment peace was the absorbing thought, for it seems that the public mind is capable of entertaining but one idea at a time.

The ancient Diet, simplified with Austria as perpetual president, was the system generally preferred. Instead of the divisions into different orders and a large number of voters, it was determined to yield to the spirit of the time, and concentrate the votes as well as the sovereignty. An ordinary assembly of seventeen members was established, of which each had but one vote, however extensive his possessions, be it Austria or Baden, Prussia or Mecklenburg; whilst the inferior princes were to be united in different groups, with a vote to each group. The free cities—which were reduced to Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfort, and Lübeck—were to have but one vote between them. Besides this ordinary assembly, established in perpetuity at Frankfort, for the arrangement of current business and for the decision of cases of competency, another assembly was established, called the General Assembly, consisting of sixty-nine voters, in which each member should have votes proportioned to his possessions, when fundamental laws on the great interests of the Confederation were in question.

It must be admitted that this new constitution of the Germanic Confederation was in conformity with the annihilation of social distinctions, and with the decreased number of petty princes, and in a word, with the simplification of modern society. The confederates preserved their independent sovereignties, could have their separate armies, and send representatives to the different courts of Europe; but they could not contract any alliance inimical to the federal compact or the safety of the Confederation, and were bound to furnish, each according to his possessions, a contingent in defence of the general interest.

These were healthy ideas, and though capable of misapplication under certain circumstances, may be considered as some of the best decisions of the Congress. When the month of February arrived, these different resolutions were either reduced to writing or agreed on; for all these minor questions had been under consideration during the discussion of the important interests which seemed to threaten a universal conflagration. When the results obtained by the particular treaties contracted between the interested parties had been approved, it was determined to draw up a general treaty, composed of all that these minor treaties contained of a general and permanent interest, and which was to be signed as arbiters and guarantees by the eight powers who had subscribed the Treaty of Paris, and which the other States represented at Vienna were also to sign, as interested and personally engaged parties. This is what was afterwards published under the title of "Final Act of Vienna."

The drawing up of these different acts was commenced in February 1815, but could not be finished for several weeks. Meanwhile the last doubtful questions were taken into consideration. That of Switzerland was of the number. This question had been a subject of serious consideration to the special committee entrusted with its arrangement, and also to the three powers who interfered privately, Russia, Austria, and France. The Emperor Alexander, influenced by liberal principles, did not wish to appear in Switzerland as the author of an extravagant counter-revolution; Austria, who cared little about liberal sentiments, sought only what was practicable and reasonable; whilst France, who had adherents both in Berne and in the small democratic cantons, was anxious to bring about a decision that would not offend either. From this general spirit of moderation nothing could result but what was rational and conformable to the spirit of the times. We have already seen that the three principal powers were opposed to the new cantons being again reduced to a state of dependence, and had it laid down as a principle that the nineteen cantons

constituted by the Act of Mediation should be maintained. France, whose aid against this decision was implored by the inhabitants of Berne, Uri, Lucerne, Schwitz, and Unterwalden, was happily represented by an enlightened man, the Duke de Dalberg, who succeeded in making those cantons understand that no other principle was admissible; for it would be impossible to reduce Vaud, Argovia, St. Gall, &c., to their ancient state of dependence without a civil war—an idea revolting to Europe. The principle of the nineteen cantons was, consequently, definitely admitted. However, as Berne had been formerly so extensive and rich a canton, and was now become so small, it was only just and prudent to make her some compensation. Imperial France, whose spoils were used to satisfy every demand, had left some fragments of territory (Porentruy and the ancient bishopric of Basle) vacant on this side of the Jura. These were offered as an indemnification to Berne, and were finally accepted. It was also decided that the new cantons should make a pecuniary compensation to the old that had been injured by their separation. The new cantons, happy to secure their existence at this price, consented to make this compensation, and thus all difficulties were smoothed away. It was also required in the federal compact that the principle of civil equality, both between the cantons and the different classes of citizens, should be proclaimed and approved. Finally, Switzerland was presented with some gems that had fallen from the imperial crown of France; for Neufchâtel, which had been given to Prince Berthier; Geneva, which had been lately restored to its primitive state of a free city; together with Valais, which was vibrating between France and Italy, were formed into three new cantons, and added to the nineteen.

The plan of transferring the federal government alternately to the different cantons, which had been suggested by the Act of Mediation, was continued in operation. Alexander, still under M. de la Harpe's influence, wished to exclude Berne. But France, from a sense of justice, and in consideration of her Swiss adherents, objected to this; as did also Austria, through sympathy with the aristocratic party; therefore Berne, Zürich, and Lucerne continued to be the three cantons between which the government of the Swiss Confederation was to alternate.

By these arrangements the Act of Mediation was almost renewed, whilst some reparation was made to the interested parties, and three cantons were added that had been taken from France. These resolutions being communicated to Switzerland, and having received the approbation of the different cantons, were about to receive the sanction of Europe, with the usual guarantee of perpetual neutrality.

Italy still remained, and here were two questions of great importance, those of Naples and Parma, which had been deferred, hoping that time would bring about a solution. As we have already said, the Sardinian question had been decided by giving Genoa to Piedmont, and by securing the succession to the Carignan branch. Austria did not allow any one to decide in her affairs, but having adjudged Lombardy so far as the Po and Tessin to herself, she had put the collateral branches of the imperial family into immediate possession of the Duchies of Tuscany and Modena. There remained to be decided only Parma and Naples, which the two houses of Bourbon demanded for the Queen of Etruria and Ferdinand IV. M. de Talleyrand, who in the commencement had been so anxious about the Neapolitan affairs, had allowed himself to become so involved in the Saxon question, that he had hardly spoken of Italy to M. de Metternich, and had not stipulated that Austria should support France on the Naples question, as a reward for the assistance he had given in the affairs of the north. He had contented himself with the unimportant reservation, that all votes on Italian affairs should be provisional until the question of the two Sicilies should be decided. This precaution was of no great use, for the only question that could have been decided was that relating to Sardinia, and we were more interested than any other power in rendering these decisions definite.

M. de Talleyrand left all to the good feeling of the Congress until the very last day; and in the desire that every one felt to leave, it was very much to be feared that the Congress would break up without coming to a decision, which would save Murat, who, being in possession, needed only silence to gain his cause.

However, Louis XVIII. did not cease to urge his plenipotentiary on this subject, which interested him much more than Saxony. This monarch, whose views in foreign policy were narrow though sensible, had no desire that his legation should play an active part at Vienna. He was proud, as we have said, of being a Bourbon; he was happy at being placed on the throne of France, and thought himself sufficiently great if he could only hold his position. He only wished to get rid of Murat, whom he regarded as the secret accomplice of Napoleon, ready to provide him with the means of coming again into action, either in France or Italy, in which views it must be admitted that he showed more foresight than M. de Talleyrand, who concentrated all his energies on Saxony. However, now that the Saxon question was decided, M. de Talleyrand, urged on by Louis XVIII., began to speak of Italy to all the members of the Congress; but he was now powerless, in consequence

of not having taken his precautions beforehand with England and Austria. That he should have given time to M. de Metternich for the Neapolitan question, which required time for its full solution, was very proper; but that he should ally himself gratuitously to England and Austria for the sole pleasure of signing a treaty, without making any stipulation with regard to Murat, was a mode of proceeding for which he might have paid dearly, and which did eventually cost him dear. The Emperor of Russia, to whom he spoke on the subject, listened as though he had fulfilled all his obligations towards France. Lord Castlereagh listened like an ally who wished to make himself agreeable, but who took no interest in questions of legitimacy, and was besides embarrassed by the promises made to Murat. M. de Metternich listened to the French ambassador like a wily diplomatist, who having made use of France did not trouble himself about being grateful, and was constantly apprehensive of exciting a commotion in Italy.

Happily for M. de Talleyrand he found a support in the Duke of Wellington, who had lately arrived at Vienna. Louis XVIII. had during his residence in England acquired much of the English habits and manners, and had adroitly flattered the British generalissimo, and won him over to his interests. When Lord Wellington arrived at Vienna he rendered important service to Louis XVIII. by the manner in which he spoke of him and his government. "Many faults are committed at Paris," he said, "but the king, who has more sense than any of his family, is generally esteemed. The army is more formidable than ever. It might be dangerous to employ the soldiers at home, but abroad they would be both faithful and terrible. The finances are re-established, and even flourishing. A government alone is wanting; there are ministers, but no ministry; but that can be provided for. Of all the European powers, France is the best prepared for war, and would be the least embarrassed were warfare renewed. She must not be neglected." These words were of more service to us than all the exertions of the French legation; and being uttered when the Russians and Prussians were called upon to come to a decision, had a very marked influence upon them.

Lord Wellington had fully adopted M. de Talleyrand's ideas with regard to Naples. And this for more practical reasons than the principle of legitimacy; for, as M. de Talleyrand wittily said in one of his letters to Louis XVIII., the English *had formed their moral notions on this subject in India*. The Duke of Wellington believed that the Bourbons reigning at Paris, at Madrid, and at Palermo, whilst Murat remained unsupported at Naples, it would soon become impossible to remain at peace with him, and that within six months all Europe would be thrown

into confusion, which would give Napoleon an opportunity of again coming into action. This he explained to the Emperor Alexander, to the King of Prussia, the Emperor Francis, and more especially to M. de Metternich, who was the least inclined of all to interfere. These observations were met by an objection quite as true, that the execution of the project would be most hazardous, as it would certainly involve all Italy in war. M. de Talleyrand replied that France and Spain would become responsible for the risk, and provided that a simple declaration were made, importing that the powers assembled at Vienna would only recognise Ferdinand IV. as King of the two Sicilies, France would promise to bring the affair to a conclusion. To this was objected the engagements that had been made with Murat, and also some doubts as to the means of execution, not that any one supposed it would be difficult for the French troops to beat the Neapolitans, but it was doubted whether the French army, when led on against Murat, and probably against Napoleon, would remain faithful to the Bourbons.

Nobody at Vienna felt any interest in Murat. On the contrary, all wished his dethronement. But now that the Saxon-Polish question was decided, and the wishes of the different powers gratified, they were only anxious to leave, and scarcely listened to what was said about Naples; in fact, all were resolved to subscribe on the last day to whatever determination France and Austria should arrive at. In the midst of this universal indifference an accidental circumstance came to M. de Talleyrand's assistance. Lord Castlereagh wanted his help on the question of the slave trade, in which the English people took the greatest interest, but about which the continental cabinets cared little, who only took part in that as in the Neapolitan question through complaisance. Lord Castlereagh was returning to England to announce the conclusion of peace and the long wished for humiliation of France, with the establishment of the kingdom of the Low Countries, the definite possession of Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, the isle of France, and many other magnificent gifts; but still he needed something else to gratify the popular feeling, which though most noble in its object, for it was the abolition of slavery, exhibited the characteristics of most popular wishes—want of reflection and impatience. Excited by the speeches of popular orators, the English people were seized with an absolute passion for the emancipation of the blacks, and this passion was sincere; but we must be permitted to say, that though sincere, this passion was not wholly disinterested. If the abolition of slavery involved a political convulsion in India, the English might have been less anxious for its success. But as it only endangered America, they were free to indulge their feelings without risk

to their interest. The English were, consequently, passionately anxious for the abolition of the slave trade; and as Louis XVIII. was aware of the intensity of their feelings on this subject, he very craftily advised M. de Talleyrand to have no scruple in drawing what advantage he could from their sentiments.

As the continental powers had neither interest nor opinion on a question that only concerned the maritime States, which were France, Spain, and Portugal, and as of these France had most authority, M. de Talleyrand would necessarily have great influence, which he promised to use in Lord Castlereagh's interest, provided that, in return, the latter would assist him in the affair of Naples. These two questions, which were left to the last, were on the part of the Congress mere acts of politeness towards the cabinets interested in them.

Lord Castlereagh first demanded the absolute and immediate abolition of the slave trade on the shores of Africa, and even required that the maritime States should have the right of watching each other, that is, the right of search, to be certain that none took part in the slave traffic; and he further demanded that the colonial goods of nations that refused to join this humane league should be refused admission to the other markets. This was asking a great deal, for the right of search could only be exercised by England, who alone took an active part in the pursuit of slave dealers. This negotiation was at first confined to the maritime powers; but as Lord Castlereagh felt himself isolated amongst them, he had induced the continental States to take part in the debate, a measure which gained him some support. He endeavoured to prove to France, Spain, and Portugal that the slave trade was injurious to them, that it was dangerous to have a great number of blacks in their colonies opposed to a small number of whites, and that it would be much better to content themselves with the negroes they had, and the posterity they would have when better treated. He was told in reply that in all probability he was right, but that in Spanish and Portuguese colonies the number of blacks and whites was nearly equal, whilst in the English dependencies there were about twenty negroes to one white, which made his advice very applicable to his own countrymen, who had taken their precautions, and filled their colonies with blacks during the maritime war, which neither the French, Spanish, or Portuguese had been able to do; that consequently they would not for some years have a sufficient number of hands, and would not until then be in a position to abolish the slave trade. After a good deal of discussion France for herself was satisfied with a term of five years, and had induced Spain and Portugal to be content with eight, at the termination of which period the slave trade was to be abolished.

This was not exactly what Lord Castlereagh desired ; but his arguments produced no result. The reciprocal right of search, which was now brought forward for the first time, surprised and displeased every one. It had been maintained, as a principle, that each nation should have the jurisdiction of her own flag in time of peace. As to a repressive commercial measure against the maritime nations who would not join in the English system, the difficulty was avoided by referring its decision to the time when the slave trade, being abolished, a penalty might be attached to its infringement. In order to satisfy Lord Castlereagh, who wished to have something definite to present to the British Parliament, a declaration, addressed to all nations, was drawn up in the names of the powers assembled at Vienna, condemning the slave trade as a moral enormity, declaring it a crime against civilisation and humanity, and expressing a wish for its speedy abolition. In this the allies of Chaumont, supported by the representative of the French Restoration, put forth a declaration which, though essentially true, equalled in style the most declamatory emanations of the Constitutional Assembly. MM. de Nesselrode, Metternich, and Talleyrand supported Lord Castlereagh in terms at which they smiled in secret, for the interest they felt in the emancipation of the blacks might be easily divined from the manner in which they disposed of European peoples.

Now that the Congress was approaching its close, and that questions of self-interest had been so largely cared for, it was thought proper to bestow some consideration on questions of a moral nature, and many excellent regulations for the free navigation of large rivers were adopted. It was decided that all should be open, and that the States on their shores could refuse any merchandise they did not wish to accept, but could not prevent their transit to other States ; that only a duty on tonnage could be enforced, and that independent of the quality or value of the cargoes ; that these dues should be always expended for the maintenance of the navigation of the rivers ; and lastly, that these dues should furnish sufficient means of towing. These noble principles, dictated by justice and good sense, and announced in perfect sincerity, have done lasting honour to the Congress of Vienna, and are, with the neutrality of Switzerland and the abolition of slavery, the sole amongst its decrees which have been enrolled amongst the laws of nations.

All was now finished at Vienna except the questions of Parma and Naples, which were still in suspense ; and all that M. de Talleyrand could obtain from Lord Castlereagh, whom he had so ably assisted on the slave question, was that on the very day of his arrival in London he would lay the Neapolitan question before the British cabinet. The question as to whether

Napoleon was to be left at Elba or transferred to the Azores was considered involved in that which touched Murat, and all discussion on that subject was avoided in consideration of the treaty of the 11th April, by which Alexander considered himself personally bound. Both, it was said, would be arranged the same day, but it would be difficult to come to an immediate decision. It was insisted that the two millions promised by the treaty of the 11th April should be paid to Napoleon, and M. de Talleyrand was told that it was not only mean, but dangerous to refuse, as the non-payment would give Napoleon a legitimate excuse for considering himself freed from his engagements to Europe.

The Congress was about to close, and no decision had been come to on those questions that were most important to the Bourbons. Lord Castlereagh was to leave on the 15th of February, and Alexander, after many delays, on the 20th, when Murat, as was his wont, came to the aid of those who desired his ruin, but who could not accomplish it. His minister at the Congress, the Duke de Campo Chiaro, had been excluded for the same reason as the representatives of Saxony, Denmark, and Genoa. From this gentleman he received constant information of the efforts of the two houses of Bourbon against him, and of the possibility of an explosion on the question of Saxony. Poor Murat, thinking this a good opportunity, sent a note through the Duke de Campo Chiaro, in which he detailed all that had been done contrary to his interests in the Congress of Vienna, and demanded whether he was to consider himself at peace or war with the two houses of Bourbon, and insinuated that in case he should be forced to defend himself, he would be obliged to pass through several Italian States. Murat flattered himself that this declaration, arriving at the very moment of a rupture between the greater powers, would furnish him both the right and the opportunity of acting against the enemies of his crown. Thus was M. de Metternich's prophecy fulfilled, that the allies need only wait a little while, and they would have a specious pretext for considering themselves freed from their engagements to the hapless Murat. Besides, the papers that had been found on Lord Oxford, whose arrest we have already mentioned, together with other intercepted documents, proved that Murat had a part in all the troubles that threatened Italy. There were therefore sufficient reasons now to urge against those who still considered themselves bound to Murat.

When the Duke de Campo Chiaro received the above mentioned note, he at once saw how inopportunistically it arrived, for the question of Saxony and all others that had threatened the unity of the cabinets had been definitely decided. He immediately waited on M. de Metternich, showed him the document

he had received, but begged him to consider it as non-existent, for that he would take upon himself to suppress it. This did not prevent M. de Metternich from telling of its arrival to the Duke of Wellington and Lord Castlereagh, who told it to M. de Talleyrand, who told everybody. This document, a seasonable arrival to persons who sought a cause of complaint, produced as much effect as though it were officially announced, for persons are never more powerfully excited than when they wish to be so. M. de Metternich, in concert with M. de Talleyrand and the Duke of Wellington, decided, that as Austria was now free from all anxiety with regard to Saxony and Poland, she should assemble one hundred and fifty thousand men on the Po, and declare that these precautions were taken to protect her territory and that of the Austrian princes established in Italy. This was almost a decided declaration of war against Murat, and at the same time gave Lord Castlereagh an opportunity of revealing all the intricacies of this affair to Parliament. It was reserved for France to strike the last blow. M. de Talleyrand was satisfied with a measure which was almost the solution he had desired, and which he had almost despaired of obtaining.

The Parma question was decided at the same time. The question had undergone many vicissitudes. At the earnest entreaties of France and Spain, the committee appointed to examine into Italian affairs had admitted that amid the universal restoration of hereditary princes it would be difficult to refuse the re-establishment of the house of Parma. But the treaty of the 11th of April, constantly defended by Alexander, was a restraint, as was also consideration for Marie Louise's father. It was almost impossible to get out of this embarrassment. At one time it was thought to decide the question at the Pope's expense by giving Marie Louise one of the Legations, which at her death should revert to the Holy See. But the Pope's representative asserted very justly that his master had as much right to the Legations as the other restored monarchs had to their dominions, and that these provinces, the richest belonging to the States of the Church, were absolutely needed for the support of the Pope's finances. As this could not be denied, M. de Metternich thought of another expedient, that of giving Parma to the Queen of Etruria, and Lucca to Marie Louise, by which she would be nearer the sea and the island of Elba, together with a pension, of which France and Austria should pay half. At Marie Louise's death, Lucca, instead of descending to her son, should revert to Tuscany, and spare France the offence of seeing a descendant of Napoleon on an Italian throne. However, when Austria consented that Parma should pass out of her family, she stipulated that she

should be allowed to keep Plaisance, on account of the bridge across the Po.

This arrangement was accepted by France and Spain, but had not been yet proposed to Marie Louise. M. de Metternich was chosen to make the communication to her. He had an interview with the princess, and speaking in the name of the European powers and of her father, endeavoured to make her understand the difficulties of this affair; but to his great surprise he was very badly received. Though this princess was not naturally endowed with much strength of character, she obstinately refused to resign Parma, which she defended as her son's patrimony and her own dowry.

Her skilful counsellor, the Count de Neiperg, had advised her to appeal to her father and to the Emperor Alexander, and embarrass them by the steadiness of her opposition, assuring her that this was the only way to succeed. She followed this advice, and succeeded in arousing her father's affection, and piquing Alexander's pride, which gave her so much courage, that when M. de Metternich returned she decidedly refused the offer that was made her, alleging to M. de Metternich's surprise what it would have been much more to her own honour to conceal, that she was more repelled than attracted by the neighbourhood of Elba, as she was determined never to join her husband. She had evidently sought in other ties that domestic happiness which she preferred to rank, grandeur, and even to her own dignity.

It was now necessary to inform the committee appointed to consider Italian affairs that the proposed arrangement was rendered impossible by Marie Louise's resistance. The case was embarrassing when M. de Metternich asked M. de Talleyrand for a few days' delay, assuring him that this last difficulty should be decided before he left Vienna. As the more important affair of Naples was about being arranged, M. de Talleyrand thought he could afford to wait the decision of the Parma question, and he did so. Here is the solution of the difficulty devised by M. de Metternich, and of which he made a mystery to the French representative.

Lord Castlereagh had left Vienna for London, and intended to pass through Paris on his way. He was to see Louis XVIII., and as he possessed great influence over this prince as head of the British cabinet, it was hoped that he could induce him to agree to certain arrangements, a concession that could not be expected from M. de Talleyrand, who considered the affair of Parma as exclusively dynastic, and felt an almost personal interest in having it decided exactly as the Bourbons desired. As the cabinets of London and Vienna were more united than ever, Lord Castlereagh undertook to perform this service for

Austria, and ask Louis XVIII. in the name of the Emperor Francis, and in consideration of the domestic sacrifices he had already made, to leave Parma to Marie Louise during her life. That meanwhile the Queen of Etruria should have Lucca with a pension, and that at Marie Louise's death Parma should revert to the Queen of Etruria or her children, and Lucca to Tuscany.

This, which was not in itself an acceptable arrangement, being directly proposed to Louis XVIII. by his Britannic Majesty's chief secretary of State, and in the name of two courts on whose decision the Neapolitan question depended, had every prospect of success. This was the cause of its being concealed from M. de Talleyrand, and his being requested to wait a few days.

When Alexander was about leaving Vienna, he wished to know what was to be done concerning a family project that interested him very much, the marriage of his sister, the Grand Duchess Anne, with the Duke de Berry. The acute Count Pozzo considered that this marriage would be serviceable to France by procuring her a powerful alliance, and to Russia, that would thus obtain a higher matrimonial connection than she had yet made. This latter consideration had very little weight with Alexander, who was only desirous of a political union of the two countries; and certainly had this alliance been accepted, and had we joined the Russian and Prussian policy on the Saxon and Polish question, there were few advantages that Alexander would have refused to France. His mother, a most respectable princess, entertaining all the sympathies of a French emigrant, was most anxious for an alliance that would be so flattering to her pride. The French court, less eager for the connection, would have acted like those noble families, who consent to form advantageous marriages in an inferior rank, but the Bourbons were restrained by the question of religion, and demanded, as we have already said, that the princess should change her faith before coming to France. Alexander, dreading lest he should seem to purchase this alliance by an act of apostasy, required that the princess should remain a member of the Greek Church until she had quitted the Russian dominions, but that she might change her faith anywhere else that was decided on. These were very trifling objections on both sides when the union was recommended by so many important political reasons. But this question had lost much of its interest at Vienna, since M. de Talleyrand had so openly quarrelled with Alexander. However, this marriage was not altogether impossible; and before the end of the Congress, Louis XVIII. desired his minister to free him from the demands of the Russian court if he should think it necessary to reject



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them definitely, in which case he wished to have reasonable cause for drawing back.

M. de Talleyrand, convinced that by the treaty of the 3rd of January he had procured France better and more solid allies, and anxious to lessen the importance of a marriage to which he had raised so many obstacles, wrote a long letter to Louis XVIII., which is perfectly characteristic of the policy of the time. If the court of France, he said, in the early days of the Restoration, when she was still weak, had attached importance to a closer union with Russia, she was no longer in the same position. She had contracted the highest and strongest alliances, and was again become the centre of European policy. It was others who should now seek her support; she stood in need of none. The Russian alliance was of very little importance at present. Alexander was a very thoughtless prince, imbued with the wildest ideas, and with whom it would be impossible to act in concert. Besides, the reigning family of Russia was far inferior in point of birth to the Bourbons, to whom it would be a sort of degradation to accept its alliance. Austria would be more worthy of such a union; but as the marriages contracted with that house had been unfortunate for both countries, he unhesitatingly advised taking a princess in the house of Bourbon itself.

When Louis read this letter, he considered that his minister's opinions on those subjects were very just, that he entertained very sound ideas on the different gradations of crowned heads, and that his advice ought to be adopted. He consequently gave up all idea of the Russian alliance, and left M. de Talleyrand to free him from it with the tact which this great diplomatist exhibited on all occasions.

As long as anything remained to be done at Vienna, M. de Talleyrand avoided entering into any explanation on the projected marriage. However, on the eve of the general departure he was obliged to put aside his reserve. In a last conversation, Alexander said to him, with an indifference that was only assumed, "I have been asked for my sister's hand, but I will not dispose of it without entering into definite explanations with the court of France. My mother would be very much pleased by this marriage, and I would consider it a very honourable connection, but I wish to have everything decided. I have refused some offers, and," he said, smiling, and in a tone of humility the most natural, "I have also met with refusals. Ferdinand VII. asked for my sister in marriage, but finding she belonged to the Greek Church he withdrew his demand." M. de Talleyrand smiled in his turn, and replied with as much ease as his august interlocutor, "The conduct of His Catholic Majesty must explain to you the embarrassment of His Very Christian

Majesty." Then turning this serious subject into a jest, he told the czar that the most pious Louis XVIII. was inflexible on the question of religion. Alexander did not insist, and did not seem to attach much importance to an affair that offended him deeply, for the Russian court was most anxious for the marriage of the grand duchess with the Duke de Berry. It was the fate of this princess to be disappointed in two alliances that would have made her a participator in the vicissitudes of our revolutions, and to be finally seated on the throne of the Low Countries, where she felt their reverberation.

This was the last question of importance that M. de Talleyrand had to conclude, and the manner in which he conducted this and all others in which he was engaged are characteristic of the man, his time, and his court.

The Congress had now brought its great work to a conclusion, and the sovereigns were about to take their departure, leaving to their ministers the less important part of drawing up their decisions in proper form, when in the beginning of March a piece of intelligence suddenly burst upon them, which, however, did not surprise any one, for all had a secret presentiment of its coming. A despatch from the Austrian consul at Genoa announced that Napoleon had escaped from Elba, and disembarked at the Gulf of Juan. Whither was he going? What was his object? were the questions asked in terror. According to M. de Metternich he would go to Paris, and this was the most natural supposition. M. de Talleyrand, anxious to deceive himself, said that Napoleon was gone to Italy. All were in the greatest excitement, and for some days public opinion hovered between these two fears, of which, indeed, one was far more probable than the other. The first feeling of terror was succeeded by anger. All were indignant with Alexander, as the author of the treaty of 11th April, by which Elba had been assigned to Napoleon as a residence. Alexander sincerely admitted his fault, but promised to repair the injury into which his generosity had betrayed him by gigantic efforts against the common enemy. All departures were immediately countermanded, and it was arranged that the sovereigns should not separate until this new danger should be past.

All the resolutions that had been decided on were to be maintained; and although their sanction by the final act of Vienna was delayed for six months, they were no less definite, and their existence was to be dated from the six last months of the year 1814, whose events we have recorded. We may therefore consider the Congress of Vienna as terminated at this period, at least as far as concerned the limits and constitution of States, and this is the fittest moment to pronounce an opinion on the European arrangement that has resulted from it, and which has

been one of the most permanent recorded in history, having endured for nearly half a century.

In considering the Congress of Vienna under the double aspect of justice and policy, this is in our opinion what may be said of it, and in delivering this opinion we lay aside all national prejudices, for the historian ought not to identify himself with any country or century, that so he may the more freely approach the eternal springs of truth.

In hearing the complaints of those who are suffering from the crimes of others, and in listening to the generous indignation they pour out against these vices, and against those who abandon themselves to their influence, we are tempted to say that these men could never become guilty of the like crimes. But alas! the generous maxims of the eve are not always the guide of the morrow's conduct. Every power in Europe had suffered from the boundless ambition of Napoleon, and had so execrated its excess, that the world might be justified in believing that should these oppressed sovereigns ever become the arbiters of Europe, justice and moderation would be the characteristics of their reign. We have just seen how their acts corresponded with their words. The only difference of conduct discernible between Napoleon and the allies is, that they were four instead of one, and that the ambition of each was restrained by that of the three others. As to France, she was treated as a conquered nation, which was natural, if not just. France, or rather he who governed her, had tyrannised in the hour of victory, and our conquerors did the same in their turn! It is childish to complain in such circumstances, and ridiculous to assert one's dignity at a rival's tribunal. It is on ourselves, on our own courage and prudence, and not upon others, that our dignity depends; and if we wish to avoid the consequences of errors, we should neither commit them ourselves, nor allow others to do so in our name.

However, we may, without subjecting ourselves to the accusation of national prejudice, be permitted to say, that though the allies justly blamed the ambition of Napoleon, they fell into the same excesses themselves; that after the different partitions of Poland and the Germanic secularisations, which so much extended the dominions of the continental powers; after having seized those colonies which gave such unlimited extent to the naval rule of England—having done all this, we say, it was neither just nor conformable to the general balance of power to reduce France to the position she held at the end of the eighteenth century. We may be permitted to say, that if France had not outstripped all calculations by the fertility of her genius, of her soil, and of her Revolution, and had not become as great in peace as she had been in war, Europe would have felt a want—Europe, that cannot without risk be deprived

of one of the States of which she is composed, and of France less than of any other, for England sometimes needs her against Russia, Russia against England, Prussia against Austria, Austria against Prussia, Germany against the two latter; and finally, there is one cause that can never progress without the aid of France—the cause of civilisation.

But a truce, we repeat, a truce to useless complaints against treatment that we drew upon ourselves. Let us speak of others! All that did not belong to the Four, or did not directly interest them, was shared like booty found in a sacked city. The lesser German princes, the free cities, the property of the Teutonic knights, the property of the knights of Malta, ecclesiastical principalities and old republics, were absorbed, without pity, into the territory of the conquerors or their dependants. Were it necessary to calm the jealousy of a neighbour, to subsidise a useful ally, to give a better contour to the frontier of one of the Four, or give another a more extended seaboard or a more convenient boundary, a German prince was immediately sacrificed, a free city was incorporated, an old republic suppressed, or a German ecclesiastical State secularised. No objection was raised when Austria took Venice, or Piedmont Genoa. Woe to any State in which one of the Four did not take an interest. Denmark, that represented no other interest than that of the freedom of the seas, at that time regarded as an entirely French interest, was deprived of Norway, to increase Bernadotte's popularity in Sweden. In return, Denmark got Swedish Pomerania; but Prussia wished to have this province, in order to continue her line of coast from Stralsund to Memel, and Denmark was deprived of this weak indemnity, which was replaced by one still more illusory—the Duchy of Lauenburg, and some million crowns. Unfortunate Saxony, that had abandoned us at the battle of Leipsic, for which she deserved some reward from the conquerors, was defended, because her preservation was of importance to Austria and Germany; but though she found advocates, still half her territory was sacrificed to Prussia, that during ten years had not ceased to complain of the spoliation of German States. Poland found protectors, because of the jealousy that England and Austria felt towards Russia, but it was finally given to Alexander under a pretext which veiled the ambition of the one and the weakness of the others, namely, that this country was again to become a kingdom, and be placed under one master; a sad illusion, that could not last, for the semi-independence thus bestowed on Poland would awaken the desire, and supply her with the means of throwing off the Russian yoke. She would naturally revolt, and entail upon herself the punishment of being reduced to a Russian province, and Europe would then learn that she had enlarged Russia by

the addition of all Poland. As France, whose feelings were little regarded, could alone take an interest in Italy, the country was given to Austria, to Austrian princes and Austrian influence, a ponderous gift, whose weight the cabinet of Vienna would one day feel and regret. No restraint was imposed on England. In addition to Gibraltar, she wished to have the Ionian Isles, the Cape, the isle of France, and some of the Antilles, and she met with no opposition. She also wished to have the mouths of the Schelde and Rhine, in order to form the kingdom of the Low Countries in opposition to us, and this wish was gratified, without the least consideration for the dislike of the Belgians to the Dutch. Sometimes, indeed, one or other of these four co-partitionists of the world, amazed, not at his own cupidity, but at that of his three associates, felt inclined to blame, but the words of reproof faltered on his lips, so ill qualified was any of the Four to pronounce a lesson on moderation.

It is no vulgar resentment that leads us to these reflections, but having exposed the faults of Napoleon, we possess the right to point out the faults of those who succeeded to his rule, and who, under pretence of avenging Europe, had only divided it amongst themselves. It is the duty of a historian to lay bare the faults of all without distinction, and we may be permitted to remind the reader that our errors were those of a man, and not of France, and that when the allies crossed the Rhine, they solemnly promised that this distinction should be remembered—a promise, alas! that was soon forgotten, as the Treaty of Paris proved.

Having considered the Congress of Vienna with reference to equity, we shall now look upon it from a political point of view. The whole policy of that assembly had but one design—to accumulate precautions against France. Instead of being ruled by the Bourbons, France should have been still in the hand of the dreaded conqueror on whom they wished to be avenged, when so many precautions were taken against her. And in that case England should have been allowed to act, and she would have neglected no precaution. Still mindful of the continental blockade, she was determined to prevent us from ever approaching the shores of the North Sea or the Mediterranean, and she could not bear the idea of our ever again visiting Antwerp or Genoa. It was on this account that she founded the kingdom of the Low Countries; and favoured the revival of Piedmont. She chose well when she selected the houses of Orange and Savoy to oppose us, for besides the recent injuries endured by both, the one had acquired its glory in fighting against France, the other by making use of and then betraying her.

She therefore entrusted them with Antwerp and Genoa.

She did not stop there, but acting on an idea of Mr. Pitt, she compelled Prussia to accept the Rhenish provinces, in order to establish an enduring animosity between that power and us. But even these precautions did not satisfy her. In order to place Bavaria in the same position as Prussia, she, together with Austria, restored her the Palatinate of the Rhine. It was not from hatred, but policy, that Austria adopted the views of England; but though she was willing to compromise others with France, she would not compromise herself, nor would she ever listen to the proposal of resuming the sovereignty of Belgium. Prussia, though very indignant with us, understood very clearly the part that was forced upon her, complained of it to England, and insisted that she should get Saxony instead of the Rhenish provinces, but in the end was compelled to accept what she was offered. Alexander saw through all these plans, at which he often smiled, and would willingly have helped us, but seeing us so obstinately and incomprehensibly allied to England and Austria, he drew back, expressing his contempt for our foolish policy.

In thus accumulating distrustful interests and inimical States around us, the Congress of Vienna originated the policy of the Holy Alliance, which has ruled Europe for nearly half a century, a policy which its authors meant to be eternal, but which, like everything else, has yielded to the influence of time, for the kingdom of the Low Countries, founded on the union of two hostile peoples, has been dissolved, and England, the obstinate enemy of revolutions, has learned to look upon them in another light; Savoy, after forty years of blind hostility to France, has suddenly returned to her old policy of making use of her; whilst Austria, oppressed by the burden of her Italian possessions, has resigned a part of them; a policy that has nearly passed away, as a natural consequence of its weakness, but which the jealousy of Europe and the imprudence of France might revive at any time, and which it is the interest of both to terminate, for with regard to Europe, this policy has the bad effect of making her neglect all her interests for one—that of checking us, and has made her in some sense the adversary of human progress, the patroness of antiquated abuses, and not unfrequently the protectress of bad governments, and above all, by this policy, she procures for demagogy the powerful aid of France; a policy no less injurious to France, whom it isolates, whom it condemns to permanent opposition to Europe, by seeing her most legitimate plans rejected merely because they are hers, whom it leaves without allies either in peace or war, and makes the accomplice of demagogy, and the terror instead of the admiration of the world; a policy which it would be sin and madness in her to retort, by alarming Europe, and compelling all nations to seek their safety in uniting against us!

Indeed, this policy was quite natural at the epoch of which we speak. It was the necessary result of a long and fearful struggle, and we must not be too severe in reproving the diplomatists, who believed they were only using a legitimate means of defence when they built up this antagonistic policy against France. Nor must we forget that those who directed the Congress, though enemies of France, and especially of the Revolution, against which they had struggled for twenty-five years, were now carried away by a violent reaction, which, however, they endeavoured to restrain within certain limits. In many things they had acted very wisely, for, after all, they were the greatest men of their age, the most skilful and the most enlightened, and though at the head of the counter-revolution, they were much more rational than the counter-revolutionists of Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, or France. As it was in their power to restrain the counter-revolutionists of Switzerland, they did so, and not being able to do more than advise those of Spain and France, they gave them excellent counsels. In fine, though each of the Four listened only to the dictates of national ambition when boundaries were to be traced, still, they have left in the treaties on the abolition of slavery, and the freedom of river navigation, principles worthy of the French Revolution, of which they were by birth and duty the inflexible opponents.

Now that we have spoken of victorious Europe, and of the manner in which she acted at Vienna, let us speak of ourselves and of our government, and endeavour to pronounce a just judgment on both.

Three opportunities occurred by which the fate of France might have been decided: the armistice of the 23rd of April, the treaty of peace on the 30th of May, and at the Congress of Vienna.

Unpopularity has long lain and still lies heavily upon the armistice of the 23rd of April, when the French negotiator abandoned, as was said, with *a stroke of his pen*, all the great fortresses of Europe, and an immense war matériel. This unpopularity, whose weight fell on M. de Talleyrand and the Count d'Artois, we consider quite undeserved. A wild and unanimous cry demanded the evacuation of the French territory; this cry, extracted by suffering, was uttered without reflection. Whatever might have been done, the allied troops could not retire in less than two months, and in that time peace might be signed, and in fact was signed. The armistice ought to have been deferred until the conclusion of peace, an arrangement that might have been easily effected, as warfare had ceased, and then some compensation might have been obtained for the surrender of the European fortresses. But the cry that demanded the evacuation of our territory was so natural and so strong that it

was not in human nature to resist, and more than excusable to yield to it. Now, demanding the evacuation of our territory necessarily originated the demand that we should evacuate the foreign territories of which we were still in possession: the one naturally induced the other. It may be answered that in giving up Magdeburg, Hamburg, Texel, Breda, and Bergen-op-Zoom, we might have kept Antwerp, Luxemburg, and Mayence. Had we made the attempt, the negotiators on the other side would have considered it a proof of our secret intention of preserving the line of the Rhine, to which they never would consent. The passionate desire for the evacuation of the French territory naturally induced the evacuation of foreign possessions, and the armistice of the 23rd of April was the inevitable consequence. The popular cry which condemned this armistice, after having imperatively called for it, is utterly unjust, and in equity we are bound to absolve the prince and the negotiator who signed it.

The armistice once signed, there was no need of treating immediately of peace even at Paris, nor of adding the precipitation of a definite treaty to the precipitation of the armistice. At Paris, our adversaries were united for our spoliation; at Vienna they might quarrel over the spoils. We ought therefore to have awaited the opening of Congress before deciding our fate. There was no occasion to hurry, as the armistice had made every one's position bearable. Blood no longer flowed; the powers had got possession of the fortresses they had so much desired; the Prussians had Magdeburg, the English Antwerp, and the Germans Luxemburg and Mayence. We were restricted to the frontiers of 1790, and therefore this delay could not arouse any prejudice in our favour. Besides, as the powers could not decide separately on the fate of any of their colleagues, they could not adopt a different conduct with regard to us. This so-much-blamed armistice restored us 300,000 men, which gave us a power of action, and our refusal to sign would have stopped all further proceedings. What we now assert is proved by the fact, that once the fortresses were restored, the coalition negotiators were no longer so eager to conclude. Alas! it was we who were eager, and that from want of foresight, General Dessoles being the only person in the council who saw the advantage of our coming to Vienna free of all engagements; and in the second place, we erred through impatience—impatience to sign, announce, and celebrate a peace which constituted the essential title, glory, and merit of the Bourbons.

It was through these combined causes—want of foresight and impatience—after the first excusable error of too hastily signing the armistice of the 23rd of April, that we committed a second, which was wholly inexcusable. We concluded a treaty of peace

at Paris, whilst our adversaries were still united, instead of signing it at Vienna, where they would have inevitably been divided.

The peace of Paris being signed, it would have been very difficult at Vienna to make any change in our fate. Still every chance was not lost, provided we did not side too hastily with either of the two parties who were about to portion out Europe, and not add to the weighty chain of the Treaty of Paris the still heavier shackles of immature decisions. There was no need of haste in the choice to be made between those powers, whose dissensions were already evident. On one side, we had Russia and Prussia, eager to get Poland and Saxony at any price, and even willing to relinquish their hostility to us, provided we forwarded their views; and on the other, England and Austria, whose only object was to shackle us, and unite all Europe in opposition to us. Under these circumstances, it is evident that we ought not to have hesitated in our choice; for if Posen and Dresden involved European interests, the Schelde, the Rhine, and the Alps presented an interest exclusively French. The conduct of Saxony at Leipsic, and of Europe at Paris, justified us in preferring our own interest to that of others. And supposing that we ought to have been equally distrustful of all these opposing ambitions, that very circumstance ought to have rendered us more cautious in coming to a decision; had M. de Talleyrand been less impatient, when he arrived at Vienna, to make a choice, whose merit was very doubtful, or to announce the principle of legitimacy so dogmatically; had he not been so eager to assume a part in important affairs, which was eventually sure to fall to him; had he contented himself with saying, with all that disconcerting phlegm which he possessed in so high a degree, that as France had been treated without any consideration, or rather deceived, in the May of 1814, when she had been promised an increase of territory and population, that was afterwards refused—she was now at liberty to seek only her own interest; that her ambition should no longer disturb the world, but that when the world should be disturbed by the ambition of others, she would choose the part consonant with her own policy. And having declared these sentiments, France might have waited until her assistance should be sought (as it infallibly would have been) by the divided parties. France's position would have been thus considerably changed. Alexander and Frederick William were so earnest and so anxious, they would have offered anything; and as the Rhine, the Schelde, and the Alps involved only English and Austrian interests, they would have made any concession we desired in that direction, and the largeness of their offers would have been proportioned to our slowness in coming

to a decision. Had the dispute led to war, there is no doubt but that we might have got a part at least of the left bank of the Rhine. On the other hand, if matters did not go so far as war, Austria and England, alarmed at seeing us united to Russia and Prussia, would have been obliged to yield to the pretensions of the latter, and we should have thus obtained without war a better result than we did; for Saxony, instead of Prussia, would have been our neighbour on the Rhine, where she would have succeeded the complaisant, accommodating, and much-regretted ecclesiastical Electors of Mayence, of Treves, and of Cologne, who were formerly our neighbours, and whose place is now occupied by the most military powers of the Confederation—Bavaria and Prussia. Thus, whatever followed, war or peace, our fate would have been better. Had war been the result, we should have had a chance of a better frontier; had peace succeeded, more tranquil neighbours. But it was not so. The cabinet of Paris, without unity or foresight, considered only what was immediately before its eyes; whilst Louis XVIII., intellectual but absent-minded, and quite indifferent to foreign policy, looked upon intervention in foreign affairs as a sad legacy bequeathed by Napoleon. He consequently left M. de Talleyrand full freedom of action, having perfect confidence in his skill, experience, and the influence he exercised in European diplomacy. When the latter arrived at Vienna, determined to support the principle of legitimacy, he found the Four determined to decide everything between themselves, which so irritated him that he placed himself at the head of the small German courts, who flattered him by the eagerness with which they sought his aid, and he was thus compelled to become the defender of Saxony. He joined England and Austria, who were firmly resolved to confine us to the terms of the Treaty of Paris, against Russia and Prussia, who would willingly have made us some concessions; whilst he loudly declared that France wanted nothing for herself—nothing but the triumph of principle, that is, of legitimacy.

Henceforth there was no chance of making any important alteration in our fate. We were undoubtedly in very good company when we joined England and Austria; but the society of Russia and Prussia was not to be despised. But the greatest advantage we could hope from this alliance would be to commence a fresh war with Russia and Prussia; and this, that Austria should obtain the entire of Italy; that England should have Malta, Corfu, the Cape, and the Mauritius; that the kingdoms of the Low Countries and Piedmont should stand like great fortresses at our very gates; that Prussia and Austria, separated by Saxony, might have less cause of mutual jealousy; that Russia should be less contiguous to Germany; and if we

conquered in the service of our masters, we should enjoy the advantage of still remaining bound by the treaties of 1815 ! Truly, considering the benefits to be obtained, it was not worth while to risk the advantages of the lately concluded peace.

But this is not all: even taking the part we did, which assuredly was not the wisest, we ought not to have been so eager in offering our aid; we ought at least to have waited until we were asked. But stung to the quick, M. de Talleyrand committed the error least consonant with his character—he was too precipitate. It is certain that had he waited, he would soon have been admitted to the discussion of the most important affairs, and in short, enjoyed all the consideration due to the representative of France. But he became a solicitor, instead of being solicited, as he ought to have been; and whilst offering the aid of 150,000 French, he appeared in the light of one who was asking instead of conferring a favour. And he consented unconditionally that in case of war, France should remain bound by the Treaty of Paris. In his impatience to acquire importance in the eyes of the great powers, he forgot to stipulate for the expulsion of Murat, the only question in which Louis XVIII. took an interest; and had not Murat himself furnished an excuse for his dethronement, the sovereigns would have quitted Vienna without coming to a decision on the Neapolitan question. M. de Talleyrand was an able negotiator—dignified, haughty, and endowed with admirable readiness of reply when called upon to reprove the sallies of pride-swollen conquerors; but he was less a far-seeing politician than a skilful negotiator; and M. de Talleyrand committed the error, after having too hastily signed the peace at Paris, of forming his resolves too quickly at Vienna, and having come to a determination, he decided in favour of the powers from whom we had nothing to hope, and against those who might have ameliorated our condition; and in making this choice, he asked no other recompense than the honour of gratuitously serving his new allies, to secure the triumph of what was at that time called the principle of legitimacy. Undoubtedly, if under ordinary circumstances, and in the normal state of things, with Europe in a state of profound tranquillity, when each sovereign would have found himself in a position consonant with the spirit of the times and of existing treaties; if, under such circumstances, it was proposed to suppress a kingdom like Saxony, even though that suppression ensured the greatest advantages to France, justice and sound policy would have induced us to oppose such an act; for every political convulsion which is not inevitable, every territorial dispossession which is not counselled by the strictest equity or by the irresistible course of events, is inhuman, imprudent, and dangerous; and M. de Talleyrand, in defending

the cause of Saxony, would have served at the same time the cause of justice and sound policy.

But amid the wreck of the ancient order of things, at a moment when the fate of no kingdom of Europe was decided, when all were in suspense, and each sought aggrandisement in the spoils taken from France; at a moment when the continental powers, after having swallowed up Poland, felt no scruple in devouring Venice, Genoa, the free cities, the intermediary German princes; a moment when England seized upon every important maritime position on the globe, when the lesser States were not less eager for spoils than the great; a moment, in short, when self was the predominant thought, it was surely at such a time lawful for France to think of herself, and not limit her entire policy to the conservation of a German State, in which no other power took an interest, and which had forfeited all title to France's protection. Under other circumstances the policy of defending Saxony would have been not only the most generous, but the most prudent. But at an epoch when all established rights and treaties succumbed during a fearful war of two and twenty years' duration, and when all were about to be re-established on a new basis, M. de Talleyrand neglected the interests of France too much in advocating the cause of Saxony, and his conduct, which would have been otherwise inexplicable, can only be attributed to his impatience to play an important part, and loudly defend a principle. But the sovereigns assembled at Vienna could not believe him serious, for the Austrian, English, and French diplomatists, who so warmly defended this principle at Dresden, sacrificed it at Vienna, Genoa, Malta, Stockholm, and in a hundred German principalities.

Thus twice within two years the fate of France was decided by the most frivolous motives. At Prague in 1813, Napoleon had it in his power to secure to France an extent of territory greater than was even desirable for her solid greatness; but blinded by an insensate ambition, he neglected the opportunity! And the Bourbons in 1814 neglected an opportunity of recovering some fragments of our lost greatness, and this through impatience to proclaim a peace, on which they based their principal title to popularity, as well as through want of reflection, want of experience, and a desire to uphold and see others uphold a principle that flattered their pride of birth. Sad fate of our country, after having been tossed by the storms of a fierce revolution, to find herself sometimes dependent on the whim of one man, sometimes on the blunder of a faction. Fortunately, material greatness is not everything, and France has by her moral greatness recovered the position of which events had deprived her. But in casting a glance over the desolating scenes we have described, let us pour forth a prayer that there

may be at length established in France a political system of government, which, regardless of dynastic or party interests, unmoved by the passion of the hour, without a dominant taste for either peace or war, in short, free from all predilections, guided solely by State reasons, and having no other object in the direction of public affairs than the safety and prosperity of the country. May the Almighty deign to accord us this blessing, and France will then enjoy what she has never possessed, at least enduringly, a position proportioned to her intelligence, to her valour, and the torrents of blood she has shed.

BOOK LVII.

THE ISLAND OF ELBA.

LORD CASTLEREAGH having left Vienna on the 15th of February 1815, arrived at Paris on the 26th, and remained a few days, being impatiently expected in London by his colleagues, who dared not venture in his absence on a discussion of the acts of the Congress. He had seen Louis XVIII., had been received by this prince with great courtesy, and had succeeded in the negotiation he had undertaken, which consisted in leaving Parma to Marie Louise during the life of this princess, and placing meanwhile at Lucca the heiress of Parma, that is to say, the Queen of Etruria. Louis XVIII. consented to this arrangement to please England, and especially to secure the assistance of this power in the affair of Naples. As to the rest, the reports circulated about Murat's armaments simplified the difficulty to the English ministers, and it had become easy to represent the King of Naples as unfaithful to his engagements, as a disturber of the peace of Europe, and as consequently deserving to be hurled from the throne upon which he had been for a short time suffered to sit. Austria was preparing to add 100,000 men to the 50,000 she already had in Italy, and Louis XVIII. had already decided in his council that 30,000 men should be assembled between Lyons and Grenoble to assist by land and sea in the projected operations against Murat. Everything was prepared to destroy in Italy the last vestige of Napoleon's vast empire.

But the destiny of the Bourbons had decreed that they should fall before Murat himself into the ever open gulf of the revolutions of the century, but they were to reissue more enduring, and unfortunately less innocent. Their position unhappily was not more improved than their conduct. About the end of December all that had been wished from the chambers having been obtained, they had been adjourned to the 1st of May 1815, and the crown, in throwing off an apparent yoke, had flung away its best support, for the Chamber of Deputies was in an especial manner, in its timid but prudent progress, the faithful expression of public opinion, which, though declaring the Bourbons imprudent, and often even offensive, was still willing to

maintain and support them. The Chamber of Deputies, which was only, we must remember, the ancient Corps Législatif under another name, though it sometimes severely blamed the folly of the emigrant party, gave a certain satisfaction to public opinion, and served as a salutary warning to the government, and thus acted as a kind of mediator, that on one side prevented irritation from rising to an excess, and on the other checked faults that might be carried too far. The absence of the chambers was therefore much to be regretted at this moment, for the breach between the nation and the emigrant party was gradually becoming wider, whilst there was no mediating power capable of reconciling and restraining them.

Thus errors and the consequences of errors increased every day. The priests from the pulpit preached incessantly against the usurpation of Church property; amongst the laity, the former proprietors of the property that had been sold worried the new possessors, trying to induce them to restore the property which they had acquired at a low price, and which the others sought to wrest from them at a still lower valuation. The article of the Charter which guaranteed the inviolability of the national sales ought to have been a sufficient security to any of the new holders capable of understanding the question; but they were told that the Charter was a momentary concession forced by circumstances, and in the constantly changing state of public affairs it was no wonder that the actual possessors of national property should feel alarmed. Besides, the tone in which the most influential of the royalist journals spoke on this subject was calculated to excite alarm, and when they were answered by citing the fundamental law, the reply was that the law could guarantee the sales in a material sense, but could never justify their morality, and make that which was evil appear good to the public conscience. "The law," they said, "justified the national sales; public opinion condemns them. Nothing can alter the fact, and this universal moral reaction against crime and spoliation merits the highest applause." This language, had those who uttered it been consistent, would have been followed by aggressive measures, but they dared not venture so far, but offered this species of moral violence to the holders of the property in question, in the hope of forcing them to surrender the contested possessions. Here was a verification of the truth of what M. Lainé had said in committee touching this article of the Charter, when he declared that it was of course right to guarantee the sales, but not too firmly, in order to oblige the new proprietors to negotiate with the former.

It was with the design of illustrating these views that a very significant fable was put into circulation. It was asserted that

the Prince of Wagram—Berthier—who possessed the estate of Grosbois, had laid his title-deeds at the feet of Louis XVIII., and begged him to accept the restitution. The king, it was said, received the papers, kept them an hour, then sent for the marshal, and said to him, “Resume the possession of the Grosbois estate, I cannot make a better use of these lands than bestow them on you in recompense of your long services.”

This anecdote was propagated with inconceivable rapidity even into the remote provinces. It was in vain that the Prince of Wagram, on being questioned, declared it to be an invention; the story was not the less believed, nor less widely circulated. He endeavoured to obtain a retraction in the royalist journals, but did not succeed.

M. Louis, fearing the effect that the uneasiness experienced by the holders of national property might produce on the public credit, had forced Louis XVIII. in full council, and not without great resistance on the part of the king, to sign an ordinance for the sale of a portion of the State forests, in which was comprised a considerable quantity of timber formerly belonging to the Church. The ordinance being signed, M. Louis had without delay commenced his adjudications, in order to tranquillise the purchasers, for it was not to be supposed that new sales would be made if the titles of the former could be disputed. The moderate price asked had attracted speculators, who found that the sale of the timber would nearly liquidate the purchase money, and that the land would become theirs for a mere trifle. With such inducements they did not hesitate to purchase. Still this measure did not restore public confidence, and the proprietors who had purchased during the Revolution, and who were very numerous in the country districts, continued to experience serious alarm. To throw a doubt on the security of such interests is equivalent to ruining them, for the apprehension of evil produces as great and sometimes a greater influence on men than the evil itself.

Manifestations against the French Revolution had not ceased. The anniversary of the 21st of January furnished a new opportunity for these exhibitions, and was eagerly taken advantage of. A pious man had purchased in the Rue de la Madeleine at Paris the ground in which Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and Madame Elizabeth had been buried. As the 21st of January drew near, he began to dig, hoping to recover the remains of these august victims. He thought he had found them, and according to all appearances he was justified in believing so. In consequence of this discovery, the government ordered a funeral ceremony for the translation to St. Denis of these remains so worthy of respect, but unfortunately this ceremony was accompanied by an outpouring of maledictions of all kinds

against the French Revolution, to which men, connected by their acts or their opinions with this Revolution, replied by doubts and raileries about the discovery made in the Rue de la Madeleine. The royalists replied by fresh insults against the revolutionists, and repeated that if in a legal sense they pardoned them, and by a great favour did not send them to the scaffold, it was all they had a right to expect in compliance with the promise of oblivion contained in the Charter, but that the public conscience could not be stifled, nor prevented from judging their execrable crime. As if to secure a repetition of these painful recriminations, an annual ceremony was appointed to expiate the crime of the 21st of January.

To these proceedings were added others, still more significant with regard to individuals. In recognising as a principle the permanency of magistrates in their office, the king had reserved to himself the right of giving or refusing the investiture to those who were actually in office, and of revising in this way the entire personnel of the magistracy. Consequently, magistrates of every rank were anxiously expecting to hear their fate pronounced, and they remained in a state of dependence which might be prejudicial to those who sought justice, and especially to the holders of national property. The chambers, before separating, demanded that an end should be put to this state of uncertainty, and in January 1815 the government commenced in the highest court the so much dreaded charges. M. Muraire was dismissed from the office of premier président on account of his private affairs, and M. Merlin lost the post of procureur-général on account of his vote on the trial of Louis XVI. These gentlemen were replaced by M. Sèze and M. Mourre. These changes were only natural, but it was quite as natural that the revolutionists should regard them as evidence of the feeling entertained for them, especially as these acts were followed by most acrimonious language. To pardon such things would have required a spirit of justice with which partisans are not endowed.

It was just at this time that the clergy, yielding in this instance not to passion, but to sincerely conscientious scruples, were very near exciting an insurrection amongst the Parisian populace. Mademoiselle Raucourt, a celebrated actress, died. Her coffin was brought to the Church of St. Roch, in order that prayers for the dead might be said, but without previous intimation being given to the vicar. It would have been prudent in the vicar to have avoided a commotion, and taken for granted that all those manifestations of repentance had been made which are required before a tragedian can be looked upon as restored to the Catholic communion. The vicar obstinately refused to admit the coffin. The crowd soon

increased, and the public seeing in this scene a fresh proof of the intolerance of the clergy, burst open the gates of the church. The coffin was carried in by force, and it would be hard to say what might have happened if a royal order despatched from the Tuileries had not commanded the vicar to grant the deceased funeral honours.

Judging by canonical rules, the vicar was right, and as the clergy no longer keep the civil registers, as their refusal has no longer any influence upon the social position of the people, and entails no consequence but the privation of honours which the Church has the right to accord or deny according to its belief, the vicar of St. Roch was justified in refusing the solicited prayers, and the friends of the deceased ought to have carried her remains to the cemetery without presenting them to the Church. But the abuse of power often prevents its most legitimate exercise. The incendiary sermons of the clergy had so irritated the public mind that even the legitimate exercise of their functions was now considered unpardonable, and it is probable that had the vicar not yielded to the royal order, the excited crowd might have committed some deplorable profanation which the army and even the national guard might have shown little anxiety to repress.

Of all the events of this period, the most vexatious, and that which most excited the public mind, was the suit commenced against General Exelmans.

We have already made our readers acquainted with the charges brought against this illustrious general. Amongst the letters found on Lord Oxford, and addressed to the court of Naples, there was one in which General Exelmans again assured Murat—from whom he had received many services and marks of friendship—that should his throne be threatened, there were many French officers whose swords were at his service. It was publicly known that the court of France was making every effort at Vienna to procure the expulsion of Murat from Naples, but war had not been declared against him, and consequently there was nothing in the detected letter contrary to military discipline. It might indeed be said that General Exelmans having been kept on active service, had subjected himself to the reproach of showing little regard to the feelings of a government from which he had received many marks of attention. But the strongest charge that could be brought against him only amounted to an infraction of conventional rules, and could by no means be considered a violation of duty. General Dupont had taken this view of the case, and had contented himself with reprimanding General Exelmans, and advising him to be more circumspect in future. But the minister Dupont had been replaced in the war department by Marshal Soult, and we have

seen how this marshal, who was at first very ill disposed towards the Restoration, but afterwards accepted office under the Bourbons, had promised to re-establish discipline in the army, and with discipline, fidelity to the reigning dynasty.

One of the means he thought proper to employ was to revive the forgotten affair of General Exelmans, and by making one of the most popular generals feel his authority, intimidate the rest. In fact, it was at this period the custom to say and to believe that it was the weakness exhibited by the government that encouraged the disaffection of the army. The Duke de Berry, irritated at finding that the feelings he exhibited towards the army were not responded to, adopted this erroneous idea, and supported it with all the natural violence of his temperament. Marshal Soult, who was most anxious to please this prince, had put General Exelmans on half-pay, and ordered him to repair to Bar-sur-Ornain, his birthplace, which was ordering him into a species of exile. At this time half-pay officers questioned the right of the war minister to appoint them a place of abode. They said that being unemployed, and consequently having no duties to perform that might require their presence in a particular locality, they were free to choose their residence, and that not enjoying the advantages of active service, they ought not to be burdened with its responsibilities. On the other hand, the war minister maintained his privilege, and he was right in persisting, for in the actual state of things, with the desire exhibited by the unemployed officers to repair to Paris, it was of the first importance to be able to disperse them by a simple order of the administration. Such orders had been repeatedly issued, but remained unexecuted, and the half-pay officers continued to flock to Paris, where their language was not only offensive but seditious. But there was great want of tact in seeking to solve the question in the person of so distinguished an officer as General Exelmans, and for the ridiculous fault with which he was reproached.

General Exelmans, around whom had congregated the most excited spirits that Paris contained, showed little inclination to obey an order which he pronounced to be a sentence of banishment, but for the moment he contented himself with asking for a delay, alleging the state of his wife, who had just given birth to a baby, and who needed his personal attentions. It would have been prudent to accept this demi-obedience, and not provoke an open resistance by persevering obstinacy in the exercise of a contested right. But Marshal Soult persevered, and insisted on the immediate departure of General Exelmans. The latter, urged on by his young friends, peremptorily refused to obey. The marshal then, without consideration for the state of the general's young wife, sent an order to his house to arrest him.

The general was arrested and conducted to Soissons. He contrived to escape from his guards, and wrote to the minister, demanding that his case should be brought before competent judges, and promising to yield himself prisoner as soon as a legal tribunal should be pointed out before which he could appear.

This event produced amongst military men, and amongst a great portion of the public, an intense sensation. A strong feeling of irritation prevailed against Marshal Soult, who, from having been a zealous servant of the empire, was become a not less zealous agent of the Bourbons, and persecuted his ancient companion-in-arms more than General Dupont had ever done. People began to talk of the insults offered to one of the most distinguished military officers, and above all, they expatiated on the annoyance caused to his young wife, and all that for a questionable fault, merely for a token of remembrance given to Murat, his former commander, his benefactor; and the disaffected denied, whether right or wrong, that the minister had a right to appoint a residence for unemployed officers. Public opinion was excited in the highest degree, and that, too, by stimulants the most calculated to produce such an effect.

This unfortunate commotion being once excited, it was impossible for the authorities to draw back, and allow General Exelmans to remain at large with no judges appointed to try his case. It was absolutely necessary to take some steps. Marshal Soult consequently presented to the royal council a badly drawn up report, that embarrassed even the least moderate members of the government. It would have been sufficient to accuse the general of disobedience, and much might have been said in favour of the right claimed by the war minister. In fact, the State, in granting half-pay to a considerable number of officers, not as a retiring pension, but for the purpose of keeping them on what may be called demi-active service, certainly retained some authority over them, and it was not assuming too much to fix their abode, for the government might need them in certain localities, and ought to possess the power of sending them there. But the minister did not limit himself to this charge of disobedience, which might have been plausibly supported; he proposed to arraign General Exelmans before the *conseil de guerre* of the 16th military division, then sitting at Lille, on a charge of corresponding with the enemy, of acting as a spy, of disobedience, of a want of respect to the king, and violation of his oath as Chevalier of St. Louis. Though the government began to be very much irritated against him, still this long list of accusations excited great surprise. General Dessoles deplored the necessity of proceeding against so distinguished an officer as General Exel-

mans, and thought the charge of espionage very strange. However, he said that it was necessary to condemn one as an example, but he at the same time intended that pardon should be granted immediately after the sentence was passed. The Count d'Artois, with a severity unlike his ordinary kindness of feeling, exclaimed that it would be dangerous to pardon, that, on the contrary, the sentence should be put into force, in order to show the military that they must obey. The Duke de Berry spoke in the same tone, but could not help admitting that the charge of espionage was ill placed. The king himself and M. de Jaucourt, who were both in the secret of foreign affairs—M. de Jaucourt had temporarily replaced M. de Talleyrand—thought there was a risk, not alone in making a charge of espionage, but in accusing the general of correspondence with the enemy. They knew how difficult it had been at Vienna to contest Murat's title; they knew that up to the period of his last acts of imprudence the title of king had not been refused him; the assembled sovereigns at Vienna had even spoken of him as "an ally," and had not yet qualified him as "enemy," though they threatened to treat him as such the moment he should put his troops into motion. The king and the temporary minister of foreign affairs could not dissimulate the fact that it would be difficult to apply officially to Murat the title of enemy, which was incontestably implied in the accusations made against General Exelmans, against whom no other fact was alleged than the letters addressed to the court of Naples.

But Marshal Soult's self-love was touched, and he obstinately persevered in retaining the original terms of his report. *The general who reigned at Naples*—it was so he styled Murat—was, according to him, only the usurper of one of the thrones belonging to the house of Bourbon, and consequently the enemy of France, and whoever had written to him *had corresponded with the enemy*. The crime of espionage was, in his opinion, fully established by the simple fact of the general's having informed Murat of the willingness with which many French officers would draw their swords in his service. As to the crime of disobedience, that was flagrant, for the general had contested the right of the minister to determine the abode of half-pay officers, and had not only contested the right as a principle, but had refused, in fact, to submit. As to the want of respect to the king, and to the violation of the oath of Chevalier of St. Louis, the proofs adduced by the minister were insignificant, and these charges were, besides, unimportant. The marshal persevered so obstinately in urging this system of accusation, that the king, as much through complaisance as through indolence, permitted him to draw up his

report as he liked, reserving to himself, in case of condemnation, the right of pardon. The Duke de Berry, though entertaining some doubts as to the validity of certain accusations, exclaimed against the indulgent feeling exhibited by the king, and repeated that it would be unwise to grant a pardon, "for," he said, "it is indulgence that has ruined the army." The king, somewhat annoyed, replied, "My dear nephew, do not anticipate the decision of the judges: wait until they shall have pronounced sentence."

The war minister was consequently allowed to draw up a list of accusations against General Exelmans, of which, as we have seen, the most probable were not very serious. When General Exelmans learned that his case was referred to the *conseil de guerre* of the 16th military division, he immediately yielded himself a prisoner, by the advice of his numerous friends, who justly believed that no military officer, nor even civil magistrate, could be found who would condemn him.

The general repaired to Lille, and appeared on the 23rd of January before the *conseil de guerre* of the 16th military division. The list of accusations drawn up by Marshal Soult having been read, the general replied simply and clearly, and with a tone of moderation not habitual to him, but which he had been advised to adopt. As to the accusation of corresponding with the enemy, he replied, that France being then at peace with every State in Europe, it was impossible to maintain that he had corresponded with an enemy, and that if France happened to have one, this secret enemy could not be reputed such until a declaration of war had been made, or decided hostilities commenced. As to the charge of espionage, he declared, with a feeling of dignity that was understood and approved by all present, that he would not even reply to the accusation. As to the charge of disobedience, he maintained that the minister, not requiring, in the actual state of things, any service from the half-pay officers, assumed the right of sending them into exile when he asserted the privilege of making them change their abode at his bidding. With regard to the offence to the king, he declared, that entertaining the most profound respect for his majesty, he was certain of having never written anything contrary to that feeling. Lastly, touching the reproach of having transgressed his obligations as a Chevalier of St. Louis, he replied carelessly, that possibly he did not understand these obligations, for he could not discover anything contrary to them in what he had done.

These replies were so natural and so truthful that they rendered any defence nearly useless. The debate was short, and almost without consultation the *conseil de guerre* unanimously acquitted the general. We may easily imagine the joy, and

above all, the manifestation of this joy, amongst the military men, numbers of whom had accompanied the general. He was brought back to his own house in triumph, and in a few days the impression experienced at Lille spread throughout France amongst the numerous enemies of the government. The more enlightened friends of the reigning dynasty regretted a proceeding by which so many serious questions were all at the same time so awkwardly asserted, and solved after so dangerous a fashion. The evident consequences of General Exelmans' trial were, that the army did not consider Murat as an enemy, and did not recognise the war minister's right to fix the residence of half-pay officers; and it proved that all the military, whether as judges or accused, did not hesitate to put themselves in determined opposition to the established authority.

No circumstance had yet shown in so striking a manner the weakness of the restored dynasty. Upon whom could the Bourbons now rely, against the many enemies they had so unwisely provoked, when the public force was manifestly hostile? There was indeed the national guard, composed of the middle classes, who wished to see the Bourbons on the throne, restrained, however, by the proper intervention of the public bodies. But at Paris, the insolence of the household troops in the provinces, that of the landed nobility, and the intolerance of the clergy on every side, the threats against the holders of national property, the sufferings of the manufacturing classes, who were ruined by the introduction of English produce, the loss of territory unjustly imputed to the Restoration, and lastly, the revival of that liberal spirit of which the Bourbons made an enemy, instead of making it an ally—all these circumstances had changed the disposition of the middle classes, and there were now to be found amongst them only a few rarely sage minds who believed that the Bourbons ought to be supported, and at the same time restrained. But would this opinion, entertained by a small number, be sufficient to sustain the Bourbons against so many and such varied hostilities? Nobody could believe it, and the thought of an approaching change, a thought which often induces what it foresees, had taken possession of the public mind. In fact, when this fatal opinion, that a government cannot last much longer, is spread abroad, the indifferent and the cold become more careless and colder, the interested turn their eyes in another direction, alarmed friends commit greater faults than ever; and the public functionaries, upon whom the responsibility of defending the government is thrown, hesitate to compromise themselves for a power which will not be able to recompense either the efforts they make, or the dangers they incur. It was the latter especially who, in the circumstances of which we treat, exhibited the worst dispositions. They

belonged, for the most part, to the empire, for the royalists, nobles or plebeians, emigrants or those who had remained at home, notwithstanding their willingness to take places, had not been able to obtain them from the government, because of their complete ignorance of public business. Many, as we have seen, had directed their ambition to military posts, which produced the most deplorable effects on the army. Others had sought employment in the financial department, but M. Louis, who was a fanatic in financial affairs, repelled them without pity. Some, again, aspired to places in the administration, but the Abbé de Montesquiou, no less haughty with his friends than with his adversaries, said that the mere fact of having emigrated did not imply that men were thoroughly acquainted with the interests of France, or qualified to administer her laws, and through pride, as well as through indolence, he had not changed twenty out of eighty-seven prefects. Lastly, with regard to those who aspired to the magistracy, the government was determined to admit them, but the long announced changes in the magistracy had scarcely commenced, and the new candidates had not yet found places; whilst the deposition of MM. Muraire and Merlin had caused the magistrates still in office serious alarm. The army was intensely hostile; the public functionaries who had been originally appointed under the empire were distrusted by the reigning dynasty, to which they bore no affection; they were undermined by the royalists, who coveted their places, and wearied of the hypocrisy to which they were condemned; the middle classes, at first favourably disposed, had afterwards grown cold; the people of the country districts were completely alienated, on account of the disputes concerning national property; the inhabitants of the towns were inclined to favour the revolutionists, both through taste and habit; and there remained to the Bourbons a few friends amongst enlightened men, whose counsels were little heeded, and who foresaw the danger of the re-establishment of the empire. Such was, in a few words, the position of French society with regard to the Bourbons, a position which each succeeding event, as it hurried rapidly along, rendered more conspicuous.

Amongst these different classes, whether indifferent or hostile, the most formidable, that is to say, the military men, entertained the belief that the government was wholly dependent on them, and would be overthrown when they willed it. This disposition had never before been manifested by our army, and happily, has never since reappeared; for there is nothing more dangerous than an army that seeks to take any other part in the revolutions of a State than that of maintaining order in the name of the laws. An army soon becomes the most fearful and the most abject instrument of revolution, for soldiers become rapidly

licentious, insatiable, and sometimes cowardly, well suited to oppress a State at home, but powerless to defend it abroad, dishonouring their country, and dishonouring themselves, until they are ultimately destroyed by fire and sword, as in the case of the Prætorian guards of antiquity, of the Strelitz, the Mamelukes, and the Janissaries of modern times. Up to this period, in fact, the revolutions that had taken place in France had had no reference to the army, for the army had neither caused these revolutions, nor been their object nor instrument. But the revolution of 1814, effected by armed Europe against a military chief who had abused his own genius and the valour of his troops, seemed to be especially directed against the French army, by whom its effects were particularly felt. Flattered for a moment by the Bourbons in the person of their chiefs, the military soon perceived that there was between them and the government all the difference that may be conceived between those who had defended their native land and those who had been willing to invade it, and on this occasion—and only then, we repeat, during our century—the military conceived the idea of playing a political, a revolutionary part. “Let us drive out these emigrants,” was the remark of all the youthful military that crowded Paris. Whether Napoleon came to head them, which they ardently desired—without understanding, alas! what they wished—or whether he did not come, they were determined to overturn the government with their own hands, and that, too, as quickly as possible. The unemployed officers openly avowed their intentions, and when they spoke in this fashion, they found in the officers on active service either silent or open approvers of their sentiments, with a perfect willingness to second their efforts. As to the soldiers, there could be no doubt about their sentiments, for the younger had quitted the service in the general desertion of 1814, and having been replaced by the old soldiers who had returned from imprisonment or from remote garrisons, the army was, especially in the lower ranks, as hostile to the Bourbons as it was devoted to Napoleon.

No war minister, whomsoever he might be, could have overcome such difficulties, and Marshal Soult, who had been chosen in the hope that he would accomplish this feat, had failed in the attempt. His severity towards General Exelmans had occasioned alarming excitement. It was not possible that officers of every grade, from the generals, colonels, and brigade-majors down to the simple sub-lieutenants, who were on half-pay, and thronged Paris in thousands—it was not possible, we say, that these men could incessantly repeat that the emigrants ought to be driven out of the country without thinking of passing from words to action. Though they were sufficiently numerous to attempt a *coup de main*, they were

conscious that the result would be more certain could they secure the co-operation of some of their comrades who were in command, and could at a beck bring with them bodies of troops. In this respect they were highly favoured by circumstances, for some of the most hot-headed general officers commanded troops within a short distance of Paris. The brilliant Lefebvre-Desnoettes had remained in command of the cavalry of the guard, then stationed in Le Nord. The brothers Lallemand, officers of great merit, and determined foes to the Restoration, commanded, one the department of Aisne, and the other the artillery of La Fère. Lastly, one of the principal *divisionnaires* of the empire, Drouet, Count d'Erlon, son of the ancient postmaster at Varennes, was at the head of the 16th military division at Lille. These four officers could assemble from fifteen to twenty thousand men, lead them to Paris, and join some thousands of half-pay officers who were collected there. In the capital they had only to fear the household troops, and these they felt assured they could overcome. Still, notwithstanding the threatening aspect of affairs for the government, the success of the malcontents was less certain than they believed, as the result soon proved, for fortunately the sentiment of obedience is so strong in the French army that it is not easy to seduce the troops to follow even the dictates of their own passions when opposed to their duty. Nevertheless, the discontented officers were full of confidence, and it must be said that never had conspirators more reason to hope for success. The unemployed officers and those who were on active service took counsel together, and fully conscious that in enterprises of this nature a great name is an important condition to success, they turned their thoughts to the only great military man who was left in disgrace. This was Marshal Davout. This grave and stern man, a strict observer of military discipline, was ill-suited to take part in a conspiracy. He was deeply offended at the treatment he had received, and which was really unjustifiable, for he was banished at the request of the enemy for his defence of Hamburg, one of the most memorable recorded in history. It was on this account he did not refuse to listen to the young and hot-headed generals who applied to him. Inclined like them to look upon the Bourbons as strangers, and flattering himself that by a word despatched to Elba he could bring back Napoleon, and place him again at the head of the empire, the proposed enterprise appeared to him only the substitution of a national for an anti-national government that had been forced on France by Europe. The marshal, without actually pledging himself to the young framers of this project, still sympathised with them so much as to induce them to believe that he would

become their leader, and quite joyous at this accession to their party, like all persons under the influence of joyous feelings, they made no secret of the hopes they entertained.

But in working thus for Napoleon, it was necessary to work in unison with him, to have his consent and his assistance, and consequently to be in communication with those who were supposed to represent him. Though those who sought to get rid of the Bourbons showed a special anxiety to strengthen their party by the acquisition of great military names, they were not less anxious to reckon amongst their members distinguished civilians, in order to commence negotiations with Napoleon by their intervention. They dared not address themselves to the prudent Cambacérès, whose timidity and gravity rendered him inaccessible, neither could they apply to the reserved Caulaincourt, who shunned all communication with strangers, nor to the Count de Rovigo, who was too much suspected by the government and too closely watched not to render any communication with him equivalent to a self-denunciation to the police; they consequently turned to the two men who were reputed to possess Napoleon's personal confidence—MM. Lavalette and de Bassano. M. Lavalette had received from Napoleon during the late campaign a deposit of sixteen hundred thousand francs in specie, a sum that constituted the entire personal fortune of the late emperor, and which M. Lavalette had carefully kept, ready to restore it at the first demand. But in the excess of his fidelity, fearing to betray a deposit upon which his master might be one day dependent for bread, he had hidden it with many precautions in his own house, and in order to conceal it better, he concealed himself by not receiving anybody. It was therefore to the faithful and ever-accessible Duke de Bassano that the authors of the projected enterprise had recourse. They at the same time charmed and alarmed him, charmed by proving that they still remembered Napoleon, and alarmed by informing him of a project that compromised so many persons, particularly Napoleon himself, who, in the isle of Elba, was still in the hands of the allied powers, and liable to suffer from any uneasiness they might be made to experience. What contributed to intimidate M. de Bassano was that since Napoleon's departure for Elba he had not received any communication from him, and had not dared to address any to him. Those who served under Napoleon were so accustomed to wait until he had taken the initiative that they never ventured to anticipate him, and since his fall they had pursued the same course. The errors committed by the Bourbons had inspired Napoleon's friends with hope, without teaching them unanimity of action, which they never possessed. M. de Bassano, who was intimately acquainted with the young

generals who made themselves so conspicuous at this time, assured them that he kept up no communication with Napoleon, and that consequently he could neither give them his advice nor approbation, still less the authority of his name; he then begged them not to compromise their former leader, who, still at the mercy of his enemies, at a word despatched from Vienna might be forcibly transported to remote regions, and a climate destructive to his health. But this reserve of manner had only been considered as the ordinary prudence of politicians, and these hot young heads, so anxious to restore the empire, had been neither discouraged nor rendered doubtful by the manner in which the emperor's ancient confidant had expressed himself.

There was another aid which it was quite as natural to desire and hope—that of the revolutionary party. Even had the Bourbons exhibited towards the revolutionists, and especially towards the *voters*, a spirit of conciliation, which they certainly did not feel, it is not probable that they would have found favour with them. But if to this fundamental difficulty we add the bitter insults lavished by the royalist press on the revolutionists, it is easy to understand that their antipathy to the Bourbons was converted into violent hatred. Under the influence of these feelings, Carnot had written and allowed to be published the famous Memoir of which we have spoken; Sièyes had laid aside his disdainful moderation of tone, and given way to an outburst of feeling in which he seldom indulged, and several persons of the same party had followed his example. Barras was not of the number, for he felt no desire to find himself again under the rule of the ungrateful general of whose fortunes he had laid the first foundation. He was desirous of dying peaceably under the Bourbons, to whom he gave prudent advice that met little attention. With this one exception, the revolutionists were highly exasperated. Pleased at first at Napoleon's downfall, they now deplored it, and openly expressed their desire of his return. M. Fouché, as usual, figured at their head. It was his constant endeavour to make himself conspicuous, and he did so by meddling in everything. Whilst he was, as we have seen, in close relation with the agents of the Count d'Artois, and with the Count d'Artois himself, promising to save the Bourbons if they confided in him, he was writing to Vienna to M. de Metternich to express his views upon the manner of arranging European affairs, information which M. de Metternich certainly never asked; and he was writing to Napoleon, advising him to flee to America, and no doubt he was sincerely anxious to deliver Europe and himself from the presence of his former master. He was thus perpetually meddling with the different parties, and after having excited the revolutionists against the emigrants, he made of the agita-

tion thus raised a scarecrow to the emigrants, in the hope that he would be called on to allay the alarm. But the last ministerial changes, by which Marshal Soult was made war minister, and M. d'André head of the police department, having deprived him of all hope of a speedy return to power, he had, like all the men of his party, but from different motives, transmuted his previous goodwill towards the Bourbons into anger, and he was ready to join any party that would overthrow them. It would be difficult that any plot could be laid against them with which he was not acquainted, and in which he did not play the chief part. But the Bonapartists held him in profound distrust, and preferred Count Thibaudeau, an old conventionalist and regicide, and formerly a prefect under the empire. He was a talented and harsh man, and was living retired at Paris, whither he had fled to avoid the resentment of the Marseillais, who were exasperated against his administration. A revolutionist upon principle, and a Bonapartist through ambition, he was still trustworthy, and had been the connecting link between the revolutionists and the Bonapartists, until M. Fouché appeared and meddled in every plot, for the purpose of directing men after his own fashion and to his own advantage. M. Fouché presented himself to the revolutionists as a regicide, to the Bonapartists as the oldest minister of Napoleon, and offered to all parties the essential qualifications of his well-known activity and business capabilities. He soon became an important personage, and endeavoured to carry out his own views. His leading principle was to expel the Bourbons, but not to replace them by Napoleon. He said that a new state of things, a new prince would be needed, a prince liberal in his ideas as the existing generation, a prince who would not inspire Europe with the hatred of which Napoleon was the object, and who would not, like him, be exposed to see six hundred thousand men cross the Rhine to dethrone him. He said that France, wearied of war and despotism, was as little inclined to Napoleon as to the Bourbons, and that there remained only two princes who could be thought of—the Duke d'Orleans, or Napoleon II. under the regency of Marie Louise; but the Duke d'Orleans, bound by family ties, could not sever them to aid revolutionary principles; that the friendly dispositions he exhibited were limited to being more polite than the other branch of his family to the army and the revolutionists, but that it would be impossible on such a foundation to effect a change of government, consequently the only solution of existing difficulties was to accept the King of Rome under the regency of Marie Louise, and that avowing this intention would secure the support of Austria, and through Austria, Europe, and with Europe, peace. Besides, the army would be

glad to see the empire revived, and Napoleon would be indemnified in the person of his son for his lost throne; and lastly, the revolutionists and the liberals would be perfectly satisfied, for seeing in the son the glory of the father without his despotism, and freed at the same time from the insults of the emigrant party, they would have every possible reason to support a régime which offered all the advantages of the empire without any of its drawbacks.

These reasons, though very rational in many respects, erred in a fundamental point, like all those adduced in support of a fresh revolution, which was to suppose that any but Napoleon could replace the Bourbons. The regency of Marie Louise was a mere dream, for Austria would not have given up either Marie Louise or her son, and this princess was as little desirous as capable of filling such a position. The Duke d'Orleans, who might be some day induced, were the throne vacant, to yield to the unanimous wishes of the public, would neither anticipate nor excite these wishes, which were at that time very vague. The rule of Marie Louise and the Duke d'Orleans being from different reasons impossible, either Napoleon ought to have been proposed, which would be a mad and disastrous provocation to Europe, or the Bourbons, their errors corrected, ought to be retained, which indeed was at that time the only honest and rational course. M. Fouché, though apparently more prudent, was in reality as rash and less innocent than the giddy heads he pretended to direct. Still his observations produced some effect upon the former servants of the empire, who remembered the despotism and ambition of Napoleon, and who dreaded his resentment, for nearly all had abandoned him, and apprehended the effect that his presence would produce on the European powers. But it was difficult to persuade the young generals, who were ready to risk their lives, to think of any one but Napoleon, and this question was accordingly laid aside to give place to the former—the overthrow of the Bourbons. Those who wished to overthrow the Bourbons saw only one means of accomplishing their object, which was to assemble the troops commanded by some amongst them, lead them to Paris, and join the half-pay officers, and by these means effect a *coup de main*.

During the months of January and February 1815, the originators spoke of this plan with an amount of indiscretion that shocked Marshal Davout, who was too serious minded for enterprises conducted so lightly, and alarmed M. de Bassano, who was ever fearful of compromising Napoleon without having consulted him. And so M. de Bassano repeated to these young military men, that he had no communication with the isle of Elba, and consequently could not promise them any support,

but he begged them not to compromise Napoleon, whom a single act of imprudence on their part would expose to be transported to the extremities of the earth. M. Lavalette, spite of his efforts at concealment, had ultimately been brought into contact with the young men, and conversed with them about their project. He begged them to remain quiet, and not seek to anticipate Napoleon's wishes; and they replied that they wanted neither the consent nor assistance of any one to overthrow a government as odious to the nation as to them, and whose existence was entirely in their hands. They consequently persisted in their designs, and kept up a constant intercourse with M. Fouché, who endeavoured to win their confidence, because he saw in them an additional puppet that he might put into motion, and in order to succeed in his object, he adopted the simple means of listening without contradicting what they said.

If we regard as a conspiracy every desire to overturn the established order of things, accompanied, too, by threatening words, there certainly was a conspiracy in what we have narrated; but if we only consider as a conspiracy a well-planned project, and that by serious-minded men firmly determined to attain their object even at the risk of their lives, and who have arranged their means with prudence and precision, it would be impossible to assert that there was anything of the kind here. These young officers were certainly anxious to get rid of the Bourbons, even at the cost of their own lives, which they were never wont to consider; some of them, on active service, held powerful means of action in their own hands, and it cannot be denied that amongst these there was a conspiracy. But it was far otherwise with the pretended leaders. Marshal Davout had listened, but without pledging himself, to projects that flattered his resentment, but were repugnant to his good sense and habits of discipline. M. Lavalette had rejected all confidence. Although M. de Bassano was more complaisant than M. Lavalette, he took care not to compromise Napoleon in the slightest degree, declaring that he had neither told nor would tell him anything of the project; and as for the Dukes of Vicenza and Rovigo, and Prince Cambacérès, it had not even been mentioned to them. Marshal Ney and the other principal military men who were suspected of being discontented were quite ignorant of what was going on, and were even distrusted by their old comrades because of the royal favours they had accepted, and only knew with the public in general that Paris was crowded with half-pay officers who were ready for the most desperate attempts. M. Fouché was the only person of note that, from his desire to have a hand in everything, had entered into these plans, of which he was in

reality become the true head, since that far from discouraging the authors of the enterprise, he became their confidant, their adviser, and very rarely sought to moderate their sentiments. Indeed, if there was a conspiracy, it was between him and these military men whose passions he flattered and whose projects he countenanced. But this was all that could be asserted of them or of him, for nothing was decided on, neither time, nor plan, nor place, nor who were to be the co-operators in the enterprise. Though the police were willing to see plots in every direction, they could not discern the only one that had an appearance of reality. All the military were objects of suspicion to them, but those we have mentioned the least of all. As for M. Fouché, he was far from being thought a dangerous person whose every act ought to be watched. The official police pointed him out as a suspicious man that ought to be distrusted, but the officious police of the Count d'Artois described him as the most skilful and powerful of men, to whom the safety of the dynasty and of France ought to be entrusted. Were these police to be believed, the real conspirators were Prince Cambacérés, who sometimes invited a few friends to dinner; M. de Bassano and M. Lavalette, who, as we have said, avoided every serious enterprise; the Duke de Rovigo, who was so compromised that everybody avoided him, and he avoided everybody, having met with such ingratitude from his friends; and finally, Queen Hortense, who had accepted Alexander's protection and the polite attentions of Louis XVIII., and who was now occupied in defending her children's property against her husband, and who, though still much attached to Napoleon, was too much dispirited by his fall to suppose his return possible. This police, called the police of the chateau, asserted that Prince Cambacérés, M. de Bassano, M. Lavalette, and Queen Hortense were in secret correspondence with Napoleon, from whom they received money to support the plots that were on foot, and whose ramifications were even more extensive; for M. de Metternich, who had quarrelled with the northern powers, had been brought into correspondence with Napoleon by the Queen of Naples, and was now thinking of replacing him on his throne, in order to be avenged of the ungrateful allies who wanted to seize Saxony and Poland.

The facts already quoted in this history are sufficient to show how much reality there was in these suppositions. It is very true that M. de Bassano, M. Lavalette, and Prince Cambacérés were possessed of Napoleon's confidence, and because they were worthy of the trust, they would be very careful not to talk of his affairs to every chance comer. Queen Hortense was most devoted to her stepfather; but at this moment the feelings of the adopted daughter were absorbed in those of the mother.

M. de Metternich was discontented with Russia and Prussia, and had with difficulty separated himself from the court of Naples, but we have seen whether he thought of using Napoleon as an instrument to check the pretensions of Russia and Prussia; and as for Napoleon, we shall soon see whether he had money to employ in such enterprises, or whether he had any part in those that were being formed in France. The real risk resulting from such extravagant inventions, to which governments too willingly listen when not guided by cool and solid judgment, is that their attention is turned from real to imaginary dangers, or in hunting phrase, that the false scent is followed instead of the true. No notice was taken of M. Fouché, who was not only treated with attention, but even lauded by the police, nor of those young generals who commanded in Le Nord, and whose daring might soon become dangerous, whilst attention and hatred were directed towards men who were indeed disaffected, but of whom not one was inclined to raise his hand against the government. The Count d'Artois was besieged by a thousand alarming reports, which increasing terror made him believe, whilst Louis XVIII., wearied by these perpetual alarms, believed nothing, and the government, for want of a firm and intelligent head, hovering between a blind credulity and absolute unbelief, overlooked all these perils, not through the absence of fear, but the want of ability to discern them.

M. de Bassano, at once disturbed and pleased by what he heard, trembled at the idea of such an enterprise as the one in question being undertaken without Napoleon's knowledge, with whose views it might interfere, whom it might expose to severe treatment, and which, were it carried on without his knowledge, might prove more advantageous to others than to him. This faithful servant was consequently desirous of informing Napoleon of what was going on, and the opportunity he sought was soon offered him by the zeal of a young man with whom he had had no previous acquaintance.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon, an auditor of the empire, endowed with intelligence, vigour of mind, and ambition, and weary of being nobody at Paris, had determined to go to the island of Elba and offer his services to the dethroned emperor, but he wished to take with him an introduction that might secure him a favourable reception. He applied to M. de Bassano, who treated him with reserve, but became more communicative when he recognised the young man's sincerity, and finally commissioned him to inform Napoleon verbally of the true state of France, that is to say, of the increasing unpopularity of the Bourbons, the coldness with which they were looked on by the middle classes, the irritation of the holders of national property, the exasperation of the army, the inclination of the young officers

to risk everything, and lastly, the general opinion that the present state of affairs could not last, but must change either to the advantage of the Bonaparte or Orleans family. M. Fleury de Chaboulon pressed M. de Bassano to be more explicit, and send some advice to Napoleon, such as that he ought to leave Elba and embark for France. M. de Bassano replied, and with justice, that he could not undertake such a responsibility, and that advice, especially such advice, could not be given to such a man as Napoleon. M. Fleury de Chaboulon was merely instructed to bear to Elba an exact account of the state of affairs, with the express recommendation not to say anything that might influence one way or the other. M. de Bassano refused to give any written document, but furnished him with a token that would prove to Napoleon whence he came. M. Fleury de Chaboulon left in January, passed through Italy, fell sick on his journey, and did not reach Elba until the month of February.

Before speaking of the result of this mission, we must first describe how Napoleon lived in Elba since he had passed from the government of the world to the sovereignty of one of the smallest isles of the Mediterranean. It is indeed a strange spectacle, and one worthy the attention of history, to contemplate a mind whose wondrous activity once filled all Europe, now confined within the space of a few leagues, and occupied with twelve or fifteen thousand subjects, and one thousand soldiers! We should but badly fulfil our task did we not sketch this picture.

Transported to Elba on board the English frigate *The Undaunted*, Napoleon anchored opposite Porto Ferrajo on the 3rd of May 1814, and landed on the 4th. A few days before his arrival he had been burned in effigy by the inhabitants, for the same reasons that had turned all the nations of Europe against him—war, conscription, and the *droits réunis*. When told of his arrival, their anger was forgotten, and all, impelled by intense curiosity, hastened to meet him. They now manifested tumultuous delight, remembering that they would be freed from the Tuscan yoke, and believing that their new monarch brought vast treasures, they fancied that he would introduce a large commerce, and that his creative genius would soon effect wondrous changes in their island. He was conducted in triumph to the church, where a *Te Deum* was sung. He graciously yielded to their wishes, as if he could in any way share in the childish joy of his new subjects.

Yielding submissively to present circumstances, and not seeming to note their insignificance, he set to work the day after his arrival, and made the tour of his island on horseback. When in the course of a few hours he had gone over its entire

extent, he decided on a system of government, and exhibited as much energy in undertaking his new task as he had displayed fifteen years before, when he commenced reorganising France.

His attention was first directed to the city of Porto Ferrajo, which is situated on an eminence commanding a beautiful gulf that looks towards the mountains of Etruria. This city had been formerly fortified, and might still be made a place of considerable strength. Napoleon immediately applied himself to getting it in a complete state of defence. By bringing a detachment of his guards to the isle of Elba, he had secured to himself some hundreds of devoted men, either to defend him against violence, or to serve as the basis of some daring adventure should he ever attempt one. These companions of his exile, in number about a thousand, being shut up in a good maritime fortress, with provisions and ammunition, could defend themselves for some weeks, and give him time to escape in case the sovereigns, regretting that they had left him so near Europe, should think of transporting him to the ocean. He therefore hastened to repair the fortifications of Porto Ferrajo, and to bring thither the artillery that had been distributed along the shores of the island during the late war. The guns were mounted on the walls, the forts that commanded the harbour were finished and fortified, and the magazines were furnished with provisions and ammunition. Within a few weeks Porto Ferrajo was so strengthened, that a considerable force would be required to seize the place. By these precautions Napoleon gained, besides the means of actual defence, the advantage of being able to ascertain more certainly the existence of any plans that might be formed against him, by the extent of the forces that would be needed to attack him. But his forethought did not stop here. The very small island of Pianosa, dependent on his sovereignty, and three leagues distant from Elba, offered many conditions favourable to the execution of his designs. This island, flat and covered with pasture land, which is most valuable in these climates, was overlooked by a pyramidal-shaped rock and a fort, in which a garrison of fifty men would be almost impregnable. This fort he put into a state of defence, and supplied with provisions and a small garrison; and without imparting his secret to any one, he arranged so that it would be possible to descend from the fort at night to the shore, embark and put to sea, which would be easy, as the island was not on the Tuscan side, but in the open sea. Therefore, if any attempt were made to seize him, Napoleon could take refuge in this island during the night, and thence embark for any region he pleased. In order to make use of the pastures, he sent his horses and cattle thither; and thus whilst he profited by the

advantages of the island, he removed all suspicion of his being about to form a military establishment.

After having provided for the defence of Elba, Napoleon organised a most vigilant police. The only landing places were to be at the capital, Porto Ferrajo, or at Rio, Porto Longone, and Campo, small ports situate some on the east and some on the west coast, the former intended for the benefit of the mines, the latter for the exportation of the productions of the country. Guards of gens-d'armes were to prevent any person landing at any other port, and a well organised naval police subjected all comers in the open ports to a strict investigation. Within four or five hours after the arrival of a stranger in any port, even the most distant from Porto Ferrajo, Napoleon was informed of who he was, and wherefore he came. He had grave reasons for these precautions. The French government had placed General Brulart, an old friend of Georges, in the island of Corsica, and had raised him to a rank and command beyond his position, evidently for the purpose of keeping watch on the isle of Elba. Nothing could certainly be more reasonable on the part of the French government than this surveillance; but Napoleon, from information he received, was tempted to believe that to observe his proceedings was not the sole object in view, but that an attempt upon his personal liberty was contemplated. But it must be said that no documents since produced contain any evidence tending to criminate General Brulart; still there can be no doubt that intriguers who kept up a correspondence with what was called *la police du Chateau*, boasted of being able to get Napoleon assassinated, and even said they were making arrangements for the purpose; it is also undeniable that Corsican bravoës were arrested in the isle of Elba, and could give no satisfactory explanation of their presence there. Napoleon sent them away, assuring them that the first of their class whom he again caught in Elba should be shot; and he added, that on good proof of any overt act, he would despatch fifty determined men to the city of Ajaccio to seize General Brulart, upon whom in the face of Europe he would execute signal justice. We must add that whether through fear, or because he really harboured no evil design, General Brulart remained quiet, and no act of his went beyond a legitimate surveillance.

Napoleon had now taken precautions both against an attempt at assassination or abduction, for owing to the arrangements he had made, a large force would be needed to attack him, and could not come upon him unawares.

As to the personnel of his force, he showed as much skill in the management of a thousand men as he had formerly displayed in directing the disposition of a million. Before leaving

Fontainebleau, Druot had selected from amongst the soldiers of the old guard—who were all willing to accompany Napoleon—about six hundred grenadiers and *chasseurs à pied*, one hundred cavalry, and twenty marines, making in all seven hundred and twenty-four picked men. Having marched from Fontainebleau to Savona, they embarked on board English vessels, and landed at Porto Ferrajo about the end of May. For a time Napoleon had feared they might be forcibly detained, and great was his joy at seeing them arrive, a joy excited as much by prudence as pleasure at again meeting his old companions-in-arms. He gave them as good quarters as he could, and sent the horses to the pastures of Pianosa. As in his island he had no need of the cavalry soldiers he converted them into gunners, and employed the leisure hours of his exile in instructing them. Sixty Poles that were at Parma having got permission to embark at Leghorn, Napoleon paid their passage, and so obtained an additional reinforcement of devoted men. He was also joined by some French officers, who had been reduced almost to a state of starvation, and had travelled across Italy as best they could. His troops now amounted to about eight hundred men, though of the original number he had lost some by death and sickness.

To these eight hundred men Napoleon found the means of adding some daring and intrepid soldiers. During his reign the guardianship of the islands had been confided to battalions of light infantry, into which the conscripts who had shown a disposition to desert had been drafted, and all of whom were brave and active, though somewhat insubordinate. Two of these battalions, belonging to the 35th light division, and consisting of Provencals, Ligurians, Tuscans, and Corsicans, were in garrison at Elba in 1814. When they were about to embark for France, Napoleon told them that he would retain such as would enter his service. About three hundred, chiefly Corsicans, remained, and with the exception of a few deserters were faithful to him to the last. He consequently had at his disposal eleven hundred men of the very best regular troops. To these he joined four hundred natives, organised in the following manner.

The island of Elba possessed a battalion of four companies of militia, tolerably well disciplined, and quite as good soldiers as the Corsicans. Napoleon ordered that each of the companies forming the battalion should every month have twenty-five men under arms, while seventy-five were left at their usual employments, by which he had a hundred men in active service, and three hundred ready at the shortest notice. Only the hundred men on active service were paid, and of these the interior and marine police were formed. Napoleon's army thus

amounted to fifteen hundred men, who being mingled with the old guard were almost equal to that celebrated corps.

These were not the meaningless occupations of a maniac amusing himself with toys that reminded him of his former state, but were, as we have said, a means of defence against assassination, or transportation to some distant clime, which could never happen unexpectedly if he were in a position to defend himself for some days; and should a new future present itself, these arrangements secured him the means of landing on the continent, and commencing a new career, without running the risk of being arrested by a few gens-d'armes and shot on the road.

With the same extensive views, Napoleon took care to form a navy. At Porto Ferrajo he found a brig, *The Inconstant*, in tolerably good condition, that might be manned by sixty men, and a goëlette, *The Caroline*, that would require a crew of sixteen. At Leghorn he had bought a felucca, *L'Etoile*, that could be managed by fourteen men, and two avisos, *La Mouche* and *L'Abeille*, which together would require a crew of eighteen men. These vessels, for which about a hundred sailors would be needed, together with two or three feluccas that might be easily procured, could embark the eleven hundred men of whom Napoleon's regular army was composed. This was all that he needed in case he should ever think of leaving his island, an event he considered very doubtful, though not impossible. These hundred and odd sailors he counted amongst his indispensable expenses, and by adding to them a small number of native seamen, he could complete the equipment of his flotilla in twenty-four hours. In the meantime, by the help of the two advice-boats, he corresponded with the ports of Genoa, Leghorn, and Naples, whence he procured provisions, letters, and newspapers. By means of *The Caroline* he maintained a strict police in the harbour of Porto Ferrajo; he occasionally displayed from *The Inconstant* the flag of his little State, which was white, striped with purple, and studded with stars, and thus accustomed the English, French, Genoese, and Turkish sailors to see his colours in the Tuscan sea.

Having thus provided for his personal safety, and as far as he could for his future prospects, Napoleon next turned his attention to embellishing his residence, and making it comfortable for himself, his family, and soldiers, also to developing the prosperity of his little State, and finally to arranging his finances in such a way as to secure their duration. On his arrival he took up his abode at the Hotel de Ville of Porto Ferrajo, and afterwards removed to the dilapidated and confined palace of the former governors. This building he determined to enlarge and improve by the addition of a *corps de bâtiment*,

so that he might be able to receive his mother and sisters, and even his wife if, which was very improbable, she would decide on coming. He purchased furniture at Genoa, and made his home quite habitable. He also erected a building for the officers of his battalion, that they might be always at hand, and a little better lodged than in the town. Besides the dwelling at Porto Ferrajo, he built a simple but elegant summer residence in the vale of San Martino, a charming valley opening on the harbour of Porto Ferrajo, and looking towards the mountains of Italy. He commenced by cultivating and planting, and made the simple-minded mayor, who was little accustomed to flatter, laugh, by pretending that he would soon sow the spot with five hundred sacks of corn. "You laugh, Mr. Mayor," he said, "but you have no idea of how things develop and increase. The first year I shall sow fifty sacks, a hundred the second, two hundred the third, and so on." This agricultural enterprise, like his great empire, needed, alas! but time. Having completed his town and country residences, he turned his attention to his capital, Porto Ferrajo, a town containing three thousand inhabitants. He had the streets paved and cleaned, and erected a pretty fountain, which scattered refreshing showers around. He made the two main roads which crossed the whole island practicable for carriages. One of these ran from Porto Ferrajo to Porto Longone, the principal port of communication with Italy, and the other from Porto Ferrajo to Campo, a small port looking towards Pianosa and the open sea.

As his finances would not allow him to spend more than six or seven thousand francs on these works—a sum whose importance must not be estimated by the present value of money—he employed his soldiers, to whom he paid a small stipend, whilst he furnished the stone, marble, brick, cement, and wood. He spent a part of each day on horseback, directing to these trifling works that powerful mind whose attention was once fixed on the world at large, and which was as correct in its estimate of small as of great objects. Nor was he less mindful of all that could ameliorate the soil or advance the commerce of the island. He wished to cover the whole country with mulberry trees, in order to encourage the rearing of silk-worms, and commenced by planting some of those valuable trees along the two roads he had constructed. He ordered that the marble quarries near Campo should be worked. The salt-mines and tunny fisheries formed two of the principal sources of the revenue of the country; he turned his attention to the improvement of both; and lastly, the iron-mines, which constituted the principal riches of the island, attracted his consideration. These mines had long produced an excellent ore, containing more than eighty-four parts of pure metal in every hundred; but

for want of fuel the inhabitants were not able to smelt the ore, and sold it to Italian merchants. The smelting of iron had dwindled down to almost nothing; but Napoleon sought to revive that branch of industry on a large scale, and to attract workmen he promised to support them at his own expense.

The corn employed for this purpose was to be purchased in Italy. But the execution of all these enterprises was checked by the smallness of his finances. If the inhabitants of Elba, his soldiers, the European public, and especially the Bourbons, were to be believed, he had carried immense treasures with him, for excepting his stature, none could believe that anything connected with him could be small. The very idea of these treasures made his enemies tremble, and his unsophisticated subjects bound with joy. But these treasures were a vain chimera, for he, the most ambitious of men, was the most heedless of what concerned himself personally. Until the very day of his abdication he had never asked on what he had to live should he descend from the throne. The 150,000,000 that he had economised out of the Civil List were not spent on himself, but on extraordinary war expenses; and when at the moment of quitting Fontainebleau he, for the first time, inquired into the state of his finances, he found that he had but the few millions sent on to Blois, and of which the greater part had been carried off from the empress by M. Dudon, the envoy of the provisional government. It was fortunate that before the commission of this act of rapine the emperor had had time to send for 2,500,000 francs, which the lancers of the guard had escorted. He desired the empress to take 2,900,000 for her own use, and out of this she had been able to send him 900,000 francs, by which his finances were raised to the sum of 3,400,000 francs when he left for Elba. This sum, in gold and silver, followed his carriages, and was received by him at Porto Ferrajo. This was the sole means of support for himself and his soldiers were he content to end his days in Elba. The annual subsidy of 2,000,000 that had been stipulated by the treaty of the 11th April had not been paid, and he had no other revenues but those derived from his island. These revenues were very small. The town of Porto Ferrajo contributed about 100,000 francs by harbour dues and other taxes, and the island itself about another 100,000 by direct taxation. The fisheries, mines, and salt-pits in their actual state produced about 320,000 francs, being altogether 520,000. Of this sum at least 200,000 francs were consumed by the municipal expenses of Porto Ferrajo and the other small towns, and by the cost of maintaining the roads in the state to which Napoleon had brought them, which left a net product of about 300,000 francs per annum. Now Napoleon would not require less than

1,500,000 or 1,600,000 francs to support his household, his army, and his navy. There was therefore a deficiency of 1,200,000 francs to be drawn annually from his private treasury, which the expenses of building had already reduced from 3,400,000 to 2,800,000 francs. He could not, therefore, live long at Elba if the appointed subsidy were not paid, unless he dismissed his guard; that is, deprived himself of the faithful soldiers that had followed his fortunes, which would be to leave himself without defence against the first band of assassins that should attack him, and give up the nucleus of an army with which he could not dispense in any enterprise he might be induced to undertake at a later period. Consequently, though he had not yet formed a project of any kind, he paid such minute attention to the smallest expenses, that he astonished even those accustomed to his love of order, and made many accuse him of avarice. After six months' residence in the island, he ceased to require the service of the native militia, of which, as we have mentioned, a fourth part was always under arms. There were thus one hundred men less to be paid. He changed the organisation of the battalion of his old guard by reducing it from six to four companies. His stables were reduced to what was absolutely necessary, only the carriages needed by his mother, his sister, and himself being kept, and a few saddle-horses for himself, Druot, and Bertrand to ride over the island, with a small escort.

The pay of his principal officers was fixed at a moderate but sufficient sum. Druot could not be induced to accept any pecuniary remuneration, as he had, he said, all that he needed when he shared the roof and table of his old general.

Such were Napoleon's arrangements at Elba for the present and the future. His life was calm and occupied; for it is the privilege of great minds to be able to submit to the reverses of destiny, especially when deserved, and to take an interest in the smallest things because that in themselves they have as profound a meaning as the greatest. His mother, a harsh and imperious woman, but faithful in the performance of her duty, considered it due to her own dignity to share the destiny of her son, and she was at Porto Ferrajo the object of profound respect to the exiled court. The Princess Pauline Borghèse, whose friendship for her brother was almost carried to passion, had also come, and her presence was most soothing to Napoleon. She took great pains to reconcile him to Murat, which indeed was not very difficult. Napoleon understood human nature too well to entertain resentment long. He knew that Murat was thoughtless and vain, and consumed by the desire of retaining his kingdom; but he also knew that he was both kind-hearted and brave, and he pardoned him for succumbing to extraordinary

circumstances. When Murat reflected upon the deceitfulness as well as the ingratitude of his conduct, he sent a declaration of his repentance to Elba, and Napoleon, in return, desired his sister Pauline to bear his pardon to Murat at Naples, and at the same time advised him to be prudent, and hold himself in readiness for any unexpected event that might occur. The princess had carried this message to the delighted Murat, and then returned to take her place beside her brother. She was the centre of a small society, composed of the most respectable inhabitants of the island, who crowded around Napoleon as their sovereign. A theatre was arranged, into which Napoleon admitted this little society, and very often the soldiers of his guard. He was gentle, polite, calm, and as attentive to the performance as though he had not formerly seen the *chef-d'œuvre* of the French theatre represented by the first actors of the age. When the duties of his modest sovereignty were fulfilled, he passed his time with Bertrand and Druot in inspecting the works of the island, on horseback, on foot, or sometimes in a boat. He occasionally embarked on board a half-decked boat with some of his officers, and remained at sea for two or three days, where he was recognised and saluted by the sailors of every nation. During these long trips he conversed gravely or gaily as the subject demanded, sometimes talking with the liveliness of a young man, but more frequently with the gravity of profound and vast genius. He was continually thinking of writing the history of his reign, and discussed the darker points of his career with tolerable frankness, frequently speaking of the irreparable mistake of refusing peace at Prague. It was the only fault that he freely admitted. "I was wrong," he said, "but let any one imagine himself in my place. I had gained so many victories, and had just re-established my power by the two battles of Bautzen and Lutzen. I had so much faith in my soldiers and myself, that I *would* throw the dice once more. I lost, but those that blame me have never drunk of fortune's intoxicating cup." Druot listened with downcast eyes, not daring to say how unwise it was to risk one's own existence, how culpable to venture the well-being of one's children, and how criminal to stake the safety of a nation. The honest man was silent, and justified his silence to his own conscience by remembering that his master was conquered and exiled.

In this tranquil mode of existence, whilst he dreamed of raising an immortal historical monument, Napoleon was almost happy, because that a gleam of hope was mingled with its calm. He read the journals carefully, and with a penetration that made him divine the truth as clearly amid the thousand assertions of the journalists as though he had been present at the

deliberations of the different cabinets. He said that the French Revolution had been arrested for a moment, but would resume its irresistible course. The old régime and the Revolution would have some terrible struggles, and in the consequent confusion an opportunity would assuredly offer for him to appear upon the stage. He did not know whether he should reign again, though he was certain that he could not reign in the same manner as before, for the minds of men, which had been paralysed for a time by the terrors of the Revolution, had resumed their vigour and independence. What should he be? what should he become? what part would he have to play? Considering the awkwardness of the Bourbons at Paris, and the ambition of the powers at Vienna, he felt convinced that the world was far from being about to subside into a state of tranquillity, and he knew that in a politically tossed world he would be sure to find a position eminent as his genius. Such were his dimly seen views of the future, and they sufficed to prevent the energy shut up in his soul from destroying him. His repose was thus enlivened by a ray of hope. He was sometimes annoyed by the outrageous language of the public papers. One day he found a journal amongst a number he had received, which said that he was become mad, and that Bertrand and Druot, his most faithful servants, together with his mother and sister and the most devoted of his family, had been obliged to leave him, not being able to endure his violence. He repaired to the drawing-room where his mother, sister, Bertrand, and Druot were assembled, and flinging a number of papers on the table he exclaimed, "You did not know that I am mad. None of you can bear my violence—you mother, you Druot, and you all have left me." He then gave them the papers to read, whilst he exclaimed, "I am mad, I am mad." He sat down and avenged himself by discussing the state of the world, and pointing out the faults of all parties with wonderful sagacity. "Europe and the Bourbons shall find," he said, "that the present state of things will not last six months."

His life at Elba was rendered tolerable by the fact that he saw every day more clearly that the great theatre of the world would be soon accessible to him. This made him eager for intelligence, and for intelligence different to that contained in the journals. He had sent agents to Italy, and learned that the whole country would rise at his appearance; but this did not tempt him, as it was not at the head of the Italians that he could flatter himself to oppose Europe. It was of the state of France that he wished to be informed; but he would not write to the men of rank who had served under him, lest he should compromise them, and they through fear of compromising him were equally reserved. He was better informed of what

was going on at Vienna. He was not indebted for this information to his wife, but to M. Meneval, whose fidelity and zeal had never failed, and who through Genoese merchants had sent him frequent accounts of his son and of the Congress. M. Meneval had his information from Madame de Brignole, a Genoese lady of high birth and rare intelligence, who was most devoted to France, and who in her office of lady of honour had vainly sought to make Marie Louise listen to the dictates of duty. Madame de Brignole received her information from the principal persons of Vienna, and particularly from her son-in-law, the Duke de Dalberg, minister of Louis XVIII. She carefully watched the course of events, and discovered the project of sending Napoleon to an island in the Atlantic. M. Meneval had not failed to inform Napoleon of this project, at the same time that he exaggerated the probability of its execution ; for, as we have said, the sovereigns were about to quit Vienna without having come to any determination on this subject. To this M. Meneval added the information that the Congress was about being dissolved, and that the sovereigns would leave on the 20th of February at the latest.

These several pieces of information produced a great impression on Napoleon, and made him reflect deeply on his present and future position. He had said more than once that he could not die upon this island, and that a tragic end even would be better suited to him, and more consonant with his glory, than an effeminate old age in the tranquil prison of Elba. The evident weariness of his companions in misfortune encouraged such thoughts. Marshal Bertrand felt the pains of exile a little less since he had been joined by his family. Druot was as ever occupied, in all simplicity, with the fulfilment of his duty. It was not so with others. The first excitement that follows self-sacrifice having passed away, both officers and soldiers were profoundly wearied of their want of occupation. They often let Napoleon see this, as they said to him in their familiar way, "Sire, when shall we set out for France?" He only replied by silence and a friendly smile, but he perceived what was passing in their minds, and foresaw that their patience would not last to the end of his exile. He tried to occupy them, by employing them for a small addition to their pay in working on his roads, in his garden, and allowed those who would not work to plunder the vineyards on his domain at San Martino, whilst he laughed at their innocent depredations. "We are coming from St. Cloud," they said, when he met them on the road eating the grapes they had stolen. "Very good," he replied, but he comprehended the ennui that oppressed them, and from which he suffered more than they. About twenty, no longer able to bear this state of inaction, demanded their *congé*, which he gave in

the most honourable terms. It is true that in return he was reinforced by some officers from the continent, men who fled from the ennui of France, but had not yet experienced that of Elba. Besides the too evident disposition of his soldiers which made him fear that he would not be long able to retain them, he saw that it would soon be impossible to support them, since, when his present works would be finished, there would remain but 2,400,000 francs of 3,400,000 that he had brought to Porto Ferrajo, a sum that would exactly pay his army and navy for two years. These reasons, without taking the indomitable energy of his mind into consideration, would have made him resolve on again appearing on the great theatre of the world. Still Napoleon had not formed any decided plan when he received the twofold intelligence we have recorded, that is, the project of transporting him to some isle in the ocean, and the intention of the sovereigns to leave Vienna as soon as their labours should be terminated. It needed nothing more to inflame his ardent spirit. Two powerful considerations struck him immediately. First, if the sovereigns were about to separate, they must have decided his fate, and the decision, once made, would be immediately put into execution. Secondly, the sovereigns being about to leave Vienna and repair to their respective dominions, it would be a good opportunity to attempt a revolution in France; for having once quitted the Austrian capital, it would not be easy to assemble the powers again, and all arrangements between distant cabinets must necessarily be slow, imperfect, and wanting in vigour. These were weighty considerations; and as Napoleon was in the habit of looking to the immediate means of executing his projects, he found in the season itself a motive for immediate action.

It was the middle of February, and long days would soon succeed long nights. But long nights were more favourable to Napoleon's escape from Elba, and to embarking on board his flotilla with his soldiers. This last consideration almost decided him; and in order to be ready for any event, on the 16th February he ordered *The Inconstant* to be put into dock to be repaired, painted like an English vessel, and provided with provisions for some months. The same day he ordered his agent for the mines at Rio to hire two large transports for the ostensible purpose of sending ore to the continent. He did not speak of his plans to any one.

Whilst he was thus thinking of escaping from his prison, and had been for two or three weeks deprived of all communication with Europe, he received a number of journals at once. He read them with the greatest eagerness, and it was with the liveliest satisfaction that he found in them new indications of the excitement that prevailed in France, for they contained an

account of Exelmans' trial, of the disturbance at Mlle. Raucourt's funeral, and proved that the soldiery and inhabitants of Paris were ready for a revolt. The *Journal des Débats* especially, being correctly informed by the Duke de Dalberg of what was going on at Vienna, confirmed the intelligence of the approaching separation of the sovereigns, and this concordance with M. Meneval's report confirmed Napoleon's resolution to prepare for his departure.

It was at this very time that he was informed of the arrival of a young stranger at Porto Ferrajo, who announced that he was charged with an important message to him. This was M. Fleury de Chaboulon, of whom we have spoken. Immediately on his landing he asked to be conducted to General Bertrand, announcing himself as an envoy from M. de Bassano. Napoleon admitted him at once, and from a slight feeling of distrust inspected him minutely from head to foot, but soon perceived that he was a young man of integrity and zeal, and listened to him with profound attention when he was informed of a circumstance known only to himself and M. de Bassano—this was the means employed by M. de Bassano to obtain credence for M. Fleury de Chaboulon. "They think of me still in France," said Napoleon, in a discontented tone; "M. de Bassano has not forgotten me?" This slight reproachfulness passed away as M. Fleury de Chaboulon informed him why his most faithful servants had been so reserved, and he listened attentively to the earnest and agitated account of his informant. Although M. Fleury de Chaboulon told him nothing but what he had already divined from the public papers, he was delighted to find his opinions confirmed by an ocular witness, and especially by one who quoted M. de Bassano's own words. What did and ought to touch him most was the positive announcement of the feelings of the army, and the evident impatience of the military to escape from the authority of the Bourbons. Here were good grounds for believing that at the first appearance of their old general the feelings of the soldiers would declare themselves, and for a man so daring as Napoleon, the mere hope of success was sufficient to induce him to act. Having heard M. de Bassano's emissary to the end, he resolved to leave immediately. However, to induce a more minute explanation he proposed the following question: "Now finish," he said, "and tell me whether M. de Bassano advises me to embark for France?" Interrogated by that piercing glance that none could resist, the young man dared neither to assume himself nor impose so great a responsibility on M. de Bassano, and timidly replied that M. de Bassano gave no opinion, and recommended him to confine himself to the simple statement of facts. Napoleon did not insist further, for he saw that

nobody could assume so grave a responsibility with respect to him, and he dismissed M. de Chaboulon without telling him of his plans, though he gave him reason to divine them. Fearing that the excitement of a young man admitted for the first time to the knowledge of important secrets might lead to some imprudence, he sent him on an imaginary expedition to Naples, with orders at its termination to return to France for fresh instructions from M. de Bassano.* At this period Napoleon ought either to have overturned the Bourbon dynasty or fallen in the attempt.

Reserved as Napoleon was with others, he told his mother of his plans. "I cannot," he said to her, "die on this island and terminate my career in a repose unworthy of me. Besides, want of money would soon leave me here alone, exposed to the attacks of my many enemies. France is excited. The Bourbons have roused against them all the convictions and interests connected with the Revolution. The army wishes for me. Everything inclines me to hope that the moment I appear the soldiers will hasten to meet me. I certainly may meet some unexpected obstacle in my path; I may meet an officer, who, faithful to the Bourbons, would restrain the impetuosity of the troops; and then a few hours would end my career. Such an end were better than a long residence in this isle with the future that awaits me there. I will leave and tempt fortune once more. What is your advice, mother?" This energetic minded woman experienced an emotion of terror on receiving this confidence, for she saw that her son, notwithstanding all his glory, might die as a common malefactor on the shores of France. "Let me," she said, "be a mother for a moment, and then I will give you my opinion." She reflected

* M. Fleury de Chaboulon in his work on the Hundred Days, entitled "*Memoirs of Napoleon's Private Life in 1815*," a very truthful work, which had the honour of being spoken of by Napoleon at St. Helena, has somewhat magnified the part he played, and which he relates under an assumed name. In his recital, he seems to think that it was he that induced Napoleon to decide on quitting the island of Elba. But like all those who know but one phase of an event, he has referred everything to his personal experience, and to what he saw. Napoleon's orders in Elba, which have been preserved, his own account to Queen Hortense and Marshal Davout at Paris, which are contained in the manuscript memoirs which we have received, together with Napoleon's notes on the work in question, prove clearly that the facts were not quite as M. de Chaboulon relates, but exactly as we tell them here. One circumstance alone—the date of the order for the repairs of *The Inconstant*—puts all doubt at an end. These orders, preserved in the correspondence of the island of Elba, which has been preserved, are dated February 16th. Now although M. de Chaboulon, in relating his journey under a borrowed name, has not mentioned the precise date of his arrival at Elba, still certain indications prove that he had not arrived there before this order was issued. This is an important point, as will be seen hereafter, for it proves that it was not by advices from Paris that Napoleon was led to this enterprise. M. de Chaboulon's information certainly hastened the execution of his project, but was not the primary cause of his determination.

for some time in silence, and then in a firm and inspired tone she said, "Go, my son, go and fulfil your destiny. You will fail, perhaps, and your failure will be soon followed by your death. But I see with sorrow that you cannot remain here; but let us hope that God, who has protected you amid so many battles, will save you once more." This said, she embraced him with deep emotion.*

Napoleon was now more confirmed in his design than ever. It was at the very last moment that he told the delighted Bertrand, who had some merit in enduring his exile, since it was painful to him, though surrounded by his family. Druot was greatly disturbed when Napoleon admitted him to his confidence. This hero, the most upright of men, asked himself whether the duty of sharing Napoleon's sufferings involved the obligation of accompanying him in an enterprise that might bring such frightful misfortunes on France. Napoleon sought to combat these doubts by depicting the state of France divided and rent by parties, condemned to suffer from the attempts of one or the other, and treated with the greatest indignity by Europe; whilst on the other hand she had still a chance of rising, by the aid of that vigorous arm that had organised her resources in 1800. Besides the new ideas with which Napoleon would return to France after ten months of profound reflection, his determination not to sink again, of his own free will, into the abyss of war, to treat the French people as a free nation, by allowing them to have a large share in the government; all these were reasons for hoping that France would obtain peace, unanimity of opinion, well-regulated liberty, and a firm position, all that she might have had had Napoleon restrained himself during his former reign. Devotedness to his master did the rest; and Druot, yielding to his wishes, commenced secret preparations for the approaching expedition. Napoleon had under specious pretexts brought the Corsican battalion, stationed in the island, to Porto Ferrajo, and ordered new clothes for the men. But he left the horses of the Polish lancers in the meadows of Pianosa, as it would be difficult to remove them, nor could he easily have found an excuse for doing so. About eleven hundred soldiers were collected, of whom eight hundred belonged to the guard, and three hundred were Corsicans, Piedmontese, or Tuscans, belonging to the 35th light infantry that Napoleon had found in the island. None of these men had an idea of the projected enterprise, and the ordinary works going on as usual, they might have supposed they were about to be reviewed. One circumstance in particular was very favourable to the projected attempt. In order to watch the proceedings in Elba, the English had retained in the neighbour-

* This is Napoleon's own account in his manuscript memoirs.

hood Colonel Campbell, one of the commissioners that accompanied Napoleon from Fontainebleau to Porto Ferrajo; and in order to conceal the object for which he was really sent, this officer received an ostensible mission to the Tuscan court. Colonel Campbell went backwards and forwards from Florence to Leghorn, from Leghorn to Porto Ferrajo, and was in reality a spy without seeming so. He had at this moment left Porto Ferrajo and gone to Leghorn. The eye of English policy was consequently closed, and there only remained the cruisers, that were easily deceived or avoided. In order to keep his preparations a profound secret, Napoleon, two days before embarking, laid an embargo on all the vessels in the harbours of Elba, and cut off all communication with the sea. He ordered his ordnance officer, Vantini, to seize one of the large vessels lying in the port, which, with *The Inconstant*, of twenty-six cannons, the goélette, *The Caroline*, the felucca, *L'Etoile*, the advice-boat, *La Mouche*, and two other transports freighted at Rio, making in all seven vessels, he secured the means of embarking his eleven hundred men and four pieces of field artillery.

Having meditated seriously on his determination and project, having considered that he could not remain in an island so near France, where he would be soon alone for want of money to pay his troops, and where he would be exposed to the dagger of every common assassin if he were not thence transported by the European powers; considering, too, that in the present state of France others might make a similar attempt without the same success as he, since his mere presence would suffice to attract the army and put the Bourbons to flight; that as the sovereigns were on the eve of separating, as the latest accounts showed, and that it would not be easy to assemble them again, and they, seeing the weakness of the Bourbons, would not be so ready to take up arms in their cause, and finding him pacific (as he was determined to be), he considered that he had every chance of re-establishing the imperial throne as by the touch of a magic wand, and that, in short, he ought to execute his project whilst the nights were still long. Having again weighed all these considerations, he resolved to commence his romantic enterprise on the 26th of February.

Before leaving, he sent a message to Naples by one of the vessels with which he communicated with the coasts of Italy. At the same time that he announced his departure to Murat, he desired him to send a courier to Vienna to inform the Austrian court that he would be soon in Paris, but with the firm resolution to maintain peace and confine himself within the terms of the treaty of the 30th of May 1814. He also traced for him the part he was to act as King of Naples. He particularly recommended him to prepare his troops, and hold them in

readiness in the Marches, where they were already partly assembled, but not to take the initiative in hostilities, but patiently observe what would occur at Paris and Vienna before making any movement; and should he be obliged to fight, to retire rather than advance until the enemy should come within his reach, for the nearer he was to Naples the stronger he would be, and the weaker the Austrians.

On the 26th, Napoleon allowed his soldiers to remain at their usual employments until the middle of the day. They were suddenly summoned in the afternoon, regaled with soup, and then assembled with arms and baggage on the pier, where they were informed that they were to go on board the vessels. Though they had not been told that France was their destination, they entertained no doubt on the subject, and gave utterance to the wildest expressions of joy. To emerge from their wearying inactivity, to quit Elba, to be called into action, to behold France again, and remount the summit of power and glory—such were the prospects that filled them with joy as they made the harbour of Porto Ferrajo re-echo with cries of *Vive l'Empereur!*

But the inhabitants of the island regretted Napoleon's departure, for they thought that the prosperity of their island left with him, and in mournful silence they surrounded the noisy and animated group about to embark. Many who had become intimate with the officers and soldiers bade them a sad farewell, wished success to their enterprise, and consoled themselves in thinking that should Napoleon's star again rise radiant in the firmament—and of this they entertained no doubt—some of its rays would fall upon their isle. Napoleon soon appeared accompanied by Bertrand, Druot, Cambronne, and the entire staff that had accompanied him in his exile. He had just dined with his mother and sister, and embracing them several times, sought in vain to dry their tears, reminding them how miraculously he had been preserved during twenty years amid the artillery of all Europe. He left them, his heart touched, but his resolution unshaken, and descended to the shore, his brow radiant with hope. His presence excited new bursts of enthusiasm, and soon the little army of eleven hundred men that was about to conquer the empire of France against all Europe was embarked. The staff and about three hundred men embarked on board *The Inconstant*, the remainder were distributed between *The Caroline* and the other vessels of the flotilla. At about seven in the evening, the crowd being assembled on the quay, and Napoleon's mother and sister at the windows of the palace, the imperial flotilla weighed anchor, directing its course towards Cape St. André. It was to coast along Elba, proceed northwards between the isle of Capria and Italy, and keep as far as possible out of

the latitudes frequented by the cruisers. The wind was from the south, as though fortune wished to favour the daring expedition, and for the last time protect the extraordinary man whom she had so often transported beyond the Alps, whom she had carried into Egypt and restored safe and sound again to France, whom she had aided in all his enterprises from the Tagus to the Borysthenes, and never abandoned but at Moscow! Would she grant him one more of those favours with which she had filled his wonderful career? That was the doubtful point, but neither Napoleon nor his soldiers in their boundless confidence could entertain any doubt.

But soon difficulties arose, as they will even in the most successful enterprises. The favourable south wind fell sensibly, and when the flotilla arrived at St. André it was becalmed. It was with difficulty that a little progress was made northwards towards Capria, and on the morning of the 27th the flotilla had advanced only seven or eight leagues. The vessels were now in the waters of the French and English cruisers, whom they might meet at any moment. The danger was great. The captain of the frigate *Chautard*, who had joined Napoleon at Elba, Captain Taillade of *The Inconstant*, and several sailors advised returning to Porto Ferrajo to await a more favourable wind. This would be avoiding one danger by seeking another, for, notwithstanding the embargo laid on all vessels in Porto Ferrajo, the English might have heard of what was going on, in which case a British force suddenly appearing might shut Napoleon up in Porto Ferrajo, detected in the very act of disturbing the public peace, and thence he might be transported to some island, not as a sovereign, but as a prisoner. It was better, therefore, to lie to and await this much-desired south wind. Napoleon, who was unequalled in his experience of the caprices of fate, knew that the various phases of fortune must be viewed with calmness, and a favourable change awaited with patience. Indeed, the greatest danger lay in the possibility of falling in with the French cruising party, consisting of two frigates and a brig. The sentiments of the crews were well known, and it was possible to seize these vessels without firing a shot by suddenly boarding them with the eagles and the tricolor flag. Napoleon therefore determined to wait the course of events, and extricate himself by a *coup d'audace*, should he fall in with the French cruisers.

At noon the wind freshened, and the vessels advanced as far as Leghorn. A frigate was perceived in the direction of the Genoese coast, and another in the open sea to the left, whilst a ship of the line was seen in the distance coming with a favouring wind in full sail towards the flotilla. These were the dangers to be braved in trusting to fate. Napoleon's vessels continued

their way, when suddenly *The Inconstant* came deck to deck with a French brig of war, *Le Zéphire*, commanded by Lieutenant Andrieux, a good officer, that had often met the little navy of Elba. An attempt might have been made to seize this brig, but Napoleon opposed the design, not wishing to incur unnecessary risk. He ordered the grenadiers to keep out of sight, and desired Captain Taillade to speak to the commander Andrieux, with whom he was acquainted. Captain Taillade saluted Andrieux by the aid of his speaking trumpet, and asked whither he was going. "To Leghorn," was replied. "And you?" "To Genoa," said Captain Taillade, and offered to take charge of any commission that *Le Zéphire* might have for that port, but there were none. "And how is the emperor?" asked the officer of the royal navy. "Very well," replied Captain Taillade. "So much the better," added Andrieux, and went on his way without suspecting whom he had met, and the immense importance of what he had passed unnoticed.

During the night the two war vessels which had caused so much uneasiness some hours before disappeared; and the flotilla shaped its way towards France.

The 28th was employed in crossing the Gulf of Genoa, where only a frigate was seen, which was at first believed to be a cruiser belonging to the enemy, but which soon ceased to notice the flotilla; and on the 1st of March, an ever-memorable though fatal day for Napoleon and for France, the French coast was discernible, to the infinite joy of Napoleon and his troops. At noon they came in view of Antibes and the St. Marguerite Isles. At three o'clock they anchored in the Gulf of Juan, when Napoleon, having surmounted the first difficulties of his enterprise, felt as though his ancient good fortune was returning, and his soldiers, sharing his belief, made the air resound with cries of *Vive l'Empereur!*

At an appointed signal and amid the roar of cannon each vessel hoisted the tricolor flag, and the soldiers, displaying cockades of the same colours, prepared to disembark in the boats. Napoleon ordered Lamouret, a captain of infantry, to take twenty-five men and seize a battery that was in the centre of the gulf. Captain Lamouret went in a boat, but found the battery occupied only by some custom-house officers, who were delighted to hear of Napoleon's arrival, and most anxious to join him. The joy with which all landed may be easily imagined; and whilst the boats were going backwards and forwards to bring the men ashore, Captain Lamouret conceived the design of seizing the fortress of Antibes, which would have been an important acquisition.

This rash officer proceeded to the fort, and entered into conversation with the guard at the entrance, by whom he was very

well received. The commander, General Corsin, was on a visit at the St. Marguerites. Colonel Cuneo d'Ornano was in command, and anxious to fulfil his duty as a soldier, he allowed the twenty-five grenadiers to enter, and then ordering the draw-bridge to be raised, he made them prisoners. But they, entering into conversation with the soldiers of the 87th, then in garrison at Antibes, influenced them so far that they, crying *Vive l'Empereur*, insisted on the place being given up to Napoleon. Colonel Ornano succeeded in calming them, whilst he ordered that the twenty-five grenadiers should be disarmed, promising to return their arms when everything should be explained.

These too venturesome twenty-five men were thus lost to Napoleon, and this might be considered as an evil omen, but that at the same time a number of the soldiers of the 87th, letting themselves down from the ramparts, hurried to Cannes to join their emperor, as they said.

At five o'clock all were landed. Napoleon's eleven hundred men, with their baggage and four pieces of cannon, had established their bivouac in a field of olives on the road between Antibes and Cannes. When the inhabitants saw several ships crowded with soldiers and firing cannon, they were terrified, thinking that the Moors had come to seize the fishermen. But when they learned the truth, they hurried to the shore to gratify their curiosity, but did not express an opinion one way or the other, for the inhabitants of the coasts were not in general favourable to the emperor, who had involved them in fifteen years of naval warfare. Napoleon sent Cambronne at the head of a vanguard to Cannes to order provisions and buy horses, and pay ready money, knowing that if he wished men to favour his cause, he must not commence by hurting their private interests. The provisions were prepared, and some mules and horses bought. Notwithstanding the order that no person should be allowed to leave Cannes, particularly by the Toulon road, an officer of gendarmerie from whom Cambronne had proposed to buy some horses, pretending that he would sell, set off at a gallop for Draguignan to tell the Prefect of Var of the great event that had occurred. Fortunately for Napoleon, this officer, having seen the artillery on the Toulon road, was deceived, and announced that the expedition was advancing in the direction of Provence, that is, towards Toulon and Marseilles.

But he was much mistaken, as we shall see. A table and seat having been prepared in the olive-field where Napoleon had encamped, he opened his maps. He had the choice of two roads—one level, leading to Toulon and Marseilles; the other leading to Dauphiné over steep mountains, at that time covered

with ice and snow, and intersected by narrow defiles, where fifty determined men could arrest the progress of a whole army. This latter road, passing across the French Alps, was in some places inaccessible to wheeled vehicles, consequently if Napoleon chose this route he should leave his artillery behind. Notwithstanding these difficulties, which at first sight appeared so formidable, Napoleon did not hesitate, and by the choice he made, assured the success of his adventurous enterprise.

The physical difficulties of the Alpine route consisted in steep and ice-covered roads, in defiles to be forced or avoided by a detour; but these obstacles could be surmounted by patience, perseverance, and daring. Napoleon was accompanied by eleven hundred men capable of anything, and quite equal to overcoming any opposition that might be met in these parts, where there could be none but small garrisons commanded by a captain or a *chef de bataillon*. On the other hand, the moral difficulties to be met on the other route were much more to be dreaded. Had Napoleon chosen this route which passes through Toulon, Marseilles, and Avignon, he would meet with none but violent royalists, who might possibly check the zeal felt by the troops for him. Besides, he would meet on that route authorities of high rank. There were admirals at Toulon, and a marshal of France at Marseilles (Massena commanded in this town). In Napoleon's position his greatest danger was to be apprehended from those high in authority. In the army the soldiers, almost all veterans who had come from prison or foreign garrisons, were all frantically devoted to Napoleon. The officers shared their sentiments, though with more reserve, as they were restrained by their oath and sense of duty. The generals, the marshals especially, were still more influenced by these considerations, and could better appreciate the danger of re-establishing the empire, and would consequently be less inclined than the officers to share the enthusiasm of the troops. It would therefore be more difficult to seduce a marshal at the head of eight or ten thousand men, than a captain or colonel in command of some hundreds.

For all these reasons the higher authorities, whether civil or military, ought to be avoided, and even the worst routes preferred, if only officers of inferior rank were to be met there. On the Dauphiné road, as we have said, Napoleon would only meet with small garrisons feebly commanded, and peasants who liked neither nobles nor priests, and who were almost all holders of national property. The largest town Napoleon would meet, did he choose the mountainous route, was Grenoble. Now Napoleon knew well that the Grenoblais, like all the inhabitants of the frontiers, animated with a most warlike spirit, and faithful to liberal traditions, were, since the famous assembly of Vizille,

totally opposed to the Bourbons. He had in his guard a surgeon, Dr. Emery, a native of Dauphiné, who had kept up a secret correspondence with his native city, and was ready to answer for his compatriots. Napoleon therefore chose the mountainous route, leaving to his left the beautiful sea-side road and the Marseillais royalism, and thus gave another proof of the excellency of that *coup-d'œil* which had so often procured him the greatest military triumphs, and which now secured him the greatest political success that ever the head of an empire or the leader of a party had obtained. He took all his measures accordingly.

He determined to leave his artillery behind, which he did not really need, as he had no intention of fighting with cannon. His eleven hundred men would suffice to defend him against the gens-d'armes, or the opposition of the leader of a battalion; all other resistance he expected to overcome by the mere effect of his presence. The moment he appeared in his redingote and celebrated cocked hat, the first detachment sent to oppose him would fall at his feet, an example that would be followed by the entire army; or he should die on the highroad the death of a common malefactor; this was a question that cannon could not decide. As he left the artillery behind, he ordered that the small sum—about seventeen or eighteen hundred thousand francs—which remained of what he had taken to Elba, should be placed upon the mules. The remainder had been partly spent at Elba, and a part was left to his mother. He determined to leave Cannes about midnight. At the same time he sent emissaries to Grasse, to order provisions and to have two proclamations printed, of which his officers had already made several copies on board *The Inconstant*; of these proclamations, one was addressed to the people of France, the other to the army. The proclamations were actually or substantially as follows:—

“Frenchmen,” he said in the first, “the victories of Champaubert, Montmirail, Chateau-Thierry, Vauchamp, Mormans, Montereau, Craonne, Reims, Arcis-sur-Aube, St. Dizier, the insurrection of the brave peasantry of Lorraine, Champagne, Alsace, Franche-Comté, Burgundy, and the position I had taken in the enemy's rear by separating them from their transports, magazines, and ammunition, had placed them in a desperate situation. France was on the eve of being more powerful than ever, and the chosen troops of the allies would have found a grave in the vast countries they had so cruelly ravaged, when the Duke of Ragusa's treachery gave up the capital and disorganised the army. At the same time our ruin was completed by the defection of the Duke of Castiglione, to whom I had confided a sufficient force to beat the Austrians,

and who, had he appeared on the rear of the enemy, might have perfected our triumph. Thus was the destiny of war changed by the unexpected conduct of these two generals, who were at once traitors to their country, their prince, and their benefactor. In these painful circumstances my heart was rent, but my soul remained immovable. I consulted the interest of the country alone, I exiled myself to a rock in the sea, and preserved an existence that might still be useful to you. . . .”

Having given this explanation of his reverses, Napoleon sought to illustrate the spirit of the emigrants, who depended, as he said, upon foreign aid, and were seeking to re-establish the abuses of the feudal system. He added—

“Frenchmen, in my exile, I heard your complaints and prayers; I have crossed the sea amid perils of every kind; I am come to you to assert my rights, which are yours. All that has been said, done, or written by individuals since the taking of Paris I shall ignore, and remember nothing but their important services, for events sometimes occur which the weakness of human nature cannot resist. . . . Frenchmen, there is no nation, however small, which has not the right, and which ought not to seek deliverance from the dishonour of obeying a prince imposed on it by the momentary victory of an enemy. When Charles VII. returned to Paris and overturned the ephemeral throne of Henry VI., he declared that he was indebted for his throne to the valour of his soldiers, and not to the Prince-Regent of England. And I consider and ever shall consider it a glory to owe everything to you and my brave soldiers.” Napoleon said to the army—

“Soldiers!

“We were not conquered; two men from our ranks betrayed our glory, their country, their prince, and their benefactor.

“Shall those, whom we have seen during twenty-five years traversing Europe, seeking to raise up enemies against us, who have passed their lives in fighting against us in the ranks of foreign armies and cursing our beautiful France, shall they pretend to command or enchain our eagles, they who have never been able to gaze steadily upon them? Shall we suffer them to inherit the fruit of our labours, to seize our honours, our property, and to calumniate our glory? Should their reign continue, all would be lost, even the memory of our greatest deeds.

“Your general, who was called to the throne by the choice of the people, and raised upon your bucklers, is restored to you, come and join him.

“Tear down those colours which the country has proscribed, and which for twenty-five years have served to mark the rally-

ing point of France's enemies. Display the tricolor cockade that you wore on the days of your greatest glory. We must forget that we have been the masters of nations, but we must not suffer strangers to interfere in our affairs. Who will pretend to be our master? Who shall have the power? Take possession again of those eagles that you bore at Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, Wagram, Friedland, Tudela, Eckmühl, Essling, Smolensk, at the Moskowa, Lutzen, Wurtchen, and Montmirail. Come, take your place beneath the standard of your chief. His existence is part of yours, his rights are yours and the nation's, his interests, his honour, and his glory are identical with yours. Victory will advance in full gallop; the eagle *with the national colours will fly from steeple to steeple, even to the towers of Notre Dame*. Then you may with honour show your wounds, then you may boast of what you shall have done; you will be the liberators of your country."

Thus in these fiery proclamations, imbued with the passions of the time, and adroitly touching all the essential questions of the day, Napoleon, not over-scrupulous as to the justice of the proceeding, gave up Marmont and Augereau to all the fury of the soldiers, by whom he knew they were detested. He opposed the rights of the people to the rights of the Bourbons, and thus touched the masses in their most sensitive point. He adroitly promised to forget certain weaknesses, imputing them to the overpowering might of revolutions, appealed to the tricolor cockade, which he knew every soldier had concealed in his knapsack, told them how their immortal glory had been tarnished by the ill-placed hatred of the emigrants, and in a striking and still popular figure of speech promised victory to his partisans. These proclamations were not the least thoughtful, neither were they the least efficacious of his profound calculations.

Before commencing his land journey, he sent the fortunate flotilla back to Elba to announce to his mother and sister the success of the first part of his enterprise, and ordered they should be taken by *The Inconstant* to Naples, and remain there in safety until the end of the crisis.

Towards evening he reached Cannes, and in consequence of an order he had given that all carriages should be stopped, the Prince of Monaco, who had, like many men of the times, changed his party, turning from the Empire to the Restoration, was arrested on his road, and brought before him. Napoleon immediately ordered that he should be set free, received him gaily, and asked whither he was going. "I am going home," replied the prince. "So am I," said Napoleon. He then left the petty sovereign of Monaco, wishing him a pleasant journey.

At midnight he set out for Grasse, following Cambronne,

who had gone before with a detachment of one hundred men. The battalion of the old guard was in the centre, escorting the treasure and ammunition, and was followed by the Corsican battalion that formed the rearguard.

Just outside Cannes commenced the mountainous road which the troops were to follow for eighty leagues, until they should reach Grenoble. About daybreak on the 2nd of March they reached Grasse. The few hours they had spent in the neighbourhood of Cannes had been employed in preparing rations and getting the two proclamations printed. From this moment Napoleon was determined not to lose an hour, in order that he might reach Grenoble earlier than any orders that might be sent from Paris. He breakfasted standing, surrounded by his staff, a short way outside the city of Grasse, within sight of the inquisitive but perplexed inhabitants, who exhibited no trace of the enthusiasm with which he hoped to be soon greeted.

He set out at eight in the morning, still preceded by his vanguard, and was several hours engaged in climbing, by a narrow pathway covered with ice, the steep mountain chain that separates the sea from the basin of the Durance. The greater part of the journey was made on foot. The men who had been able to procure horses walked beside their beasts, the others followed carrying their kit. The cold was intense, and Napoleon was frequently obliged to dismount to warm himself by walking, a species of exercise to which he was little accustomed. He sometimes stumbled in the snow, and on one occasion stopped a few minutes in a hut occupied by an old woman and some cows. Whilst he warmed himself before a brushwood fire, he entered into conversation with the old countrywoman, who little imagined what guests she entertained beneath her humble thatch, and asked what news from Paris. She seemed surprised at a question to which she was little accustomed, and replied very naturally that she knew of none. "You don't know what the king is doing then," said Napoleon. "The king," answered the old woman still more astonished, "the king! you mean the emperor—he is always *yonder*." This dweller in the Alpine regions was wholly ignorant that Napoleon had been hurled from his throne and replaced by Louis XVIII.! All present were struck with astonishment at witnessing this extraordinary ignorance; Napoleon, who was not less surprised than the others, looked at Druot, and said, "Well, Druot, of what use is it to disturb the world to fill it with one's name?" He left the hut, plunged in thought, and reflecting on the vanity of earthly glory. The march was resumed, and the little army stopped that night at Seranon, a small hamlet consisting of a few farms. The soldiers lay in the outhouses, and Napoleon found a good bed

in the country house of an inhabitant of Grasse. The little army had in their first day's march advanced a distance of fifteen leagues without encountering other obstacles than those presented by the ice and the rocks. The men were exceedingly fatigued, but sustained by the enthusiasm of their feelings, they seemed ready to fulfil the prophecy of the eagle *flying from steeple to steeple*.

Early on the morning of the 3rd of March they again set out. The paths were still mountainous and covered with snow, and the same evening, after a march equal to that of the preceding day, the troops took up their lodgings for the night at Barrême, in the valley of the Durance, but at a distance of twelve miles from the banks of the river.

Notwithstanding the increasing fatigue, the troops set out at an early hour on the morning of the 4th; they halted at Digne to breakfast, and afterwards advanced as far as Malijay. They had now nearly reached the banks of the Durance, and it was necessary to ascend by Sisteron and Gap, and cross a narrow neck of land, in order to reach the basin of the Isère. Here an alarming obstacle presented itself. At Sisteron the route passed from the left to the right bank of the Durance by a bridge, which the artillery of the fortress, if defended, would render inaccessible. An officer devoted to the Bourbons could, by merely closing the gates of this little fortress, arrest the progress of the advancing column. In this case the troops would be obliged to descend the Durance to cross lower down, and so losing some valuable hours, allow the military commanders in the neighbourhood time to take precautions, and afford the infuriated populace of Marseilles an opportunity to track Napoleon. The danger was imminent; but Napoleon, confiding in the influence of his name, advanced without hesitation on Sisteron.

He had divined justly; and those who were opposed to him, instead of accumulating difficulties on his route, in their alarm, removed them. In fact, according to the information received from the officer of gendarmerie of whom we have already spoken, the Prefect of Var, believing that Napoleon was advancing on Toulon and Marseilles, had placed in the forest of Esterel, that is to say, on the sea-shore route, all the national guards and regular troops he could assemble. The former could be depended on, but the sentiments of the latter were doubtful. Having taken these precautions, he despatched to Marshal Massena at Marseilles an express which could not arrive before the 4th. At the same time he had endeavoured to inform all the commanders of the Alpine fortresses of what had occurred, without, however, giving them any instructions, which, indeed, spite of his zeal, he was incapable of doing. In

this state of things each commander, struck with a kind of terror on learning the alarming intelligence, had only thought of retiring within his walls, without daring to venture forth to dispute the passage with Napoleon. General Loverdo, who commanded in the department of the Lower Alps, had drawn up the few troops at his disposal on the Lower Durance and Aix; on their side, the commanders of Embrun and Mont-Dauphin, anxious to retire into the fortresses confided to their honour, recalled all their forces to the Upper Durance, so that Sisteron, which was situate midway, was left undefended. This species of contraction, natural to surprised and alarmed people, had left the way open to Napoleon without the intervention of treason. His name alone had produced these imprudent resolves, which he was about to turn to his advantage.

Cambronne presented himself before Sisteron at the head of one hundred men, and entered the place without difficulty on the 5th; Napoleon breakfasted there, after having seen one of the greatest obstacles on his route fall as if by enchantment. He now came in contact with the spirit of the mountaineers of Dauphiné. These brave mountaineers, highly sensitive to military glory, hated foreigners, and detested what was called the nobles and the priests, and were alarmed beyond measure by the sermons of the clergy about national property and tithes, and influenced by all these motives, they were enthusiastically devoted to Napoleon. They rushed in crowds from their mountains when they heard the cry of *Vive l'Empereur!* vied with each other in offering provisions, and horses, and everything required; these they gave willingly gratis, and still more willingly for money.

Spite of his friendly reception at Sisteron, Napoleon did not delay there, but passed the night at Gap, in order to seize the defiles that lead from the basin of the Durance to that of the Isère. His troops were worn out, for they had marched from ten to twelve miles a day, sometimes even fifteen, and many of the men had fallen behind. But the peasants received them hospitably, lent them waggons, and after a few hours' repose the laggards were able to join their ranks. Napoleon arrived on the evening of the 5th at Gap, after having traversed nearly fifty leagues in four days over mountainous roads. And yet this extraordinary rate of progress was surpassed in the succeeding days.

Napoleon was very well received at Gap, but he there learned intelligence that forbade a protracted stay. He had sent an emissary to learn the sentiments of the garrison of Embrun, and this emissary reported that the soldiers were ready at the first signal to assume the tricolor cockade, but that the officers, restrained by a sentiment of duty, were far from wishing to

deliver up the fortress, and were, on the contrary, thinking of occupying the defile called St. Bonnet, which led from the valley of the Durance to that of the Drac, an affluent of the Isère. This defile commences immediately outside Gap, crosses a high mountain along the peak known as St. Guignes, and then descends on St. Bonnet. Napoleon, fearing to be forestalled in so dangerous a passage, sent his vanguard thither early on the morning of the 6th, and followed in person after having waited until noon at Gap for the remainder of his column. The defile was not guarded, and he was able to sleep that night at the borough of Corps, situated on the boundary of the department of Isère. Hitherto success had crowned all his efforts. He was in the centre of Dauphiné, and already began to be sensible of the emotion that his approach caused at Grenoble. If he succeeded in taking this city, which was important on account of its site, its fortifications, its arsenal, its large garrison, and the political and moral strength of its inhabitants, Napoleon would be almost master of France, for Grenoble would be a guarantee for Lyon, and Lyon for Paris. Careful not to neglect any precaution, he sent forward Dr. Emery, who had connections in Grenoble, and who might be able to dispose the public mind in his favour.

The express sent from Draguignan by the Prefect of Var had reached Grenoble on the evening of Saturday the 4th of March. An illustrious savant, M. Fourier, was Prefect of Isère. General Marchand, one of the most distinguished imperial officers, commanded at Grenoble, where the 7th military division was stationed. The prefect and the general were very disagreeably surprised by the intelligence they received, for besides its importance for France in general, it increased a thousand-fold their personal responsibility. In fact, the Prefect of Var, thoroughly well informed, named the direction of Grasse, Digne, Gap, and Grenoble as that which Napoleon was most likely to take. The storm was then advancing directly towards them. Influenced by a feeling natural to all governments upon learning a disagreeable event, they concealed the intelligence, which besides, gave them the advantage of a few hours of quiet, to deliberate upon the best course to pursue. M. Fourier was one of those savants that public disturbances annoy, and who only require from the governments they serve time to pursue their studies in peace. He would therefore naturally have desired that Providence had averted this terrible trial from him. Attached to Napoleon by recollections of former glory—he had accompanied him in the expedition to Egypt—and to the Bourbons through personal esteem and love of repose, he had no decided preference for either dynasty, and was much inclined to entertain ill-will towards any one who disturbed the

tranquillity of his life. Add to this an honest sentiment of duty, and we can easily understand that he wished in the first instance to be faithful to the Bourbons, without, however, incurring the risk of martyrdom in their service. As to General Marchand, though largely associated with the imperial glory, he was a strict observer of military discipline, and though he disapproved the conduct of the emigrants, he was too intelligent not to comprehend the dangers to which Napoleon's return exposed France. His resolution was much firmer than that of the prefect; but at this moment a little more or less energy did not procure the means of resistance. There was no want of troops. The concentration of troops in the direction of the Alps, induced by Murat's imprudence, had commenced, and there were in Franche-Comté, in Lyonnais, and in Dauphiné, more soldiers than the emergency called for. But unfortunately, when Napoleon was in question, it was not the number of the troops but their fidelity that became a matter of consideration. Would they resist the influence of his name, and still more, could they resist the influence of his presence? General Marchand knew the army too well to entertain a doubt on the subject. He summoned the *chefs de corps* to a private conference, and these declared that they were ready to do their duty, that they had doubts as to the fidelity of the officers, and could by no means answer for the soldiers. It happened that the choice of regiments stationed at Grenoble was unfortunate. With the 5th infantry, which was well disciplined and well officered, there was the 4th artillery, in which Napoleon had made his first essay in arms, and into which several companies of the artillery of the imperial guard had been drafted after the dissolution of that body. There was also the 3rd engineers, a corps by no means attached to the Bourbons, and whose influence over the rest of the troops was much feared. General Marchand became very uneasy, and awaited the arrival of General Mouton-Duvernét, who commanded the sub-division of Valence, before coming to a determination. The 7th military division, consisting at that time of four departments, was divided into two sub-divisions—that of Grenoble, comprising Isère and Mont Blanc; and that of Valence, comprising Drôme and the Upper Alps. From this arrangement it naturally resulted that General Mouton-Duvernét, in going to give orders in the Upper Alps, that is to say, at Gap, was obliged to pass through Grenoble.

This general, upon learning recent events, had hastily taken precautions for the defence of the Roman bridge on the Isère, in case that Napoleon should advance along the banks of the Rhône; he then left hurriedly for the Upper Alps, and arrived at Grenoble on the morning of Sunday the 5th. A meeting, consisting of Prefect Fourier, General Marchand, General

Mouton-Duvernet, and some staff officers, was held, to deliberate upon the measures most proper to take under existing circumstances. It would not be easy to fix on any that could satisfy the well-founded anxieties of thoughtful men.

To send the troops against Napoleon was running the risk of giving them up to him, for notwithstanding the fidelity of the leaders, it was not very probable that the soldiers would resist the influence of his presence. To summon the soldiers to their quarters would be to leave the country empty and give it up to Napoleon, as well as the most important posts, like that of Sisteron for example. Thus, whatever measures were determined on, there was a risk of abandoning to Napoleon either men or territory. However, the occupation of Grenoble by the enemy was so serious a consideration as to admit of no deliberation. This capital of Dauphiné, besides being of vast moral importance, was a fortress of great strength in former times, and contained *une école d'artillerie, une école de génie*, and an immense matériel consisting of 80,000 muskets, 200 cannon, and all the accompaniments attendant on such a military dépôt. A post of so much importance could not be abandoned. It was agreed that all the troops scattered through Dauphiné, and that portion of Savoy that still belonged to France, should be concentrated at Grenoble. Orders were sent to Chambéry for the two infantry regiments stationed there, and to Vienne for the 4th hussars, who were greatly needed at Grenoble, where there was a want of cavalry. Unfortunately, the 4th hussars, though commanded by an excellent and honourable officer, was so little to be relied on, that during the recent visit of the Count d'Artois the men could not be prevented from crying *Vive l'Empereur!* But the authorities were obliged to make use of the means within their reach, and they flattered themselves that by assembling a considerable mass of troops they could revive the military spirit amongst them, and with the military spirit, the sense of duty attached to this noble profession. These resolutions being adopted, General Mouton-Duvernet set out for the Upper Alps, pursuing the Gap route, along which Napoleon was advancing. The general hoped to anticipate his arrival at the important pass of St. Bonnet, and take measures to arrest his progress.

The intelligence, which at first had been known only to the principal authorities of the city, was soon spread abroad, and on Sunday afternoon was become public. The prefect and general then thought it their duty to announce the intelligence officially, and they published a proclamation in which they invited the functionaries of every class to fulfil their duty, promising to give them the example. Grenoble was a perfect sample of France at this period. There were to be seen some

of the ancient nobility openly proclaiming their hopes and their wishes, but fully conscious since the trial of Exelmans and the funeral of Mademoiselle Raucourt that it would be better to restrain their feelings if they did not wish to expose themselves to fresh misfortunes. There was also a numerous bourgeoisie, rich and intelligent, who had participated neither in the excesses nor the sudden revival of the revolutionary spirit, a bourgeoisie who, admiring the genius of Napoleon, and detesting his faults, were deeply offended by the conduct of the emigrants, but were at the same time sensitively alive to the danger of re-establishing the empire in opposition to Europe in arms. There was also a lower class, industrious, well-to-do, and brave, less fluctuating in their sentiments than the bourgeoisie, because less intelligent, passionately fond of military glory, and detesting what they called the nobles and priests, sympathising, in a word, with the sentiments of the peasants of Dauphiné, though, unlike them, they had no interest in the question of national property.

It is easy to divine without description what must have been the feelings of these different classes upon learning the intelligence of Napoleon's approach. The nobles uttered exclamations of anger, and hurriedly sought the authorities, urging them to do their duty, and uttering angry threats if they showed the least hesitation. But though they exclaimed and made great commotion, they did not offer to do anything for the general defence. There was one means, certainly, at their disposal, which was to furnish some reliable men who would fire the first shot, which would be the best way to induce the troops to do the like. They promised to find such men, but their power to do so was doubted, and they doubted it themselves too. The bourgeoisie were restless and divided in opinion, for though they condemned the political conduct of the Bourbons, they saw clearly the perils inseparable from their overthrow. As to the people, in whose ranks were many half-pay officers, they were transported with joy, and made no attempt to disguise their desires and hopes. The public functionaries dissimulated more than ever their real sentiments, but they were in reality favourable to Napoleon; they were weary of the hypocritical part they were obliged to act towards the Bourbons, which humiliated them, without affording any certainty that they would be continued in office. A population divided in this manner offered no great resources. Had there been in Grenoble a united and well-organised national guard, these might, if mingled with the regular troops, have restrained them by the influence of good example. But the nobles had there, as throughout France, assumed the privilege of forming the cavalry of the national guard, allowing the infantry to consist

of the bourgeoisie alone. The latter having on many occasions opposed the proceedings of the government, had been, under divers pretexts, deprived of their muskets, and were, at the time of which we speak, disarmed and disorganised. Consequently, there only remained for the defence of the city the troops of the line, whose fidelity was the great problem of the day.

The entire afternoon of Sunday the 5th, and all the forenoon of Monday the 6th, were passed in intense uneasiness, and a quick succession of hopes and fears, making what was joy to one party, grief to another. It was at one moment asserted that Napoleon was pursued, arrested, and shot. Then the royalists walked about the streets in joyous, even insulting triumph, and afterwards returned home to communicate the happy intelligence to their friends at Lyon and Paris. The next report declared that Napoleon had overcome every obstacle, and was even then close to the gates of Grenoble. It was then the turn of the royalists to be sad and silent, and the people, in a delirium of joy, ran through the streets exclaiming *Vive l'Empereur!* The half-pay officers, whose influence was much dreaded, sought the society of the troops. They found the officers reserved and silent; but the men were demonstrative and joyous, and had the tricolor cockade hidden within their shakos. The general officers, knowing the danger of such intercourse, endeavoured to prevent it, and for that purpose kept the men either in their barracks or under arms; but they only succeeded in creating discontent amongst the soldiers, without being able to hinder those electric-like communications which result from a perfect community of sentiment.

About the middle of the day on Monday the 6th, intelligence was received of General Mouton-Duvernet. Having advanced rapidly along the Gap route by Vizille, the general met a traveller, whom he caused to be arrested. This was Dr. Emery, whom Napoleon had sent on to Grenoble. The general questioned the traveller, who declared he knew nothing, that he had left the island of Elba several months previously, and was returning quietly to Grenoble, his native place, to take up his abode there. Deceived by these declarations, General Mouton-Duvernet dismissed Dr. Emery, and advanced on his way. He soon learned that Napoleon, after having passed the previous night at Gap, was advancing that very day on Corps, where he would soon arrive, after having passed through the defile of St. Bonnet. It was too late to offer any opposition, and to retrace his way to Grenoble was the only course left to General Mouton-Duvernet. En route, the general remembered what had taken place with Dr. Emery, and sent some soldiers in pursuit, with orders to arrest him. But the doctor was too quick, and had already reached Grenoble, where he was sheltered by his friends, whom

he commissioned to spread abroad Napoleon's proclamation, and intelligence of his approach.

The agitation became fearful when it was known at Grenoble that it had been impossible to anticipate Napoleon's passage through the defiles that separate the basin of the Durance from that of the Isère, that he would that evening arrive at Corps, and perhaps the next day at Grenoble. One party declared that nothing could resist him, and that the troops sent against him would only augment his forces; another party announced that an army commanded by the Count d'Artois and several marshals was assembling at Lyon to arrest the fugitive from the island of Elba, and punish him in a signal manner. The royalists who put the report into circulation, in order to raise their own courage, did not succeed in their design. They beset the authorities, scolded them, accused them of doing nothing—whilst they did nothing themselves—and reproached them bitterly with shutting themselves up passively in Grenoble. According to the royalists, this was opening every issue to Napoleon and abandoning France to him. They mentioned another point where it would be possible to arrest his progress by blowing up a bridge. This was the Ponthaut bridge, thrown across a small river, the Bonne, which falls into the Drac, an affluent of the Isère, and intersects the Gap route. The royalists said that were this bridge blown up, Napoleon would be obliged to take refuge in the mountains, or descend to the plain, that is to say, to the banks of the Rhône, where the forces assembled at Lyon would not fail to destroy him. They insisted so much on this point with the civil and military authorities, that the prefect and the general resolved to send to this bridge of the Bonne a company of artillery, a company of engineers, and a battalion of the 5th of the line, troops in whom confidence was placed on account of their perfect discipline. This battalion was commanded by a very distinguished officer named Lessard, who had formerly served in the imperial guard, but was strict in the discharge of his duties, and resolved to keep his oath. The people of Grenoble accompanied these troops to the Bonne gate of the city, the royalists confiding in their excellent discipline, the Bonapartists, on the contrary, saying that the looks and gestures of the soldiers left no doubt as to the part they would act on meeting Napoleon.

The column left in the evening, consequently intelligence, which was eagerly expected, could not be received until next day. On the morrow, Tuesday the 7th, the 11th and the 7th of the line arrived from Chambéry, and the 4th hussars from Vienne. Preparations for strengthening the town were being actively carried on, cannons were brought from the arsenal and hoisted on the walls. The royalists placed great confidence in

one of the two infantry regiments that came from Chambéry. This was the 7th, commanded by Colonel de la Bédoyère, a young and highly distinguished officer, who had served in the most severe campaigns of the empire. He was a gentleman of high birth, and connected through his wife with the Damas family; he was in high favour at court, and appeared to be devoted to the Bourbons. It was said that on entering Grenoble he had distributed amongst his soldiers a sum of money drawn from his private resources, and it was supposed he had done so to gain the affection of his soldiers, and make them more faithful in the discharge of their duty.

This young colonel, with the officers of the garrison, dined the same day with General Marchand, who had invited them for the purpose of ascertaining with greater certainty the state of their feelings. The greater number, in the presence of their commanding officer, displayed considerable zeal, but some, more sincere, declared that though they were willing to do their duty, it would cost them a severe pang to do so against Napoleon. Amid these different manifestations, Colonel de la Bédoyère remained silent, and this silence, on the part of an officer who was believed to be a staunch royalist, appeared strange, but no ways alarming, as to doubt him was impossible. The company rose from table about two o'clock; and as it was calculated that at that hour the troops sent to the Ponthaut bridge would be face to face with Napoleon, and as the crisis was approaching, each retired to attend to his respective duties.

The troops that had left on the previous evening had advanced through Vizille, La Frey, and La Mure on Ponthaut, the two companies of engineers and artillery strewing the way with their white cockades, and uttering insubordinate language, whilst the men of the 5th battalion, on the contrary, gave no indication of their sentiments. The two companies of engineers and artillery stopped at the village of La Mure, situate at a short distance from the bridge of Ponthaut, on the Bonne. The mayor and inhabitants of La Mure, on learning the object for which the military had come, became greatly excited, and opposed the destruction of a bridge which was their principal means of communication with Provence. They gave as a reason for their resistance that a little above Ponthaut the Bonne was fordable, and that the only inconvenience that could be inflicted on the imperial column would be to make the men walk through some cold water. The two companies of engineers affected to think the reasons adduced by the inhabitants of La Mure satisfactory, and without persevering in their design they asked for quarters, which were quickly procured, and here they waited the arrival of the 5th of the line.

Napoleon, as we have said, had passed the night at Corps

in his eagerness to seize the defiles between Gap and Grenoble. He passed through without interruption, and advanced with confidence, as the disposition of the people became manifest in the cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* But he knew that the morrow would be the decisive day, for he should then meet for the first time a large body of troops, and upon the manner in which these troops should act depended the success of his undertaking. Whilst he remained at Corps to take a few hours repose, he sent forward Cambronne with an advance guard of 200 men to take possession of the bridge of the Bonne, and prevent its destruction. The Polish lancers, who had procured horses since they advanced into the interior, had outrode Cambronne, and having crossed the Bonne had asked quarters from the Mayor of La Mure. At the same hour, that is to say, about noon, the battalion of the 5th arrived. The lancers endeavoured to fraternise with them, and found the soldiers well disposed, but embarrassed by the presence of their officers. But communications were kept up, and the soldiers of the 5th showed strong symptoms of friendly feeling towards the lancers, when Lessard, the commander of the battalion, suddenly arrived, and dreading the influence of the soldiers from Elba on his troops, he determined to make a retrograde movement, and accordingly fell back on the village of La Frey. Cambronne arrived too at La Mure, and fearing that in the intercourse between the different parties some drunken soldier might provoke a collision—which Napoleon had given express orders to avoid—he collected his troops, so to speak, one by one, in order to concentrate them on this side of Ponthaut. And so both parties spontaneously abandoned La Mure, Cambronne holding possession of the bridge of Ponthaut.

The night passed in this manner, the opponents as well as the followers of Napoleon filled with the most intense anxiety. Meanwhile the commander of the 5th battalion had made a retrograde march of some hours in order to cut off all communication between his soldiers and those of Napoleon, and had taken up a good position, with the mountains on his right and the marshes on his left. He could defend himself there, and allow his troops a little repose. He waited until noon, and seeing no enemy approach, he began to flatter himself that Napoleon had changed his route, which would have relieved him of an immense responsibility. About one o'clock some lancers appeared; several of them advanced close enough to be heard by the soldiers of the 5th, and told them that the emperor was coming up, begged them not to fire, but to join him. The brave commander of the battalion ordered the lancers to withdraw, threatening to fire on them if they persevered in advising his soldiers to desert.

These horsemen fell back upon a larger column that was advancing, and which seemed to consist of several hundred men. This was the Elba column, led on by Napoleon himself. He had slept at Corps and then marched to La Mure, where he was informed he would find a battalion of the 5th of the line, with some artillery and engineers that seemed prepared to make a defence. The lancers, who had fallen back, told him that the officers seemed disposed to resist, but that probably the soldiers would not fire. Napoleon took up his glass and looked for some time at the troops before him, in order to observe their bearing and position. At this moment some half-pay officers, disguised as bourgeois, arrived and informed him of the sentiments of the troops sent to oppose him. They assured him that the artillery and the engineers would not fire. As to the infantry, the officer who commanded them would certainly order them to fire, but it was doubtful whether they would obey. After hearing this, Napoleon determined to advance and decide by an act of personal daring a question that could not be otherwise determined.

He placed the vanguard under Cambronne on the left of the route, on the right the mass of his column, and in advance the fifty cavalry soldiers for whom he had been able to procure horses. Then in a distinct voice he commanded the soldiers to put their muskets under the left arm, with the muzzles pointed downwards, and ordered one of his aides-de-camp to advance in front of the 5th, and tell them that he was coming up, and that those who fired would have to answer to France and to posterity for the consequences of their conduct. He was, alas! right, and those to whom he appealed were about to decide whether Waterloo should or should not be inscribed on the bloody pages of our history.

Having given these orders, he put his column in motion, and marched at the head, followed by Cambronne, Druot, and Bertrand. The aide-de-camp who had been sent forward addressed the battalion, repeated the words of the emperor, and pointed him out as he approached. At this sight the soldiers of the 5th were seized with an extraordinary emotion, and looking alternately at Napoleon and at their commander, seemed to implore the latter not to impose upon them a duty impossible to fulfil. The commander of the battalion seeing the soldiers so agitated, perceived very clearly that they could not resist the influence of their old master, and in a firm tone ordered them to retreat. "What would you have me do?" he said to an aide-de-camp of General Marchand, who was with him *en mission*. "They are pale as death, and tremble at the idea of firing on this man."

Whilst they were retreating, Napoleon's fifty lancers galloped

up to the 5th, not to charge them, but to overtake and speak with them. The brave Lessard, believing he was about to be attacked, ordered his soldiers to stop and present bayonets to the assailants. The lancers rode close up to the bayonets of the 5th with their swords still in the scabbards, and exclaimed, "Friends, don't fire, the emperor is coming up." At the same moment Napoleon arrives, and pauses in front of the battalion, at speaking distance. "Soldiers of the 5th," cried he, "do you recognise me?" "Yes, yes," responded hundreds of voices. Then opening his redingote and presenting his breast, he added, "Which amongst you will fire on his emperor?" Overpowered by these words, the artillery and foot-soldiers, waving their shakos on the end of their swords, cry out *Vive l'Empereur!* Then breaking the ranks, they surround Napoleon, kiss his hands and call him their general, their emperor, their father. The commander of the 5th battalion, thus abandoned by his soldiers, knows not what to do, when Napoleon, freeing himself from the thronging soldiers, steps towards him, asks his name, his grade, his services, and then adds, "My friend, who made you *chef de bataillon?*" "You, sire." "Who made you captain?" "You, sire." "And you would fire upon me?" "Yes," replied this brave man, "in the performance of my duty." He then gives his sword to Napoleon, who takes it, presses his hand, and in a tone of voice free from the slightest irritation says to him, "Meet me at Grenoble." Napoleon's manner and voice show that he accepted this worthy officer's sword with the intention of restoring it. Then turning to Druot and Bertrand he said, "All is decided; within ten days we shall be in the Tuileries." And indeed, after this significant event there could be no doubt that he would reign again. But for how long nobody could say.

The first emotion of joy having subsided, the troops won over at La Mure fell into the ranks with those that came from Elba, and all marched in a body towards La Frey and Vizille. As they advanced, they met enthusiastic partisans of the empire, who hastened to meet Napoleon, and announced that an entire regiment, headed by the colonel, was coming from Grenoble in the direction of La Mure. The narrators seemed to think that, from the manifestations made by the soldiers, there was nothing to fear. And in effect a regiment was seen at a distance advancing in column, and newcomers brought further intelligence. It was the 7th of the line, commanded by Colonel de la Bédoyère, whose silence at General Marchand's table had appeared strange, and in contradiction to his supposed sentiments. The young de la Bédoyère was, as we have said, closely connected by his wife's family and his own with the house of Bourbon, to whose interests he was naturally believed to be devoted.

But he nurtured in the depths of his heart sentiments antagonistic to his birth and family ties. He had conceived an intense attachment for Napoleon and the glory of the French arms. Sharing the prejudices of the greater number of his comrades, he looked upon the Bourbons as the creatures of foreigners, and did not wish to remain longer in their service. Nevertheless, yielding to the entreaties of his family, he had consented to take service again, and had accepted the command of the 7th, flattering himself, from the vague rumours of war circulated during the Congress of Vienna, that the latter misfortunes of France might be avenged on Austria. Sent by a terrible destiny into Dauphiné, and finding himself in Napoleon's path, he was not able to resist the impulse that impelled him towards the emperor. But unable to delay the expression of his feelings until fortune should have declared in favour of Napoleon, he had, on leaving General Marchand's table, assembled his regiment in one of the squares of Grenoble, ordered the eagle of the 7th to be taken from a case, and cried *Vive l'Empereur !* Then waving his sword, he said to his soldiers, "Those who love will follow me."

Nearly the entire regiment followed him, and took the road to La Mure, amid the enthusiastic cheers of the people of Grenoble.

Such were the accounts brought to Napoleon, and they were of a nature to dissipate his uneasiness, if he could feel any after what had passed at La Mure. The 7th was now within sight, and La Bédoyère was seen to throw himself from his horse and hurry towards Napoleon, who had alighted; he embraced the colonel, and thanked him warmly for the unselfish affection with which he joined him at a moment when his fortunes were still involved in uncertainty. La Bédoyère replied that he was influenced by a desire to lift up humiliated France; then in an outburst of unrestrainable emotion, he told Napoleon that he would find the nation much changed, that he would be obliged to renounce his former mode of governing, and could only keep the throne on condition of commencing a new reign.* "I

* Napoleon denied at St. Helena that La Bédoyère spoke in that fashion. Napoleon was certainly justified in denying that La Bédoyère used the violent language attributed to him; but he could not deny the general character of the sentiments expressed by the latter, and of which we have given the pith. As to the rest, I can answer for all the circumstances described in the text. As authority for what occurred at Elba, Cannes, Grasse, Gap, La Mure, Grenoble, and Lyon I have had a number of highly interesting manuscripts, some written by military men, others by civil magistrates, who were all ocular witnesses of the events they describe, and worthy of implicit confidence, both from their character and social position. The most curious and most satisfactory document regarding his abode in the isle of Elba is the register of Napoleon's orders and correspondence, and it was with this document before my eyes that I wrote these pages.

know that," said Napoleon; "I return to revive the glory of France, to establish the principles of the Revolution, and to secure to the nation a degree of liberty which, though difficult at the commencement of my reign, is now become not only possible, but necessary."

Napoleon then passed through Vizille, where his reception was highly demonstrative, and continued his route towards Grenoble, where he arrived about nine o'clock on the evening of the same day, the 7th. He had performed in six days a journey of eighty leagues at the head of a body of armed men, a march, as he said himself, unexampled in history. The people in their zeal had provided the soldiers with horses and carts, and had wonderfully assisted in accomplishing this prodigy of rapid movement.

Meanwhile all Grenoble was thrown into confusion. When the general learned that the 7th had left, he ordered the gates to be closed, and the keys given up to him, which did not prevent some soldiers of the 7th, who had remained behind, to let themselves down from the ramparts in order to join their comrades. The terrified nobles had retired to their houses. The bourgeoisie, divided between the pleasure of being revenged on the nobles, and the apprehension of the misfortunes that threatened France, scarcely showed themselves. The people, free to do as they pleased, traversed the streets pêle-mêle with the half-pay officers, crying out *Vive l'Empereur!* The enthusiasm of the people was excited to the highest degree by intelligence of what had occurred at La Mure, and which they learned from some horsemen. They immediately ran to the city gates, and finding them closed, they hastened to the ramparts, awaiting with anxious eyes the appearance of the Elba column.

When Napoleon appeared within sight, the people of Grenoble burst into transports of joy. The people on the ramparts rushed to the gate to endeavour to open it, whilst on the outside bands of peasants tried to force it. The gate, yielding to this double effort, fell at the very moment that Napoleon appeared at the head of his soldiers. It was with considerable difficulty that he made his way through the crowd that pressed round him and alighted at the hotel of the Trois Dauphins.

No sooner had the principal authorities learned his approach than they disappeared. The general retired into the department of Mont Blanc, to assemble the remaining troops, and endeavour to fulfil, to the last moment, his military duties. The prefect, embarrassed by his former connections with Napoleon, for fear should he see him of being induced to deviate from the line of duty, took his way to Lyon, after sending an apology to his old master for his precipitate departure. Napoleon would not lodge either at the prefecture nor at *l'hôtel de*

la division militaire, but remained at the inn of the Trois Dauphins, where he first alighted, in fulfilment of a resolution he had made to pay his expenses everywhere, in contra-distinction to the Bourbon princes, whose journeys had been very burdensome to the provinces they visited.

Napoleon was no sooner established in his humble apartments at the Trois Dauphins than he prepared to give audience to all who should appear, and passed the evening in receiving the mayor, the municipal authorities, the military commanders, and in showing himself from time to time at the window, to satisfy the impatience of the people. He deferred until the next day the reception of the official departmental authorities, as well as the review of the troops.

On the following day, the 8th of March, he employed the early morning in giving orders for the organisation of his government in the provinces he had conquered; he afterwards received the civil, judicial, and military authorities. All, in congratulating him on his triumph, and prophesying for him a triumph still greater in his march to Paris, congratulated themselves on seeing him return to defend the threatened principles of the French Revolution; but still, amid these protestations of devotedness, they declared to him boldly that he should prepare for a new reign, entirely different from the former—a reign at once liberal and pacific. Though the respect for Napoleon's scarcely established authority was very great, the language in which he was addressed was no longer that addressed to a master, but to the head of a free State. The faces that thronged round him, though still in his presence testifying curiosity and admiration, no longer wore the look of humble submission formerly discernible when he appeared.

Napoleon gave no evidence of either annoyance or discontent. Tranquil, serene, fashioned, as it were, to the new part he was called upon to perform, he said to all whom he received, whether in private or in public, sometimes in a familiar, conversational tone, sometimes in the measured language of an official reception, that he had employed ten months in reflecting on the past, and had endeavoured to draw useful lessons from his reflections; that the outrages of which he had been the object, far from irritating, had taught him; that he saw what France needed, and would endeavour to effect it; that peace and liberty were, if he understood aright, a craving want of the times, and should from henceforth be his rule of conduct; that he had certainly loved power, and allowed himself to be too far led away by the thirst of conquest; but he was not the sole criminal, for the powers of Europe by their submission, the constituted bodies by their eagerness to place at his disposal the blood and treasures of France, and France herself by her approbation,

had contributed to an illusion that was general at the time; that besides, the attempt to make France the governing power in Europe was excusable—it was an error that deserved pardon, and should never occur again; that he would not have signed the Treaty of Paris, for he had not hesitated to descend from the throne rather than deprive France of that which he had not given her, but that a respect for treaties was a principle of every regular government, and he would therefore accept the Treaty of Paris, and would make it the basis of his policy; that having made this declaration, he had no doubt as to the maintenance of peace, for he had made his father-in-law acquainted with his sentiments, and had reason to hope that this communication would obtain him the aid of Austria; that he was then about to write to Vienna, by Turin, and expected to see his wife and son soon at Paris.

As to the home government of France, Napoleon, borrowing the language of the ruling passions of the day, said that he was come to save the peasants from tithes, the holders of national property from imminent spoliation, the army from insupportable humiliation, and in short, to maintain the principles of 1789, imperilled by the designs of the emigrants; that the Bourbons, even had they possessed the intelligence and strength, of which they were wholly destitute, could never have acted otherwise than they had done, because, being representatives of a feudal royalty, and looking for support to the nobles and the priests who had lived in foreign lands with them, they could not keep the throne without their aid; that without depreciating or being unjust to the Bourbons, there could be only one conclusion drawn from their errors, which was, that they were incompatible with France; and that to protect the new interests that had sprung up, a new government would be needed, a government the offspring, so to speak, of these interests, formed by and for them; that his son, for whom he was preparing the way, would be the true representative of this government; that he was come to prepare his reign, in order that it might be dignified and tranquil; that, moreover, even had he not come, the Bourbons would not the less inevitably have succumbed amid the convulsions they would have necessarily provoked; whilst he, on the contrary, by giving stability to the new interests, and satisfying the spirit of liberty, would avert future commotions by suppressing their cause; that he would himself propose a revision of the imperial laws, in order to raise from them a true representative monarchy, the only form of government becoming a nation so enlightened as France; that whoever would aid him in this patriotic work would be well received, as from late events he wished to draw salutary lessons, and not make them subjects of resentment;

that his arms were open to all who would espouse the national cause ; that as it was wise to have received the Bourbons and tried once more their mode of governing, he could not entertain an ill-feeling towards any who had aided in the attempt, for on leaving Fontainebleau he had advised his most faithful followers to do so ; but the trial had been made, and the conclusion to be drawn from it was, that the Bourbons were an impossibility, and he would therefore await with confidence, and receive with cordiality, those patriotic Frenchmen who would return to the cause of the Revolution, liberty, and France, a cause of which he and his son were the true and only representatives.

Napoleon spoke simply and frankly, and with tact. He avowed his faults, and by this self-condemnation appeased the wrath of others. But he expressed himself with dignity, attributing both his own faults and those of others to the force of circumstances, which he said were stronger than human nature. He even excused the Bourbons, by endeavouring to show them rather incorrigible than guilty, and never mentioned the claims of his dynasty but as the rights of the nation. He spoke of his son more frequently than of himself, in order to indicate that he only reappeared on the scene to prepare for his child, who would be the child of France, a tranquil, liberal, and prosperous reign. These explanations produced a very good impression even on those who dreaded this attempt at re-establishing the empire in opposition to Europe in arms, and who also feared Napoleon's confirmed habits of arbitrary and absolute authority. But they flattered themselves, or at least, the die being cast, they found a pleasure in flattering themselves, that with this mode of thinking, and his genius regenerated by repose, by deep reflection, and by his late experience, he would be able to surmount the difficulties of his new task, and give France all he had the good sense to promise her.

Napoleon, always master of his thoughts, even in the most perplexing circumstances, talked with M. Berryat St. Prix about some of our codes, concerning which the jurisconsults were divided in opinion, and he promised to make the examination, and if necessary the change of these acts one of the legislative reforms with which he intended to occupy himself when a profound peace should be established, which, he said, he would never again think of breaking.

After having given audience to the different authorities he reviewed the troops, by whom he was naturally received with transport. The 5th of the line quartered at Grenoble, the 7th and 11th that had come from Chambéry, the 4th hussars that had arrived from Vienne, the 3rd engineers and the 4th artillery, gave utterance to almost frantic exclamations of delight.

Two or three military commanders, influenced by professional scruples, had quitted their regiments, but the greater number remained, considering themselves freed from the obligations of their oath by the authority of a revolution. The tricolor cockades, which the soldiers had kept concealed in their knapsacks, had sprung forth with magical celerity; the eagles even, hidden nobody knew where, again appeared at the top of the tricolor flag, and it could scarcely be believed that the imperial reign had been interrupted for a year. Napoleon said a great deal to the soldiers about their glory, dimmed by the emigration. He then told them that he was desirous of peace, and was sure of establishing it, for he was determined never again to meddle in the affairs of others, neither would he suffer strangers to interfere in the affairs of France; and if unfortunately they should interfere, he had no doubt of finding his soldiers as valiant and as successful as formerly. He added that having marched on Grenoble, escorted by his companions in exile, who had accompanied him from Elba, he was now accompanied by the brave soldiers who had rallied round his standard, about to march on Lyon and Paris, and so complete the conquest of France, which would be accomplished as that of Provence and Dauphiné had been, not by force of arms, but by the irresistible pressure of opinion, represented by the army and the people. He said that every moment was precious, for the Bourbons ought not to be allowed time to prepare and call foreigners to their aid; it was therefore necessary to set out without delay. Rations were already prepared, and by the emperor's order were distributed amongst the troops. About four in the afternoon he gave them orders to march, directing their course to Lyon through Bourgoin.

Napoleon on leaving his soldiers said that he would soon join them, that the next day at farthest he would be at their head, and would open the gates of Lyon as he had opened those of Grenoble, by merely displaying the tricolor flag. The 5th, 11th, and 7th of the line, the 3rd engineers and 4th artillery, furnished with a park of thirty field-pieces, the 4th hussars at their head, set out for Lyon amid cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* Here was a corps of seven thousand men, fanatically devoted to their chief, able to conquer the soldiers that had remained faithful to the Bourbons should they encounter them, but more likely to seduce them through the influence of the sentiment that had seduced themselves.

Napoleon, resuming his old campaigning habit of working whilst his soldiers were en marche, returned to the Trois Dauphins, intending to leave next day, escorted by the soldiers from Elba, who, thanks to this arrangement, would have enjoyed a day's rest. He would consequently arrive the next day but

one, the 10th, at the gates of Lyon, at the head of a much larger body of troops than could be sent against him.

He was much displeased with the prefect, Fourier, who had not awaited his arrival, and who had fled from Grenoble to avoid his presence. "He was in Egypt with us," he said, "he was deeply involved in the Revolution, he even signed one of the addresses sent to the Convention against the unfortunate Louis XVI."—Napoleon was deceived on this point—"what then can there be in common between him and the Bourbons?"

In the first moments of his anger Napoleon was about ordering the arrest of M. Fourier, but he just then received the explanations, sent through an indirect channel by the prefect on leaving Grenoble. Napoleon was appeased, and sent an order to M. Fourier to join him at Lyon. He despatched a similar order to General Marchand, and then wrote to Marie Louise, announcing his entrance into Grenoble, and the certainty of his speedy entrance into Paris; he urged her to join him and bring his son, and requested her to present to the Emperor Francis the assurance of his pacific intentions. He sent this letter to General Bubna, commander of the Austrian troops at Turin, the same with whom he had treated so amicably at Dresden in 1813. He requested the general to send on his letter to Marie Louise, and wished that the courier should publicly take the road of Mount Cenis, in order to induce a belief that communications had been established with Austria. On Thursday the 9th, having previously issued all his orders, he left Grenoble at noon, bearing with him the good wishes of the people of Dauphiné, and took his way towards Lyon.

Whilst Napoleon was thus advancing through France, winning over in succession all the troops sent against him, the rumour of his appearance had everywhere excited profound emotion. This intelligence, despatched from the Gulf of Juan on the 1st of March, had spread as rapidly as the means of communication then in existence would permit. The news arrived at Marseilles on the 3rd, and threw the excitable population of that city into extraordinary agitation. It was known at Lyon on the morning of the 5th; the inhabitants of this city were divided in opinion, and much excited against each other. Lastly, the intelligence was transmitted by telegraph to Paris, where it arrived in the afternoon of the same day, the 5th. M. de Vitrolles did not lose a moment in informing Louis XVIII. This prince, who generally viewed things with a considerable share of indifference, appeared at first more astonished than alarmed, and seemed to inquire in the eyes of those around what was to be thought of this great event. But the frantic delight of some who thought nothing easier than to seize and shoot the fugitive from Elba, and the terror of those who

already in imagination saw him master of all the troops sent against him, showed the gravity of what had occurred, and he sought to discover in the contradictory advice of his habitual counsellors what was best to be done. Helpless from his youth, accustomed to very little exertion during his exile, and frequently mocking his brother's incessant activity, he had become inert as much by habit as by nature; he was averse to all prompt and decisive resolutions, and was as unwieldy in mind as in person upon trying occasions.

Like his prefects, he wished the intelligence to be kept secret as long as possible. He would not at first allow this formidable mystery to be communicated to any but the princes, the war minister—a personage whose presence under such circumstances was indispensable—M. de Blacas, who was always informed of whatever occurred; and M. de Vitrolles, who of the wrecks of the ancient *Ministère d'Etat*, had retained the direction of the telegraph. The princes were greatly disturbed, for called by their rank to head the troops, they felt more than any one the difficulty of their position. As for Marshal Soult, the war minister, who had attached himself to the Bourbons, as if there were no possibility of ever again beholding the terrible face of Napoleon, he was confounded at the complications in which he was involved. However, he made a great display of zeal. The first idea that naturally presented itself to every mind was to put the princes in command of the different bodies of troops that were about being raised, and to put the largest of these divisions under the orders of the Count d'Artois, the most active member of the royal family, and the most popular with the ultra-royalists, who had now an opportunity of rendering signal service if their devotedness was as active as noisy.

Napoleon being en marche since the 1st of March, and being under a necessity of advancing to Lyon whichever route he chose, that of Grenoble or that of Marseilles, it was evident that he ought to be met at Lyon, and that it was there that the strongest means of opposition ought to be accumulated. The Count d'Artois immediately offered to go there, and this offer was so agreeable to the general wish that it was at once accepted. It was thought well to give him as lieutenants his two sons, the Duke de Berry on the left, and the Count d'Angoulême on the right; the latter was at this moment at Bordeaux. Both were to set out for the provinces they were in the habit of visiting, and bring up their forces on Napoleon's flanks. It was arranged that the Duke de Berry, who was known in the military provinces of the east, should repair to Franche-Comté, and assemble at Besançon the troops of the line, those of the national guard that seemed well inclined, and lead them through Lons-le-Saulnier to the left of Lyon. The Duke d'Angoulême, who was

well acquainted with the people of the south, was to leave Bordeaux immediately, and repair to Nîmes by Toulouse, and so take Napoleon in the rear with the forces he should have assembled. These combinations, which the war minister regarded as very profound, supposed two conditions; firstly, that there would be time to concentrate the troops on these different points; and secondly, that the troops would be faithful. These arrangements were proposed on the evening of the 5th. Orders despatched on the 6th would not arrive at the different places until the 7th, the 8th, the 9th, and the 10th, according to the distances, and besides, time would be required for the execution of these orders, and we have already seen that Napoleon would reach Lyon on the 10th. As to the fidelity of the troops, what we have already narrated shows what hopes might be entertained on that point.

The war minister made a great show of zeal and activity, and very seriously proposed the measures we have enumerated as infallible means of safety. He was allowed to do as he pleased, for after all, he understood better than the men by whom the Bourbons were surrounded the best mode of proceeding with the soldiers. Ignorant of what had occurred at La Mure and Grenoble, the royalists did not despair of the fidelity of the troops; as an additional security, it was determined that the princes should be accompanied by popular military chiefs, respected in the army. Marshal Ney, who commanded in Franche-Comté, was chosen to accompany the Duke de Berry. Marshal Macdonald, who commanded at Bourges, received orders to set out immediately for Nîmes, to aid the Duke d'Angoulême. These two marshals, who had acted at Fontainebleau as Napoleon's negotiators, seemed proper persons to oppose to him. No doubt was entertained as to the rigid probity with which Marshal Macdonald would fulfil his duties. As to Marshal Ney, though he was known to be discontented with the court, and had on that account retired to his country residence, it was believed that he would be annoyed at Napoleon's return, especially in remembering the scenes that took place at Fontainebleau, and it was hoped that at the sight of this terrific apparition all his passions would be aroused.

Lastly, in order to procure the Count d'Artois an additional lieutenant, and one of great importance, the Duke d'Orléans was appointed to the post. This selection, apparently malicious, was in fact very innocently proposed by the Count d'Artois himself. The Duke d'Orléans, though he conducted himself with great reserve, was become an object of distrust to the emigration. He received many visitors at his house, for he was popular with military men, who remembered with pleasure his services in the republican armies, and was no less liked by those

who held constitutional opinions, and who were glad to find their sentiments shared by a member of the royal family. This species of popularity, which the Duke d'Orléans had no intention of abusing, offended the court, and Louis XVIII. was not sorry to get rid of him by sending him with the Count d'Artois, who was glad to be supported by a military Bourbon. This measure was as well received as the others, and the war minister was desired to give immediate orders for the movement of troops and matériel necessary for carrying into effect the proposed combinations. It was agreed that the Count d'Artois should leave for Lyon on the night of the 5th-6th of March. The Duke d'Orléans was summoned to the Tuileries to be informed of the intelligence that was still kept secret, and to receive from the lips of the king himself the orders that concerned him personally. The duke lost not a moment in appearing at the palace. "Well," said Louis XVIII., with wonderful nonchalance, "*Bonaparte* is in France!" The Duke d'Orléans, perceiving with his ordinary sagacity the danger that threatened the dynasty, did not conceal his apprehensions. "What would you have me do?" replied Louis XVIII., evidently impatient; "I should be better pleased if he were not here, but he is here, and we must get rid of him as well as we can." The Duke d'Orléans, convinced that the measures taken for the defence of Lyon would be slow and inefficacious, felt little inclination for the mission that was offered to him, and endeavoured to persuade the king to keep him at Paris, where there would be no prince of the blood should his majesty leave, and where the duke's popularity, of which he did not boast, but which was an acknowledged fact, might be useful. But in asking to remain he asked precisely what was least agreeable to the king, and he was obliged to leave. The sole result of his advice was that the Duke de Berry was retained at Paris. Indeed, it was considered necessary to leave one of his nephews with the king, and it was besides thought unsafe to invest the fiery-tempered Duke de Berry with uncontrolled authority. It was consequently decided that Marshal Ney should go alone to Besançon. This marshal, who was staying at his country residence, was immediately summoned to Paris by telegraph.

These military measures being determined on, the other ministers were summoned to provide for the political emergency. All were profoundly disturbed by what they heard; some with a consciousness of past errors felt penitent, whilst others only regretted having been too gentle, or as they understood it, too weak. The latter wished to compensate for their recent weakness by an extraordinary display of energy under existing circumstances. Without reflecting, without taking into account the gravity of the act they were about to commit, or the terrible

law of retaliation to which they were about to render themselves obnoxious, they issued a proclamation, founded on the 14th article of the Charter, exhorting every citizen to pursue Napoleon, and take him, dead or alive; if alive, he was to be delivered to a court-martial, that would put the existing laws into immediate execution, that is to say, order him to be shot. This proclamation was not only issued against Napoleon, but against the companions and abettors of his enterprise. To prove the identity of the accused person was sufficient to procure his immediate execution.

To this dictatorial act, the first use made of the 14th article, which was afterwards so fatal to the dynasty, there was added another, both legitimate and necessary—the chambers, that had been adjourned to the 1st of May, were summoned. Nothing could be wiser than to summon the chambers to the king's aid, in order that he might, in concert with them, adopt those measures of defence that existing circumstances required, and so oppose to Napoleon—the representative of military despotism—legitimate royalty surrounded with all the appurtenances of constitutional liberty. The chambers were accordingly summoned with the least possible delay, and the members actually in Paris were invited to repair to their respective halls of assembly in order to commence deliberations when a sufficient number of members should have arrived.

These resolutions, adopted on Monday the 6th of March, and published on Tuesday the 7th, the very day that Napoleon entered Grenoble, revealed to the public the mighty intelligence which had been kept secret as long as possible, but which had gradually escaped from the Tuileries, and had caused a profound sensation amongst those to whom it had become known. The published details somewhat allayed the first feeling of alarm. The government as yet only knew of Napoleon's disembarkation at the Gulf of Juan at the head of eleven hundred men, of the attempt on Antibes, which had failed, and the march towards the Upper Alps. The prefects in sending intelligence of these events had dwelt on the most favourable circumstances, and the government endeavoured to infuse into the public mind the tranquillising impression that the despatches sought to convey. As great importance was attached to the first manifestation of the sentiments of the army, much stress was laid on what had taken place at Antibes, and *Bonaparte*, as he was then called, was represented as repulsed by the troops he met on disembarking, and obliged to flee to the mountains, where he would ere long sink beneath the pressure of want or the arm of justice.

This *cowardly brigand*, it was said, unworthy to die the death of a hero, should soon die the death of a malefactor; and it

was a motive of thankfulness to Heaven that he had left the retreat where his adversaries were weak enough to allow him to remain, and put himself within reach of the punishment he so well deserved. This mode of viewing the question was adopted by the ultra-royalists, who having recovered from their first emotion of terror, only saw in the great event of the day a subject of hopefulness.

The remainder of the public thought differently. They did not rely on the official version of what had occurred, and did not believe Napoleon so irrevocably lost as some people were pleased to say. The mass of the people, feeling an instinctive preference for the man who so powerfully excited their imagination, felt a secret joy at the news of his return. The military, touched to the depths of the soul, uttered wishes, of which they made no secret, for the success of their ancient general, though the heads of the army professed a rigid adherence to their duty. The revolutionists after having ten months previously applauded the return of the Bourbons, who revenged them on Napoleon, now applauded the return of Napoleon, who revenged them on the Bourbons. The holders of national property, and they were innumerable in the country districts, considered themselves saved from imminent spoliation. The bourgeoisie, on the contrary, tranquilly disposed, and having no interest in the question of national property, of which they had purchased much less than the inhabitants of the country districts, anxious for peace and moderate liberty, were filled with intense alarm. Though offended at the partiality exhibited by the Bourbons for the nobles and priests, they preferred to support, and at the same time restrain them constitutionally, than to run the risk, under Napoleon, of fresh wars and very little liberty. These sentiments were peculiarly those of the bourgeoisie of Paris, the most prudent in France, because they are the most intelligent and less influenced by those private provincial interests which often mar the honesty of men's opinions. Thus in the maritime cities, whose commerce had been ruined by the continental blockade, the bourgeoisie were in a kind of frenzy; whilst in the manufacturing towns, whose trade had been created by Napoleon, and which had suffered much by the communications established with England, the bourgeoisie experienced sincere delight, damped, however, by the apprehension of war.

Amongst enlightened men only one feeling prevailed, that of grief. These men, who were small in number, but influential without seeking to be so, expected from Napoleon's return only fearful calamities. To all, war seemed inevitable. The Congress, which was believed to be on the eve of dissolution, had prolonged its sittings, and it was evident that the powers would not separate, but would endeavour to overthrow, without

leaving him time to collect his resources, the man who was endeavouring to undo all they had done at Vienna. There would be then another death struggle between France and the European powers. This imminent danger ought to be sufficient to put every good citizen in opposition to Napoleon's enterprise. Indeed, Napoleon was not alone in fault; the Bourbons had, by their errors, suggested the idea, and prepared the success of his undertaking. But whether the fault lay with the one or the other, the misfortune was the same for France.

With regard to the home policy, the causes of regret, without being so serious, were still considerable. The Bourbons had alienated every Frenchman who entertained an affection for his country or for the principles of '89, but these men were resolved to oppose a constitutional resistance to the reigning dynasty. The elections of the current year would bring in a contingent of moderate oppositionists, who would reinforce the independent majority that existed in the Chamber of Deputies, and this assured a legal victory, slow perhaps, but sooner or later certain, over the dangerous tendencies of the emigration. In this way the true principles of the French Revolution might be established, combined with a wise, legal, and practical liberty, similar to that which constitutes the happiness of England. Besides, the work was commenced, and it would be better to carry it out than to undertake another, and so continually recommence without ever coming to a completion.

Another consideration presented itself. Would there be with Napoleon, even when taught by adversity and reflection, equal chances of success? This was problematical. There could be, of course, no doubt with regard to the principles of '89, which formed, so to speak, his political philosophy; but with regard to constitutional liberty, there would be, probably, a sharp struggle. Even supposing that he had been rapidly instructed by misfortune, did there not still remain his powerful will, his formidable genius, and could they be made to bend to all the exigencies of a constitutional régime? Under Napoleon there might therefore be anticipated certain war and doubtful liberty, and these considerations were more than sufficient to prevent enlightened men from wishing his return.

There is neither exaggeration nor partiality in saying that the men who thought thus were to be found almost exclusively in the ranks of the constitutional party. That party was known as "constitutional" that sought to establish legal liberty under the Bourbons, gradually subjecting them to its yoke by victories legally obtained over their evil tendencies. Both in the chambers and outside their walls this party unanimously exhorted all to rally round the Bourbons, and endeavour to support them. It cannot be denied that private interest alloyed

the generosity of this resolution. The members of both chambers knew they were compromised, some for having pronounced Napoleon's deposition, and others for having sanctioned the decree. Certain writers, such as M. Benjamin Constant, had employed against the imperial régime a violence of language which, to say the least, would render them incompatible with the sovereign of Elba, should he again become ruler of France. But independently of any private motives, the greater number was animated by a sincerely honest desire to observe their oath to the Bourbons, and to complete, conjointly with them, the edifice of constitutional liberty which was commenced, and spare France a fresh and fatal struggle with all Europe. The leaders of the constitutional party thought themselves bound in honour to prove that their opposition, manifested either in their speeches or writings, was not directed against the dynasty of the Bourbons, but against their political proceedings. Such conduct on the part of these gentlemen was at once honourable, rational, and prudent.

The members of the chambers hastened to take their seats. They were anxious to see each other, to converse about public affairs, and give vent to their sentiments in conversation, whilst awaiting an opportunity of enunciating them in their public speeches when a sufficient number should be assembled to proceed to business. It was around M. Lainé, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, that the largest group collected. M. Lainé had, through hatred of Napoleon, become an ardent partisan of the Bourbons, and entertained the principles without the prejudices of the royalists. He began to perceive the errors that had been committed, of which he was not himself wholly innocent, and he was not a man to conceal what he felt. He avowed without hesitation these faults. His opinion was shared by the moderate royalists, and even by some of the ministers.

The latter, as we have already said, did not really constitute a real cabinet. In order that a cabinet should exist under the form of government then attempted in France, it would be, in the first place, necessary that the king should consent to it by suffering another will to exist coequal with his; secondly, the ministers should have a leader recognised as such by his colleagues, and accepted, at the same time, by the chambers and the king as an intermediary and connecting link. Louis XVIII., though less alarmed, as we have said, than any of our previous monarchs by the spectacle of free assemblies—a feeling resulting from his long residence in England—had not yet made all the sacrifices of authority that a representative government requires, and if in practice he yielded much of his royal power, it was as much through a dislike to business as through

an effort of good sense. Be this as it may, he did not seek to provide a leader for his cabinet, and indeed, there was not amongst the ministers any one competent to discharge the duties of such a position. M. de Talleyrand, absent-minded and habitually indifferent, was unsuited to the post, though the most distinguished statesman of the day. M. de Montesquiou, next in importance to M. de Talleyrand, and the only minister capable of addressing a public assembly, might have become chief of the cabinet had the chambers enjoyed a higher degree of importance than was accorded to them, and had he possessed the pliancy, firmness, and business-like habits required in such a position. There were then, as we have seen, ministers, but no ministry. These ministers were divided into men of sense, conscious of the errors that had been committed, and even inclined to acknowledge them; and others, either members or flatterers of the emigration, who believed that if they had committed a fault, it was that of being weakly indulgent to the adverse party. Amongst the former was Baron Louis, who was exclusively occupied with the finances, and who had displayed in his *spécialité* the qualities of a great minister. Amongst the men of sense we must also rank M. Beugnot, who was unjustly attacked by the emigrants, whose intervention in the police department he would not suffer; nor was he less disliked by the ultra-royalists, who bitterly reproached him with having facilitated the escape from Elba, which, as minister of marine, he could have prevented by employing more vigilant cruisers. In the same class was M. de Jaucourt, M. de Talleyrand's temporary substitute, an honest, intelligent, and moderate-minded man. And lastly, there was M. de Montesquiou, who saw clearly how much the ministers had gradually deviated from the current of the national sentiments. He frankly acknowledged these errors, and discontented with all parties, but more especially with his own, to whom he unhesitatingly imputed all the evils that had occurred, in soreness of spirit, took a pleasure in saying that he and his colleagues could not do anything better than give up their places to men who were more popular and more competent to save the monarchy.

MM. Dambray and Ferrand through blind obstinacy, and Marshal Soult in consequence of his connection with the ultra-royalists, supported the opinions of the emigration. They asserted that it was necessary to be a little more royalist than they had been, especially more vigorous, and strike right and left when the opportunity occurred, and perhaps revoke some of the concessions of the Charter—this was said in a low tone—and endeavour by these means to save the monarchy. M. de Blacas gave no opinion. He was too clear-sighted not to perceive that errors had been committed, either in one way or another,

but he looked upon himself as so identified with the monarchy that he did not suppose that either public censure or change of ministry could ever touch him.

The penitent ministers thronged round M. Lainé, and M. de Montesquiou did not hesitate to say, that it would be better to sacrifice three or four members of the cabinet, including himself, for he was ready to close the chasm by throwing himself in. M. Lainé highly applauded these sentiments, and sought to win the support of the leaders of the moderate opposition, both in the chambers and outside their walls.

There were two of those in particular whom he had induced to join him, M. Benjamin Constant, who had excited a great sensation by his writings, and M. de Lafayette, who, after having visited Louis XVIII. at the time of the promulgation of the Charter, in order to show that he was ready to accept liberty under the Bourbons, had returned to his estate of Lagrange, where he lived retired, awaiting a formal summons from the electors to take part in public affairs.

M. Lainé, M. de Montesquiou, and other leaders of the constitutional party, adopted the idea of changing three or four ministers, such as M. de Montesquiou, who offered himself as a sacrifice, and MM. de Blacas, Soult, and Ferrand, who were not so generous, and replacing them by more popular men. It was also thought good to increase the Chamber of Peers by elevating to the peerage men distinguished either by great civil or military services, and completing the Chamber of Deputies by replacing the two sets whose powers had expired by men of liberal opinions, leaving the selection to the chamber, in consideration of the shortness of the time. It was also proposed to reorganise the national guard, selecting them from amongst the bourgeoisie, who were for the most part well disposed, the command to be given to M. de Lafayette. The government would explain their views concerning national property in such a way as to appease the anxiety of the purchasers, and finally, those measures that had given offence to the army were to be annulled.

M. de Montesquiou did not consider any of these concessions, even the appointment of M. de Lafayette, as too high a price to pay for saving the monarchy. The ministers, especially those who were to be dismissed, exclaimed loudly against them, whilst M. de Blacas, who estimated things as they concerned Louis XVIII., who gave no opinion, was silent and immovable. It was in vain that M. Lainé, foreseeing that Napoleon would advance with his usual rapidity, insisted that some determination should be immediately adopted. M. de Montesquiou, disowned by the court since he had adopted such rational opinions, could not give an answer, which he had not received himself;

whilst Louis XVIII., worried by the remonstrances of the rational portion of the royalists, and by the excitement of the enthusiasts, not knowing to whom to listen or whom to believe, preferred in this state of doubt not to abandon his old habits, and resolved to retain M. de Blacas, and not to dismiss anybody.

In this state of perplexity, the court did not confine itself to consulting the constitutionalists, who were the most honest of its opposers, a party animated by the desire of preserving the dynasty, by correcting its errors, but resumed relations with the principal revolutionists, such as MM. Fouché, Barras, and others, like sick men, who are generally more inclined to trust quacks who flatter them, than accredited physicians who prescribe disagreeable remedies. It must be added that when the hot-headed and unwise members of any party are obliged to make a choice from amongst their adversaries, they more easily pardon those who, like themselves, hold extreme opinions, than moderate men, whom they no more resemble in disposition than in opinions.

The persons employed to negotiate with M. Fouché again held out hopes of the ministry of police, but long waiting had disgusted him, and he was more evasive and less anxious to counsel than before, which plainly showed his aid was sought too late. M. d'André, the wise and moderate director of the police department, sought to win over the Duke of Rovigo and get his advice, but the duke told him without hesitation that the adherents of the empire, particularly military men, had been so badly treated that there was no chance of gaining any of them.

Whilst the royalists were thus exerting themselves without any result, the Bonapartists and revolutionists were not less active, and were equally unsuccessful in attaining their object. Both had been thunderstruck on learning Napoleon's return.

M. de Bassano, who alone had had any communication with Elba, and that merely to send some information, was no less surprised than the others, for M. Fleury de Chaboulon, who had not yet returned, had not sent him any information. Dreading the result, Napoleon's ancient and faithful minister regretted the part, trifling as it was, which he might have had in inducing his master to take his resolution. The young officers, the instigators of those plots of which we have spoken, and who had no communication with Elba, nor even with Colonel de la Bédoyère, were more ardent now than ever, and wished to act immediately in order to second Napoleon. The civic Bonapartists, MM. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angély, Boulay de la Meurthe, Thibaudeau, and others, knowing as little as M. de Bassano of the real state of things, were equally disinclined to action or inaction; for if they should make a diversion in favour of Napoleon in the north, they dreaded lest they should derange

his plans by a movement that he had neither foreseen nor ordered. Accustomed to waiting and not to anticipating the emperor's orders, they were strangely perplexed how to act.

Almost all the revolutionists were satisfied. However, their leader, M. Fouché, though always fond of exciting events, so consonant with his restless nature, was greatly annoyed by Napoleon's return, as it deranged all his plans. He thought he held the Bourbons in his power, and could support or destroy them as he pleased, for he was implicated in every intrigue of the time, even those concocted by the royalists. "We could have formed a ministry," he said to his confederates, "composed of such regicides as Carnot, Garat, and myself, and of inflexible soldiers like Davout, and could have ruled or dismissed the Bourbons at pleasure. But this terrible man has come to bring us war or despotism. In the present state of affairs we must support him, that our services may give us some claim upon him, but we shall wait until he arrives, when, in all probability, he will be as much embarrassed by his triumph as ourselves."

More daring than such Bonapartists as M. de Bassano, with less faith in the emperor's infallibility, and willing to risk, if not his own life, at least those of others, he advised immediate action and to give the young officers their own way. Generals Lallemand, Lefebvre-Desnoettes, and Drouet d'Erlon were come to Paris, and he encouraged them in their plan of immediate action. Drouet d'Erlon commanded at Lille under Marshal Mortier, and had several regiments of infantry at his disposal. Lefebvre-Desnoettes had the chasseurs of the guard, now called chasseurs royaux, at Cambrai, and the mounted grenadiers, now royal cuirassiers, quite near at Arras. Of the Lallemands, one brother was commandant at Aisne, and the other general of artillery at La Fère. It was decided that Lefebvre-Desnoettes, the most daring of all, and he that could count most on his men, should leave Cambrai with the chasseurs of the guard, and proceed to Aisne and La Fère, where he could be joined by the Lallemands and what troops they could induce to come with them; and then the combined troops should advance along the Oise to Compiègne, where Drouet would join them with the infantry from Lille. Placed thus at the head of twelve or fifteen thousand men, they would exercise no small influence on the course of events, perhaps induce the whole army to join them, or, at the very least, cut off the Bourbons' retreat, and deliver them (in every other respect safe and sound) into the hands of Napoleon, to do with them as he pleased.

The plan was to be put into execution immediately, with only the necessary delay of proceeding from Paris to Lille; for it was now the beginning of March, Napoleon had landed on the 1st,

and though his friends knew as little as the government what direction he had taken, they considered it necessary to make a diversion in his favour as early as possible. The insurgents had always hoped that Marshal Davout would take the command of this army as soon as it should be collected, and thought that so great a name at the head of veteran troops would decide those that still wavered to join the movement. But this plot had been so hastily got up that the marshal, either from repugnance to an enterprise that accorded so little with his ideas of discipline, or through fear of being compromised by giddy-headed young men, or perhaps dreading to anticipate Napoleon's orders, came to M. de Bassano, and told him that he was not to consider him as sharer in what he looked upon as a very flimsily concocted enterprise. The young generals, greatly displeased, said they could do without him, and without further delay, set off to attempt without their illustrious chief their long-projected adventure.

Whilst the enemies of the house of Bourbon were acting with all that activity and daring that was natural to them, the Bourbons themselves, perplexed by conflicting counsels, hesitated which of the proposed plans to adopt, and confined themselves to some military preparations, which might have been of use could they count on the army. We have said how the Duke de Berry, who was to have been sent to Franche-Comté, was afterwards kept near the king at Paris, and how Marshal Ney had been ordered to repair to Besançon alone. The marshal, summoned by a telegraphic message, had experienced much pain on learning an event which again opened to Napoleon a path to the throne. Less guilty towards his former master by the faults he had actually committed than by those of which he had groundlessly accused himself, he had no wish to fall again into his power; but to his honour it must be said, that with his military good sense he foresaw that the re-establishment of the empire would give rise to a war against all Europe. It was therefore no less from patriotic than from personal feeling that he experienced both fear and anger at Napoleon's return. Never accustomed to restrain the expression of his sentiments, he loudly proclaimed his opinion when he arrived at Paris. This was most agreeable to the royalists, who overwhelmed him with attentions, and conducted him to the king, who received him in the most flattering manner, and to whom he promised to bring Napoleon conquered and a prisoner. The courtiers even asserted that he said, *a prisoner in an iron cage*—an expression which, whether true or false, was only the thoughtless and pardonable phrase of a soldier little accustomed to choose his words. Marshal Ney left, giving the court hopes, which on his part were sincerely uttered, more sincerely than

received, for there was more confidence expressed in his fidelity than was really felt. Without acknowledging it even to themselves, the royalists had a presentiment of that universal impulse that would soon lead all minds and hearts towards the man whom by their own fault they had made the representative of all the moral and material interests of the French Revolution.

The Count d'Artois, who had left on the night of the 5th-6th of March, arrived on Wednesday the 8th at Lyon, where he found the inhabitants in a state of extraordinary excitement. We have already explained the moral position of this great city. A small but violent party of bigoted royalists had completely alienated from the Bourbons the affections of the Lyonnais, who always considered themselves indebted to Napoleon for the exertions he had made to repair their misfortunes, and because he had opened the continent to their commerce. This ill feeling had been excited to the highest degree by the assassination of a patriot by a royalist, a crime that besides was left unpunished, and when it was announced that the column from Elba was approaching, the entire population, with the exception of a few rational-minded men, were transported with joy. When an account of the proceedings at Grenoble arrived, there was no doubt of what would happen at Lyon.

The royalists, irritated and terrified, declared that the government did nothing, but here, as elsewhere, they did not say what ought to be done. Count Roger de Damas, the governor of the division, was not wanting either in goodwill or courage, but he had not the command of a force on which he could count. The national guard—the most faithful expression of popular opinion—was at the best lukewarm, with the exception of the cavalry, few in number, who, as elsewhere, were formed of the nobility of the locality. The troops in garrison, consisting of the 24th of the line, the 13th dragoons, stationed at Lyon, and the 20th of the line, that had arrived from Montbrison, made no secret of their feelings, and appeared ready to open their arms to Napoleon as soon as he would appear at the gates of the town. There was not a single piece of artillery. Marshal Soult had very strangely ordered that artillery should be sent for to Grenoble, that is, the very place which in all probability would be invaded by the time the orders arrived from Paris. Indeed, this was no great loss, for men would be needed to work the guns, and the artillery were as little to be depended on as the infantry.

Such was the state of affairs at Lyon when the Count d'Artois arrived. He soon saw that the honourable but thoughtless zeal that had brought him thither could only tend

to involve him in a disagreeable affair. He was very sorry for having come, not because of the personal risk he incurred, but because that his presence would make the almost certain loss of this large city still more important.

He exerted himself very much, and as was his wont, he talked to and flattered everybody, but gained none but those who came into personal intercourse with him, whom he conciliated both by his goodness and amiability. He wanted money to distribute amongst the troops, and the treasury not being supplied in time, he received excuses instead of loans. The Duke d'Orléans arrived at Lyon twenty-four hours after the Count d'Artois, and they deliberated as to what was best to be done. The difficulty here was the very same as at Grenoble. To send the troops against Napoleon would be to deliver them up to him; to order a retreat would be to abandon the city to him. The latter was the only alternative, for as in all probability Lyon would be in the enemy's power within two days, it would be better to retire with the troops than to supply Napoleon with a reinforcement of some thousand men. The Duke d'Orléans endeavoured to convince the Count d'Artois that the wisest course would be to retreat; but the latter, disinclined to abandon so important a city as Lyon, wished to consult Marshal Macdonald, who was about to pass through the town on his way to Nîmes to join the Duke d'Angoulême. It was nine o'clock at night when the marshal arrived, his carriage having broken down on the road. He was immediately conducted to the Count d'Artois, who was impatiently awaiting his arrival, and who desired him to remain with him, as the road to Nîmes was intercepted. The marshal manifested the most loyal disposition, but was by no means pleased by the situation of affairs. However, he did not consider it advisable to evacuate Lyon until forced by the course of events. He proposed to cut off the bridges of the Rhône if possible, or at least to barricade them; to review the troops, speak to them, and seek to influence them in favour of the royal cause; to choose some zealous royalists who, dressed as soldiers, should fire the first shots, and perhaps induce the others to oppose Napoleon. These proposals did not delude the Duke d'Orléans, but he made no objection, as this was no time to dispute about means when they had so few at their disposal. The Count d'Artois adopted the marshal's plan for want of a better, and desired him to give the necessary orders, and then retired to take some repose whilst awaiting the following day. For it was indeed on the next day, the 10th, that, according to calculation, Napoleon would present himself before the gates of Lyon.

Marshal Macdonald passed the night in ordering the cutting down or barricading of the bridges, in bringing the boats from

the left to the right bank of the Rhône, and in receiving the commanders of the different regiments, who, from a principle of honour, but not of affection, were ready to do their duty, though they were unanimous in the doubts they had conceived of the soldiers' sentiments. He also recommended them to give the Count d'Artois a suitable reception; but as he was giving these directions, General Brayer, the commandant at Lyon, arrived, and said it would be better that the prince should not present himself to the troops, as it was doubtful what reception he might experience. The marshal immediately hastened to the prince, awoke him, and related this sad news, which did not surprise the Count d'Artois much, and they agreed that it would be better to commence the review without him, but that he could be sent for in case things assumed a more favourable aspect. Early in the morning, under heavy rain, the marshal assembled the 20th and 24th regiments together with the 13th dragoons, who in the present state of disorder had received no rations, which added ill-humour to their hostile feelings. He collected them in a circle around him, reminded them of the twenty years' warfare during which he had served in their ranks, how loyally he had behaved at Fontainebleau, of the faults which had occasioned the misfortunes of France in 1814, and told them of the still greater misfortunes that threatened if they should give up the country to Napoleon, since they would be again opposed to all Europe, now more powerful, more united, and more irritated than ever. He spoke with sincerity and warmth, but without success. Wishing to bring his discourse to a conclusion, he seized his sword and cried in a loud voice *Vive le Roi!* Not a voice replied. A little disconcerted, he thought of trying what effect the Count d'Artois' presence would produce, feeling certain from the aspect of the troops that nothing disagreeable would occur. The prince came and presented his amiable and attractive countenance to the troops, who received him respectfully but coldly. When he came before the 13th dragoons, the marshal called an old sub-commissioned officer from the ranks, whose long services were attested by his grey hairs and the cross displayed upon his breast. He spoke to him of his campaigns, and in the prince's presence desired him to cry *Vive le Roi!* The old soldier was stunned, but remained immovable and silent, and then saluting the Count d'Artois, returned to his place without repeating the desired cry.

The prince, deeply moved, turned pale, but said nothing, and retired to his residence, leaving the marshal on the ground, who, to make a last attempt, invited the officers to his house. They accompanied him to about the number of a hundred, and then, without failing in the respect due to the experienced warrior to

whom they spoke, they bitterly complained of the wrongs they had suffered. In order to calm them, the marshal admitted their wrongs, promised that they should be redressed, but could produce no effect, even when he showed them in perspective the certainty of a fatal strife with all Europe. They were seriously irritated against the household troops, and those they called the Chouans; they were offended at the disdain exhibited for the Legion of Honour, for even at this very moment Count Roger de Damas did not wear it; and though they were convinced that there would be a new struggle with Europe, they were determined to run the risk, and die to free France from the emigrants, Chouans, Austrians, English, all of whom were alike objects of their hatred.

Nothing was to be expected from minds so prejudiced. The marshal went to the Count d'Artois, whom, although he ran no greater personal risk than that of becoming Napoleon's prisoner, he advised to leave at once with the Duke d'Orléans. He determined to remain himself and make a last effort to induce the troops to fight, and take part with the Restoration against the Empire.

Having accompanied the princes to their carriage, Marshal Macdonald returned to the bridges of the Rhône to see if his orders had been executed. The bridges had not been cut down, for the people would not allow it, nor had they been even barricaded. Of all those royalists who had done so much to alienate the Lyonese populace, not one had assumed the shako, or offered to fire the first shot. The marshal had the bridges barricaded as well as he could, and ordered a trench to be opened in order to commence a kind of *tête de pont*. Whilst he himself was presiding at these works, a foot-soldier, whose zeal he was trying to stimulate, said to him with great coolness, "Marshal, you are a brave man, and have passed your life in our ranks, and not in those of the emigrants. You would do better by leading us to our emperor, who would receive you with open arms." Neither argument nor punishment could influence men so disposed, and the marshal waited with intense anxiety the approach of the enemy who, he was told by some officers he had sent to reconnoitre, was near. It was three or four o'clock in the afternoon of Friday the 10th, and he was assured that Napoleon was not far from the Faubourg de la Guillotière.

Napoleon, whom we left going out of Grenoble at noon on the 9th, had lost no time, but hastened to join his troops, who were proceeding towards Lyon. His progress from Grenoble to Lyon had all the appearance of a triumph, as the open carriage in which he travelled could proceed but slowly in consequence of the numbers of farmers, holders of national

property, that surrounded it, all curious to behold this extraordinary man. On all sides were heard cries of *Vive l'Empereur ! à bas les nobles ! à bas les prêtres !* and he was frequently obliged to stop and receive the addresses of the mayors and make them suitable replies. He supped at Rives, slept at Bourgoin, and on the 10th continued his route towards Lyon, which he hoped to enter before the end of the day.

About four o'clock his advance guard, composed of the 4th hussars, appeared at the entrance of the Faubourg de la Guillotière, where a detachment of the 13th dragoons was posted to make observations. No sooner did these two bodies of cavalry come within sight of each other than they fraternised with the cry of *Vive l'Empereur !* they then traversed the faubourg, where the people received them with the same cry. Soon both people and cavalry poured together towards the bridge of Guillotière. When Marshal Macdonald heard the tumult, he ordered two battalions to follow him, and directed his course towards the bridge, ordering his officers to draw their swords, in order to stimulate the soldiers and induce them to fire that first shot from which he expected the safety of the royal cause. Whilst he was executing this movement, the 4th hussars and 13th dragoons appeared in a mingled crowd exclaiming *Vive l'Empereur !* which excited an irresistible movement amongst the infantry on the bridge. These responded with *Vive l'Empereur*, and rushing on the barricades they had helped to raise, began pulling them down as fast as possible. The hussars and dragoons, assisted by the people, also set to work, and in a short time the passage was clear. At this spectacle the marshal thought only of escaping from the zeal of his soldiers, who wanted to conduct him to Napoleon and effect a reconciliation. Putting spurs to his horse, he set off at full gallop, accompanied by General Digeon and his aides-de-camp. He passed through Lyon at full speed, closely followed by some horsemen, who, without intending any personal harm, were anxious to seize and make him join the imperial cause. But the marshal, obstinate in the accomplishment of his duty, from a sense of honour and a consciousness of the real interests of France, wished to avoid a reconciliation, which Napoleon would have accompanied by the most brilliant marks of favour. He was followed for some leagues, and then, as the soldiers said, *abandoned to his evil star*, that he was determined to follow.

A very different scene was at the same moment being enacted at the bridge of Guillotière. The bridge had been cleared as quickly as possible, and an immense crowd of citizens offended by the royalists, and of patriots stigmatised for the last six months as revolutionists, had hastened to meet Napoleon,

and mingling with the soldiers, saluted him emperor. As for him, he calmly received their greetings like a master returning to his patrimonial domain, and replied by affectionate salutations to the enthusiastic cries that met him on every side.

He was to stop, not at an hotel as at Grenoble, but at the archiepiscopal palace, which was for him a family mansion. The civil, judicial, and military authorities hastened to present their felicitations and homages. To all he repeated what he had said at Grenoble, but now couched in terms less popular and more imperial. He told them that he was come to save the interests and principles of the Revolution endangered by the emigrants, to restore France to her former glory, but without war, which he hoped to avoid; that he would accept the treaties that had been signed with Europe, and would live at peace with her, provided she did not interfere in the affairs of France; that times were changed; that we must content ourselves with being the most glorious of nations without seeking to rule all others; that both at home and abroad he would take into account the changes that had taken place, and would accord France all the liberty of which she was worthy and which she was fit to receive; that if extensive power was needed when he entertained vast projects of conquests, a wisely restricted prerogative would now suffice to rule over happy and pacific France; that he would be soon at Paris, where he would convoke the nation itself, in order to modify the laws of the empire, and adapt them to the new state of things.

This language was as successful at Lyon as it had been at Grenoble, and it seemed so impossible to hold other opinions that nobody thought of asking whether Napoleon were sincere. When the receptions and harangues were ended, his first care, as at Grenoble, was to hurry towards Paris without losing an hour. He resolved to do as before, that is, to keep the troops that had accompanied him near his person, that they might enjoy some repose, and send forward those that had joined him, and who had not yet experienced any fatigue. He intended to follow with those he had brought from Grenoble, who after one day's rest would be ready for the road. By the addition of the garrison of Lyon he would have twelve thousand men, and a park of artillery that would be completed in passing through Auxonne. It was doubtful whether the Bourbons would have time to assemble an equal force, and still more doubtful whether they could induce the men to fight. However, Napoleon could not send on to Paris the Brayer division which had given up Lyon to him, without seeing and addressing the men. He ordered a review of the national guard and the troops for the following day. The next day, 11th March, he reviewed the soldiers from Elba, Grenoble, Lyon, and the Lyonnaise national

guard, on the Place Bellecour, which he had rebuilt. The hope, alas, chimerical! of seeing at the head of the government a great man devoted to the Revolution, who, from reason as well as from necessity, was ready to accept the principles of legitimate liberty, and who consequently combined the threefold advantage of genius, glory, and popular birth, and that without war or despotism; this hope seduced all imaginations, and won back to Napoleon the hearts of the Lyonnais which he had lost by his errors of the last three years.

He rode along the front of the Brayer division, thanked the men in a dignified manner, like a general who knows how to address his soldiers, and bade them set out immediately and win him new regiments and new cities.

When he returned to the palace, he immediately occupied himself with the cares of the administration, whose scattered threads he sought at every step to gather up. The young Fleury de Chaboulon, now on his return from Naples, came to throw himself at his feet, intoxicated with joy at seeing him safe after having incurred so many dangers by land and sea. Napoleon received him most graciously, and immediately gave him a place in his cabinet. He next thought of choosing a prefect for Lyon. As has been seen, he was displeased at Grenoble by the sudden departure of M. Fourier. He was, however, soon calmed by his explanations, and told him to join him at Lyon, whither M. Fourier came, as incapable of resisting a rising as of betraying a falling power. Napoleon received him with cordiality, and considering it both suitable and piquant to appoint to the Prefecture of Lyon the very prefect who had sought to prevent his entrance into Grenoble, he gave him the Prefecture of the Rhône, which M. Fourier accepted without hesitation.

Napoleon proceeded to more serious acts of legislation. Since his arrival at Lyon he considered himself as already in possession of sovereign authority, and he resolved to use it in such a manner as to strike terror into those powers that were opposed to him. He pronounced the dissolution of the two chambers of Louis XVIII., alleging against them such reasons as were most likely to render them unpopular. He said the Chamber of Peers was composed of old senators of the empire, who had come to terms with a victorious enemy, and of emigrants who had returned in the train of foreigners. As to the Chamber of Deputies, he said that the term for which the members, or at least of two-thirds of them, had been elected, had expired, that the members had communicated with the enemy, and by a scandalous and anti-national vote had expended, under pretext of paying the king's debts, a sum of thirty million francs, destined to pay the expenses of twenty years of civil warfare.

Though he uttered these fulminating denunciations against the two legislative chambers, he took care not to renew the idea of that gigantic despotism that for fifteen years had sought to exist alone, and alone decide the destiny of France. The royal chambers being denounced, Napoleon prepared the way for the formation of the chambers of the empire. He ordered that the entire electoral body should assemble within two months at Paris in the Champ de Mai, to assist at the coronation of the empress and the King of Rome, and to make such changes in the imperial laws as would be consistent with the state of public opinion, and the demands of a well-regulated freedom. This was an indirect announcement, though not an actual promise of the speedy arrival of Marie Louise and the King of Rome, and an intimation that the new institutions were to originate with the people themselves, and that he assumed the national sovereignty as the base of imperial power, and did not, like the Bourbons, appeal to divine right.

Napoleon did not confine himself to attacking the great legislative bodies of the Bourbon government, and to announcing the approaching formation of his own; he also sought by some other measures to gain the assistance of the principal functionaries. The Bourbons had announced the reconstitution of the magistracy, but by deferring it had kept the magistrates in a state of continual anxiety. Napoleon declared all dismissals and appointments made since the April of 1814 to be null, and ordered the old imperial magistrates to resume their functions. Thus was the entire magistracy gained by a stroke of his pen. He made no arrangement concerning the prefects and the sub-prefects, who were almost all imperialists who had retained office under the Restoration, and about whom it would be impossible to legislate at a distance, besides that the greater number would probably join him as soon as they should have an opportunity of making a choice. To these politically justifiable measures he added others less excusable, some meant to satisfy the army and revolutionary party, others to win over or restrain certain powerful enemies who were to be intimidated but not directly attacked. He decreed that all emigrants who without permission had returned before 1814 should be obliged to evacuate the country immediately, and that such as had obtained military rank should quit the army. This measure, though rigorous, was inevitable, for without it the soldiers would have expelled with violence the emigrant officers that had been forced upon them; but this measure was surpassed in severity by another, which could not be excused on the plea of necessity, and which from the rank of those attacked would be certain to produce a bad effect. Napoleon was highly displeased with MM. de Talleyrand, de Dalberg, de Vitrolles,

Marmont, Angereau, &c., some of whom had invited the enemy into France, and others treated with them. He drew up a decree by which he commanded the future trial and present sequestration of property of MM. de Talleyrand, de Dalberg, de Vitrolles, and M. Lynch, Mayor of Bordeaux, together with Marshals Marmont and Angereau, asserting that all of them had connived with the invaders of the country. As the greater number of these was absent, and the others would soon leave, this decree could only affect their properties, and might be annulled should these personages join Napoleon's party. But still it was an act of violent reaction in Napoleon, which contrasted forcibly with the clemency promised in his proclamations, and which might be more injurious to his cause by exciting alarm, than to those who being absent were threatened, but were beyond reach of personal harm. These, in some sort military decrees, were to be countersigned by the Grand-Marshal Bertrand, in his quality of major-general. But his generous nature revolted from such acts, and he made strong objections. He asserted that such a measure would be enough to destroy all confidence in Napoleon's promises, and would give his enemies an opportunity of saying that he returned to France inflamed with resentment, and as rooted as ever in his despotic habits. Napoleon told the grand-marshal that he understood nothing of diplomacy, that clemency would be unavailing unless accompanied by a dose of severity, especially towards dangerous and some of them implacable enemies; that, in reality, he had no idea of acting with rigour, as he had proved by appointing M. Fourier, who had so loudly declared himself against him, to the Prefecture of Lyon; that besides, it was necessary to act differently towards those who had yielded to circumstances, and those who had treated with the enemy, while honest Frenchmen were shedding their blood upon the frontier; that this appearance of severity would be most agreeable to his party in France, and besides, he repeated that he only wished to intimidate and not to punish, that he was ready to receive with open arms all those that were willing to return to him. However, Napoleon allowed himself to be influenced by the grand-marshal, who said that he ought not to close the road to an accommodation, and that threats would rather repel than attract the men in question. The execution of the measure was therefore adjourned, but not abandoned.

Before quitting Lyon, Napoleon wrote again to Marie Louise, informing her how far he had advanced, and that he would make his triumphal entry into Paris on the 20th of March, the anniversary of the King of Rome's birth, and ended by requesting her to return to France. He sent this letter to his brother Joseph, who was in the canton of Vaud, with directions to have

it sent to Vienna to Marie Louise, informing him at the same time of his immense success, and desiring him to declare officially to all foreign ministers residing in Switzerland that he was determined to preserve peace according to the conditions of the Treaty of Paris.

Having arranged everything, he determined to leave Lyon on the morning of the 13th of March, having remained there but two days, that is, only the time absolutely necessary for assembling the troops that arrived successively from Grenoble, giving them one day's rest, and then sending them on to join the Brayer division, which had left Lyon on the 11th. He determined to choose of the two roads that led from Lyon to Paris the one that passed through Burgundy, and which the feeling of the people made safer than that through Bourbonnais.

Everything seemed to promise Napoleon as prompt and complete a success for the remainder of his journey as he had met with from La Mure to Lyon. There was, however, great excitement both in his flank and rear. The Marseillais were greatly irritated when they heard of his landing. They saw in imagination their port again closed, and their misery assured for years to come, and all eagerly asked to be led in pursuit of him whom they called the *brigand of Elba*. Marshal Massena, destined, despite his glory, to suffer from the injustice of the two dynasties, had no more reason to be grateful to Napoleon than to Louis XVIII. Weary of everything but repose, he judged the present state of affairs from the elevation of his rare good sense and sincere patriotism. Sincerely attached to the Revolution, but dreading a fresh struggle with Europe, he saw in Louis XVIII. the personification of counter-revolution, and in Napoleon that of war, for neither of which did he feel inclined. These opinions made him feel rather pain than pleasure in the present attempt of his old emperor, and he was determined to confine himself to the strict performance of his military duty. Yielding to the wishes of the Marseillais, he had allowed twelve or fifteen hundred to leave, escorted by two regiments of infantry, who had their tricolored cockades concealed in their knapsacks. This column proceeded towards Grenoble, in order to attack Napoleon in the rear, but certainly could not do him much injury, being more than a hundred leagues distant from him. Massena had also taken precautions for the defence of Toulon, fearing that amid the conflict of parties this important town might fall into the hands of the English, and he kept some forces at Marseilles, that he might not be at the mercy of a furious populace.

Some troops of the line began to assemble at Nîmes, and were to be commanded by the Duke d'Angoulême. But these

preparations, though made in Napoleon's rear, were not by reason of the distance much to be feared. Marshal Ney, who had been sent to Franche-Comté, was more to be dreaded, as he was to advance through Besançon and Lons-le-Saulnier on Napoleon's flank. He might overtake the imperial army, but could not assemble more than six thousand men, who would fight unwillingly, if at all, against Napoleon's twelve or fifteen thousand, filled with enthusiasm, and determined to march over the bodies of all that should oppose them. This latter danger was not therefore of a nature to cause much alarm, but a collision would be most disagreeable to Napoleon, who hoped to get to Paris without shedding blood. He therefore avoided a meeting, but was determined not to write either to Ney or the other marshals, preferring to owe everything to the soldiers, to whom he had no objection to be under an obligation, but he would not owe anything to their commanders, with whom he was not pleased at the time of his fall, and from whom he would not accept conditions. The Grand-Marshal Bertrand did not follow this example. He wrote to Ney, describing the triumphal march from Cannes to Lyon, and predicting a continuation of the same success to Paris. He wrote thus, to make him feel the importance of the resolution he was about to take, and its danger to himself and inutility to the Bourbons should it be contrary to the imperial cause.

He sent some old non-commissioned officers of Elba to communicate with Ney's soldiers, and inflame them with the same ardour as the others. It was also very probable that they would have passed beyond Maçon and Chalons, the only places where they could be attacked on the flank, when Ney would be in a position to act. Napoleon left Lyon on the morning of the 13th, announcing publicly that he would be in Paris on the 20th. It seemed indeed likely that the rapidity of his eagle *flying from steeple to steeple*, as he expressed it, would be as great from Lyon to Paris as it had been from Cannes to Lyon.

As Napoleon approached Burgundy he met populations inflamed in the highest degree with these sentiments, which had assured his triumph in the commencement of his expeditions. The country about the Saône had prospered greatly under the empire, because that at that period fluvial communication had replaced maritime, and the Saône had become the medium of continental commerce. Independently of this circumstance, the presence of the enemy, so feebly combated by Augereau in 1814, had greatly exasperated the inhabitants, who, like all those along the frontier, were very patriotic. The imprudence of the nobility and clergy had done the rest, and Franche-Comté and Burgundy were as well disposed as Dauphiné to open their

arms to Napoleon. The cities of Maçon and Chalons in particular were greatly excited when they heard of the proceedings at Lyon and Grenoble. Napoleon stopped for some minutes at Villefranche, and then proceeded through enthusiastic crowds to Maçon, where he was to pass the night. When the inhabitants heard of his approach, they assumed the functions of the magistracy, and effected the revolution themselves. So great was the excitement that Napoleon's mere approach was sufficient to effect now what his presence would have been needed to accomplish but a few days before. He was received with unheard-of enthusiasm at Maçon, the people hurrying along *pêle-mêle* with the soldiers, who either abandoned their commanders or forced them to do as they did. *À bas les nobles ! à bas les prêtres ! à bas les Bourbons !* such were the cries of this multitude of mingled peasants, soldiers, and sailors, all inflamed with the national and revolutionary sentiments which the Bourbons had so unwisely shocked.

Napoleon gave audience to the municipal authorities, and conversed familiarly with such of the inhabitants as addressed him ; told them why he had left Elba, in almost the same words he had used at Lyon and Grenoble, spoke to them of peace and liberty, and charmed them by that friendliness of manner which he could so well summon to his aid whenever he wished to give himself the trouble. He asked one of the municipal officers how it had happened, that while the feelings and courage of Chalons and Maçon were the same, the former had defended itself so well, and the latter so ill, against the Austrians ? "It was your fault," bluntly replied the Maconnais ; "you gave us bad magistrates, and left us without arms or leaders, and our hands alone were useless." The emperor smiled and said, "That proves, friend, that we have all erred, but we must not do so again. For the future we shall only trust in true patriots ; we will not go to seek strife with foreigners, but if they come to us, we shall receive them in such a manner as to deprive them of all desire of coming again."

Having exchanged some words with these good people, he took some repose, intending to continue his route to Chalons next day.

Napoleon was now approaching the second decisive event of his expedition—his meeting with Marshal Ney. He did not exactly dread it, for he had already been joined by twelve or fifteen thousand men, that is, by more than half the troops that the Bourbons had stationed in the east of France. From the accounts that had reached Napoleon, the marshal could not have more than six thousand soldiers, and those probably ill disposed, and surrounded by a population devoted to the empire and the Revolution. It was impossible, notwithstanding, to

foresee what the *obstinate-headed* marshal, as was generally said, might do, and Napoleon would have deeply regretted a collision, of whose success there could be no doubt, but which would have lessened the prestige of the pacific conquest of France effected without bloodshed. Marshal Bertrand, as we have said, had written to Marshal Ney, hoping to induce him to reflect seriously. Napoleon had contented himself with sending him orders, as though he had never withdrawn from his command. He ordered him to proceed with his troops to Autun and Auxerre, where he expected to meet him. Besides, he was very near the marshal, who it was said was at Lons-le-Saulnier, and if some prudent men felt anxious, the people considered Ney and his soldiers as completely won as those that Napoleon had already met between La Mure and Maçon.

The moment was, in fact, approaching when one of the most extraordinary scenes of our long and wondrous Revolution was about to be accomplished. Marshal Ney, ignorant of the proceedings of Generals Lallemand and Lefebvre-Desnoettes, long on bad terms with Marshal Davout, believing that Napoleon regarded him with animosity on account of his conduct at Fontainebleau, and being consequently wholly unconnected with the Bonapartists, felt all his resentment against the Bourbons vanish when he heard of the disembarkation at the Gulf of Juan, which with his simple good sense he considered as the precursor of a foreign and perhaps of a civil war. He had consequently promised Louis XVIII. that he would oppose Napoleon's progress by every means in his power.

When he arrived at Besançon, he did all that the circumstances required with zeal, intelligence, and resolution. Either through the fault of the war department, or the effect of existing difficulties, scarcely anything necessary for the organisation of a *corps d'armée* was prepared. He did everything in his power, at the same time that he complained to the minister with his usual bluntness. Finding the royalists dejected, and no longer supported by that arrogance which had been so injurious to the Bourbon cause, he was indignant with them, but soon revived their energy by the vivacity that revealed itself in his looks, his words, and every motion of his heroic person. The royalists of the locality, without participating in the confidence he felt, were charmed by his sentiments and the attitude he assumed.

Having ordered that some pieces of artillery should be mounted and cartridges prepared, he determined, in order to supply the difficulty in matériel, to divide his troops into two divisions under two generals in whom he could confide. He had five regiments of infantry under his command—the 15th light infantry at St. Amour, the 81st of the line at Poligny,

the 76th at Bourg, the 60th and 77th already assembled at Lons-le-Saulnier; and three cavalry regiments—the 5th dragoons stationed at Lons-le-Saulnier, the 8th chasseurs on their way to the same place, and the 6th hussars sent on to Auxerre to protect the artillery dépôt. He had also been promised the 4th of the line and the 6th light infantry, but these could not arrive before a lapse of ten days. He had chosen Generals Bourmont and Lecourbe to command his two divisions. General Bourmont, commandant at Besançon, was at hand. An old Chouan leader, he should of necessity be agreeable to the royalists, and could not be disliked by the troops, who remembered his distinguished services under the empire. He combined in his person all that was required, and could not refuse service when the cause of the Bourbons was in question. This was not the case with General Lecourbe. This officer, the most distinguished of his time in mountain warfare, was an old republican, disgraced by Napoleon, and living in retirement on his estates as unnoticed by the Bourbons as he had been by the emperor. Ney sent for him, and found him free from all ill-feeling towards Napoleon, but alarmed lest his return should cause a foreign and a civil war; he reminded him of their former companionship in arms on the Rhine, of their mutual aversion to the imperial despotism; he told him of all the evils that Napoleon's ambition had caused France, and succeeded in inducing him to accept the command of one of the two divisions that the royalists were trying to form in Franche-Comté.

These arrangements being finished, and his artillery harnessed in haste, the marshal set out for Lons-le-Saulnier, with Generals Lecourbe and de Bourmont. He arrived in that town on the morning of the 12th of March, and found there the 60th and 77th regiments of the line, together with the 5th dragoons. The 8th chasseurs were expected. He had a choice of two alternatives. He could throw his troops into Lyon, if there were still time, to prevent Napoleon's entrance into that city, or he could make a movement to the right, advance to the Saône, and take possession of the route that led to Paris through Burgundy.

Scarcely had Ney entered Lons-le-Saulnier when he learned that Lyon was evacuated, and he began to comprehend the immense agitation produced in the country by Napoleon's approach. The troops said nothing, but spite of their silence, the intensity of their emotion was discernible in their eyes. The restless and inquisitive population, seeking for news, and hoping to hear what was favourable to Napoleon, took no trouble to conceal their sentiments. The clergy had taken refuge in the churches. The nobility, in distraction of mind, flocked round the marshal, hoping he would restore the feeling

of confidence they had lost. The Count de Grivel, an old soldier, inspector of the national guard, and a devoted royalist, had come to offer his services in support of the royal cause, so imminently imperilled.

Marshal Ney was fully conscious of the difficulties of the position in which he had placed himself; but the more he felt himself inclined to yield to the influences that prevailed around him, the more resolutely did he resist the inclination. When the royalists spoke to him of the dangerous position of affairs, he said he was quite aware of it, that it was no slight undertaking to resist Napoleon, but that it was necessary to call up courage equal to the occasion. He added that he did not wish for the company of *tremblers*, that those who were afraid were at liberty to retire, for were he left alone he would resist; he would take a musket, fire the first shot, and force his soldiers to fight. The terrified royalists pressed his hand on hearing him speak in this fashion, uttered words of gratitude, even of admiration, but did not express great hopes of success, for indeed they entertained very little.

Some hours after his arrival, Marshal Ney reviewed his regiments. The 60th and 77th of the line deployed before him, with the 5th dragoons, and 8th chasseurs that had joined. After having carefully inspected his troops, he assembled the officers, and spoke to them with great warmth and determination. He reminded them that he had accompanied Napoleon to Maçon and to Fontainebleau, that he had consequently served him to the last moment, but that after Napoleon's abdication he had, like them, taken an oath to the Bourbons, and intended to keep it. He represented to them that the re-establishment of the empire would inevitably involve France in a deluge of woes, that it would draw upon her the anger of all Europe, and occasion the recommencement of a disastrous struggle; that every honest Frenchman ought to oppose such an event, that for his part he was decided to do so, without, however, wishing to constrain any person, and if there were amongst those who heard him any whose affections were opposed to their duty, they had only to declare their sentiments, and he would send them home, without exposing them to any other inconvenience than that of quitting the ranks, but that he did not intend to keep with him any but trustworthy men, determined to do their duty.

Notwithstanding the ascendancy that he in general exerted over the troops, the marshal's address was followed by a glacial silence, which proved that if he wished to retain only those who shared his opinions, he would be obliged to send home nearly all his officers. No sooner was the meeting broken up than the aides-de-camp of the marshal heard angry remarks on

every side. "Where was the necessity," murmured the greater number of the officers, "for what the marshal said to us? Does he not know our opinions? Ought he not to think as we do? We are in the ranks, we shall await there in good order whatever fate shall determine. Let him wait as we shall do. He may allow the royalists that surround him to indulge their frenzy, but he ought not to give utterance to opinions that do not become him."

These remarks, when repeated to the marshal, displeased him less than the dispirited language of the royalists. "Let them go," he said with a kind of nervous irritation, "let them go if they are afraid, let them leave me alone, and I will take a musket from the hands of a soldier and fire the first shot."

The more powerfully the general impression invaded his strong heart, the more resolutely did he defend himself, and by this interior struggle he touched the feelings of the more clear-sighted royalists without encouraging them; but he afflicted the Bonapartists, who grieved to see him becoming entangled in a labyrinth from which he could never issue. Several officers belonging to the Count d'Artois, amongst the rest the Duke de Maillé, had joined Marshal Ney. He complained bitterly to them that Lyon had been so easily evacuated; he begged the Count d'Artois not to retreat further, but to make a movement to the left, and so reach the Saône, whilst he, by a movement to the right, would join him, and he maintained that by combining their forces they would possibly succeed in arresting the enemy's progress. He promised, and with perfect sincerity, to take the initiative in the combat, and added that as soon as his artillery arrived, which would be probably the next day, he would advance on Maçon or Chalons to meet the Count d'Artois. The unhappy man did not know that it was not the Count d'Artois who had returned to Paris, but Napoleon himself who would be at the Saône.

The next day, the 13th, whilst Napoleon was advancing towards Maçon, the aspect of affairs became very sombre. Every moment intelligence arrived that revolts had broken out, sometimes at one point, sometimes at another, so that the royalist forces were, as it were, enveloped on every side. The Prefect of Ain arrived about the middle of the day, pursued by the inhabitants of Bourg, who had just revolted. The 76th, who occupied this city, had joined the inhabitants, and unfurled the tricolor flag. Nearer still, at St. Amour, the 15th light infantry threatened to do the like. About ten in the evening an officer from Maçon brought intelligence that the city of Maçon had risen, and expelled the royalist authorities. At midnight a despatch from the Mayor of Chalons announced that a battalion of the 76th, employed to escort the artillery that the marshal was so impatiently expecting, had revolted,

and gone off with the artillery to Napoleon. An hour after an officer who had travelled by the Burgundy route related that the 6th hussars, commanded by the Prince de Carignan, had set off in full gallop for Dijon, for the purpose of raising that city; and an hour later a despatch from General Heudelet announced that this city, the capital of Burgundy, yielding to the impulse communicated by neighbouring towns, had just proclaimed the re-establishment of the empire.

These diverse messages, reaching the marshal in succession during this fatal night, were to him like so many poignard stabs. Unable to resume a sleep that had been interrupted by so many violent shocks, he rose and walked distractedly about, expecting every moment still more terrible intelligence. He knew that some of the Elba soldiers had come from Lyon and mingled with his troops, endeavouring to imbue them with the spirit of insurrection.

He was in this state of agitation when about the middle of the night two merchants who had left Lyon in the afternoon were brought into his presence. What they related made a profound impression on him. They told with what facility the revolution in favour of the empire had been effected at Lyon, and that there were good reasons to believe that a similar revolution had taken place at Paris. They added something about the uselessness of shedding blood in opposing such a movement. At the same moment the officers despatched with Marshal Bertrand's letter arrived. They were personally known to Marshal Ney, and empowered to add verbal explanations to the letter they brought. These officers, mingling falsehood with truth, and repeating what they had heard amongst Napoleon's followers, made a fatal commentary on the words of Marshal Bertrand. They declared that everything had been long previously concerted between Paris, the isle of Elba, and Vienna; that at Paris a vast conspiracy, comprising the entire army, and even the war minister, had already overthrown or was about to overthrow the Bourbons; that Napoleon, who was the focus of this plot, was in correspondence with his father-in-law; that Kohler, the Austrian general, had made arrangements with him at Porto Ferrajo; that the English vessels even had withdrawn to allow the imperial flotilla to pass; that the European powers, tired of the Bourbons, had resolved to accept Napoleon if he promised to preserve peace and observe the treaty of the 30th of May, which he had, in fact, solemnly promised to do; that thus everything had been previously arranged; that it would be a folly to resist a revolution so deeply planned between the highest potentates, and whose most alarming consequences had been foreseen and prepared for.

The reader can judge, from what we have narrated, how much

truth there was in these assertions. They furnish another proof of the plausible falsehoods which, during a political crisis, may be constructed on a slight basis of facts, and a few remarks imperfectly examined and foolishly interpreted. In fact, Napoleon had allowed those about him to believe, though he did not assert it, that he was in correspondence with Austria. M. Fleury de Chaboulon had related to the officers of the staff some of the lightly laid plots of Generals Lefebvre-Desnoettes and Lallemand, who, as we have seen, had had no communication with the isle of Elba, and with these slight materials the tissue of falsehood narrated to Marshal Ney had been composed. "Now," said Ney, "I understand the meaning of Bertrand's words when he says that measures are taken with infallible certainty, and so I was sent alone to fight against a revolution that was wished for by France and even by Europe." Reckoning from this moment, the marshal looked upon himself as a dupe, the victim of his own ignorance, sacrificed to sustain a cause already lost, and which did not leave him in a position even to attempt to combat, for his soldiers would not fight, and even could he induce a few to do so, it would be only a useless shedding of blood, for which he would have to give a serious account to Napoleon and to France. The idea of advancing almost without soldiers to encounter his former companions in arms, in order to defend a court that had inflicted more than one humiliation upon him and his wife, and to avert calamities in which the marshal no longer believed, for Napoleon appeared to be in correspondence with the principal European powers, such a project seemed to him extravagant, and one that ought to be abandoned.

But what was to be done, after having pledged himself so deeply, after having promised to fight *à outrance* against Napoleon? The unfortunate marshal was sorely perplexed. The Bonapartists endeavoured to persuade him that there was but one safe mode of acting, which was to act openly, declaring, for example, in a proclamation to his troops, that France having formally declared for Napoleon, he, the faithful servant of France, did not wish to provoke a civil war in defence of a dynasty antagonistic to the glory of France, and irrevocably condemned by its errors. A proclamation to this effect was drawn up, which Ney appeared disposed to publish, and perhaps read in person to his soldiers. If, in the present time, after forty years' experience of liberty, interrupted indeed, but not forgotten, after having adopted certain principles, professed them openly, and identified himself with them, if any man, whether civilian or soldier, had under such circumstances been asked so abruptly to change his party, he would express considerable astonishment, and look upon such a proposition as an insult. But the education of public men in France was at

that time based upon the doubtful morality of revolutions and despotism, and seeing the government pass so rapidly from the hands of one party to those of another, they had no idea of following a steady line of conduct unmoved by the fluctuating character of the times; and it soon happened that politicians, who in general are more cautious in their proceedings than military men, showed themselves quite as unscrupulous. The marshal, whose principles were those of the times in which he lived, was besides of a fiery and irritable temperament that never allowed him to adopt a middle course. Having abruptly joined the Bourbons in 1814, because he was tired of war, and as abruptly alienated himself from them when he became discontented with the court, he as suddenly returned to them when he learned the disembarkation at Cannes, which had renewed in his mind the images of civil and foreign war, and he expressed his intention to resist Napoleon with characteristic violence of language. And now seeing the probability of a civil war disappear in the affection exhibited by the soldiers for Napoleon, and that of a foreign war in the pretended concert with Europe, he did not think that he ought to desire other than what France desired, and he changed without scruple, with the mobility of a child; for a man governed by his impressions is always a child. Another, on discovering that he had been deceived, would have stepped aside and allowed the train to pass whose approach he had not foreseen. But the marshal, influenced by personal interest as well as by temperament, had no idea of sheathing his sword because he had committed a political error in not foreseeing Napoleon's triumph. Yielding besides to some of his secret causes of ill-feeling, he said within his own breast, that if Napoleon entailed upon France neither a civil nor a foreign war, he was much better than the Bourbons, and that in getting rid of the Bourbons, France would get rid of their prejudices, their arrogance, and their counter-revolutionary tendencies. Before taking an ultimate resolution he wished to consult Generals de Bourmont and Lecourbe, his two generals of division. One was, as we have said, an old royalist, the other an old republican. Both were sensible men, strongly opposed to Napoleon, but they saw clearly how irresistible was the movement that was being accomplished around them. General Bourmont, gentle and astute, though an energetic soldier, kept a mournful silence, as if in acknowledgment of the irresistible force of circumstances, but did not recommend any line of conduct, leaving the marshal to take care of his own dignity. Lecourbe, who had not lost the frankness of an old officer of the army of the Rhine, said to Ney, "You abandon all thoughts of resistance, and I think you are right. It would be useless on our part to attempt to

oppose this torrent. But you would have done better had you followed my advice and not mixed yourself in this affair, and left me to till my fields."

With the exception of these few unpolished remarks, Ney met with no opposition, and suddenly determined that, as he could not resist the torrent, he would go with the current. Without further delay, he called his aides-de-camp, who were not aware of his design, and ordered them to assemble the troops in the principal square of the city. He then advanced in front of the soldiers, surrounded by his staff, amongst whom were several royalist officers whom he had frequently reproached for their want of zeal. He drew his sword in a convulsive manner, and amid an anxious silence, read the celebrated proclamation that had been drawn up for him, and which cost him his life. "Soldiers," he said, "the cause of the Bourbons is lost for ever. The legitimate dynasty that France has adopted is about to reascend the throne. It is the Emperor Napoleon, our sovereign, who is henceforth to reign over our glorious country!" At these words, which occasioned unspeakable surprise to those by whom he was surrounded, frantic expressions of joy, loud as a peal of thunder, burst from the ranks of the soldiers. Hoisting their shakos on the end of their muskets, they uttered cries of *Vive l'Empereur! vive le Maréchal Ney!* then breaking from the ranks, they rushed towards the marshal, and some kissing his hands, others the skirts of his coat, they thanked him after their fashion for having gratified their fondest wishes. Those who could not get near the marshal surrounded the aides-de-camp, who were rather embarrassed at receiving a homage that they did not deserve, for they had had no part in the sudden change the marshal's opinions had undergone. The soldiers, thronging round them, pressed their hands, and said, "You are honest fellows, we always reckoned on you and the marshal, and we were very sure that you would not remain long with the emigrants." The inhabitants, not less demonstrative in the expression of their feelings, had joined the soldiers, and Ney returned to his house escorted by a noisy and joyous multitude.

However, on returning to his residence the marshal found an expression of embarrassment, and even of disapprobation, on the countenances of several of his aides-de-camp. One of them, an old emigrant, broke his sword, saying, "Marshal, you ought to have let us know what was about to occur, and not made us witnesses of such a scene." "And what would you have me do?" replied the marshal. "Can I stop the incoming ocean with my hands?" Others, whilst they admitted the impossibility of making the soldiers fight against Napoleon, regretted that the marshal had thought proper, within so short

an interval, to play two parts so diametrically opposite. "You are babies," replied the marshal; "I was obliged to choose either one party or the other. Could I hide like a coward, shunning the responsibility of events? Marshal Ney cannot sink into obscurity. Besides, there is only one means of diminishing the evil, which is to take a decided part at once, in order to avert civil war, and get a hold upon the man who is about to become again our ruler, and prevent his committing new follies; for," he added, "I do not pretend to give myself to a man, but to France, and should this man wish to lead us again to the Vistula, I shall not accompany him."

After having thus roughly replied to those who condemned his conduct, Ney received at dinner, besides his generals, all the commanding officers, with the exception of one who refused to go. Notwithstanding a slight feeling of restraint, induced by the consciousness of an infraction of military duty, the entire time of the repast was occupied in a long recapitulation of the errors committed by the Bourbons, who, without wishing, or in wishing it—each judged according to his own fashion—had given himself up to emigration, to foreigners, and had enunciated anti-national sentiments. There was also a unanimous protestation against the former faults of the emperor, against his mad passion for war, his despotism, and his refusal to listen to the representations of his generals in 1812 and 1813; in short, there was manifested a determined resolution to tell him the truth, and to require on his part guarantees for liberty and sound policy. "I am going to see him," said Ney, "I am about to speak with him, and I shall declare to him that we will not allow ourselves to be led again to Moscow. It is not to him that I give myself, it is to France, and if we join him, it is because we regard him as the representative of our glory, but we do not wish a restoration of the imperial régime."

Generals Lecourbe and de Bourmont, who were at the dinner, took little part in the conversation, but admitted that the revolution that had just taken place was inevitable, and in a great measure induced by the errors of the Bourbons.

The marshal quitted his guests for the purpose of executing the orders he had received from Lyon, written, as we have said, as if Napoleon had never ceased to reign, and directing him to bring his troops to Autun and Auxonne. He wrote a letter to his wife, in which he related what he had done, and finished with these characteristic words: "*My dear, you shall not again have reason to weep on leaving the Tuileries.*" *

* I have learned these details from an old artillery colonel of the imperial guard, a member of several of our public assemblies, and a sincere royalist. He was a man of good understanding, perfectly trustworthy, and had seen this letter in the hands of Madame Ney.

Marshal Ney's determination to join the emperor removed all doubt as to the success of the extraordinary enterprise of conquering France by his personal influence alone, which Napoleon had commenced at La Mure, and almost accomplished at Grenoble. Napoleon passed the night of the 14th at Chalons, and continued his route through Autun and Avallon, marching at pretty much the same pace as his troops, whom he sometimes followed, or sometimes outstripped, according to the position of any respectable house where he chose to pass the night. Journeying in this way, he arrived on the 17th at Auxerre, surrounded by the people of Burgundy, who, in concert with the troops, rose to proclaim the re-establishment of the empire. Napoleon repeated everywhere what he had said at Lyon, declaring that he brought peace, liberty, and the definite triumph of the principles of '89. M. Gamol, brother-in-law of Marshal Ney, came to Vermanton to meet him. Napoleon received him in a friendly manner, and took up his abode at the Prefecture, where he began to make preparations for his last march, that which was to conduct him to Paris.

Whilst Napoleon was thus advancing to Paris, M. Lainé, stimulated by events, had not ceased to make the most honourable efforts to reconcile the reigning dynasty with the constitutional opposition. As the members of the Chamber of Deputies continued to arrive at Paris, he prayed them to forget past errors, and to seek even in these errors an opportunity of doing good by requiring reparation, which he said the government was disposed to grant, such as modifying the ministry, increasing the number of peers, renewing two-thirds of the members of the Chamber of Deputies, all which changes were to be effected upon liberal principles. An electoral law was also contemplated, which, recognising the influence of property, would also recognise the influence of the liberal and industrial professions, and a law upon ministerial responsibility—a guarantee to which much importance was at that time attached—a new legislative act touching the press, and lastly, a tariff that would protect French manufactures against British competition. To the promises he enumerated, M. Lainé added, but with good intentions, an officious lie. He said the government was reflecting on these concessions, and even preparing to make them the work of the session, when the *genius of evil* put his foot again on the soil of France. But M. Lainé did not confine his rational observations to private conversations; he conducted the deputies who arrived at Paris to the foot of the throne, and repeated in the presence of the king that it was necessary to acknowledge and forget past errors, and repair them by a combination of measures conformable to the necessities of the times and the wishes of the nation.

The leaders of the constitutional party, as well those who were members of the chambers as those who were not, and amongst the latter MM. de Lafayette and Benjamin Constant, gave their warmest support to M. Lainé, and publicly advocated his conciliatory principles. So far things were going on very well; but it was necessary that the court should adopt these ideas, and M. Lainé insisted that the government should put a hand to the work and commence at the commencement, that is to say, by changing three or four of the ministers. Of the necessity of this measure he had convinced M. Montesquiou, who had offered himself as a sacrifice, but he was the only convert M. Lainé made. The court, whose royalist fervour was excited to the highest degree by the sense of danger, far from being disposed to make concessions, was rather inclined to be severe, declaring that the only faults committed were the result of too great indulgence. Louis XVIII. was placed between the moderate and the violent royalists, not knowing with which to side, and half inclined to favour the former, only that he would have been obliged to make M. Blacas the first sacrifice in the proposed change of ministers; for ill-informed liberals looked upon M. Blacas as the agent of the emigration at court. He consequently came to no determination, and lost in deplorable vacillation of opinion the time that Napoleon employed in advancing with lightning-like rapidity towards Paris.

As to concessions, the court had not thought of making any except to the army, and these were ill devised, for besides being undignified, they possessed the disadvantage of rather multiplying dangers than preparing means of safety. The war minister had turned his attention to the half-pay officers and old soldiers who had returned to their homes, and recalled both to active service. The half-pay officers received orders to join their regiments immediately, in order to form the *cadre* of new battalions to be composed of the recalled soldiers. Those who could not find a place in these battalions, which were called "a reserve," were to be drafted into battalions of the national guard that were to be mobilised. Others were to increase the number of the household troops, in whose honours and advantages they were to share. All were immediately put on full pay. There are undoubtedly difficulties to which no remedy can be applied, but still it was a strange illusion on the part of the war minister to imagine that the half-pay officers, with the feelings that had been allowed to grow and spread amongst them, could be induced to support the Bourbons at the very moment that they learned Napoleon's arrival in France. Even the national guards, though animated by a bourgeoisie spirit, opposed to the re-establishment of the empire, and who ought

consequently to be reliable, were really not to be depended on. Had they been summoned in time, and prepared long beforehand for the twofold defence of the throne and the public liberty, they might have been able to restrain the army, and prevent the soldiers from throwing themselves into Napoleon's arms. But the national guard was almost everywhere divided into cavalry composed of the ancient nobility, and of infantry formed from the middle classes. The latter, offended, irritated, and discontented, had been disbanded in the greater number of the cities. Much advantage could not therefore be expected from this force. Nevertheless the prefects were ordered to organise battalions of the "mobile," national guard, and half-pay officers. They were at the same time authorised to convoke the *Conseils Généraux* to vote contributions for this purpose. Remedies whose utility was doubtful were multiplied in this way, as is sometimes done in the case of a patient in the last extremity, whose friends do not like to witness his agony without prescribing something. To all these measures the war minister had added a violent proclamation little calculated to conciliate the army, and of a nature to make those laugh who remembered his language and conduct at Toulouse.

Such were the measures taken to arrest Napoleon's march. But when the rapid progress he had made was ascertained, when it was known that he had entered Grenoble, then Lyon—what the royalists had at first denied, and declared to be false and impossible, they were then obliged to admit on evidence, and ceased to assert that Napoleon had only come to France to be shot. But if they now perceived the necessity of action, they did not see a whit more clearly in what way they ought to act. It is usual with political parties who have committed errors to believe, not that they are guilty, but that they have been betrayed. The royalists of every shade, seeing the defections that had taken place at Grenoble and Lyon—they were still ignorant of Marshal Ney's—were seized with a kind of feverish distrust of everybody without distinction. They saw traitors on every side, and cried treason even in presence of the leaders of the army whom they had a short while before caressed. Those amongst the latter who were not haughty minded—and there are such amongst the bravest—only replied to these offensive allusions by excessive protestations of sincerity, and were not the more faithful on that account. Others were indignant, and felt but one desire, that of quickly seeing such folly and arrogance punished. As had happened a few months previously, the ministers of war and police were the especial objects of distrust. After having been first accused of doing nothing, they were now accused of doing too much when they took the measures we have narrated.

The royalists believed that a vast conspiracy existed, comprising all the officers of the army, from the marshals to the sub-lieutenants. Our account has, however, demonstrated that nothing of the kind existed; that at Grenoble the Generals Marchand and Mouton-Duvernet had sincerely endeavoured to fulfil their duty; that at Lyon, General Brayer had not yielded until his troops had opened the gates of the city to the imperial army; that La Bédoyère was wholly unacquainted with the plots of the brothers Lallemand and Lefebvre-Desnoettes; and even that Napoleon had acted independently of the flimsy and giddy Parisian conspiracy. But it is history which, by dint of patient researches and impartial inquiry, establishes truths of this nature long after the events have passed, truths of which the different parties were wholly ignorant at the time they occurred. The royalists, believing in the existence of a vast conspiracy comprising the entire army, began to ask themselves whether Marshal Soult was not of the number. The more high-spirited of the royalists, whom Marshal Soult's conduct in Brittany and his Quiberon monument had charmed, remained faithful to him, and asserted that he alone could save the monarchy. But the others, who were much more numerous, saw reasons for distrust in the very acts that pleased their fellow-royalists. The violent language of the marshal's proclamation was in their eyes only a feint to deceive the reigning dynasty, and give it up bound hand and foot to Napoleon. The proposed measure of assembly at Paris, and placing about the king's person the half-pay officers who should not find place in the new battalions—a late and now imprudent measure, but devised in good faith—was in their eyes only an act of perfidy. But it was a most erroneous notion, for Marshal Soult, who was not incapable of abandoning people upon whom fortune commenced to frown, was wholly incapable of betraying them, and far from being a deep thinker, his was rather a shallow mind. And yet he passed for an astute Italian of the fifteenth century cast, and though three months previously, when there was a question of dismissing General Dupont, it was said that all was lost if the marshal were not made war minister, it was now, on the contrary, asserted that all would be lost were he allowed to retain the post.

Similar remarks, but not so violent, were made with regard to M. d'André, director-general of police. This functionary, who, as we have said, was an ancient Constituent, and devoted to the king, with whom he had corresponded during fifteen years, ought to have been able to give the royalists full satisfaction, at least on the score of fidelity. But there are moments when the spirit of party, like a frightened horse, no longer recognises the voice of its friends. Having succeeded M.

Beugnot, M. d'André had been obliged to follow the same line of conduct, and reject the absurd inventions of all the officious police that the Count d'Artois encouraged by suffering and sometimes by paying them. Henceforth M. d'André was reported at court incompetent, if not a traitor. "He will not believe anything he is told," was the principal charge brought against him. We shall here narrate a circumstance which would be unworthy a place in history, did it not truthfully paint the bewilderment of party spirit. Very little intelligence reached the capital, because the prefects who were on Napoleon's route, terrified and disconcerted at his approach, had scarcely time to write before his arrival, and did not think of doing so afterwards. Still the telegraph was kept in incessant motion, either to transmit administrative orders, or to question the authorities, whose tone was not sufficiently pleasing to the government, or to ask them for intelligence which they had not sent. It was immediately fancied that if the telegraph wires were kept actively employed, it must be in the service of Napoleon, and not of Louis XVIII. The director of the telegraph was summoned. He was much surprised at the suspicions that had been conceived, and gave explanations so simple and convincing that the doubters were satisfied after having propagated the most ridiculous terrors.

These facts prove how great was the terror of the royalists. M. de Blacas, though he did not participate in the exaggerated fears of the majority, could not help sympathising in their distrust, and in his profound alarm, he, too, asked himself whether Marshal Soult might not be a traitor, and M. d'André an incompetent person. Driven to despair by the news from Lyon, he conceived the idea of subjecting Marshal Soult to an examination in full council, as though he were a criminal, and in his excitement he provided himself with a pair of pistols, ready, as he said, to proceed to extremities if he found the marshal a traitor. As a matter of course, the king was not to be present at such a scene, for it would not be desirable that his majesty should witness the violence that might arise. But M. de Vitrolles, who had not lost his temper, remarked to M. de Blacas, that in his opinion the suspicions entertained against the marshal were unfounded, that he appeared to him to be a man powerfully agitated by the circumstances in which he was placed, but that he was not a traitor. He added, that there was evidently a false estimate made of his capacity when he was chosen to succeed General Dupont, that it might be necessary to elect another minister, a proceeding in itself quite sufficient to meet the exigencies of the case, without the addition of a political scandal.

The marshal, as we have said, did not betray anybody, but

he had fallen into an agitation of mind which did not add to the clearness of his perceptions. Annoyed by the suspicions of the royalists, he endeavoured to tranquillise them by means of a proclamation, whose violence only added to their alarm; and thus, whilst he did not succeed in winning their confidence, he saw advancing with giant strides the man whom he had so terribly insulted. Here were causes sufficient to shake a stronger head than his. And though the measures he had taken in recalling the half-pay military to active service, and ordering certain military movements, might be inefficacious, yet they contained no taint of treason, and should the soldiers, on seeing Napoleon, abandon the royal cause, the fault could not be attributed to the marshal. What was needed was a guarantee for the fidelity of the army; but Napoleon, to whom the army was to be opposed, possessed the affections of the soldiers, consequently Marshal Soult did neither better nor worse than another might have done in his position. His sole error was having promised too much to the court, and raised too great expectations of what his energy and capacity could effect.

Being summoned before the council, his demeanour was conformable to his position, that is to say, very embarrassed. He was questioned almost in the same manner as if he were arraigned as a criminal, and replied without manifesting any indignation at the suspicions of which he was the object. He enumerated in detail the measures he had taken, several times protested the purity of his intentions, and ultimately almost established a belief in his innocence; but if his auditors thought somewhat better of his fidelity, they thought less of his talents; and having often repeated when he did not know what else to say, that if a doubt were entertained of his loyalty, he was ready to give in his resignation to the king, he was in some sort taken at his word, and without further delay conducted to Louis XVIII. This prince understood nothing of the administrative measures then under consideration, but with a clear perception of the truth he saw that the war minister had certainly not performed miracles, neither had he been guilty of treachery. He also saw that it was necessary to sacrifice somebody to the anger of the royalist party. He allowed the marshal to speak as long as he pleased, then the offer of his resignation being renewed, the king profited by the opportunity, told him that he esteemed his services highly, that he would always retain a favourable recollection of them, but as the cares of office seemed at the actual time to press too heavily upon him, he would relieve him of the burden, and appoint his successor. The marshal, surprised at being taken at his word when he expressed a wish to retire, showed a disposition to retract what he had said; but the king took no notice, and the marshal was obliged

to consider as definite a resignation that was only offered for form's sake. The marshal quitted the king's cabinet very discontented at leaving his portfolio behind him, and was reconducted to the gates of the Tuileries by MM. de Blacas and de Vitrolles, still making protestations of loyalty. He found around the gates a terrified crowd, that uttered cries of *Vive le Roi!* when any person of distinction issued from the palace; when the marshal appeared this cry was repeated. He replied by waving his hat, adorned with white plumes, and exclaiming *Vive le Roi!* He then threw himself into his carriage and drove to the war office. He thus found himself dismissed after having continued three months in office, and accused of treason by the very persons for whom he had sacrificed his past career, and compromised himself with Napoleon, whom he had so violently insulted in his last proclamation, and only too happy would it have been for him had he been wholly compromised with the latter, for he would not then have incurred the weighty responsibility of acting as major-general on the fatal day of Waterloo.

Less ceremony was used with M. d'André. His fidelity was undeniable, though some fools affected to doubt it, and he was dismissed with the simple explanation that the king's interest required it. These proceedings took place on the 11th of March, and it was necessary to fill the two high posts thus left vacant. Here was an opportunity of profiting by the sage advice of M. Lainé, and satisfying public opinion. But M. de Montesquiou, who acted for M. Lainé, was only looked upon as a timid man—a doubtful merit—since he had advised concessions, and had consequently very little influence. As the danger augmented, the ultra-royalists acquired greater ascendancy, and unwilling to acknowledge that their great error was having alienated public opinion from their party, they fancied that their safety could be secured by the exertions of talented men endowed with that diabolical skill which they acknowledged Napoleon to possess, even whilst they questioned his genius, and they sought such men in every direction. There was an old war minister who during ten years had received, transmitted, and got the imperial orders executed, and who since his return from Blois had not ceased to address to the court his most humble assurances of fidelity. This was General Clarke, Duke de Feltre. Hitherto his humility but not his services had been accepted. The royalists resolved to have recourse to him, for he ought to know, if anybody did, how Napoleon might be beaten with his own weapons. He was sent for, and was so anxious to accept office that he forgot the danger he incurred. As he did not refuse to compromise himself at such a time, his fidelity was put beyond doubt, and he was immediately sent to the war office to replace Marshal Soult.

As no desire was entertained of conciliating public opinion, and as the royalists only saw in what was going on a struggle in which whoever possessed the largest share of those dark talents attributed to Napoleon would gain the ascendancy, it was no wonder that they thought of making M. Fouché minister of police. Hopes had always been held out to him of obtaining this post, but he had never got the appointment, and was even at last harshly refused. The frequently interrupted communications were again resumed. M. Fouché replied with great protestations of respect for the Bourbons, but declared that he could not accept any office, and that in the actual state of things it would be impossible to avoid a serious crisis. Disappointed in their efforts to obtain the services of one so experienced in police affairs, the royalists made a great descent, and cast their eyes on one much lower in social importance, in intellectual endowments, and in reputation, but they found in the new candidate, to compensate for all these deficiencies, an intense hatred of Napoleon. It was to M. de Bourrienne that the royalists now turned their attention. He had long before lost Napoleon's confidence, and had on that account been made postmaster-general. The direction of the police was now confided to him, with the title of director-general, for it would be impossible to give him the title of minister. The royalists felt assured that this man would pursue the imperialists without mercy, and neither shelter nor spare them.

The two changes we have just related were a strange mode of replying to the advice of MM. Lainé and de Montesquiou, who perseveringly demanded that four ministers should be dismissed, and replaced by four respectable and popular men. But the violence of party feeling increased as the public danger became more imminent, and with the violence of party feeling the blindness of party spirit became greater. The royalists did not believe that the impending danger could be averted by inspiring the public with confidence; on the contrary, they believed that the general safety could only be effected by the exercise of profound craft, and the most skilful plotter, however despicable his character, was the man in whom they were willing to confide. Deplorable blindness, which proves, not the perversity of the Bourbons or the emigrants, who for the most part were honest folk, but the perversity of party spirit, which is always great in proportion to the want of sound sense.

This change of officials took place on the 11th and 12th of March, and a partial success obtained at the same time called up a transient gleam of hope. Generals Lallemand, Lefebvre-Desnoettes, and d'Erlon had, as we have said, set out for Le Nord, in order to put their useless and imprudent attempt into execution. Lefebvre-Desnoettes made arrangements with the

Count d'Erlon, who was to bring the infantry from Lille to Compiègne, and with the brothers Lallemand, who were to bring from the department of Aisne to La Fère all the troops they could induce to accompany them. Having come to an understanding on these points, he left Cambray on the morning of the 9th with the royal chasseurs, formerly chasseurs-à-cheval of the guard, leaving orders with the royal cuirassiers, formerly cavalry grenadiers, to follow. The horse chasseurs, accustomed to obey blindly a general who during ten years had led them to battle, followed as they were accustomed to do, and on the morning of the 10th of March appeared before La Fère, whose gates were opened, as might be expected, to the French troops. The brothers Lallemand had already endeavoured to seduce the artillery regiment that was stationed at La Fère, by saying that a revolution had been effected at Paris in favour of the empire, that the Bourbons were dethroned and thrown into prison, and that the time was come to make a movement in favour of Napoleon. The regiment of artillery would have been only too happy to listen to the brothers Lallemand and follow them, but General Aboville, who was in the town, and a strict observer of military duty, resisted, and Generals Lallemand, fearing to lose time, had set out for Compiègne with Lefebvre-Desnoettes, hoping to meet the cavalry grenadiers, and especially the Lille infantry, led by Count d'Erlon. Having arrived at Compiègne at the head of the former chasseurs of the guard, consisting of a thousand splendid horsemen, Lefebvre-Desnoettes and the brothers Lallemand attempted to seduce the 6th chasseurs, whose officers hesitated and finally refused. Having failed in their attempt on this regiment, they were still obliged to await Count d'Erlon, of whose coming there was yet no indication. The latter, at the very moment when he was putting his infantry into motion, had been surprised and completely paralysed by the arrival of Marshal Mortier from Paris. The marshal told him to keep quiet, and allow revolutions to take place without compromising himself, and, in fact, to retire for the moment from public life, lest he might become the object of legislative severity. The Count d'Erlon had consequently been rendered powerless to act, and had even been obliged to conceal himself to escape legal punishment.

This intelligence confounded Generals Lallemand and Lefebvre-Desnoettes, who perceived but too late that in such serious circumstances, where the minds of men fluctuated between duty and passion, the appearance of any other than Napoleon to influence their opinions would embarrass rather than persuade them. They consequently did not know what to do, when Lion, the second in command, seeing them in this perplexity, questioned them sharply, and forced them to declare their

intentions with regard to the compromised corps. They acknowledged everything, and proposed to him to accompany them to Lyon, the only alternative left them. The Commandant Lion, alarmed at such an enterprise, refused to take part in it, and in some measure extricated them from their difficulty by taking the command of the corps, whilst they attempted to escape. He sent instantly to Paris in the name of the chasseurs an act of submission and repentance, alleging their ignorance of the intention of the generals who had tried to mislead them.

Intelligence of this abortive attempt being circulated at Paris on the 12th of March, served to counterbalance the effect produced by the disastrous news from Grenoble and Lyon. It is only at the last extremity that political parties despair of safety, and if an unexpected gleam of hope glimmers for a moment before their eyes, they cling to it with tenacity, as a dying man does to life when his strength seems for a little restored. The hope awakened on this occasion was of a nature to deceive the wisest, for though the troops who had remained faithful had only resisted giddy-headed men, and not Napoleon, still those who were inclined to flatter themselves might conclude that under energetic leaders they would resist Napoleon himself. The reports from Franche-Comté, and in particular from the staff of Marshal Ney—his defection was not yet known—were also favourable. The royalist officers that surrounded the marshal gave the most flattering accounts of his conduct. Marshal Oudinot, who had set out for Metz, declared that he had everywhere found the infantry of the old imperial guard animated by the best sentiments. Of all this intelligence a tranquillising combination was formed, which people began to believe and to make others believe. It was said that from Cannes to Lyon, Bonaparte had taken everybody by surprise, that no preparations had been made for resistance, and that he had triumphed, as he had so often done, by taking his enemies unawares and confounding them. But henceforth he would meet an energetic and invincible resistance. He was to be attacked in flank by Marshal Ney, and he would not be able to overcome the bravest of the brave. Marshal Oudinot was to march from Metz to attack him in the rear. Lastly, the troops assembled at Paris and in the environs were to compose an army of 40,000 men, commanded by the Duke de Berry in person, with Marshal Macdonald as head of the staff, and under the eyes of the prince and the worthy marshal appointed to assist him, every one would do his duty. There was at this time great talk about the firing of the first shot, which was looked upon as the decisive remedy that was to save the monarchy; for were the conflict once

commenced, the troops, it was said, would be obliged to fight. At Paris the means of firing the first shot was afforded by the household troops, consisting of 5000 brave men devoted to the royal cause, and who, there could be no doubt, would fire. The royalists flattered themselves that they would have 30,000 or 40,000 men, whilst Napoleon would be at the head of only 8000 or 10,000, and however great a general he might be, he could not conquer with numbers so disproportionate.

These were specious reasons, and party spirit is often satisfied with less valid. The Duke de Berry was nominated commander of the army of Paris, which was to encamp before Villejuif. Marshal Macdonald, who had just performed prodigies of valour at Lyon and given unquestionable proofs of fidelity, was appointed his major-general. The Duke d'Orléans was sent to Le Nord to organise an army of reserve with the troops who in that department had lately shown such good dispositions; he was to lead them to Amiens or St. Quentin, and after having provided the necessary matériel, to bring them to Paris to form the Duke de Berry's left wing, and fight at his side. Marshal Oudinot received orders to put the infantry of the old guard in motion if he still retained his faith in them, and to direct his course so as to traverse the road leading from Lyon to Paris; he was authorised to promise the rank of officer to every soldier that pledged himself to fire.

At the same time registers were opened at Paris for the enrolment of volunteers. Ardent royalists were to be seen every day parading the streets of the capital, waving white flags, and uttering cries of "To arms" against the usurper, the tyrant, who was to bring upon France the double scourge of despotism and war. Though these demonstrations did not make a very great impression, still *Le Censeur*, which had appeared as a volume to evade the censorship of the press, endeavoured to point out all the dangers resulting from Napoleon's return, exercised a certain influence over the young liberals, who, though they were not violently attached to the Bourbons, preferred them to Napoleon, and were ready to support their opinions by force of arms. The law students had enrolled themselves in large numbers. It was hoped that the national guard, as anxious for peace as the young students were for liberty, would serve the royal cause with the same zeal. The royalists endeavoured to encourage each other and recover from the dejection created by the intelligence received from Grenoble and Lyon.

In order to propagate these sentiments more effectually, a meeting of the chambers was convoked. This meeting took place on the 13th of March. The Duke de Feltre, the new war minister, and M. de Montesquiou, minister of the interior, were the most conspicuous personages on this occasion. The war

minister proposed a motion declaring that the garrisons of Antibes, La Fère, and Lille, that the Marshals Mortier and Macdonald deserved well of their king and country. He also proposed that the soldiers who distinguished themselves under existing circumstances should be recompensed by the nation. He related on this occasion the attempt of General Lefebvre-Desnoettes and the brothers Lallemand, which he stigmatised as infamous; he declared that the troops showed the most excellent dispositions, that they would fulfil their duty, and that he would be himself the first to set them the example. He added that if Lyon had not resisted, it was solely for want of artillery.

These explanations, hopes, and promises of devotion were warmly applauded, because of the great need there was of believing them. One member proposed that the Charter should be put under the special protection of the army and national guards; another, that the arrears of the Legion of Honour should be immediately paid up. All these propositions were almost unanimously voted. The almost childish address of the war minister was succeeded by the wise and dignified discourse of the minister of the interior, who, though he could not give office to the heads of the constitutional party, still thanked them for their noble conduct on this occasion. He particularly praised the liberal writers, who, forgetful of their dissensions, had written in defence of the king and liberty, that is, of the common good.

As this scene appeared to produce a good effect, a still more solemn one was prepared. It was announced that on the 16th the king and the princes would meet the Chamber of Deputies, in order to renew their alliance with the nation, and to give formal assurance of their fidelity to the Constitutional Charter. As the king's indecision and the perverse tendencies of the princes prevented them from joining the constitutional party, M. de Montesquiou and M. Lainé were anxious that by repeated demonstrations they should conciliate public opinion, the only force that could be effectively opposed to Napoleon.

The king prepared a speech which he drew up himself carefully, and learned by rote that he might deliver it with more effect. This speech was considered a masterpiece by the council, and was indeed couched in terms as dignified as they were skilfully chosen. Encouraged by the approbation of the council, Louis XVIII., wearing the insignia of the Legion of Honour and surrounded by the princes, passed from the Tuileries through a double line of national guards and soldiers of the line. The Duke of Orléans was in the royal carriage, and the king did not forget to draw his attention to the fact that he wore the medal of the Legion of Honour. "I wish," said the duke, "that it were for the first time." As the king passed along he

was affectionately greeted by the crowd, chiefly composed of Parisian citizens, the national guard cried "Long live the king," but the regular troops were silent. The Duke de Berry and the Duke d'Orléans observed what passed, but the king took no notice, still repeating to himself the speech he was about to deliver.

Having arrived at the Bourbon palace, Louis XVIII. entered the hall and ascended the steps of the throne, supported by MM. de Blacas and de Duras. As the monarch entered, the members of both chambers rose quickly, and cheered him warmly. The deputies to the left were the most enthusiastic in their applause. All wished for peace, the Charter, and the king, and all wished to prove to him, that if he were true to them, they would be faithful to him. Three or four times they rose and cried *Vive le Roi!* These exclamations, which were warmly seconded by the royalist deputies, moved Louis deeply, and might almost have made him believe that his crown was secure. Unfortunately these were but the cries of enlightened and truly patriotic citizens. The rest of the nation, carried away by the indignation of which the Bourbons were the involuntary cause, was hurrying towards newly-created abysses!

When the king had recovered his composure, he delivered the following address in a clear and well-modulated voice.

"Gentlemen,—

"At the present crisis when the public enemy has advanced into one portion of my kingdom and threatens the liberty of the rest, I come amongst you to bind more closely those bonds which, by uniting us, constitute the strength of the State. I come to express to you, and through you, to all France my feelings and my wishes.

"I have returned to my country, and reconciled her with all foreign powers, who, you may be assured, will be faithful to those treaties by which we have won peace; I have laboured for the happiness of my people; I have received, and do every day receive, the most touching proofs of their affection; can I, in my sixtieth year, do better than finish my career by dying in their defence?"

Fresh acclamations broke forth at this. "It is not you," cried the deputies, "it is we who ought to die for the throne and the Charter!" The king resumed—

"I fear nothing, therefore, for myself, but I fear everything for France. He who comes amongst us to light up the torch of civil discord brings with him also the scourge of foreign war; he comes to impose an iron yoke upon our country; he comes to destroy the Constitutional Charter that I have given you, the Charter that will constitute my noblest title in the eyes of posterity, that Charter so cherished by Frenchmen, and which I again solemnly swear to maintain. Let us rally around

it, let it be our consecrated standard! The descendants of Henry IV. will be the first to take their places, and they will be followed by all good Frenchmen. And now, gentlemen, let this assembly of the two chambers support authority efficiently, and this truly national war shall prove by its successful issue what a great people can do when united in love for their king and for the fundamental laws of the State."

These words were scarcely spoken when the Count d'Artois rose, and respectfully seizing the king's hand, said, "Permit me, sire, in the name of your family, to unite my voice to yours, and assure you of our frank and cordial union with your majesty, at the same time that we swear to be faithful to you and the Constitutional Charter." "Yes, yes," cried the Duke de Berry and the Duke d'Orléans, "we swear it!" At this unexpected scene the two chambers rose to applaud a unanimity of sentiment that would have been most salutary had it been manifested earlier, and to thank royalty for seeking from the nation that support which they most warmly promised him, but which, alas! was not at their disposal; and the chambers, in their excessive prudence, had not sufficiently opposed royalty to gain for themselves that popularity by which they could now defend and save it.

Louis XVIII. retired amid the general emotion, deeply moved by the success, both of his own discourse, and that of the meeting, a success whose utility a few days before might have been most useful, but which was now more than doubtful.

After the meeting the national guard was reviewed by the princes, in order that trustworthy men might be chosen from its ranks to form the mobile battalions. The Count d'Artois used all the art he was master of to win the favour of the armed citizens of Paris, but when the well-disposed were summoned, very few appeared. Indeed, the feelings of the citizens had been too deeply wounded to allow them to feel very ardent devotion for the royal cause. They dreaded him that was approaching, but did not love those that were about to leave. However, they preserved an appearance of loyalty, and the princes were tolerably well received, though not as they had been by the Chamber of Deputies. These different manifestations, and the unsuccessful attempt of the brothers Lallemand, inspired a little hope, whilst confidence was felt in the numbers and fidelity of the troops that were to be assembled at Melun, under the Duke de Berry, Marshal Macdonald, and Generals Belliard, Maison, Hayo, &c., &c. The Bonapartists, on the contrary, disheartened by the adventure of the Lallemands, which they looked on as an alarming proof of the feelings of the army, kept themselves concealed, their timidity increased by the mere name of Bourrienne, the new prefect of police.

In the meantime, Napoleon had arrived at Auxerre on the 17th, and was preparing to march to Paris. The troops from Grenoble and Lyon, together with those brought from Franche-Comté by Marshal Ney, amounted to about twenty thousand men, with sixty pieces of ordnance. His forces had also been increased by the 14th regiment of the line, which, sent to Auxerre to oppose, had joined him with cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* Intelligence had reached Auxerre that an army was being formed at Melun. There were rumours of forty thousand troops of the line, of the household troops, of the national guard, under the immediate command of the Count d'Artois and several marshals, and it seemed probable that the combat so desired by the royalists, and so dreaded by Napoleon, would take place beneath the walls of Paris. It seemed very possible, indeed, that amongst the five or six thousand men composing the household troops a sufficient number would be found to commence the conflict, which would give a more serious aspect to the whole affair. Napoleon was not much disturbed by these rumours. He said, in his own mind, that the troops would not be more faithful to the Bourbons at Paris than they had been at Grenoble and Lyon, that his approach would confound the government, and that the king would take flight as those prefects had done who had wished to remain faithful to him. Besides, emissaries who had come from the neighbourhood of the capital said that they had not met any soldiers on their way, and that at Melun they had only seen some half-pay officers, not very well disposed towards the government they were called on to defend. Napoleon did not attach much importance to the reports in circulation, but he was too experienced a commander to despise them, and consequently determined to remain two or three days at Auxerre to concentrate his forces, and then to advance *militairement* on Paris. He waited the arrival of Marshal Ney with the corps from Franche-Comté, and perhaps with the old guard, which was said to have escaped from Marshal Oudinot, and he would thus be able in these two days to give the necessary stamina to his army. That his infantry might not be too fatigued, he determined to embark them on the Seine at Auxerre, and send them by water to Montereau. He did the same for the artillery, having hired all the vessels on the Seine. He sent the cavalry by land to Montereau, and so prepared everything that his assembled troops might enter the forest of Fontainebleau on the 19th.

Having arranged all this with his usual promptness and precision, he employed the remainder of his time in receiving mayors, sous-prefects, and commanders of divisions, all of whom he addressed in the same terms he had used in other places.

In the evening, at the prefect's table, and in a smaller circle composed of Druot, Bertrand, Cambronne, and the prefect himself, he expressed himself in that concise, expressive, and caustic style which was peculiar to him. "I have allowed it to be reported," he said, "that I am leagued with the European powers, but I am not. I am not leagued with any one, not even with those who are accused of conspiring for my cause at Paris. Whilst in Elba, I saw the errors that were committed, and determined to profit by them. My enterprise seems an act of extraordinary daring, whilst it is, in reality, the result of rational reflection. There could be no doubt but that the soldiers, peasantry, and middle classes, from the insults they had received, would welcome me with delight. The gates of Grenoble would have opened *had I but knocked with my snuff-box*. Louis XVIII. is certainly a wise prince, whom misfortune has enlightened; and had he been alone, I should have had much more difficulty in wresting France from his grasp. But his family and friends destroy any good that he can do. They fancy they are returned to their paternal inheritance, and can do as they please, and they do not see that they have entered on my domains, which cannot be ruled like theirs." The prefect, having remarked that the Bourbons had restricted themselves to the strict observance of the law, Napoleon replied, that it was the spirit and not the letter of the law that ought to guide a government. "The laws of the present time," he said, "are framed in the spirit of the past, which must necessarily revolt the present generation. That is the sole cause of my success. Last year it was said that I recalled the Bourbons, this year they recall me; so we are equal."

Napoleon passed the evening thus, conversing with his accustomed vivacity, showing plainly the faults the Bourbons had committed, and cheerfully acknowledging his own, but declaring that he was changed, that he would be no longer found either an absolute master or a conqueror, for, he said, he could correct himself, and was not like the Bourbons, who during twenty-five years *had neither learned nor forgotten anything*.

Marshal Ney arrived the next day, the 18th. Napoleon expected him with impatience, and was even surprised that he had not come earlier. The marshal was indeed late, for he had been detained by the issuing of some necessary orders, and he felt not a little embarrassed as he approached headquarters. There were two reasons for this—his conduct formerly at Fontainebleau, and lately at Lons-le-Saulnier. The manner in which he had acted at Fontainebleau, except for its harshness, might be excused, in consideration of the force of circumstances; but his late change, though it might be explained in the same manner, had been so very abrupt that it embarrassed him even

in the presence of Napoleon, who had profited so much by it. The marshal, in his own justification, said everywhere what he had already said at Lons-le-Saulnier, that he had yielded to the wishes of France, which had been so unanimously declared at Grenoble, Lyon, Maçon, Chalons, &c., but that he had not yielded to an individual man, to one especially that had led the French to Moscow; that times were changed, and France now needed peace and liberty, which he meant to tell the emperor at their next meeting, and that if his words were not heeded, he would immediately retire to his estates, and abide there for the remainder of his life. Such were the sentiments that Ney had expressed on his route, which he had repeated on his arrival to his brother-in-law, and which he was about to address to Napoleon himself. However, as he came nearer, his courage failed by degrees, and fearing that he would not dare, would not know how to say all he thought, he drew up a written statement of his opinions and conduct from the time at Fontainebleau to the events at Lons-le-Saulnier. He read this to his brother-in-law, who found nothing in it to correct, and then repaired, paper in hand, to Napoleon a few minutes after his arrival.

Napoleon's profound sagacity had divined all that the marshal would feel inclined to say, and what he had already heard from many lips was sufficient to warn him that Ney would meet him both with excuses and remonstrances. He wished to dispense with the first and avoid the latter. He met him with open arms, exclaiming, "Let us embrace, my dear marshal." Then as Ney was unfolding his paper, he would not allow him to read it, but said, "You need no excuse; your justification, as well as mine, is to be found in the force of circumstances, which are stronger than man. But let us speak no more of the past, and only think of it in as far as may guide us to act better for the future." Then without giving the marshal time to speak, he explained to him the actual state of affairs, and his own intentions, which left nothing to be desired, for he admitted the necessity of peace and moderate liberty, and was willing to grant both. He said that he accepted the Treaty of Paris, and had caused it to be made known at Vienna, and he expected that this communication and Marie Louise's intervention would prevent a fresh struggle with Europe. He intended when he arrived at Paris to assemble the most enlightened men of the capital, and consult with them as to the changes to be made in the imperial code. It was unnecessary that the marshal should add anything to these declarations, as they contained all that he desired, and showed the wants of the actual time more clearly than he could express them. However, he repeated all he had just heard, that he might be able

to boast of having said it, and Napoleon listened with patience to what was only the repetition of what he had just expressed. The conversation was therefore all that it ought to be. However, although Ney was not as astute as Napoleon, he saw plainly that the latter would not allow himself to be bound by conditions, and Napoleon saw still more clearly that there had been a desire entertained to fetter his actions. Both were consequently less satisfied than they affected to be. When Ney retired, he told the officers and his brother-in-law that he was very well pleased with the emperor, who had been most friendly and reasonable. His companions applauded loudly, and declared they had nothing more to desire since they had got back their emperor, and got him back improved by experience. Though Napoleon, on the other hand, divined from Ney's looks and words that he sought to excuse the violation of his military duty by the loudly proclaimed intention of restraining the imperial power, he affected to be unconscious of it, and pretended to be perfectly satisfied with the marshal. However, after the first outburst of feeling was past, he gradually began to treat Ney with a somewhat imperial haughtiness, and made an appointment to meet him at Paris, as though he did not need his assistance to enter the capital.

Everything being arranged, Napoleon left Auxerre on the morning of the 19th, to put himself at the head of his troops, that had received orders to march to Montereau. Towards night he was on the borders of the forest of Fontainebleau, surrounded by his soldiers. Great rumours were afloat there concerning the movement of troops before Paris, but Napoleon thought little of the intelligence, and advanced into the forest accompanied by a few horsemen. At four o'clock on the morning of the 20th of March he entered the courtyard of the castle of Fontainebleau, where eleven months before (on the 20th April) he had spoken his farewell to the imperial guard. He was received by a group of cavalry that had escaped from the army at Melun. His countenance gleamed with satisfaction as he entered this palace, where the first empire had ended, and where it seemed the second was about to commence. This was certainly a brilliant compensation made him by fortune, and for a moment joy usurped the place of prudence in that great mind, which—as we shall soon see—had been cured of all its illusions in the island of Elba.

Meantime, the greatest confusion reigned at the Tuileries. The hopes with which the royalists had flattered themselves had not lasted long, and though it had required three months to deprive Marshal Soult of all influence, the war minister, Clarke, needed but eight days to lose the confidence that had been reposed in him. When, in addition to Napoleon's triumphal

march through Burgundy, news arrived of Ney's defection, it was plainly seen that it was folly to hope for safety from any minister of war whatever, and the royalists abandoned themselves to the most profound despair. The ultra-royalists saw no resource but to emigrate again to those countries where they had always found shelter. But if affairs wore a gloomy aspect in France, the accounts from Vienna were most consolatory, for it was announced that the Congress, assembled anew at Vienna, had fulminated a literal sentence of death against Napoleon. Unfortunately the royalists were compelled to seek abroad that most dangerous support—foreign aid—which, whilst it procured them some material strength, deprived them of all moral force.

In justice to M. Lainé, M. de Montesquiou, and all those who thought the royal cause might be saved by uniting the Bourbons with the liberal party, it must be admitted that they did not despair of their policy, and that even to the very last day they had struggled, at the risk of falling into Napoleon's hands, before they had been able to accomplish the desired reconciliation. M. Lainé and M. de Montesquiou insisted, in order that the coalition might be complete, that the ministers should be chosen from amongst the constitutionalists, and M. de Lafayette put at the head of the national guard, by which the liberals, armed with the Charter, might be opposed to Napoleon. The constitutionalists ratified these proposals by showing a willingness to unite at the last moment, and on the 19th, M. Benjamin Constant published a very violent article in the *Journal des Débats* against Napoleon, and declared a formal and irrevocable preference for the Bourbons and the Charter.

At this time the ministers' council could scarcely be regarded as the king's council, for, as is usual at a political crisis, a crowd of busy-bodies had surrounded the members of the government, forced their way into the assemblies, took part in the debates, and assumed as much authority in public affairs as those who were responsible for them. These are the last moments of power when all command and none obey, and which may be looked on as the commencement of its death agony. Royalists of every political shade had invaded the two or three first floors of the Tuileries, where they might be seen moving about, talking and declaiming against M. de Montesquiou and M. de Blacas, to whom all existing troubles were attributed. The first was become an object of aversion since he had counselled moderation. He was now described as a fickle-minded man, whose reputation for talent was solely due to women's prattle, but that he was in reality incompetent to discharge the duties of office. The second was obnoxious to the ultra-royalists as the king's favourite. They believed him to be the cause of the king's inertia and vacillation of mind. The moderate

royalists blamed him as much as the others, because he would not listen to them, and said that he was like a wall raised around the king to prevent his hearing good advice; and indeed, his chilling haughtiness favoured the idea, though in reality he never failed to inform Louis XVIII. of all he heard. It must be added that in times of danger the royal favourites, or those who seem to be so, are blamed for all public misfortunes; they are punished for the favour they enjoy by being accused of every misdeed that occurs, even of those they seek to prevent.

The outcry against these two personages was therefore extreme. M. de Montesquieu, without being in the least disconcerted, persisted in advocating the system of concession, whilst M. de Blacas maintained a haughty, cold silence. The ultra-royalists, who persisted in seeing no fault in the government but its too great indulgence, considered these concessions as an augmentation of this weakness, which would sink the government in public estimation, without producing any sensible amelioration in the actual state of things. In their opinion, nothing remained to be done but to leave Paris and retire to foreign countries, where their cause would receive the support of the European powers, the only support on which they could count for the future. They said, with ill-concealed satisfaction, that the coalition would punish this ungrateful nation which they had not been able to rule, because it could only be held in check by the iron hand of Napoleon or of Europe. They added that it would be an advantage to get rid of the Charter, which they considered as an essential cause of the new dangers with which legitimacy was threatened. The error committed was, in their opinion, not that the conditions of the Charter had not been observed, but that it had been ever granted.

However, even the ultra-royalists did not agree amongst themselves. Some, with M. de Vitrolles at their head, felt the greatest repugnance to applying for aid to foreigners. They had recently experienced the oppression of foreign influence, for it was this influence that had prevented them from giving free scope to their passions, and they were by no means desirous of coming under it again. To escape this dilemma, they proposed that on leaving Paris (which all considered inevitable), that they should not retire to the north towards Lille or Dunkirk, but to the west towards Angers, Nantes, and Rochelle, which would bring them to Vendée, into the midst of the old royalist soldiers, who had again taken up arms during the last ten months. They hoped to assemble fifty thousand soldiers in that quarter, and supported by Nantes, Rochelle, and Bordeaux, and getting assistance in money and war matériel from England, they would be able to hold out there for a long time, win over

a part of the usurper's forces, and give Europe, without being apparently leagued with her, time to solve the fundamental question between the Rhine and the Seine. The Duke de Bourbon had already left for Angers and Tours, and there was no doubt but that he would raise Vendée.

The accounts from Bordeaux announced that the Duke and Duchess of Angoulême had excited the greatest enthusiasm there, and on the whole the west was considered the safest place of refuge, for even were they forced to leave, they were near the sea, and could return to England whence they came.

Many specious reasons could be adduced in favour of this plan, but as assistance from the Chouans would be as unpopular as from foreigners, there was some difficulty in choosing between two unpopular courses. M. de Montesquion, who was become the habitual opponent of M. de Vitrolles, said with the air of one weary of silly advice, "Well, sir, the King of the Chouans will never be King of the French." To which M. de Vitrolles replied, that the king chosen by the Austrians, English, and Russians had just as little chance. These two men disliked each other to such a degree that they could never meet without mutual insults, M. de Vitrolles calling M. de Montesquion a thoughtless and impertinent court abbé, for which in reply he was told he was a tiresome and dangerous intermeddler.

As the plan of concessions was abandoned, M. de Montesquion saw no other resource than for the Bourbons to retire towards the northern frontier to Dunkirk or Lille, and await on French ground the issue of the conflict between Europe and Napoleon, without themselves taking any part in it. This was the advice that the Duke d'Orléans, Marshal Macdonald, and all sensible men had given to Louis XVIII., in case, as seemed most likely, that the capital should be abandoned to Napoleon. But this project was not more agreeable to the old monarch than that of going to La Vendée. The habitual indolence of Louis XVIII. made the idea of leaving Paris insupportable, and every plan beginning with a removal was disagreeable to him. To go and fight in Vendée like an adventurer did not seem to him suited to his age, health, or dignity. He did not consider it possible to take refuge in a fortress, for in the first place it would be necessary to find a fortress where devotedness to the royal cause prevailed, and secondly, it would require a sufficient garrison for its defence, which could not be found in the three or four thousand horsemen to which the household troops would be reduced should the king be obliged to abandon Paris, and such a town as Lille would require twelve or fifteen thousand chosen infantry for its defence. And to be besieged in a fortress where he would be ultimately obliged to yield would be, he considered, rather a grotesque termination of his career.

To remain at Paris was the project most consonant with his wishes, and if he could not do that to retire to London. His natural indolence induced him to form a secret resolution of remaining at Paris till the last moment, for he hoped but little from a second emigration. "We were well received the first time," he said, "because our misfortunes were looked upon as the inevitable consequences of the Revolution; but now our misfortunes would be attributed to our want of tact, we should be reputed men of little sense, and importunate guests." He was consequently determined to remain to the last, listening to every proposal and agreeing to none, whilst he left to M. de Blacas the ungracious task of objecting to all that was displeasing to himself.

In the midst of this tumultuous court, where the framers of projects were sometimes met by the king's indifferent and ironic glance, or the curt objections of M. de Blacas, there was one man—Marshal Marmont—who could not possibly keep quiet in so serious a state of things. Thoughtless, vain, restless, and as usual, mischief-making, he commanded at this juncture the household troops, a post which was indeed due to his extraordinary bravery. He too was anxious to save the king, and asserted that he had found the means. He had conceived an intense hatred against M. de Blacas, because of the freezing reserve with which this minister met his views, and though he did not join his most violent enemies, he still echoed their cries, and accused him of all the evils that had befallen the monarchy. He had even carried his imprudence so far as to propose to M. de Vitrolles that M. de Blacas should be carried off forcibly, that he might no longer influence the king, and that they should then seize on the government, and save the monarchy without M. de Blacas, and if necessary without the king. When he and M. de Vitrolles should have placed themselves at the head of the government, they were to fortify the Tuileries, lay in a supply of provisions and ammunition, shut themselves up there with all the faithful royalists, and await the coming of Napoleon, who would be not a little embarrassed by the prospect of besieging an old king in his palace, a proceeding that would excite the indignation of Europe. M. de Vitrolles told him that the time for carrying off favourites had passed away with favourites themselves, that M. de Blacas was not one, and that his abduction would only make them hateful and ridiculous, without being of any service to the king. When he imparted the second part of his plan to Louis XVIII. in confidence, the monarch replied in anything but a flattering tone, "You propose that I should ascend the curule chair, as antiquated an idea as any of those of which my poor emigrants are accused."

As in all desperate situations the aid of quacks is willingly sought, the royalists betook themselves again to M. Fouché, for his advice if not his aid, for as we have said, when the choice lay between having recourse to a regicide or making concessions to the constitutionalists, they always preferred the former.

M. de Dambray was, therefore, commissioned to call on M. Fouché, and received the royal authority to make him certain proposals. M. Fouché was endowed with a genius for intrigue, which had carried him so far against the Bourbons as to urge the brothers Lallemand to their foolish enterprise, and he was now glad to see the king's chancellor and discuss his propositions. When M. Dambray having in the king's name asked his opinion and advice, which was equivalent to saying that they were still willing to accept his aid, he said what everybody knew, that it was too late, that the fatal impulse had been given, and that the army would desert to the last man; that Napoleon would be in Paris in a week, and that nothing remained but to abandon the capital, place the king in safety, and wait the issue of events. M. Dambray exclaimed against such dreary forebodings, and insinuated that perhaps M. Fouché would not indulge in such dreary prophecies, only that he desired to see the events accomplished which he foretold; but the latter replied with unparalleled impudence and vanity, that he was disliked by and disliked Napoleon, and was as little desirous of his return as the royalists themselves, but that he was resigned to what could not be avoided; that had the Bourbons taken his advice a little earlier, he would have spared them and France this new and dangerous crisis, which could no longer be avoided, and in which it would be necessary to aid to get through it successfully; nor need any one be surprised to hear within a few days that he, the Duke d'Otranto, had become Napoleon's minister; that he would become his minister to escape his tyranny, and accelerate his fall; that this was the mode of escape which he proposed to himself; and that perhaps when disembarassed of this dangerous madman, he would be able to do more for the Bourbons than he could at the actual time.

One scarcely knows whether to be more surprised at the cynical impudence of such declarations, or at the imprudence of confiding them to any one, or at the childish vanity that flattered itself to be able to foresee and rule such distant events. M. Dambray allowed himself to be entrapped by this seemingly profound policy, and retired surprised and overpowered by the affected superiority of his interlocutor. He told the king and the Count d'Artois of what had passed, and both, particularly the latter, were annoyed at having sought the aid of M. Fouché's genius so late. However, his repelling the advances of the court seemed suspicious, and it was thought that he would not

reject offers made in all sincerity, were he not engaged with the enemy. As his assistance could not be had, it was resolved to render him harmless by securing his person. Neither M. de Bourrienne's good sense nor scruples could prevent the police agents being sent to arrest the Duke d'Otranto. It was a useless piece of folly which, at least, ought not to have been attempted without a certainty of success. But if M. Fouché took part in every commotion, he had the tact to be prepared for every event, and had secured a retreat in the mansion of Queen Hortense, which was next to his, and when the police officers arrived, he, under pretence of wanting to withdraw for a few minutes, made his escape through the garden.

This would have been a laughable adventure had it occurred at a less critical time. On the morning of the 19th, news arrived that Napoleon was approaching Fontainebleau, and now the inevitable moment had arrived when Louis XVIII. should come to some determination. A man of his habits and tastes had not much to choose between. It was too late to seek the constitutional party, with whose leaders he was but slightly acquainted, and whom he could not summon to his aid without exciting the anger of his friends, to a degree exceeding his power of resistance. Marshal Marmont's proposal of enduring a siege in the Tuileries he looked upon as folly; and that of M. de Vitrolles, to retire into Vendée, he regarded as worthy of the Count d'Artois, which, on the king's part, was saying enough. No alternative remained but to retire towards the north, without crossing the frontier. This plan, which had been suggested by the Duke d'Orléans and Marshal Macdonald, was more in unison with the king's ordinary prudence, and he consequently preferred it to the others. The Duke d'Orléans had gone to Flanders. Louis XVIII. felt the greatest esteem for the prudence, loyalty, and coolness shown by Marshal Macdonald, who was still in Paris, though appointed to command the army at Melun under the Duke de Berry. He sent for him to ask his advice. The marshal told the king that he felt no confidence in the army that was being assembled at Melun, that though the household troops were brave and devoted, they were inexperienced, and would not be able to stand against the imperial troops for two hours; that the number of volunteers in the national guards was too insignificant to be taken into account, whilst the troops of the line would certainly pass over to the enemy as soon as they came within range of the cannon. So little confidence, indeed, did the marshal feel in the soldiers, that he had not ventured to assemble them at Melun, lest, when congregated together, they might give utterance to their sentiments. For this reason, he had only sent the half-pay officers thither, who were formed into battalions *d'élite* by

Marshal Soult, but who already gave vent to alarming expressions, and threatened every moment to revolt. These things being told in all sincerity, the marshal advised the king to retire to Lille, and there await the issue of the struggle that was about to commence between Europe and the revived empire. The king considered the marshal's advice excellent, and fully coincided in his opinion, but he did not think it would be easier to make an effectual resistance at Lille than at Paris, and his wish was simply to retire to his asylum at Hartwell, where he had enjoyed perfect repose during six years, and where, thanks to the errors of his brother and friends, he feared he would be obliged to end his days.

But Lille was on the road to London, and as it would be better to remain at the frontier, if possible, he agreed to the marshal's plan, and desired him to see to its execution. But there was one thing that made him feel anxious, and this anxiety was shared by the marshal. Memory, that dangerous faculty of the Bourbons, told him that Louis XVI., in seeking to escape, had been arrested at Varennes, and brought back by force to Paris. He dreaded that in a popular tumult, excited by the inhabitants of the faubourgs and the half-pay officers, his carriage might be stopped, and his departure prevented. The marshal, who participated in his fears, arranged with him that the troops should be sent to Villejuif, under pretence of forming them into *corps d'armée*, and these out of the way, the household troops should be assembled in the Champ de Mars, under pretext of being reviewed, but in reality to escort the royal family, that then they should suddenly cross the Seine, and proceed towards the north by the road of La Revolte. The king arranged all these details with Marshal Macdonald, but said nothing of his plans to Marshal Marmont, whose indiscretion he dreaded; he simply ordered that the household troops should be kept ready to march at a moment's notice.

On the morning of the 19th, things had come to such a state that nobody thought of making any further objection or suggestion, but only looked forward to Napoleon's arriving within the next twenty-four hours, and of escaping from the effects of his ferocity, which each pictured to himself in accordance with the amount of his own hatred. Louis XVIII. was thus freed from all opposition, for even his brother, the Count d'Artois, and his nephew, the Duke de Berry, did not, in presence of the impending danger, advance an opinion opposed to his. On the morning of the 19th, therefore, everything was prepared in secret for the departure of the royal family, either during the day or night, when there would be no longer a doubt about Napoleon's approach.

In conformity with the adopted project, Marshal Macdonald

ordered the immediate departure of the troops for Villejuif, and sent the royal volunteers, commanded by M. de Viomesnil, to Vincennes, announcing at the same time, that the princes and he would proceed to Villejuif to take the command of the army. This was only meant to deceive the mass of the people, but every one at Court was aware of the preparations for leaving Paris. Consequently, many private individuals took their departure the same day. Money was wanted, but could not be easily procured from so scrupulous a minister as M. Louis. However, it was got in the most regular manner possible. The *domaine extraordinaire*, which was appropriated to defray the expenses of the Civil List, had not yet been touched. It consisted of exchequer bills to the amount of six million francs, and these were cashed some days before the king's departure. The Civil List became debtor to the *trésor extraordinaire*, and converted the bills into specie. As it was the beginning of the year, the Civil List, which was large, might take an advance of several millions, by which five or six millions more might be raised, making in all from eleven to twelve million francs. Of these, four millions were given to the treasurer of the household troops, and about three millions to M. de Blacas, for the expenses of the king's household. Some millions were divided between the princes, the principal gentlemen of the court, and those generals that were to accompany the royal family.* The next proceeding was not so regular. The crown jewels were packed up, and placed amongst the baggage of the royal fugitive. In a political sense, the Bourbons considered they had no orders to give, and gave none. They contented themselves with telling the ministers to follow the king, but gave no intimation of their design to the chambers. As the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême were in the south, where great zeal was shown for the royal cause, and the Duke de Bourbon in Vendée, it was decided that M. de Vitrolles, who had always felt great confidence in the western provinces, should proceed thither, to act as responsible minister to either the Duke d'Angoulême or the Duke de Bourbon, and try under the authority of these princes to form a special government for these countries. He was to take with him letters of authority from the king, and was to leave for the south at the same time that the royal family set out for the north.

During the entire day of the 19th, an anxious, curious, and evidently well-meaning crowd filled the Place du Carrousel, looking at the carriages that entered and left, and suspecting, from the numerous departures from the Faubourg St. Germain, that a more important one would soon proceed from the Tuile-

* The account of these sums, regularly presented, is to be found in the archives of the empire.

ries. Although there were many half-pay officers in this crowd, come to watch what was going forward, a general feeling of sincere interest was felt for the royal family, and cries of *Vive le Roi!* were occasionally heard. In the course of the day, M. Lainé came, in the name of the constitutional party, to renew once more the offer of making some opposition to the enemy by giving M. de Lafayette the command of the national guard. He was received politely, and though he was not told of the approaching departure of the Court, it was intimated to him that it was now too late to attempt anything. In the afternoon, the king arranged with Marshal Macdonald that he would drive out for a little while, in order to try the disposition of the populace, and see whether he would be permitted to leave his capital. Marshal Marmont had received orders to assemble the household troops in the Champ de Mars, which he was only able to do partially, as the orders had been issued so unexpectedly. However, the greater number were brought together, and it was arranged that the king, under pretence of reviewing them, should leave the Tuileries, to which he would return if all seemed quiet, but if the populace appeared hostile, he was to cross the Seine by the Jena bridge, traverse the wood of Boulogne, and reach the St. Denis route, ordering his bodyguards to follow.

He left the palace between three and four o'clock, and found the crowd assembled on the Place du Carrousel inquisitive, but quiet, and even affectionate. They made way respectfully for his carriage. He proceeded to the Champ de Mars, found tranquillity everywhere, and then returned to the Tuileries, intending not to leave until the evening, which would give him a little more time to prepare.

Towards evening, Napoleon's arrival at Fontainebleau was announced, and there was no doubt but that he would be at Paris the next day. It was therefore determined not to delay the departure any longer. At eleven o'clock, when the crowd had somewhat dispersed, the gates of the Tuileries were closed, and the royal family got into their carriages. They proceeded towards St. Denis without meeting resistance or inquiry, for the streets of the capital were quite deserted at that hour. Marshal Macdonald ordered such troops as had not yet left for Villejuif to proceed towards St. Denis, but without the least hope of saving them from the contagion of desertion, or securing their fidelity to the king. It was midnight when the royal fugitives passed through St. Denis, without meeting any other accident than some unseasonable cries from a battalion of half-pay officers proceeding in the same direction. Thus, after a Restoration of eleven months, the unfortunate Bourbons became again exiles, a consequence less of their own errors than of those committed by their friends.

The next morning, the 20th of March, as soon as day dawned, anxious crowds assembled round the Tuileries to observe what was going on. Servants in livery were visible, but not a single officer, or one member of the bodyguard; as usual, some of the national guards were stationed outside as sentinels. The white flag still floated from the principal dome, and some few cries of *Vive le Roi!* were heard, but not one ventured to say *Vive l'Empereur!* although there were a great many half-pay officers among the crowd. Soon the fatal secret was declared, and spread through Paris in a moment. The heads of the different parties were the first that learned the intelligence, and hastened to talk it over together. The royalists were in despair, the constitutionalists were deeply annoyed at having been entrapped into compromising themselves without necessity, and the Bonapartists were delighted, because since the unsuccessful attempt to arrest M. Fouché, they had lived in constant alarm, nor could they believe themselves safe until Napoleon should be settled at the Tuileries. Some called on old Cambacérès to ask what was to be done. He advised them not to anticipate Napoleon's wishes, as he would not be pleased with any one that would act without or before him. When they mentioned the public treasury, the post-office, and all that ought to be saved from the general confusion, "Don't you interfere," he said, "anything is better than to assume the authority that belongs to the emperor." He spoke in the spirit of the old empire, but the new was to be entirely different.

Still M. Lavalette would go to the post-office, which he had directed so long, merely to get information, not thinking that he was thus preparing that sentence of death that was to be pronounced against him at a later period. The moment he arrived there, the clerks surrounded him, begging him to resume his former place as their *chef*, and even M. Ferrand, the director appointed by Louis XVIII., requested him to take his place, and give him an order to get horses. This old royalist was convinced that it was by a conspiracy, and not through their own fault that the Bourbons had fallen, and M. Lavalette's appearance, though the result of accident, confirmed this opinion. M. Lavalette had had no part in any conspiracy, not even in the silly attempt of the brothers Lallemand, and did nothing more than send a courier to Fontainebleau to inform Napoleon of the evacuation of the Tuileries.

The moment the king's departure was known, the Place du Carrousel was thronged with thousands of young officers, who for the last year had filled Paris with their opposition in word and deed. General Exelmans was one of the first that appeared. For some time they contemplated the silent and deserted palace, over which the white flag was still floating; they entered, the

servants obsequiously opening the doors, and ordered the white flag to be lowered, and the tricolor to be hoisted in its stead, to the great joy of all present. They then traversed the city, seeking the ancient ministers and dignitaries of the empire, MM. de Bassano, de Rovigo, Decrès, Mollien, Gaudin, Queen Hortense, and Joseph's wife, the former Queen of Spain. In an instant, the palace was filled with Napoleon's old officials, all impatiently waiting the arrival of their master. A great number of military men of every rank had gone to meet him on the Fontainebleau route.

In fact, Napoleon had arrived during the night at Fontainebleau, and rested there for some hours while awaiting his cavalry. He then received M. Lavalette's courier, and soon after saw M. de Caulaincourt hastening to him in the first post-chaise he could procure. Napoleon clasped that faithful servant in his arms, and held him for some time pressed to his heart. He determined to set out on the spot, and enter Paris on the same day, that there might be no delay in placing himself at the head of the government. Besides, the 20th of March was the birthday of his son, and he had a superstitious feeling concerning anniversaries, which is very common amongst those who have made large and successful demands on fortune.

Having given some orders about the marching of the troops, he left Fontainebleau at two o'clock, in a post-carriage, accompanied by M. de Caulaincourt, and his faithful companions Bertrand and Druot. He was joined at Villejuif by the greater number of the troops destined for the army at Melun. The staff of this army had, as we have already said, been sent to St. Denis. The soldiers were consequently without commanders, and could the more easily follow their own inclinations. When Napoleon had received their enthusiastic congratulations, he continued his journey, escorted by a number of officers from different regiments on horseback. His progress being retarded by this crowd, it was nine in the evening when he arrived at Paris. In order to avoid the narrow streets of the centre of the capital, he drove along the outer boulevard, and then along the quays to the Tuileries. The people of Paris were not aware of his arrival, so that this strange and extraordinary imperial restoration had no other witnesses than the few idlers and the crowd of officers assembled on the Place du Carrousel.

His carriage had entered the palace yard before it was known whom it contained. A moment was sufficient to spread the intelligence. Then Napoleon, snatched from the arms of MM. de Caulaincourt, Bertrand, and Druot, was borne forward in the arms of the half-pay officers, who exhibited a frantic joy. A combined and intense cry of *Vive l'Empereur!* had carried the important intelligence to the throng of high functionaries

that filled the Tuileries. They immediately rushed towards the staircase, where they formed an opposing current to that of the officers who were ascending, and an almost alarming struggle followed, for both parties were nearly stifled, and so was Napoleon himself. He was borne in this manner to the top of the staircase, and for the first time in his life, overcome by his emotion, he shed tears. Placed at length upon his feet, he walked straight forward not looking on either side, abandoning his hands to those who pressed, kissed, and bruised them with the testimonies of their affection.

After a few moments he recovered himself, recognised his most faithful servants, embraced them, and without taking one moment's rest, retired with them to organise a government.

Thus in twenty days, from the 1st to the 20th of March, that strange prophecy was fulfilled which said that the imperial eagle "*would fly without pause from steeple to steeple even to the towers of Nôtre Dame.*" Nothing in Napoleon's entire career was more extraordinary nor apparently more difficult of explanation, though in reality capable of being easily explained. The unfortunate Bourbons who fled imputed this revolution not to their faults, but to a vast conspiracy, which according to their report was spread throughout France. But as we have seen, there was no conspiracy. There had been indeed an insignificant plot devised by some young officers, the dupes of M. Fouché, but this project when put into execution, even aided by the powerful stimulant of Napoleon's disembarkation, failed completely. But this was wholly unconnected with the isle of Elba, for M. de Bassano, who was aware of its existence without being mixed up in it, had informed Napoleon of the public discontent, without offering any advice. Napoleon, upon whom this information produced very little effect, was expecting to be quickly carried off by force from the isle of Elba, to see his companions in exile die of weariness or want before his eyes, and believing that the Congress was dissolved, he had determined to set out, moved thereto especially by his intense activity of mind and by his extraordinary daring. He trusted to his good fortune to traverse the sea in safety, and he hoped to march triumphantly through the interior of France, sustained by sentiments that the Bourbons had deeply wounded. His profound discernment had unerringly foreseen that the national sentiments, represented by the army and the principles of '89, represented by the peasantry and the inhabitants of the towns, would burst forth at his appearance, and that having overcome the first difficulty, he would win over the people and the army, and advance with rapid strides to Paris, accompanied by the soldiers that had been sent to oppose him. He had therefore embarked, confiding as usual in his presiding star,

crossed the sea without opposition, and disembarked without encountering any impediment upon a coast along which were stationed a few excise officers; then having to choose between two routes, that of the Alps, beset with physical impediments, and that of the seashore, rendered difficult by moral obstacles, he selected the former—meeting at La Mure a battalion that hesitated, he turned the scale in his favour by boldly presenting his bare breast to the men. On that day France was reconquered, and Napoleon virtually remounted his throne.

Thus an act of foresight that consisted in reading distinctly the heart of France, whose sentiments were insulted by the emigration, and an act of daring that won over a battalion that vacillated between duty and feeling were, combined with the errors committed by the Bourbons, the true causes of this extraordinary, and yet we must say, commonplace revolution, however extraordinary it may appear. Would it, in fact, be possible that the old régime and the Revolution could find themselves again brought face to face in 1814, without immediately grappling with each other, and engaging in a formidable and decisive struggle. Certainly not, and a fresh struggle between these two powers was inevitable. Napoleon, it is true, by engaging in the contest, gave it European, that is to say, gigantic proportions. But for him this struggle would not, perhaps, have occurred so soon; it would not perhaps have provoked foreign intervention, and in this sense, being inevitable, it is deeply to be regretted that it was aggravated by his presence. But this is a doubtful point, and it is probable that foreigners on seeing the Bourbons defeated by the regicides would not have been less tempted to interfere than on beholding the provoking countenance of the conqueror of Austerlitz.

Be this as it may, amid the delirious joy of one party, and the natural consternation of the others, enlightened patriots, who were desirous of moderate liberty, intermediate between the old régime and the Revolution, limited their last contest to peaceful and legal struggles, and it must ever be a cause of regret that this conflict was not allowed to decide the deadly conflict between France and Europe. Consequently the bourgeoisie, understanding the sentiments of these patriots better than those of any other class, without regretting the emigrants, without rejecting Napoleon, whose great deeds they admired, were restless and disquiet. No tears were seen in their eyes, neither were there any traces of joy on their faces; they scarcely exhibited any curiosity, so clearly did they foresee a repetition of the sad events they had already beheld, and which excited in their minds a sentiment of profound alarm. Events soon justified these sad presentiments.

BOOK LVIII.

ADDITIONAL ACT.

THE palace of the Tuileries, on the evening of the 20th of March, presented a scene of confused and noisy delight, which respect, diminished by revolutionary principles, no longer restrained. Here were fortuitous meetings between persons who had not seen each other for a year, and who never expected to meet in that palace again. As soon as anybody appeared who had been long forgotten, or who possessed the rare merit of not having sought the favour of the Bourbons, he was received with loud applause, reverence for the place and the master who had returned there being no check on these demonstrations. The crowd of lookers-on exhibited a profound feeling of interest as the Queen of Spain and Queen Hortense passed between their serried ranks. The latter, as we have said, had remained at Paris, protected by the Emperor Alexander; she had obtained for her children the province of St. Leu. The emperor, who had been most amiable in his manner to all comers, was harsh to her. "You in Paris," he said, on perceiving her; "you are the last person I should have expected to meet there." "I remained," she replied, "to take care of my mother." "But after the death of your mother?" "After her death, I found in the Emperor Alexander a protector for my children, and I endeavoured to secure their future prospects." "Your children! poverty and exile would have become them better than the patronage of the Emperor of Russia." "But have not you, sire, allowed the King of Rome to owe the Duchy of Parma to the generosity of this prince?"

Not being able to reply to so strong an argument, Napoleon resumed: "And your lawsuit! who advised you to that proceeding?" (The princess had instituted a suit against her husband in the French courts to obtain the guardianship of her children.) "You have been persuaded to make an exhibition of family misfortunes which ought to have been kept secret, and you have lost your suit." But Napoleon, quickly regretting this severity, opened his arms to his adopted daughter whom he loved, embraced her and said: "I am a good father, you know it. Let us say no more on these subjects. And you have been

present at poor Josephine's death. Amid our many misfortunes, her death pierced my heart."

This short explanation being finished, Napoleon became again, for the Queen Hortense, the most affectionate of fathers, and continued to show himself such during his abode in France.

The Prince Cambacérès next appeared, broken down under the weight of years, and scarcely capable of experiencing an emotion of joy; with him came M. de Bassano, far more delighted at again beholding his master than at the prospect of recovering his former position. Napoleon received the former with the consideration that he had always accorded to his profound good sense, and the latter with expressions of the warmest friendship. He conversed a long time with both. Then came the Dukes de Vicence, de Gaëte, de Rovigo, Decrès; the Counts Mollien, Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angely, Lavalette, and Defermon. A murmur of approbation, always proportioned to their recent conduct, greeted these diverse personages. When Marshal Davout appeared, whose memorable defence of Hamburg and his proscription had rendered dear to the Bonapartists, uproarious acclamations burst forth, when it became necessary to remind the applauders that they were not in a public assembly.

Napoleon had not seen the marshal since their sad separation at Smorgoni in 1812, when he left the Russian army. The marshal had retired first to the Lower Elbe; he was afterwards shut up in Hamburg, where he had kept the tricolor flag flying to the end of April in opposition to all the armies of Europe, and when he returned to Paris, Louis XVIII. had already occupied the throne two months. Napoleon embraced the marshal, complimented him on his glorious defence of Hamburg, spoke of his justificatory memoir, which he praised very much, and added pointedly, "In reading this memoir, I saw with pleasure that my letters had been useful to you."

The marshal had, in fact, quoted in his justification some passages from the terrible letters that Napoleon had written to him from Dresden, omitting those parts that commanded excessive severity, which indeed had never been put into execution. "I only quoted," replied the marshal, "a very small portion of your majesty's letters, because you were absent; I shall now quote the entire." Napoleon smiled at this reply, and testified the highest esteem for the marshal.

There appeared soon after a personage of a very different caste, whom stupid-minded courtiers hurried to present to the emperor as one whose adhesion was of vast importance; this was the Duke d'Otranto. By dint of asserting himself to be a person of great importance, M. Fouché had actually become so in the eyes of the public, and he was believed to be the author of that pretended conspiracy, whose triumph seemed now to be

accomplished ; a ridiculous chimera, in whose existence the Bonapartists had the folly to believe, which the fugitive emigrants determined to punish by the shedding of blood, and for which the heads of illustrious men were destined to fall ! The courtiers had boasted to Napoleon of M. Fouché's services, and even of the dangers he had incurred, and on seeing him appear, they exclaimed, "Allow the Duke d'Otranto to pass," as if this gentleman were about to bring chained to the feet of Napoleon all the parties of whom he was supposed to be the secret mover. Napoleon was not the dupe of the common illusion, but feeling the necessity of keeping on good terms with everybody, he received M. Fouché as an old friend of the Revolution and the Empire ; but there was a shade of difference between his present manner and that of former times ; he was at the same time less familiar and less severe. M. Fouché told Napoleon that he had done wisely to return, for France desired his presence. He then related in a certain careless way that it was he, the Duke d'Otranto, who had made the troops march from Flanders to operate a diversion in his favour, and if this movement had not succeeded, the failure was attributable to the giddiness of those who had undertaken to execute it.

Napoleon listened complacently to all that M. Fouché and others said to raise their own importance. "I see," he said, "that there has been a conspiracy, and," he added, smiling, "I am willing to believe that it was in my favour. As for me, I have not conspired with anybody. My sole correspondents have been the public journals. When I learned through the press how the army and the holders of national property were treated, and in fact all those whose interests were bound up in those of the Revolution, I had no longer a doubt about the sentiments of France, and I resolved to come and deliver her from the influence of the emigrants. Besides, I was certain that my enemies intended to carry me off to some tropical clime. I selected the moment when the Congress was about to be dissolved, and when the nights were still sufficiently long to favour my escape. Having crossed the sea, I presented myself before the soldiers, and asked would they fire upon me. They replied by exclaiming *Vive l'Empereur !* The peasantry caught up the cry, adding *à bas les nobles ! à bas les prêtres !* They accompanied me from city to city, and when they could go no further, they confided to others the duty of escorting me to Paris. After the Provençaux, the Dauphinois—after the Dauphinois, the Lyonnais—after the Lyonnais, the Bourguignons, have formed my cortège, and the real conspirators who have won me all these friends are the Bourbons themselves. We must now profit by their errors, and by our own," he added, bowing his head with a modest smile. "We do not intend to

repeat the past. I have dwelt a year in the isle of Elba, and *there as in a tomb I have heard the voice of posterity.* I know what ought to be avoided, I know what ought to be desired. I had dreamed a magnificent future for France; on the morrow of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, such dreams were pardonable. There is no occasion to tell you that I have abandoned these ideas. Alas! it would be no longer excusable in me to frame such bright illusions after the experience I have had. I wish for peace, and I who would never have consented to sign the Treaty of Paris, I pledge myself, now that it is signed, to execute it faithfully. I have written to Vienna, to my wife, and my father-in-law, to offer peace on these conditions. The hatred of the allies against us is unquestionably very great, but by allowing each to keep what he has taken, interest will perhaps silence the voice of passion. Austria has powerful motives for dealing gently with us. England is overwhelmed with debt. Alexander through vanity, the Prussians through hatred, will be alone tempted to recommence hostilities, but it is not certain that they will do so. We shall, however, be ready, and if after appearing before Europe with the Treaty of Paris in our hand, we are not listened to, we shall beg the aid of heaven, and I hope we shall be once more victorious.

“But,” continued Napoleon, “it is not peace alone that I wish to bestow on France, I wish to give her liberty. Our duty is to do firmly and thoroughly all that the Bourbons have not been able to accomplish. They have sapped the security of the legitimate interests of the Revolution, and have insulted our glory whilst affecting to court the chiefs of the army; we must re-establish these interests, and revive this glory. We must do more, we must give freely that liberty which they gave by compulsion, and which whilst they gave with one hand, they withdrew with the other. I wished for unlimited power, and I needed it, when I sought to reconstitute France and to found an immense empire. But I do not want it now. Let me only be allowed to pacify or conquer our foreign foes, and I will content myself with the authority of a constitutional king. I am no longer young; I shall soon have lost the vigour of youth; besides the measure of authority wielded by a king of England will be sufficient for my son. But we must avoid blunders, we must not stumble in our attempts at liberty, for that would revive in France the necessity and desire of absolute power. As for me, the sole glory to which I aspire is to uphold the principles of the Revolution, to secure our independence by policy or victory, and then to prepare a constitutional throne for my son. I shall consider myself sufficiently powerful if I succeed in this twofold task. After having given my first cares to the reorganisation of our army and the re-establish-

ment of our relations with Europe, I will, with you, apply myself to the revision of our laws, and seek to accommodate them to the state of public feeling. And without further delay, we shall to-morrow restore the liberty of the press. The liberty of the press!" exclaimed Napoleon, "why should I henceforth fear it? *After what the journalists have written during the last year, they can have nothing more to say of me, but something still remains to be said of my adversaries.*"

These remarks which we have condensed, were addressed sometimes to one person, sometimes to another, always with infinite tact, a perfectly natural manner, and a convincing air of sincerity. These observations were so suitable to the position of affairs, and so consonant with the feelings of the listeners, that no person thought of questioning their sincerity. The more clear-sighted would no doubt, had the emotion called up at the moment permitted them to reflect, have asked themselves whether it would be possible for Napoleon to endure submissively the sharp shocks of liberty. But even the most clear-sighted, stunned by the events that were passing around them, and by Napoleon's miraculous return, thought more of enjoying the present than of penetrating the future to seek there cause of grief.

Be this as it may, though Napoleon was eloquent and fond of talking, he was not in the habit of wasting his time in empty speeches. What he had said was necessary, in order that the opinions he entertained might be generally known. But there was an affair quite as necessary and as pressing, which was to form a ministry. In former days, when Napoleon was everything, both the aggregate and the detail of the government, it was easy to construct a ministry. But now when the country was to be associated in his acts, when it was necessary to prove to the people his intentions by the choice he made, it was needful that he should exercise much reflection and discernment in the appointment of ministers who were not to be mere clerks.

After having had a conference the same evening with Prince Cambacérès, whose good sense he had always appreciated, and with M. Bassano, whose fidelity had never faltered, Napoleon filled up the list of his ministers with his accustomed promptitude. There were several gentlemen whom it was merely necessary to restore to their former places, for they were competent to fill them under any régime. These were the Duke Decrès, who was appointed minister of marine, the Duke de Gaëte, minister of finance, Count Mollien, first lord of the treasury, and lastly, the Duke de Vicence, who was made minister of foreign affairs. About these appointments there could be no hesitation. It was not so for the departments

of war, the interior, the police, and the administration of justice. The appointments in these departments should be new and characteristic. The Duke de Feltre had followed the fortunes of the Bourbons; he was therefore out of the question. But his place could be advantageously filled by one whom the voice of the public would have nominated had a moment of doubt intervened. This was the defender of Hamburg, Marshal Davout. He was an upright dispenser of justice, unbending and unremitting in the discharge of his duties, as well as an intrepid warrior; and to all these high qualifications he added the singular merit of being the only marshal that the Bourbons had proscribed. Napoleon determined to offer and make him accept the war portfolio.

For minister of the interior Napoleon would have wished M. Lavalette, whose rectitude of feeling equalled the perspicacity of his intellect, and to whom during twenty years he had been in the habit of speaking without reserve. But it was remarked to Napoleon that to so important a post he ought to appoint a more distinguished person, one who would seem to indicate the changes he proposed, and the illustrious Carnot was named. He was the type of honest revolutionists, and joined to his anciently acquired merit of having organised the victory of Fructidor, for which he was afterwards proscribed, the additional claim of defender of Antwerp, and author of the "Memoir to the King." No sooner was he named than Napoleon acquiesced in the choice. Carnot had won his heart by asking service in 1814, and by boldly resisting the Restoration; but he feared the republican memories attached to his name; "For," he said, "France is now enamoured of a constitutional monarchy, but she has not ceased to fear a republic."

But as Napoleon was desirous of appointing Carnot to the ministry, he devised a means of avoiding the difficulties attached to his name by giving him the title of count, a recompense he well deserved for his noble conduct at Antwerp.

The police department was not less important than that of the interior, and Napoleon would willingly have reinstated the Duke de Rovigo in his former office, though he had been often importuned by his frankness. But no sooner was his name mentioned than there arose a universal cry, not against the Duke de Rovigo personally, but against the ancient imperial despotism of which he was the living representative. Napoleon did not persist, but received with a very bad grace the name of the Duke d'Otranto, which rose simultaneously to the lips of all present. He considered M. Fouché as something more than a restless intriguer; he saw in him a secret enemy, capable of the most dangerous machinations. He was told in reply, that M. Fouché, besides being a regicide, had become still more

incompatible with the Bourbons, since he had run the risk of imprisonment. "It is possible," replied Napoleon, "that he has quarrelled with the Bourbons, but it is not certain. In any case he has not quarrelled with the Duke d'Orléans, nor with the republic, nor with some fanciful regency of Marie Louise that he has devised, and the plan of which he has been hawking about for the last year." In reply to this, it was said that as the Duke d'Otranto was irrevocably separated from the Bourbons by the blood of Louis XVI., and by the late attempt to arrest him, he might be firmly attached to the empire by the portfolio of police; besides, that he alone possessed sufficient address to guide and restrain the newly awakened parties without offending them; in short, that he was a necessity.

This last merit, the offspring of chance alone, was the only one that Napoleon admitted, and he yielded, but, however, without hoping to receive such important services from M. Fouché as were promised. He felt that it would be dangerous to change him into a declared enemy by refusing him the post he so ardently desired. However, he determined to give him an overseer by appointing his enemy, the Duke de Rovigo, chief of the gendarmerie. He thus rewarded a faithful servant at the same time that he placed him as sentinel on a minister on whose fidelity he could not depend, but whom he was forced to accept.

The chancellor was still to be appointed. Napoleon wished to give this post to Cambacérès, at least for a time, as he alone possessed sufficient tact and authority to influence the magistrates, who, whilst they were disturbed, divided, and discontented by the retrograde policy of the Bourbons, were alarmed by the enterprising genius of Napoleon, and were still hesitating between the different masters to whom they had been subject during the last year. Such a choice was sure to be approved, provided that Napoleon could induce the timid high chancellor to take any part in the government.

The persons whose consent was necessary were at that moment within reach of Napoleon, they were actually in the salon of the Tuileries. He took advantage of the opportunity, and with one exception, did not allow them to leave till they were appointed. MM. Decrès, de Gaëte, and Mollien consented to return to their former posts, where every one expected to see them. The Duke de Vicence, who was even more than usually inclined to augur badly of the future, had not sufficient confidence in the continuance of peace to undertake to maintain it. He consequently resisted Napoleon's entreaties, and left the Tuileries without accepting the direction of foreign affairs. Prince Cambacérès, disgusted with men and things, had no inclination to enter the ministry, which, indeed, for an ancient grand dignitary was a lowering of position. It is true

that under the constitutional government that was announced a responsible minister would be superior to even the ancient dignitaries of the empire. These were not considerations calculated to influence the prince; but he nevertheless yielded through a spirit of obedience and devotedness to Napoleon, and received the title of prince high chancellor, *provisional administrator of justice*.

Napoleon next took Marshal Davout aside, and told him his intentions. The marshal declared himself anxious to be again on active service at the head of the troops, and as a further objection to a ministerial appointment, adduced the little sympathy that existed between him and the soldiers, with whom his severity was proverbial. "It is exactly that severity," said Napoleon, "joined to your well-known probity of which I have need. For the last year the army has been deteriorated by gifts. The Bourbons have lavished promotion. All those, and they are not few, who have adopted my cause, will expect to be favoured in their turn, and will be no less avaricious than the others. I must have an inflexible minister whose impartial justice, influenced alone by zeal for the public welfare, cannot be accused of any tendency to royalism. Your position places you above suspicion, and you can render me important services that I cannot expect from any one else." As the marshal still objected, Napoleon added, "You are a man on whom I can depend, I may tell you everything. I have allowed it to be believed that I am in treaty with some of the European powers, and above all, that I have secret communications with my father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria. There is nothing of the kind. I am alone, alone against all Europe. I expect to find the entire continent united and implacable. We must fight to the death, and consequently make formidable preparations within the next three months. I must have a minister as indefatigable as honest, and besides, when I set out for the army, I must leave in Paris a man to whom I can safely entrust unlimited authority. You see that we cannot consult our tastes, but only conquer or die. Our very existence depends on it." After hearing these frank and energetic words, Marshal Davout obeyed in a soldier-like spirit, and accepted his appointment as minister, exchanging with Napoleon a warm clasp of the hand.

Napoleon then entered into conversation with the Duke de Rovigo, and with his wonted tact spoke of the ministry of police in such a manner as to induce him to refuse it. In fact, this faithful servant saw that he could no longer undertake the office, and stated the reasons himself which would prevent his accepting it. Napoleon, affecting to yield to his wishes, gave him the command of the gendarmerie, and put himself consequently under the surveillance of M. Fouché. Lastly, Napoleon spoke in

private with the Duke d'Otranto. And will it be believed, that the latter did not wish to become minister of police, an office for which he was so well suited, but wished to be appointed minister of foreign affairs? M. de Talleyrand had acted as intermediary between the Bourbons and Europe; M. Fouché wished to fill the same post with regard to Napoleon. He had the presumption to believe that he would be able, by his intrigues abroad, either to reconcile the European powers with Napoleon, or if that were impossible, induce them to accept some one that he would choose, Marie Louise, the Duke d'Orléans, or somebody else. He imagined that this would be the surest path to the high position to which he aspired ever since the era of revolutions had recommenced. He had therefore the boldness to insinuate that he would be more useful abroad than at home. Napoleon read M. Fouché's boundless vanity at a glance, but did not laugh, for misfortune had taught him self-restraint. He excused himself for not being able to place him at the head of foreign affairs, by mentioning the Duke de Vicence, before whose claims all others should withdraw. He then spoke most graciously of the services that he could render in the ministry of police, which post M. Fouché accepted when he saw that he could not obtain any other.

It only remained to obtain the consent of the future minister of the interior. But the eccentric Carnot was not at the Tuileries. As he lived alone in one of the suburbs of Paris, and had no knowledge of public events but from common report, he was still ignorant of Napoleon's arrival. It was late, and Napoleon desired that he should be summoned for the next morning.

Thus ended the 20th of March, a day that had commenced in the forest of Fontainebleau, and ended at Paris with the formation of a ministry in the midst of the old imperial court. It was decided that the *Moniteur* should announce on the following day the appointments that had been made, with the exception of those of M. Carnot and M. de Caulaincourt. M. de Bassano, ever devoted to the emperor, resumed his old position of secretary of State; M. Lavalette returned to the post-office; and the former presidents of the Council of State were restored to their posts.

The following day, the 21st, after a few hours' repose, Napoleon resumed that active correspondence by means of which he imparted such vitality to the springs of government. He first traced out for Marshal Davout the plan by which he could discharge the functions of an office which approaching events would render so important. He ordered him to proclaim throughout France, either by telegraph or express, the events of the 20th of March, in order that the troops and local authorities that had not yet declared their opinions might come to a

decision. He desired him to send active and intelligent officers into those departments where the prefects were likely to resist the re-establishment of the empire, that the troops might be used against them; to despatch orders to the governors of frontier fortresses to hoist the tricolor flag, and close the gates against the enemy who might be tempted to take them by surprise. He ordered the minister of police to turn his attention immediately to the prefects and sub-prefects, and retain them in their office or dismiss them according to their behaviour; and the Duke de Rovigo, the new commander of the gendarmerie, was ordered to assume as soon as possible the command of a troop so valuable by its intelligence, vigilance, and devotion to its duties. He sent for the Count de Lobau, whose good sense, tact, and influence with the army were well known, and conferred on him the command of Paris and of the troops that would pass through it. This was an arrangement worthy of Napoleon's vast intelligence. The revolution that had replaced him on the throne was a strictly military one. The greater number of regiments had declared for him in presence of officers, some of whom, though devoted to his cause, were undecided how to act, and others, though but few, who were hostile to his cause. Against the latter the soldiers were in a state of revolt, which it was necessary to terminate at once, in order to avoid falling into a state of absolute anarchy. The Count de Lobau was admirably well chosen to put an end to such a state of things. Besides the command of the first military division, Napoleon gave him dictatorial authority over the troops passing through the capital, with permission to change the officers or reconcile them with their soldiers, and to restore order and discipline in the army. Napoleon's plan was to bring almost every regiment successively to Paris, at least for some days, that they might all pass under the gentle but firm hand of Lobau. He advised him to commence the revision at once, for out of the fifteen or twenty thousand actually in the capital, and the almost equal number about to arrive, it was necessary to select twenty thousand to send to Lille to oppose either any royalist attempt on the part of the fugitive princes, or any possible though improbable attack of the Anglo-Dutch army quartered in Belgium.

The precautions which it was necessary to take in this direction gave rise to a question which, though of no weight with Napoleon, he discussed on this morning with the new minister of war. Ought he, as some critics * have since asserted, to

* This remark is directed against Marshal Marmont, who, with his usual thoughtlessness, has asserted, in his Memoirs, that Napoleon ought not to have stopped at Paris, but profiting by the general enthusiasm, have advanced to the Rhine. It will be seen by what follows that his opinion was rash, and void both of reason and knowledge of the existing state of things.

have continued his triumphal march towards the north, and carry even to the banks of the Rhine the revolution that he had effected from the Loire to the Seine, and thus at a single blow recover the ancient frontiers of France at the same time that he recovered France herself? The plan looked alluring, for amidst the prevailing enthusiasm, he was certain to meet no obstacle as far as Lille, and might flatter himself to be able to overcome all that he should meet from Lille to Cologne. But however dazzling such a project might be, it could not for an instant shake his newly acquired but deep-rooted prudence.

In the first place, as Napoleon was advancing towards Paris, he had received information from the south which, though not alarming, deserved attention. He was told, as was true, that Marseilles was in a state of excitement, and that the people of Lower Provence were advancing towards Grenoble and Lyon under the command of the Duke d'Angoulême. On the morning of the 21st, news came from Bordeaux and the west. It was announced that under the influence of the Duchess d'Angoulême, Bordeaux, imitating the example of Marseilles, was attempting to excite the departments beyond the Garonne to revolt, and was not unlikely to succeed; that the Duke de Bourbon, who was at Angers, was encouraging a rising in La Vendée; that Marshal St. Cyr, endowed with extraordinary powers by Louis XVIII., had hastened to Orleans, whence he had banished the tricolored cockade assumed by the troops at the instigation of General Pajol; that he had caused this general to be arrested, and had again hoisted the white flag on the banks of the Loire. And lastly, he was told, which was of more importance, that he could not trust the Parisian national guard. This guard, composed of citizens of the capital, were not glad to see the fall of the constitutional throne of Louis XVIII., and dreaded war beyond everything else. If the disposition of the Parisian national guard could be deduced from the expressions of some of the officers, there was every reason to suspect them of hostile intentions.

In all this there was no cause of serious uneasiness to a mind so firm as Napoleon's. He was well acquainted with the good sense of the national guards of Paris, and knew that though discontented at the first moment, they would soon join him when told of his pacific and liberal intentions, especially when he would have removed some officers who wished to make a noise and render themselves of importance. As to the royalist attempts in the west and south, he was convinced they would be counteracted by the effects of his entrance into Paris; but in any case, he could not believe that the Bourbons, who were not able to resist him when masters of Paris, could now, fugitives at the very extremity of the kingdom, influence troops

that failed them when in possession of the entire sovereign authority. However, it would have been giving them too great a chance to withdraw from the capital before taking firm hold of the reins of government, or to hasten rashly through Belgium and the Rhenish provinces with the only organised troops that were at his disposal, and leave at Paris only ministers that had been appointed but the day before, and some dispersed and disorganised regiments, and expose himself to the risk of seeing the Bourbon authority, which he had overturned on his way, recover existence in his rear. But then there were still more important objections to be made to such a project.

In the first place, it would not be possible, in collecting all the disposable troops between Paris and Lille, to assemble more than 25,000 or 30,000 infantry, 4000 or 5000 cavalry, and fifty or sixty pieces of badly mounted artillery. Was it known in what state Belgium would be found? The people would be certainly well disposed towards us, but the troops would be faithful to their sovereign, and three or four times more numerous than those we could bring with us. There were, in fact, in the environs of Brussels 20,000 Hollando-Belgians, 30,000 English and Hanoverians, whom we in marching on Liège would throw back on 30,000 Prussians. We would thus find ourselves in presence of 80,000 enemies, whilst our troops amounted to only 30,000 or 36,000. A little further on were 20,000 Prussians, 18,000 Bavarians, 20,000 or 30,000 Wurtembergers, Badeners, Hessians, &c., &c.; and on arriving at the Rhine, we should have found ourselves opposed by 140,000 or 150,000 enemies. This would be going a distance to seek a defeat which, only possible on the Meuse, was almost certain on the Rhine. Our forces would become more scattered, when they were only too much so already; the difficulty of reorganising the army, already very great, would be increased by carrying its empty *cadres* from Lille, Mezières, and Nancy to Cologne, Coblenz, and Mentz. Besides, throwing the allied forces back one upon the other would be to defeat the plan on which Napoleon founded his greatest hopes, and which consisted of profiting by the dispersion of his adversaries, to throw himself into the midst of them, and conquer them in detail. And lastly, and above all, by commencing hostilities at once, he would lose those three months which he was certain of having at his disposal by not taking the initiative, three months of more importance to us than to the enemy, for they had something whilst we had nothing, and these three months, employed as Napoleon knew well how, would serve to compensate for the immense disparity between the French forces and those of allied Europe.

As yet we have not spoken of Napoleon's new position with regard to France, which was indeed one of the most difficult imaginable, and absolutely forbade all immediate operations beyond the frontiers.

In what character did Napoleon appear when he landed at Cannes? As a liberator who was come to free France from the emigrants, but not to attack either her liberty or peace. Peace and liberty were the two words that pervaded his speeches from the time he left Grenoble. It was easy to pronounce the words, but not so easy to gain credence for them. To attain this, he had constantly declared, and even written to Vienna, from the different towns through which he passed, that he accepted the Treaty of Paris, and would observe it faithfully, though he had not signed it. This declaration was most agreeable to all who heard it, for they saw that if there were any chance of preserving peace, it was by the immediate announcement of his readiness to accept the arrangement of the powers, that is, the old frontier of 1789, a little extended towards Landau and Chambéry. Now, if on the very day after his arrival at Paris he had advanced at one bound to the Meuse and the Rhine, he would necessarily be looked on as the same man who had led the fortunes of France to Moscow, and brought them back by Leipsic to the heights of Montmartre; he would be again looked on as the conqueror, and if the conqueror, the despot, who had destroyed the country and her greatness. Morally speaking, not one would take his part; and as for material aid, he would be supported by some skeleton regiments stationed on the remote Rhine, where the difficulty of recruiting them would be tripled.

If, therefore, to military and administrative motives be added political reasons, it may be affirmed that there was not only good cause, but even an absolute and indisputable necessity, for his remaining at Paris.

Napoleon's determination was therefore taken. Having arrived at the capital of the empire, he resolved to seize the reins of government, and make proposals of peace to the powers, proposals based on the Treaties of Paris and Vienna; he was resolved to endure the humiliating refusals to which in all probability he exposed himself, which refusals, far from concealing, he would announce publicly, in order to enlist the national pride on his side; he would profit by the delay caused by these conferences to collect troops with his usual activity; he would keep his forces between the capital and the northern frontier, to facilitate his operations; then while he affected the most perfect inaction, he would suddenly descend on the enemy and appear unexpectedly in the midst of their dispersed cantonments. These were sensible, solid ideas, worthy of the military and administrative genius of Napoleon.

Having entrusted the Count de Lobau with the task of assembling the troops actually in Paris, or that were to arrive there, he ordered him to inspect them rapidly, and to restore union and discipline in the regiments. He ordered him to raise immediately a body of 20,000 men, to be commanded by the brave and sensible General Reille, who was to advance to Lille, where it was said that Louis XVIII. intended to fix himself with his household troops, and perhaps a reinforcement of foreign soldiers. Fortunately Marshal Mortier commanded at Lille under the superior command of the Duke d'Orléans. There was no doubt but that the marshal, though he would receive Louis XVIII. as was his duty, would refuse admittance to Prussian or English forces, and that the Duke d'Orléans would be guided by Marshal Mortier, and that consequently Lille, though it might afford a temporary resting-place to Louis XVIII., would not be given up to the enemy. However, not only this fortress, but all those along the northern frontier, should be watched, and this General Reille could do with the 20,000 or 30,000 men that would be successively placed under his orders. As General Reille could not be ready for three or four days, Napoleon ordered General Exelmans to collect all the available cavalry at once, and follow the fugitive court with 3000 horse. General Exelmans' orders were merely to use every possible means of getting this court out of the kingdom, with as little violence as possible, except perhaps getting possession of the little treasury of Louis XVIII. and the crown diamonds, that were packed in his travelling waggons. It was certain that General Exelmans, notwithstanding his personal wrongs, would not use unnecessary rigour in the execution of his orders, and this was what Napoleon wished, as he considered it due to himself that his conduct should contrast strongly with that of those who had set a price upon his head.

Before deciding anything with regard to the south, he wished to know the exact state of affairs in that quarter. Besides, he would require time to collect other troops independent of those that were to be given to General Reille, at the same time that the state of public feeling at Lyon and Grenoble gave him full security as to anything that would be attempted on that side. As to the west, he sent an officer to Orleans with orders to Marshal St. Cyr to restore the command to General Pajol, under threats of the most severe punishment; and he sent General Clausel to Bordeaux, with orders to proceed thither with all the troops he could collect on his route, and expel the Duchess d'Angoulême from the town, who, all respectable as she was, could not become a very important enemy.

The morning of the 21st being spent in these necessary arrangements, he employed the remainder of the day in reviewing

the troops that were in Paris, together with those that had followed him from Grenoble, and those that had time to come from Fontainebleau. This afforded him an opportunity of showing himself to the Parisians who had not seen him yet, and to give utterance to sentiments which, not being restricted to the circle of his private conversations, might be re-echoed from Paris throughout Europe.

On the Place du Carrousel were assembled about 25,000 men, consisting of those troops that had come from Grenoble to Fontainebleau, those of the camp of Villejuif, and especially of the battalion from the island of Elba, which in twenty days had achieved the prodigious march of 240 leagues on foot. The Parisian national guard had not been summoned, because some of the officers should be changed before the guard could appear on an occasion that celebrated the re-establishment of the empire. But the populace hastened thither, and of course, amongst the most zealous were to be found those who hated the emigrants, those who always admired the imperial glory, and many prompted by curiosity, whom the wonderful expedition from the island of Elba had roused from their indifference. Indeed, any government, however poorly supported, can get up a brilliant festival, for every government has its partisans, who will be present on such occasions, whilst its adversaries are absent, and partisans applaud so loudly that one may be induced to believe it the universal cry of the citizens. Besides, in the present case, the events which had just taken place were sufficient to excite the coldest-hearted people. The inhabitants of the suburbs came to the Place du Carrousel to applaud the man who possessed in a higher degree than any other the power of influencing their imaginations, and especially to cheer those 800 grenadiers and chasseurs of the guard who, having accompanied their general into exile, had brought him back triumphant, to place him on the throne of France. These old soldiers, covered with wounds, exhausted from fatigue, and with their shoes in tatters, produced the most lively impression on all present, and many amongst them replied, not with cheers, but tears, to the applause of the crowd. The earnest gaze of the spectators was turned from them only to seek the popular redingote of that wondrous man who had just accomplished a miracle worthy of his former fame. They perceived that he had become fatter, but his complexion was embrowned, which counteracted the effect of his increased stoutness; and his genius-lighted eye still glanced, as ever, keenly round.

He ordered the troops to form a serried mass around his horse, with the officers in front, and then, with his sonorous voice, addressed to them a few passionate and energetic words. "Soldiers," he said, "I have returned to France with 800 men,

because I calculated on the love of the people, and the recollections of the army. I have not been mistaken. Soldiers, I thank you. The glory we have won is yours and the people's. Mine is to have known and understood you. The throne of the Bourbons was illegitimate, because that, having been overturned twenty years ago by the nation, it was restored by the hands of foreigners, and only offered the guarantees of an arrogant minority, whose pretensions were opposed to your rights. The imperial throne can alone guarantee the interests of the nation, and the noblest of these interests, your glory. Soldiers, we are about to march for the purpose of expelling from France those princes who have been the accomplices and instruments of our enemies, and having arrived at the frontier, we shall pause there. We do not wish to meddle in the affairs of other nations, and woe to those who would attempt to meddle with ours!"

Then calling forward the soldiers of the Elba battalion, Napoleon resumed: "Soldiers, behold the officers who accompanied me in my misfortunes! they are all my friends: they are dear to my heart! Every time I looked at them I fancied I beheld the entire army; for amongst these 800 heroes each regiment finds a representative. Their presence reminded me of those immortal victories that can never be effaced from your memory or from mine. In loving them, it was you I loved! They have brought back to you intact, and still glorious, those eagles that treason had for a moment veiled with a funeral crape. Soldiers, I restore them to you. Swear that you will follow whithersoever the interests of France may call them."

"We swear!" replied the soldiers, waving their bayonets and brandishing their swords.

The emotion excited was great, because the sentiments to which Napoleon appealed were deep-seated in the breasts of the men who listened to his impassioned discourse. Napoleon returned to the palace attended by a multitude of persons. His looks were animated, and he seemed, as it were, haloed by a new prestige. The high functionaries who had not presented themselves the previous evening, either because they were not aware of Napoleon's arrival, or because they still hesitated as to the line of conduct they should adopt, appeared on the 21st; and the emperor was in some sort universally recognised and proclaimed. Carnot, torn from his retreat, had arrived at the Tuileries, and influenced by a sentiment shared in by all his friends—that of combining with Napoleon to defend in common the cause of the Revolution—had accepted the office of minister of the interior. He did not like the title of count; but the gravity of public affairs did not allow him to make a difficulty about it. The Duke de Vicence accepted, in like manner, the

office of minister of foreign affairs. Napoleon's ministry now formed, he immediately set about his immense task.

Whilst Napoleon was engaged in these primary cares, Louis XVIII. had continued his retreat to Lille. As we have seen, the ultra-royalists had endeavoured to draw him into Vendée, whilst the moderate royalists, anxious to conciliate the feelings of France, had wished to bring him to Lille, in order that he might witness, without passing the frontier, the struggle that was about to take place between Europe and the revived empire. Having no great faith in the shelter that a French city might afford him, and disliking an abode in Belgium, Louis XVIII. preferred the country where during six years he had enjoyed perfect repose. Finding himself, as soon as he had passed St. Denis, freed from fools and sages, he had followed his inclination, and taken the route to Abbeville, which led to Calais, and from Calais to London.

Meanwhile, the Count d'Artois and the Duke de Berry, who remained at the head of the household troops, had marched at the head of the infantry towards Beauvais. Nothing could be more mournful than the picture presented by the household troops at this moment. Composed of men devoted to the royal cause, but for the most part unaccustomed to military duty, and inadequately equipped, the household troops formed a long line of stragglers, who, for want of horses, had placed themselves and their baggage on carts. The company of bodyguards commanded by Marshal Marmont was alone properly organised. This company was composed of carefully selected old soldiers, well fed and well clad, as the troops confided to the marshal generally were. The others presented a most sad and desolate appearance. But the troops assembled at St. Denis presented a still more mournful aspect.

We have already said, that in order to conceal the approaching departure of the royal family, the troops intended for the army at Melun had to be sent on to Villejuif; but the king having left without encountering any opposition, the troops had received orders to fall back upon St. Denis. They had not obeyed, as we have seen, and only a very small number of those who had been sent to St. Denis appeared there. Amongst those were a great portion of the artillery, a battalion of half-pay officers, and some young law students who had followed Louis XVIII. under the name of royal volunteers, and who represented the virtuous youth of the country, that hoped for liberty from the Bourbons, and did not expect it from the Bonapartes. Marshal Macdonald had repaired to St. Denis to collect these débris, and conduct them to Louis XVIII.; but having arrived on the afternoon of the 20th, he found the battalion of half-pay officers in open revolt, and endeavouring to

induce the artillery to join them, and even pillaging the baggage of the royal cortège. The marshal tried to stop this scandal, but though personally respected, he was obliged to withdraw and rejoin the household troops whom he met *en marche*, and in the state we have described. He afterwards left the Count d'Artois and the Duke de Berry, to join the king, and try to persuade him to follow the advice he had constantly given, of retiring to Lille.

Having arrived on the evening of the 21st at Abbeville, he presented himself to the king, with whom he found M. de Blacas and Prince Berthier. His majesty was perfectly calm, and seemed to feel more sensibly the inconveniences attendant on his abrupt removal from his home comforts than the loss of the throne. Entertaining but little hope, attributing his fresh misfortunes to his brother and the other emigrants, and convinced that Europe would take very little interest in people who had not known how to take care of their own affairs, Louis XVIII. was more anxious to return to his asylum at Hartwell than solicitous by a prudent line of conduct to redeem a future that promised so little. He spoke only of the fatigue he experienced, of his gout, of the annoyances to which the loss of his baggage exposed him, and listened with an absent air to all the marshal said to induce him to return to the Lille route.

This brave and prudent soldier, who combined with great personal bravery and vast military experience sound political sense, reminded the king of the bad effect produced by the compliments he had paid the prince-regent on leaving London, and the reproach universally addressed to the Bourbons of preferring foreign countries to France, and particularly England to every other country. He pointed out the disadvantage of justifying these prejudices by showing so great a desire to cross the frontier, and to cross it in order to reach London. He insisted pertinaciously that the king should retire to Lille, and should remain at least on the extreme verge of France. At Lille he would be in safety, and in case of necessity, need only travel two or three leagues to get outside the limits of the French territory.

Louis XVIII. replied, very appositely, that he would not be safer at Lille than elsewhere, because there was need of a garrison, and that every garrison would act as the troops whose services he had endeavoured to secure had already done, and that to summon the English or the Prussians to Lille would be in the eyes of France the worst of all proceedings. But the king set a proper value on the remarks of so loyal a servant as Marshal Macdonald, and consented to follow his advice. He only asked time to take a little refreshment; and requested the marshal to precede, promising to join him in a few hours.

During this interview the marshal alone had spoken. M. de Blacas, who thought each alternative equally objectionable, had scarcely made an observation, though it was evident that he preferred the proposal of going to Lille. The unfortunate Berthier, as astonished to find himself where he was as the public was to see him there, betrayed, in his dejected and mournful countenance, the perplexity of his mind. Thus was an honest man bitterly punished for his desire of being on good terms with every régime, and spite of his antecedents, wishing to hold office under every government.

Marshal Macdonald immediately took the road to Béthune, in order to announce the approach of the royal family at Lille. He arrived on the morning of the 22nd of March before this town, which was occupied by the Duke d'Orléans, who had ordered the gates to be closed. We have said that this prince had been put in command of the troops in the north, with directions to form a reserve of them, and support the Duke de Berry's left, should an engagement take place before Paris, and to cover the retreat of the royal family should they be obliged to abandon the capital. This prince, the only member of the royal family who was at all popular with the troops, had found them quiet, but evidently ill disposed towards the royal cause. He had taken the precaution to keep the soldiers separated, in order to retard the manifestation of their sentiments. He had sent to Lille those whose sense of discipline seemed least shaken, and had shut himself up in this town with six or seven thousand men and Marshal Mortier, who was also determined to give the king shelter at Lille, but to refuse access to the Prussians and English. Having learned, on the morning of the 21st, by telegraph, that Napoleon had entered Paris, he had forbidden all external communication, with the twofold intention of preventing Bonaparte emissaries from entering the city, and the soldiers from deserting.

The orders of the Duke d'Orléans had been so punctually executed that the keys of the town had been deposited with the staff, and the keepers of the keys being absent, there was no one to answer a summons. Marshal Macdonald, not knowing how to make himself heard, was obliged to write a note with a pencil, fasten it to a stone, and fling it to the sentinel that guarded the rampart. As the marshal announced himself on the superscription, the sentinel sent the note to the nearest post, whence it was forwarded to the staff. The gates were soon opened, and the marshal was conducted to the Duke d'Orléans, who informed him of the true state of things, and told him that the king would receive a short but respectful hospitality from the troops, on the express condition that he would not attempt to introduce into the town either the English or the household troops.

Louis XVIII. arrived in the afternoon, and was received with all the honours due to a sovereign. The pious and loyal population of Lille uttered loud cries of *Vive le Roi!* whilst the troops, drawn up in line, and presenting arms, observed a sullen silence.

No sooner had Louis XVIII. arrived at Lille than he wished to learn from the prince and the marshals the line of conduct he ought to follow. In presence of the king, M. de Blacas, Prince Berthier, and Marshals Macdonald and Mortier, the Duke d'Orléans, with perspicacity of thought and language, showed the exact position of affairs. He very much commended Marshal Macdonald for having advised the king to remain as long as possible on French soil; but he showed at the same time that the city of Lille would not be habitable more than a few hours, and that the spectacle before their eyes of a population clamorously sympathetic and troops coldly respectful was the true expression of the position of affairs. He added that the troops were masters of Lille, and would not permit the slightest annoyance to be offered to the king; that it was a point of honour with them; but that they were impressed with the idea that the royalists were inclined to give up the town to the English; and that, influenced by this feeling of distrust, they would never consent to allow the household troops to enter, still less would they submit to leave the city, supposing that a wish were entertained to get rid of them. And even if the royal party succeeded in removing the troops, it was not with 1200 men of the national guard and 3000 or 4000 limping cavalry of the household troops that a fortress could be defended, where at least 12,000 of the best infantry would be required to make a proper defence. Besides, the troops would for some days be content to form the guard of the king, but would not wish to fill that office long; that the wisest determination would be to go to Dunkirk, whose population was as loyal as that of Lille; that a small garrison would suffice there, which the household troops, converted into infantry, would supply; that at Dunkirk there was the neighbourhood and proximity to England in case of need. Another advantage resulting from this choice, independent of being still on French soil, was, that the king would be further removed from the theatre of war, and would probably retain in his party Calais, Ardres, Gravelines, which would furnish an opportunity of supporting a few ships; that in this way a little maritime kingdom would be formed, where the white flag would continue to float, without any appearance of complicity with the foreign flag that was about to invade France.

Marshal Mortier warmly supported these prudent counsels, Prince Berthier offered no opposition, and M. de Blacas approved.

Marshal Macdonald, in adopting the project, raised an objection on only one point—the precipitation of the movement, which would give the king the appearance of a fugitive, either a prey to fear, or expelled from Lille. The Duke d'Orléans replied, that they were twenty-five leagues distant from Dunkirk, and that what was very easy of accomplishment on that day might be difficult on the next; whereupon the counsel that advised immediate departure seemed to prevail; but the extreme weariness of the king called for some hours' rest.

Orders were given that preparations should be made for the departure of the royal family; but the king, fatigued and perplexed, deferred it to the morrow. The Duke d'Orléans and the marshals employed the remainder of the day in visiting the troops and speaking to them. "The king is safe amongst us," replied the officers; "but we know that the emigrants by whom the king is surrounded intend to deliver up the place to the enemy. And if the household troops appear before the town we shall fire upon them."

Spite of every assurance to the contrary, it was impossible to dispel these prejudices; and what contributed to enroot them still more in the minds of the troops were the remarks of the king's attendants, who said it would be better to put an end to the comedy of an affected respect for the sovereign's person, which only covered an approaching treason, and that the simpler proceeding would be to introduce ten thousand English into the place. These imprudent observations obtained credence, and the assertions of the Duke d'Orléans were regarded as the offspring of his credulity. It became evident that the royal party could scarcely pass a day or two in this equivocal position.

The following day, the 23rd, there was a false alarm. Some couriers having appeared within sight of the Lille ramparts, a report was circulated that it was the king's household troops that were approaching. The troops in the town became immediately very much excited, and declared that they were determined to fire on the newcomers. The Duke d'Orléans and the marshals found great difficulty in appeasing them, and they appeared still convinced that the place was about to be given up to the English. In a town where such feelings prevailed, it was impossible for the king to remain longer. The Duke d'Orléans, M. de Blacas, and Marshals Berthier, Macdonald, and Mortier, with whom the king had consulted on the previous evening, were summoned in the morning, and unanimously recognised the necessity of quitting a city guarded by troops who treated Louis XVIII. with respect, but who were devoted to Napoleon, and who were ready at the first opportunity to proclaim the imperial authority. There was no difference of opinion except as to the place whither the king ought to retreat.

The Duke d'Orléans, supported by the three marshals, again strongly recommended Dunkirk. The king did not reject this advice, but said that in the actual state of things he thought it would be dangerous to travel twenty-five leagues on the French frontier; and announced his intention of first taking the Belgian route, and perhaps journey to Dunkirk through Belgium. The Duke d'Orléans advanced many reasons for not abandoning, even for a moment, the native soil; but these producing no effect on the king, Marshal Macdonald, in a respectful but firm tone, declared that, to his great regret, he would be obliged to leave his majesty; that he would never emigrate, especially to a country filled with the allied troops. He added that he had been faithful to the king so long as his majesty remained in France, but that he could not accompany him beyond the frontiers, neither would he offer his sword to the man who had come to disturb the public peace, but that he would await in retirement the dawn of happier days. Louis XVIII. listened with perfect politeness to this frank declaration, thanked the marshal for his noble conduct, freed him from his oath, and bade him an affectionate adieu. Marshal Mortier spoke in the same tone, received the same reply and the same testimonies of regard, and announced that with Marshal Macdonald he would accompany the king to the frontiers. Prince Berthier was silent; but taking Marshals Macdonald and Mortier aside, he told them that, as captain of a company of the bodyguards, he was obliged to accompany the king to the place of his retreat; and that when he should have fulfilled his duty, he would return to France. He even desired them to announce his intentions at Paris. The king, turning to the Duke d'Orléans, asked him, in a pointedly sarcastic manner, what he intended to do. The duke replied coolly, that he entertained the same opinion as the marshals, but that, as prince of the blood, he could not pursue the same line of conduct—that is to say, he could not remain in France; that he would accompany the king to the frontier, and then ask permission to leave him, as he did not wish to go into Belgium, where the adverse armies were assembled. The king, in a tranquil tone, said he did well, and gave orders for his immediate departure.

On the afternoon of the 23rd, Louis XVIII. left Lille, and directed his course towards Belgium. The populace expressed intense regret; the troops observed a respectful demeanour, but appeared much relieved at being freed from so embarrassing a deposit. The Duke d'Orléans and the marshals escorted the carriage of the king on horseback to the frontiers, a distance of about two leagues. There they received his thanks, made their adieux, and returned to Lille for the purpose of surrendering their command. The Duke d'Orléans wrote to all the generals

under his command, releasing them from their military obligations, and restoring them to themselves and their country. Marshal Mortier then informed him of a circumstance which he had had the delicacy to keep secret, which was, that he had received from Paris powers and orders to act as he should think most advisable for the defence of the frontier, for the expulsion of the Bourbon princes, and even for their arrest should it appear necessary. The marshal had not wished to embarrass the princes, nor even to hasten their departure by declaring the new duties that had been imposed on him by one who was again become master of France, and he only made the announcement when their determination was taken and even being put into execution. The Duke d'Orléans set out for England, Marshal Macdonald for his country seat, and Marshal Mortier sent intelligence to Paris, by telegraph, that Louis XVIII. had left Lille, and that the place was not and never had been in danger. He transmitted the command to General the Count d'Erlon, who had been obliged to conceal himself since the affair of the brothers Lallemand. Amidst these sudden revolutions, which disturb and often mislead the most upright, it becomes a pleasing task to the historian to record scenes where everybody, princes, marshals, soldiers, all, fulfilled duties that appeared almost conflicting, with delicacy and exactitude.

Meanwhile, the king's household troops, worn out with fatigue, had dragged themselves as far as Abbeville, having at their head the Count d'Artois and the Duke de Berry; and close on their heels, General Exelmans, with three thousand cavalry, who watched their progress without attempting to molest them. From Abbeville they advanced towards Lille; but having on the way learned the king's departure, they directed their course to Béthune. There the princes became fully aware of the impossibility of leading these troops into a foreign land and supporting them there; they therefore resolved to dismiss them. Three hundred men, fit for service, were retained. The support of these was not beyond the means of the royal family; they accordingly accompanied Marshal Marmont into Belgium, where they were to form the bodyguard of Louis XVIII. The others took their way in different directions. The princes crossed the frontier with the intention of joining the king.

Whilst Louis XVIII. thus evacuated France, and put a term to the very slight uneasiness that was felt at Paris concerning the northern provinces, affairs wore an equally tranquil aspect in the east. Marshal Victor, who had been ordered to organise a *corps d'armée* in Champagne and Lorraine, had been obliged to abandon the undertaking. Marshal Oudinot, abandoned by

the grenadiers and chasseurs royaux—the ancient imperial guard—had also abandoned his command, and had seen in every direction the tricolor flag waving. The old imperial guard had advanced spontaneously towards Paris. In Alsace, Marshal Suchet, bowing before the revolution that had taken place, had hoisted the tricolor flag throughout the province, and put our frontier fortresses in a state of defence against external foes. We have already described what had occurred between Grenoble and Besançon; consequently any uneasiness that might be felt about the fortresses was nowhere realised, and the enemy, spite of their desire, had not been able to surprise any.

In the interior, the progress of the imperial authority was neither less general nor less rapid. Marshal St. Cyr, who had left Paris on the 20th of March with M. de Vitrolles, had repaired to Orleans, where General Dupont commanded. Finding the troops in a state of demi-revolt, he had ordered the gates to be closed, the tricolor flag to be pulled down, and General Pajol, the author of the movement, to be thrown into prison. But some officers who had been sent from Paris having found admission into the city, and entered into communication with the 1st cuirassiers, who were garrisoned at Orleans, that regiment spontaneously mounted their horses, attacked the prison, set General Pajol at liberty, and put to flight Marshal St. Cyr, who retired in great haste towards the Lower Loire. General Pajol then took the command, and ordered the re-establishment of the imperial authority to be proclaimed at Orleans and in the environs.

This important portion of the Loire was thus reconquered. At Angers, the Duke de Bourbon, after a conversation with M. d'Autichamp and the principal Vendean chiefs, had arrived at the conclusion that if the ancient agitators of Vendée were disposed to resume their former practices, the inhabitants of the country districts, though royalists, no longer possessed the ardour that would induce them to brave the horrors of a civil war, of which they retained a painful recollection. Feeling that his presence was more embarrassing to the people than useful to the royal cause, the prince had followed the advice unanimously given to him, and withdrew. Commandant Noireau, an officer of gendarmerie, having learned the state of affairs, offered him passports, on condition that he would make use of them immediately. The prince without hesitation accepted the offer. He embarked at Nantes, and left the district, not restored to Napoleon, but in a peaceful disposition.

General Clausel, who had been sent to the Gironde, had stopped at Angoulême, and there, in the emperor's name, received the submission of the neighbouring departments; then calling together a portion of the gendarmerie, he marched to

the Dordogne to assemble the troops, and fulfil his mission with regard to the city of Bordeaux.

This city was in a state of terrible agitation, owing to the presence of the Duchess d'Angoulême, and of MM. Lainé and de Vitrolles. The population, royalist through interest and through conviction, were plunged in grief by Napoleon's return, which implied a fresh blockade of the ports. They consequently rose at sight of the Duchess d'Angoulême, who had come with the prince, her husband, to celebrate the 12th of March, and promised to support the Bourbon cause. These warm demonstrations of feeling took place in presence of two regiments, the 8th and the 62nd of the line, then garrisoned at Bordeaux, and who witnessed this scene in a rather alarming silence. There was every reason to believe that at the first appearance of the tricolor flag, displayed on the right bank of the Gironde, the troops would declare their sentiments and suppress a vapoury insurrection.

M. de Vitrolles having communicated the king's intentions to the princess, took his departure for Toulouse, in order to make that city the centre of the royal government in the south. He had effected levies of men and money, and acting on his own authority, had placed Marshal Pérignon at the head of the royalist troops, and endeavoured to keep up a correspondence between Bordeaux, where the Duchess d'Angoulême was staying, and Marseilles, whither the Duke d'Angoulême had hurried. The prince arrived at Marseilles, and we may divine, from the spirit that prevailed in that city, to what vehement demonstrations the population gave expression. They had always hated the empire, and now seeing themselves again threatened with starvation, after having fancied rather than enjoyed abundance, they abandoned themselves to a species of fury, and received the Duke d'Angoulême with an almost delirious joy.

Marshal Massena exercised his military command in the midst of this excited people with the disdainful coldness of a soldier who had formerly succeeded in subduing the Calabrians, and who took little heed of the outcries of a mob. As he accompanied the prince on the day of his arrival, a crowd of women of the humbler classes, with children in their arms, flung themselves on their knees before his horse, and cried in the unsophisticated phraseology of the district, "Marshal, don't betray this good prince." He took no notice of these demonstrations, for, not liking either the dynasty that was departing, nor that which was returning, and deploring all the French blood that would flow in consequence of these new convulsions, he was determined to confine himself to the strict observance of his military duties. He had given two regiments, the 83rd and 58th, together with a column of volunteers, to the Duke

d'Angoulême, and with these the prince was to endeavour to recover Grenoble and Lyon, as he ascended the course of the Rhone. Marshal Massena did not accompany him in this expedition, but remained to preserve order at Marseilles, and more especially to watch Toulon, determined to show no mercy to any one that should attempt to give up that great military arsenal to the English.

Such was the state of things in the different parts of France on the 23rd and 24th of March. Napoleon having learned the retreat of Louis XVIII., and the submission of the northern and eastern provinces, became quite satisfied as to the safety of the frontier fortresses; and having no doubt but that La Vendée would submit, at least for the present, he was not at all alarmed by the insurrection in the south, although it extended from Bordeaux to Marseilles. He had only been anxious about the fortresses; for it would have been a great misfortune if such places as Lille, Metz, or Strasburg had fallen into the enemy's hands. Now that he was reassured on this important point, and freed from the king's presence, which at worst would be nothing more than an inconvenience, he considered that he had recovered entire possession of the empire. Could he accommodate his authority to the newly acquired spirit of independence in the people, and could he appease or conquer Europe, he was certain of recommencing a new reign, less brilliant perhaps, but not less prosperous than the former, and certainly more deserving of praise should he be able to substitute the sanguinary magnificence of war for the salutary enjoyments of peace. But he had always entertained doubts, though he did not give them utterance, as to the pacification of Europe, and in reality, he reckoned on a short and vigorous campaign, carried on with the resources which restored France and three hundred thousand soldiers returned from abroad offered to his powerful genius.

He had been but a few days in Paris when he found his sentiments correct; for while all submitted at home, abroad everything assumed an aspect of unprecedented violence. As the Bourbons were about to retire, they had published a most important declaration issued by the Congress of Vienna. At first the authenticity of this document was doubted—a doubt that Napoleon encouraged, because advantageous to him, though, in the resolutions and style, he easily detected the rage of his enemies—a rage he had himself excited by more than fifteen years' abuse of victory. This document declared that the powers assembled at Vienna, considering that Napoleon Bonaparte, by violating the treaty of the 11th April, had destroyed his sole legal claim to existence, and attacked the peace of Europe, they declared him an outlaw—a decree that subjected him to be treated as the meanest criminal. The evident conclusion was,

that whoever could seize his person ought to shoot him immediately, and would be looked on as having rendered an important service to Europe. Such conduct towards a great man, who had certainly disturbed the peace of Europe, but whose power had been flattered and extolled, and whose ambition had been rivalled by every living prince—such conduct, we repeat, was unworthy of the century; and pride, ambition, and terror can alone explain, but cannot justify the act.

Napoleon did not allow this document to be published for some days, waiting until France should be made acquainted with the entire state of affairs. By comparing the declaration of the 13th of March with some other manifestations, he saw the realisation of all that he had foreseen, and the necessity of preparing without a moment's delay for a formidable struggle. Fresh manifestations, the natural consequences of the declaration of the 13th of March, left him no doubt on this point. M. de Caulaincourt had no sooner taken possession of his official residence than the foreign embassies came to demand their passports. Of some, such as the English and Russian, whose heads were absent, the secretaries took it upon themselves to make this demand; but of others, such as Austria, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, Sardinia, Holland, &c., the ambassadors came in person, and persisted in leaving, notwithstanding all M. de Caulaincourt's efforts to retain them. With M. de Vincent, the Austrian ambassador, he had a long conversation, and sought by every means to convince him that France was desirous of peace, and was even determined to adhere to the Treaty of Paris; but it was with difficulty he even obtained a patient hearing, and by no arguments could he persuade the ambassador to take charge of letters from Napoleon to his wife and father-in-law. However, M. de Vincent, anxious to leave Paris at once, consented that one of the secretaries of the Austrian legation, who was to leave a day later, should undertake to deliver the two letters. Napoleon had determined to take a humble tone for the time, but this was a part that M. de Caulaincourt did not wish to overact: he contented himself with stating his master's pacific intentions clearly; and without putting any obstacle to the departure of the representatives of the different courts, he sent them their passports the very day they demanded them.

Though no opposition was made to their departure, M. de Vincent's permission was profited by, and the secretary of the Austrian legation received two letters, one for Marie Louise, and the other for the Emperor Francis. Queen Hortense, who was on the most friendly terms with the officials of the Russian embassy, since Alexander had publicly declared himself her protector, wrote a long letter to that monarch, in which she

endeavoured to give him the most favourable idea of Napoleon's newly acquired intentions, both as regarded his home and foreign policy. This letter she gave to M. de Boutiakin, secretary to the Russian legation, and one of the many foreigners whose goodwill her graceful manners had won for herself, if not for her cause. Through the same channel, Alexander was informed of the secret alliance that was formed on the 3rd of January between Louis XVIII., England, and Austria, against Russia and Prussia. To this were added some papers that M. de Blacas had left at Paris, and which would leave Alexander no doubt of the feelings with which he was regarded by his allies. Queen Hortense took advantage also of the departure of her brother's steward for Vienna to write to several persons there, Marie Louise in particular, and to inform them, in the most glowing terms, of Napoleon's triumphant restoration to the imperial throne, of the people's enthusiastic love for him, and their hatred of the Bourbons, and the consequent necessity Europe was under of avoiding a sanguinary struggle by approving a deed that was now accomplished, and which would neither disturb the peace, nor interfere with the partition that had been made at Vienna of almost all the States of the universe.

Although the departure of the legations wore an unfavourable aspect, it might be accounted for, at least to a certain degree, for though accredited to the court of Louis XVIII., they were not to that of Napoleon. This, indeed, need not have prevented their awaiting fresh powers, but still their eagerness to depart could not be construed into a declaration of war; and it was of the utmost importance that such a declaration should not be anticipated, but rather allow all the blame to fall upon the Congress of Vienna, which was not more popular in Europe than in France. The only way to meet the conduct of the foreign embassies in a dignified and inoffensive manner was to recall the French ambassadors, who could not, in honour, be allowed to remain at the courts of princes who had broken off their connection with us. Besides, these ambassadors were, for the most part, chosen from amongst the emigrants—the implacable enemies of the empire. M. de Caulaincourt addressed a circular to the officials of embassies, in which he announced that their powers were withdrawn, and that they were consequently recalled, and should return immediately. At the same time he authorised them to declare that France would not take the initiative in hostilities with any nation, and would strictly observe all existing treaties.

Nothing else could be said or done in the actual state of things. A different course of action, however, was to be pursued with each court, and some indirect measures to be adopted towards some—measures that could not be neglected whatever

might be the result. For example, the court of Vienna, besides being the seat of the Congress, might be considered in the light of Napoleon's parent court, to which it might not be impossible for him to gain access. It was well known that Austria was discontented with Russia and Prussia, with both of whom she had been inclined to go to war, and that she had often regretted having increased the power of Russia so much. The prospect of having at Paris a son-in-law whom misfortune had corrected, and whom new institutions would restrain, and who would be succeeded by the son of an archduchess, brought up by her with pacific views, was likely to cause serious reflection, and gradually lead Austria to adopt opinions very different from those which dictated the declaration of the 13th of March. There was one man who could make such views effective, and that man was M. de Talleyrand. Could he be won, it would not be impossible to gain over the court of Vienna itself. Napoleon did not yet know how far M. de Talleyrand was pledged to the cause of legitimacy, nor how much he had declined in favour at the Austrian court by yielding to his jealousy of M. de Metternich. In any case, M. de Talleyrand would be a valuable acquisition, and he, it was hoped, might be won by the influence of a singular man, one who was well known in society, though not in politics, who had often been employed in secret negotiations, and who, gifted with rare intelligence and daring, presented one of those contradictory characters that are sometimes met with, and who combine unusual clearness of intellect with irregularity of conduct. This man, who possessed over M. de Talleyrand an influence resulting from his intimate acquaintance with all the secrets of his life, was M. de Montrond; and if there were any one that could succeed in reaching Vienna, and obtaining an audience of M. de Talleyrand, and even carrying off Marie Louise and her son, it certainly was he, with his great tact, his numerous connections, and unparalleled daring. He had been imprisoned at Ham by Napoleon for some satirical remarks; he had escaped, had returned to France with the Bourbons, and was now, from the mere love of adventure, ready to undertake anything, even for the advantage of his old persecutor. It was the Duke d'Otranto, an experienced master in secret diplomacy, who had thought of employing M. de Montrond, and Napoleon, compelled by circumstances, had consented. M. de Caulaincourt entrusted this singular envoy with letters for M. Meneval (who was still with Marie Louise) and several other influential persons. He was authorised to treat on any terms with M. de Talleyrand, M. de Dalberg, and some others. He was also empowered to present himself to Marie Louise, and furnish her with the means for flight if she were disposed for it, and for this purpose he was provided with the necessary credit, that

want of funds might be no restraint on the inexhaustible fertility of his imagination. It was by such obscure paths that Napoleon was compelled to find an entrance to cabinets that he had once domineered and trampled upon. M. de Montrond left at the same time as the couriers that were sent with the circular that recalled our embassies; but foreseeing that he should find all the frontiers impassable, he had procured the passport of an abbé attached to the Roman legation, and so succeeded in deceiving the European authorities and reaching Vienna, which our couriers were not able to do.

Independent of this secret mission, etiquette and policy required that some of our diplomatic agents should not be recalled. M. Serurier, the French minister at the United States, was left at his post, both because America had always been friendly to the empire, and that M. Serurier had discharged his duties with great good sense. The secretaries of the legation at Rome, Switzerland, and Constantinople were ordered to retain their places, and even received the title of *chargé d'affaires*. Now that Switzerland was reconstituted, she appeared jealous of her neutrality—a feeling that was deserving of all consideration from us, as it protected an important portion of our frontier. It was well known that the court of Rome was displeased by the obstinacy of the Bourbons in revoking the Concordat, and she was now promised not alone that her wishes on this point would be gratified, but that the possession of her old dominions, including the Legations, should be guaranteed. M. de Rivière, who had been appointed ambassador at Constantinople by Louis XVIII., was detained at Toulon, and M. Ruffin, our former *chargé d'affaires*, received instructions to flatter Sultan Mahmoud in every possible way. The miraculous return of Napoleon might well be supposed to have impressed the excitable imaginations of the superstitious Turks, and won them back to the imperial cause. Lastly, although M. de Laval was recalled from Madrid, still, as it was known that the two houses of Bourbon had quarrelled because of Mina's being arrested on French ground, an officer was despatched to treat of the exchange of such prisoners as had not yet been restored to their country, and this officer was authorised not to confine himself to the apparent object of his mission. Even should the coalition be general, it was something to have America, Switzerland, the Holy See, Turkey, and Spain neutral, if not friendly.

Napoleon submitted to adopt all these expedients, that he might be able to say to himself that he had not neglected anything, and to prove to France that he had sacrificed all personal pride in order to preserve peace. But it was on his sword alone he counted to conquer the adverse feelings of the European

powers. He consequently profited by the submission of the northern and eastern provinces to turn his attention to the immediate arrangement of his military preparations. Having arrived on the evening of the 20th of March, the very next morning he had requested Marshal Davout to repair to the war office. He pointed out to him the most skilful officials of that vast department, and ordered that they should come to the Tuileries to receive the first orders from himself. As he knew by experience that the formation of the *corps d'armée* was of more importance than recruiting regiments, because the corps once formed, all the rest—men and materials—would follow as a matter of course, he commenced by ordering their formation, and appointing to each a complete staff.

Of the troops that had been cantoned in the department of the Nord he composed the 1st corps, making Lille their headquarters, and Count Drouet d'Erlon their general-in-chief. The troops that had left Paris under the command of General Reille were to constitute the 2nd corps, and to assemble at Valenciennes. This corps was to be the largest, because it was intended to be the first to encounter the forces of the enemy. Although it was Napoleon's intention to commence operations at Maubeuge, he stationed this corps at Valenciennes a little to the left, that he might the better conceal his plan.*

The 3rd, commanded by General Vandamme, and stationed around Mézières, consisted of the troops that had been dispersed through the Ardennes and Champagne. The 4th, under the command of General Gerard, was stationed near Metz, and consisted of the troops of Lorraine. The 5th, intended for General Rapp, was to assemble at Strasburg, and to be formed of the Alsatian regiments.

These different corps possessed the advantage of protecting each of our frontiers, and of being able, from their situation, to aid in a concentration of forces, which Napoleon intended to render both rapid and unexpected by means of combinations of which we shall speak in their proper place. He had already decided that Maubeuge should be the point of concentration; and he resolved to put his plan into execution not only by making the wings cover the centre, but by making the rear cover the van. For this purpose he determined to form a 6th corps, composed of the troops which would be assembled at Paris, and which could advance rapidly to Maubeuge, through Soissons, Laon, and La Fère. This 6th corps was confided to General Count Lobau, who commanded the first military division. We have already mentioned, that in order to re-establish discipline, he had arranged that almost every regiment should

* Napoleon's letters of 25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th of March prove that he had mentally arranged the plan of this campaign at this very period.

pass through the hands of Count Lobau at Paris. There would be consequently great numbers of troops at Paris, from which it would be easy to form a numerous and well-disciplined corps, which, leaving Paris at the same time that the 1st corps would leave Lille, and the 4th Metz, would form a compact mass with the 2nd and 3rd at Maubeuge. Thus did Napoleon, with superior skill, manage so that the different arrangements rendered necessary by circumstances should all tend to one end.

To the 6th corps Napoleon joined the imperial guard, which he intended to reorganise on a most extensive scale. The old guard he re-established on the basis of four regiments of four battalions (grenadiers and chasseurs included), and the young guard on the basis of twelve regiments of two battalions, with the addition of a powerful cavalry, and the old reserve of artillery that had signalised themselves in every battle of the period. Napoleon considered that with the 6th corps and the guard he would have a reserve of fifty thousand men, which, joined to the four corps stationed between Lille and Metz, would allow him to take the initiative at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand men (more or less, according to the time he should have to prepare); and as he showed no inclination to commence hostilities, least of all at Maubeuge, his plan could be thoroughly prepared whilst remaining perfectly secret.

The 5th corps, stationed at Alsace (that is, without the circle of these combinations), was to protect the Upper Rhine, and become a second point of concentration, in case the brunt of the war should fall on that quarter. This corps was to join the troops which were destined by Napoleon to guard the Alps, and to act against Switzerland in case she should not observe her neutrality, or against Italy, if, as was to be feared, Murat should not be sufficient alone to occupy the Austrians. As this corps was stationed beyond the operations of the Nord, it would be necessary to confide the command to a man capable of acting alone, and not needing to be led by the hand. Napoleon chose Marshal Suchet. He intended to form at a later period a 7th corps, to protect the Maritime Alps, and lastly, an 8th, which, if it were not needed to restrain the Spaniards, who were not much to be dreaded at the moment, it might restrain the south of France, where the sentiments of the people wore a suspicious character. He intended that the 7th corps should be commanded by General Clausel, who was at this time occupied in reducing Bordeaux.

Napoleon immediately commenced the formation of these corps, to which he gave the title of *corps d'observation*. For their complete organisation he had three entire months, which would deprive his preparations of every appearance calculated

to excite alarm. The generals he appointed, Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gerard, Rapp, and Suchet, were admirably chosen, both in a military and political sense; and these were now ordered to repair without delay to their different stations, and to summon all their troops from the fortresses. For this purpose, as each regiment marched to headquarters, it was to place all its disposable men in the two first battalions, and leave the *cadre* of the third in the fortresses as a *depôt*. Having a great number of officers on half-pay in his service, Napoleon ordered the immediate formation of a fourth, fifth, and sixth battalion in each regiment. When the men, collected in the way we shall explain immediately, would have reached the *depôt*, the third battalion was to be immediately completed, and sent to join the *corps d'armée*. The same was to be done with the fourth and fifth, according as men should come to the depot.

This simple organisation being decided on, nothing remained to be done but to arrange measures for recruiting. For this purpose Napoleon made the following arrangements.

On the 20th of March 1815 there were 180,000 men under arms, and 50,000 on a six months' leave of absence, who would at the first summons raise the effective forces to 230,000 men. This was not much, but even this number would not have existed, had not M. de Talleyrand requested Louis XVIII. to arm. Fortunately France had a much greater number of soldiers who had returned to their homes. If the reader recall what we have already said of the organisation of the army under the Bourbons, he will understand perfectly the explanation we are about to give.

At the time of Napoleon's abdication there was in France and Europe the following number of French soldiers of all arms, some constituting *corps d'armée*, others in garrison in the fortresses, or prisoners in the hands of the enemy. During the campaign of 1814, Napoleon had 65,000 men under his own command, General Maison had 15,000, Marshal Soult 36,000, General Decaen 4000, Marshal Suchet 12,000, Marshal Augereau 28,000: the whole amounting to 160,000 combatants, composing the active army. There were 95,000 in the fortresses of the interior, which brought up the whole effective force on French ground to about 255,000. There were 24,000 men in garrison in Catalonia, 30,000 in Piedmont and Italy, more than 32,000 defending the Adige under Prince Eugène, or returned to France under General Grenier. In Hamburg, Magdeburg, and other German fortresses there were 60,000 men, and 40,000 in the fortresses ceded by the convention of the 11th of April, such as Antwerp, Wesel, Mentz, &c., which made the garrisons of Spain, Italy, Germany, and Belgium amount to 186,000 men. Nominally 130,000 prisoners were to return from Russia,

Germany, and England, though the real number was considerably more. Were all these collected in France, she would possess a formidable army, since, independently of the 40,000 men, veterans, gens-d'armes, and staffs that must always be added to the total amount of the French army, she would have from 600,000 to 610,000 men, the greater number tried soldiers, and of whom at least half had borne part in all our wars. Had Napoleon been able to assemble all these around him in 1815, both he and France would have been invincible. But we must explain what had become of all these men since the peace.

After the abdication at Fontainebleau the spirit of desertion, as we have already mentioned, had revealed itself in the army. Some soldiers, from a feeling of patriotic displeasure, others from hatred to the service, of which they had experienced only the severities, had abandoned their standards, which the military authorities took little trouble to defend. It is estimated that at this period from 170,000 to 180,000 deserted, either of the troops stationed in France, or those that had returned from abroad. This would leave 420,000 in the ranks; but as we have seen, the budget of the Restoration would hardly allow one-third of these to be paid. The surplus must be got rid of in various ways. Of these, 25,000, who, by the cession of territory, were become foreigners, were sent home. The conscripts of 1815 were dismissed by an ordinance, which caused a further reduction of 46,000. Lastly, 115,000 men of every age were dismissed, who either had served their country for a sufficiently long time, or whose health had been more or less injured in the service of the State. The effective force was thus reduced to 230,000; and small as was the number, it was found impossible to pay the expenses; and the minister of war gave 50,000 more leave of absence for six months, which left but 180,000 actually under arms.

This was the exact state of our forces on the 20th of March 1815: 180,000 men under arms, and 50,000 on leave of absence, whom an order from the war department could immediately reassemble. The first thing to be done was to recall these 50,000 men, which would bring up the effective force to 230,000, a number that would not suffice for the formation of the three first battalions, each consisting of 500 men, and still less would it allow the formation of the 4th and 5th battalions. Recourse must be had to some other means. Conscription, which Napoleon had made hateful, and which had been imprudently given up by the Bourbons, could not be employed again without awakening the most painful remembrances. There were the numbers of soldiers that had returned to France; and were now dispersed through its whole extent. Of these, the best as to feeling and experience were certainly those

who had been prisoners of war. But the greater number of those who had returned lately were already enrolled; for it was to make room for these that some of the others had been dismissed. The 115,000 who had been definitely dismissed could not be recalled, since they were absolutely restored to their liberty, nor could those disbanded in quality of foreigners be summoned, as they had left the country. There only remained those who had deserted, and as a last resource, the conscripts of 1815. Those who had deserted were reputed as on leave of absence without pay—a subterfuge devised by the authorities to avoid being compelled to punish them.

These could be recalled, and of the 160,000 that were still French subjects, it was hoped that 80,000 would return to their standards, by which our army would amount to from 230,000 to 310,000, or to 300,000 exactly. But this number was far from being sufficient, and it would be necessary to fall back on the conscription of 1815. This conscription had been levied by a decree of 1814, which decree had not been revoked. It was therefore perfectly legal to put it into operation, at least when authorised by a decree of the Council of State, which might be easily obtained. Here were abundant means of recruiting the army without levying a fresh conscription. These conscripts, who had been dismissed by a royal ordinance, numbered about 140,000. Allowing for losses through time, and for the bad feeling of some provinces, their number could not be less than 100,000, which would increase the army to 400,000, the greater number of whom had seen service, or been at least for some time under arms, a very great advantage, which would add considerably to the effective force of our arms.

To render this army sufficient to oppose the coalition, all the troops composing it should be on active service, and none called on to do garrison duty. Another resource that presented itself, and by which Napoleon immediately determined to profit, was to call out the national guard, but in such a way that none but men fit for service should be chosen, and those only in provinces of assured patriotism. The state of our laws at this time favoured such an arrangement. The local authorities, whose duty it was to make the selection, could, when choosing the *compagnies d'élite*, called grenadiers and chasseurs (a mode of proceeding borrowed from the foot regiments), select young and vigorous men, some of whom had seen service, and who were neither married nor necessary to the support of their families. This had been done in 1814; and it was seen at Fère-Champenoise what national guards chosen in this manner were capable of. A valuable addition to the army could thus be obtained by increasing the *compagnies d'élite*, and this operation would be much facilitated from the great number of

retired soldiers dispersed through the country districts, and the still greater number of holders of small portions of national property. With well-organised recruiting companies in each *arrondissement*, it would be easy, in choosing the old soldiers, and citizens of undoubted patriotism, to form battalions of 500 or 600 men each, fit for service. The great number of half-pay officers added to this facility of forming battalions, presented an opportunity of drafting them into good *cadres*.

Napoleon calculated that by thus enrolling the thirtieth part of the population very nearly a million of men would be collected, and that by confining this appeal to the frontier provinces irritated by the late invasion, and near the fortresses that required to be guarded, he could easily raise 400 battalions, which, did they consist but of 500 men each, would amount altogether to 200,000. It would not be difficult to induce the inhabitants of Lorraine to defend Thionville, Nancy, and Metz, nor the Alsatians to arm for Strasburg, the inhabitants of Franche-Comté for Besançon, those of Dauphiné for Grenoble, Embrun, and Briançon. In confining himself for the present to Ardennes, Champagne, Burgundy, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, Lyonnais, Auvergne, and Dauphiné, he was sure to have 200,000 men in the *compagnies d'élite*, and thus the army of the line would be disposable for active service. Besides that, these men would form excellent garrisons in the fortresses; some of them, such at least as were best drilled, might aid the army as bodies of reserve, or even fight in the ranks. The army thus compensated for the regiments left in *dépôt*, and amounting to 400,000 men, would, in Napoleon's hands, suffice to overpower the coalition, provided he could obtain time to realise the projected levies. France could then meet Europe at the head of 600,000 men, 400,000 on active service, and 200,000 in garrison. This would be sufficient for one campaign, however bloody it might be, and should the result be favourable, it was not probable that the coalition would attempt a second. It would consequently be possible, by not being too exacting, to obtain a moderate peace, infinitely more advantageous than that of Paris.

Such were the principles on which Napoleon founded his plan of national resistance against foreigners. The great number of retired soldiers, the inhabitants of the country districts irritated against the clergy and nobility, and the many officers on half-pay, rendered this plan more easy of accomplishment than it would be in ordinary times.

Napoleon, who, from his long administrative experience, knew exactly how and when everything ought to be done, gave his orders accordingly. Had he undertaken everything at once, necessary as expedition was, besides causing great confusion,

he would have excited the public mind more than would be prudent. He did not desire to conceal anything, but he did not wish that the morrow of his arrival should be, as it were, the signal for a general levy; for his desperate appeal to the people's patriotism would be looked on rather as the effect of his military tastes than the result of necessity.

For this reason he commenced operations by ordering the men on leave of absence for six months to join their regiments. The soldiers who had retired without permission were to be recalled a few days later; and then the Council of State was to decide whether the decree by which the conscription of 1815 had been raised was still in force. The local authorities and *gens-d'armes* would not have sufficed for the accomplishment of the three measures had they been attempted simultaneously; and therefore a few days' interval between each was not too much. Besides, the men on leave of absence for six months, and those who had retired without leave, were all more or less accustomed to warfare, and might join the ranks immediately on their arrival, provided that they had arms and ammunition.

As Napoleon had determined to reorganise the imperial guard, he ordered the *cadres* to return to Paris, and in order to furnish the old soldiers with an additional motive for again entering the service, he announced that all able-bodied men who had borne arms, and who should demand admission into the guard, should be drafted into the twelve regiments of the young guard that were about being enrolled. This would be sufficient to attract 12,000 or 15,000 additional men.

Not wishing that a single corps should be employed in accessory service, Napoleon ordered that all the disposable vessels should be sent from Toulon to Corsica to bring back three regiments of infantry that were in that island. He took advantage of the respect still shown by the English to the white flag to allow it to float from the masts of the navy, at the same time that the crews were ordered to resume the tricolored cockade. Thanks to this ruse, he was able to bring back these three regiments, the nucleus of the 7th corps, which, from want of resources, was still but a name.

Having thus provided for the infantry, he turned his attention to the cavalry, which, there was no question, would be a magnificent corps, could horses be provided. As those who were expected to enlist in the cavalry had served before, there was every probability that all the men would be well drilled—a circumstance of much more importance in that branch of the service than in the infantry. Of the 180,000 men composing the effective force as it existed on the 1st of March, about 20,000 were cavalry. Napoleon determined to increase these

immediately to 40,000, and as soon as possible to 50,000. The late government had contracted for 4000 horses. He ordered the immediate fulfilment of these contracts, and then re-established the great dépôt at Versailles, which, under General Bourcier's direction, had been of such utility to him in 1814. He ordered this general to repair immediately to Versailles, and take possession of such localities as he had occupied a year before, and collect a large supply of military equipments and horses. He opened a credit of several millions for him, that he might be able to pay ready money for the horses brought by the peasantry.

If the cavalry regiments sent their yet unmounted men to Versailles they would be certain to find there everything they wanted; and as the active army was to assemble between Lille and Paris, they would not have far to go to procure accoutrements and horses. Napoleon hoped to procure 2000 or 3000 trained horses belonging to the dismissed royal household troops. He also intended to take some thousands from the *gens-d'armes*, but for which he would pay immediately. He next sent several cavalry officers, provided with money, to the country districts, and these he expected would return with from 10,000 to 15,000 horses. From what he had seen on his march from the Gulf of Juan to Grenoble, he was convinced that with money, horses might be found everywhere. It was his maxim, that in extreme cases, success was to be obtained by adopting a variety of expedients; for if one should fail, another might succeed.

As the artillery requires more time to take the field than any other branch of the service, he ordered that this force should immediately leave the arsenals and proceed to join the different *corps d'armée*. A large number of artillery horses, the remains of our military staff, had been left in charge of the peasantry. Napoleon ordered that these should be collected, and gave directions for the purchase of a number of horses sufficient to supply a powerful artillery, which he intended should not be less than three pieces to every thousand men. He finally gave orders for the formation of a park of a hundred and fifty pieces of artillery at Vincennes, which was to form the customary *corps de réserve* of the guard.

Having completed his plan for the organisation of the army, Napoleon next turned his attention to the fortifications. The fatal day of the 30th of March 1814 having shown him the part the capital was called on to play in the defence of the empire, he determined to surround Paris with works as solid as could be made in three months, and to cover these works with a powerful artillery. As experience had also shown him the importance of such places as La Fère, Soissons, Chateau-

Thierry, Langres, and B fort in case of an invasion, he determined to fortify them as well as the shortness of the time would allow ; and as there were many other points that might be made temporarily useful, he formed a commission of generals who were to make a rapid survey of the frontiers, and report not only what towns, but what passes through mountains or forests, could be made capable of resistance. He ordered that the large fortresses long looked on as the bulwarks of the country should be repaired, supplied with arms and provisions—in a word, put into a complete state of defence.

The navy, in its actual state, could be of no use, for even if a naval victory were won, it would not protect Paris. Napoleon, with his usual fertility of invention, determined that the sea forces should aid the movements of the army, by which two advantages would be gained—the sailors, thrown idle by the blockade of the seas, would obtain employment, and the services of 60,000 brave and patriotic men would be secured. Of these he determined to form twenty regiments under the command of naval officers ; a part to be left on the coast in defence of our ports, and 30,000 to be sent to the capital, to aid in its defence. He also determined to distribute some thousand naval gunners amongst the fortifications of Paris, with two or three hundred cannons of large calibre, to be brought from Brest, Cherbourg, Dunkirk, and other maritime places.

The clothing and arms of the different regiments were still to be provided for. Want of time made it difficult to procure clothing. Money would lessen these difficulties. Napoleon summoned the contractors who usually supplied the army, and paid in ready money the sixteen millions that were due to them, and which the Restoration had neglected to pay. By this means Paris and other large towns would soon be filled with extra workshops, which, by means of zealous overseers, would soon supply the most pressing wants. Napoleon required for each soldier of the line only one capote, a pair of pantaloons, and a vest ; and he selected a uniform blouse that should suffice for the national guard in defence of the fortresses.

It was still more difficult to procure arms. Napoleon remembered how in the last campaign there were 20,000 men from the suburbs whom want of arms had prevented from assisting in defence of the capital. He hoped, as we have seen, that by calling in the deserters of 1814, together with those on furlough for six months, that he could raise the army to 310,000 men, and to 400,000 by the addition of the conscripts of 1815. Lastly, he expected by the aid of 200,000 of the national guard to raise the number of the defenders of the country to 600,000 ; and by the addition of the sailors to raise the entire to 660,000.

He would consequently require at least 600,000 muskets by the commencement of June—the time he expected hostilities to commence. There were about 200,000 in depôt, or in the possession of the soldiers. There were 150,000 new muskets in the magazines, thanks to the Duke de Berry, who had incessantly urged the necessity of manufacturing firearms. There were therefore 250,000 still to be got. The soldiers who had returned from abroad had brought with them a great number of muskets, which with a little repair might be made serviceable; but these muskets were scattered over the frontiers, and most frequently in places where it would be impossible to construct manufactories. Napoleon determined that these should be brought to Paris, where there were already 40,000 needing repair, but where the means of manufacturing and repairing would soon be increased by the erection of new workshops. He divided the others amongst the fortresses from Grenoble to Strasburg, and from Strasburg to Lille. He expected that in two months he would have 200,000 repaired, and 50,000 manufactured. He flattered himself that he should thus procure the 600,000 he needed. His plan was to urge on the manufacture of at least 300,000 during the latter six months of 1815, in order to keep up a supply, and to arm fresh soldiers. For this purpose he ordered the erection of numerous extra workshops in Paris and the environs, in which he employed cabinetmakers, locksmiths, and even watchmakers, all directed by artillery officers. He paid the State contractors 1,800,000 francs that had remained due to them, and placed as much money at their disposal as they needed.

It was M. Louis, the talented finance minister of the Restoration, who, without knowing for whom he was working, had prepared the funds which Napoleon was about to employ in the defence of the country. Thanks to the peace and to the courageous maintenance of indirect taxation, M. Louis had re-established the collection of the ordinary taxes, and so considerably enriched the treasury. Besides, by acknowledging the debts of the State, and by the happy combination of the *reconnaissance de liquidation*, he had obtained the valuable assistance of the floating debt, which permits the yearly revenues to be anticipated, and places all the resources of a State at the disposal of the treasury. When this talented minister retired, he left, besides the regular and easily collected ordinary taxes, the possibility of raising fifty or sixty millions by anticipating the revenue by means of exchequer bills. This resource, together with the current taxes, sufficed for the first months, the expenses not being at that time what they have since become. In three months there would be either peace or a decisive battle; and were this battle successful, there

would be no difficulty in replacing that portion of the revenue that had been expended in advance. Thanks to Baron Louis' prompt and successful re-establishment of credit, M. Mollien and M. de Gaëte had found everything on the best footing, and the means of expending fifty millions beyond the actual receipts. This was all that Napoleon's creative and economical genius needed in order to supply the first expenses, and to prevent the necessity of having recourse to extraordinary or unpopular expedients.*

Thanks to these combined resources, Napoleon was almost certain of having within a few months four hundred thousand men on active service, and two hundred thousand in garrison, all provided with what they needed; and the longer the war was deferred, the greater the probability of seeing his armament completed. In all great administrative enterprises it is that forethought which, comprehending the whole as well as the details, forgetting nothing, deferring nothing, because nothing has been forgotten—it is this forethought, we repeat, which secures a successful result, even in the sometimes very short time that can be consecrated to the development of great designs. It is when the whole is not seen at a glance, nor all the details foreseen, but left to develop themselves with time—it is then that there is danger of delay, because those details which were not taken into account, not having been provided for at

* There is nothing more difficult in times of revolution than to induce governments that replace one another to do each other justice, and in no case is this more difficult than in financial matters. Calumny, and that sometimes of the deepest dye, is all the justice that can be expected from them. I have seen strange examples of this in my time, but none more extraordinary in the quickness of the reprisals than those of the years 1814 and 1815. When the Baron Louis succeeded M. Mollien and M. de Gaëte, he made a most unfair report of the state of the imperial finances, and handed in a most unjust balance-sheet representing the state of the treasury. Eleven months later he met with the same kind of justice. During the Hundred Days all expenses were met by the resources he had created, though great care was taken not to admit it. When Napoleon was at St. Helena, where he generally showed tolerable impartiality, and would have shown more if his great mind had not been ruled by the bad habits of the times, Napoleon, talking *en passant* of the finances of the Hundred Days, said carelessly, that Count Mollien (of whom he spoke at other times with well-merited praise), very cleverly employing forty millions which Baron Louis had used in *stock-jobbing by means of the reconnaissances de liquidation*, had succeeded in meeting all the extra wants of the time. Such is the heedless and unjust manner in which Napoleon spoke of one of the greatest financial operations of the age. These forty millions—Napoleon does not estimate the sum high enough—constituted the floating debt, the vast resource which Baron Louis had procured for the State, and the pretended *jobbing* with the *reconnaisances de liquidation* was only a temporary expedient, blamable, of course, in ordinary times, but necessary in the infancy of public credit. When Baron Louis put in the market the *reconnaisances de liquidation*, which were nothing else than our exchequer bills, unknown at that time, he thought it right to keep up their value by purchasing them when they began to fall in price, and thus succeeded in keeping up their credit, and in maintaining them at par. This

the same time as the others, have yet to be attended to; and thus the whole may be retarded by an apparently insignificant omission.

Any person who has any knowledge of the administration of States will easily perceive by the sketches we have given of Napoleon's preparations that nothing necessary to a great armament had been forgotten; all had been calculated beforehand, all made clear, and with a certain security in the means of accomplishment that could only be designed by the highest genius perfected by vast experience. It must be added, that in the execution of these measures he had carefully kept political considerations in view. Thus the immediate formation of the *corps d'armée*, which was so essential to their proper organisation, and which was made as inoffensive as possible by being called *corps d'observation*, together with the recalling of the men on six months' furlough, the immediate institution of the fourth and fifth battalions, the re-establishment of the dépôt at Versailles, the transporting of arms to where they were to be repaired, and lastly, the formation in the ministry of the interior of those bureaux in which the national guards were to be enrolled—all these were urgent measures, which admitted of no delay. But they possessed the advantage of being capable of being put into immediate operation. In ten or fifteen days, when the real state of affairs would be known, when the declared hostility of Europe need no longer be concealed, and when, far

could no more be called *jobbing* than the repurchasing of the scrip of *le caisse d'amortissement*, which Napoleon had often done, when he sold quantities of national property, or of the communes. Baron Louis bought up very few of these *reconnaissances de liquidation* when their credit was good, indeed he did nothing but what was absolutely necessary. Now that exchequer bills, thanks to a systematic financial system, are always at par, it is not necessary to have recourse to such expedients, and should circumstances make them fall below par, the minister would be blamed who, instead of keeping up their value by redeeming them as they fell due, would try to buy them up at a reduced price. He would be looked upon in the same light as a merchant who bought up his own dishonoured bills, and speculated on his own loss of credit. But at the present time public credit is established, and at the time of which we speak, ministers were involved in all the difficulties of endeavouring to establish public credit. We have not allowed ourselves these reflections, in order to assert truths admitted by all who understand finance, but to show once more what justice men show each other, and what, on the other hand, should be the justice of history. The resources created by a talented minister, and which supplied Napoleon's expenses in 1815, were qualified by him as *a sum kept in reserve for stock-jobbing*, and he thus retorted the calumnious report that had been made ten months before of the state of his finances. However, a time always comes when everything and every man are put in their proper light, and history is only too fortunate when, instead of having to destroy an ill-deserved fame, or pronounce a long-deferred condemnation, she has but to unveil the merits of men who have mutually misunderstood each other. As for me, always anxious to do justice, I feel like those jurymen who congratulate themselves on having to pronounce an acquittal, and not a condemnation, and I believe that I do justice to both régimes when I say, "Count Mollien created the machinery of the treasury—Baron Louis, the credit."

from fearing to disturb the public mind, it would be necessary to call forth all the energies of the people, and make them aware of their danger, then those other measures, such as the summoning and selecting of the old soldiers that had deserted, the mobilisation of the national guards, the decision of the Council of State as to the conscription of 1815, the levies of horses, the erection of extra workshops, and the throwing up of earthworks around Paris, which could not be executed in secret, could be attended to without the loss of a single day; for they necessarily gave precedence to the others, and the attention they would at a later period attract would be harmless, since policy would itself then demand publicity rather than secrecy.

It was on the 24th of March, four days after his arrival, that Napoleon received certain information of the Bourbons having left the country. It was on the 25th, 26th, and 27th of March that the resolutions of which we have just spoken were conceived, and immediately transmitted to the heads of the war department, even before Marshal Davout had time to make himself acquainted with the men and things that constituted his ministry. Meanwhile, measures for the armament of France were decided and ordered, so that the minister had only to put them into execution under the direction and superintendence of his indefatigable master. Applying the same impulsive force to the ministry of the interior, he directed Carnot's attention to General Mathieu Dumas as the most competent person to direct the bureaux of the national guard. This gentleman possessed that rare combination of military and civil qualities, specially adapted to the twofold nature of the militia that he was appointed to organise. Napoleon ordered General Mathieu Dumas to prepare at once, and as quietly as possible, everything connected with the mobilisation of the national guards. He next turned his attention to the revision of military promotions made by the Bourbons, and which had been so lavishly bestowed that it would be impossible to keep them up. He laid down a few true and equitable principles on this subject, and entrusted the application of them to a commission of generals possessed of the public confidence. He reserved the decision relative to the marshals for himself. In the decree published at Lyon he exempted thirteen persons from the general amnesty, and amongst these were Marshals Marmont and Augereau. He could not persevere in his enmity against Augereau, who, being Governor of Caen, had expiated his faults by publishing a most violent proclamation against the Bourbons. But Marshal Marmont's name was left on the list: the execution of the decree was, however, deferred. Napoleon determined to erase from the list of marshals the names of Oudinot,

Victor, and St. Cyr, who had zealously espoused the cause of the Bourbons; but he gave them pensions commensurate with their former services. He did this not so much to punish these men, as to make vacancies for others who would devote themselves to the defence of France. Three other marshals, Berthier, Soult, and Macdonald, were in pretty much the same position. Napoleon deferred his decision concerning them. He was so much attached to Berthier that it gave him great pain to act with severity towards that old servant, and he sent him word that he would freely forgive his weakness as a father, on condition of his immediately returning to Paris. He believed that Marshal Soult would not be inflexible, as he supposed him very much irritated against the Bourbons, who had recompensed him so badly, after having placed him in circumstances that involved a self-contradictory line of conduct. He took no measures respecting him nor Marshal Macdonald, whose nobility of character he was well able to appreciate. His plan was to induce both to come to Paris, and then offer them employment, confirming them in their dignities. As for Marshals Lefebvre, Suchet, Davout, Ney, and Mortier, who had already declared for the empire, and Massena, of whom he had no doubt, he had already employed some of them, and intended to give the others appointments suitable to their deserts. With regard to Ney, he adopted a measure advantageous at once to the public service and to the marshal. Ney was quite embarrassed by the contradictory manner in which he had acted at Fontainebleau and at Lons-le-Saulnier, and thought that the looks, if not the words, of every one he met expressed the reproaches he felt he deserved. This false position had a bad effect both on his thoughts and words. To excuse his own faults, he was constantly blaming others; saying at one time such things of the Bourbons, at another of Napoleon, as not only detracted from his own dignity, but which might make it difficult to employ him. As Napoleon did not wish to lose the marshal's services, he thought it better to remove him from Paris, and therefore ordered him to inspect the frontier from Dunkirk to Bâle, with power over all the civil and military authorities, and with express orders to report everything connected with the defence of the country or the state of the army. Ney, notwithstanding his characteristic faults, was extremely shrewd with regard to everything connected with his profession, and would be most useful on the frontier, whilst at Paris he would only injure the public interests and his own.

All these different arrangements with respect to the general armament of France had, as we have already said, been planned and ordered from the 25th to the 27th of March. Meantime, frequent intelligence had been received from the south of the

empire. Napoleon had been informed that all was becoming quiet in the west, at least for the moment, but that the royalists were making some progress in the south, especially between Marseilles and Lyon. Though he felt no uneasiness about this, he wished to put an end to demonstrations that might interfere with his preparations for war. He ordered General Morand to send two columns along the Loire, one on the right, the other on the left bank, each to be composed of one regiment of infantry and of two regiments of foot, and to repress every insurrectionary movement. He also desired that he should summon three regiments of infantry from the coast, and send them to General Clausel, to aid him in subduing Bordeaux. He also summoned General Grouchy, who had publicly quarrelled with the Bourbons, because of the dignity of colonels-general being transferred to the princes of the blood, and sent him to Lyon to arrest the progress of the Duke d'Angoulême. He desired him to act with vigour and promptitude, but by no means to treat the prince as it had been intended to treat him. "But," asked the general, "if the prince fall into my power, what shall I do?" "Take him, but treat him with every respect," said Napoleon; "for I wish that Europe should see the difference *between me and the crowned brigands who have set a price upon my head.*" These words, which showed how much he was irritated, referred to the declaration of the 13th of March, which had been published in the names of the sovereigns assembled at Vienna. Napoleon was silent a moment, and seemed to reconsider his resolutions. "The prince," he said, "may be made a means of exchange with foreign courts, and be perhaps given in exchange for my wife and son." But he soon abandoned this idea, for the Duke d'Angoulême was not of sufficient importance to be made the object of such an exchange, and repeated his former instructions. "Get the prince out of the country," he said; "if you take him, treat him with the utmost deference; write immediately to me, and we will give him up safe and sound in exchange for the crown diamonds, which I had in my possession last year, but which I did not hesitate to resign, and which do not belong to Louis XVIII. nor to me, but to France."

This said, Napoleon dismissed General Grouchy, and gave him, as companion of his expedition—not that he doubted him—General Corbineau, in whose promptitude, sincerity, and intelligence he felt the most perfect confidence. He desired the latter to remain constantly beside General Grouchy. At the same time he sent off one of the divisions of the 6th corps, under the Count Lobau, by post. This division was particularly well suited to the south, as it was composed of regiments that had been most forward in declaring for the empire. They were

the 7th of the line (the regiment of de la Bédoyère), the 20th and 24th from the garrison at Lyon, and the 14th, that had come to meet Napoleon between Fontainebleau and Auxerre. These four regiments would suffice to disperse the southern insurgents, and that easy task accomplished, they were to form the nucleus of the 7th corps, destined to defend the Alps.

Napoleon's attention was not exclusively occupied by these military measures. He was obliged to think also of the home policy, and to declare under what form of government France was to be placed. During the review of the 21st, and one or two which had taken place subsequently, he had addressed the troops in language similar to that he had used at Grenoble, Lyon, and Auxerre. He was come, he said, to restore the national glory, to revive the principles of 1789, and to bestow on France as much liberty as was suited for her. These professions, which had been addressed to some provincial municipalities and to a few soldiers, must now be repeated, with suitable solemnity, before more dignified assemblies, before the great bodies of the State, and this in a manner that would precisely define his engagements with the country.

Napoleon had appointed Sunday the 26th of March for the reception of the great bodies of the State, when discourses, which had been previously arranged, would be delivered on both sides. But on the day before, he sought to impress the public mind by an act that would plainly declare his actual sentiments.

No government had ever repressed the manifestation of public opinion more than his. In the commencement of his reign he had led public opinion captive by the personal admiration he inspired, and in later times an inexorable police suppressed in journals and in books every thought that opposed his opinions. Towards the end of his reign Napoleon became conscious of the inconvenience of such an oppressive system, and often spoke of it to the Duke de Rovigo, minister of police, who fully agreed with him. One great evil resulting from the system was, that no one had faith in the declarations of the government, even when perfectly sincere. In time of war, for example, to want of faith in the French government was added implicit belief in foreigners; and whilst our bulletins were not credited, no doubt was ever entertained of the veracity of those of the enemy, which were infinitely more false than ours. Deeply touched by this state of public feeling, Napoleon, in 1813, wrote to the Duke de Rovigo, "As we are not believed, we must no longer speak in our own name, but assuming that of others, tell the whole truth, our only safeguard now." In consequence of this resolution, Napoleon despatched no bulletins in 1813 or 1814, but had articles inserted in the *Moniteur*, which commenced thus, "We have heard from the army that," &c.

This painful experience had opened Napoleon's eyes on the subject of the liberty of the press. However, had it been suddenly proposed to him in 1813 or 1814 to expose himself freely to all the violence of the journalists—a violence that is most formidable when restraint is suddenly exchanged for unrestrained liberty—he would most certainly have refused, as one refuses to undergo a painful operation of whose necessity one is not convinced. But he was now returned from Elba, where during an entire year he had been the target at which the journals of Europe had hurled their abuse. After such a trial he had nothing more to fear, and as he himself very shrewdly remarked, *that there was nothing more to be said against him, whilst a great deal still remained to be said against his opponents.*

Though still aware of the inconvenience resulting from the liberty of the press, his twofold experience as sovereign and exile had changed his opinion on the subject. But he was influenced by a still more powerful motive, a motive that coloured everything connected with his home policy, which was, to do in all things the opposite of what the Bourbons had done. His only excuse for expelling them at the risk of a fearful war was, that his government was to be the antithesis of theirs, and the corrector of their errors. They had not shown sufficient interest for the glory of France; he must therefore exalt it more than ever. They were opposed to the interests of the Revolution; he must declare such interests sacred. They granted liberty hesitatingly and bound by many restrictions; he must give it freely, fully, without any restraint, and at the same time with seeming pleasure and confidence, whatever might be the result, for nothing could be so bad as to have it said that he trod in the footsteps of the Bourbons, and that consequently it was not worth the trouble to get rid of them at the risk of a revolution, and of what was worse, a universal war. It was evident that the censorship of the press had been an infringement of the Charter, and totally opposed to the government it was meant to inaugurate; Napoleon determined to annul it by the simple insertion of an order in the *Moniteur*.

He merely introduced some precautions in the details, which the legislature has since then consecrated as wise and necessary. He required that each journal should publish the name of the principal person connected with the publication, who should be responsible for the articles that appeared in the paper—a person since named the responsible editor. This precaution had been suggested by M. Fouché, who, flattering himself that he could mould men as he pleased, thought that by making certain persons responsible for what appeared in the journals, he would have them all in his power. Napoleon did not expect this, but he was determined to run every risk; and on the 25th of March

announced in the *Moniteur* the abolition of the censorship of the press.

Napoleon could not include amongst the great bodies of the State which he was about to receive the two chambers which had been dissolved by the decree of Lyon. Their place was supplied by the ministers, who were received as a body, which gave them an importance they had never before enjoyed, by the Council of State, the Court of Cassation, the Cour des Comptes, the Court of Appeal, &c. Prince Cambacérès spoke for the ministers, and in their name entered into all the engagements necessary for those exercising the executive power. Having congratulated the monarch whom Providence, he said, had twice raised up—the first time to deliver France from anarchy, the second to save her from counter-revolution—Prince Cambacérès summed up the principles of the executive power in the following words: “*Your majesty has already traced the path that your ministers have to follow; you have already, by your proclamations, informed the world of the maxims by which you wish your empire to be governed. The Bourbons promised to forget everything, but did not keep their word. Your majesty will remember your promises; you will forget the violence of parties, and only remember the services rendered to the country. You will also forget that we have been masters of the world, and will only go to war to repel an unjust aggression. You will not seek arbitrary power; you will respect persons and property, and allow the free communication of thought; and we shall be happy to assist you in the accomplishment of a task by which you will gain the best and noblest glory.*”

More than this could not be expected from any government until liberty had been secured by law, the best of all securities. “*The sentiments you express are mine,*” said Napoleon, and immediately gave audience to the Council of State.

This body proposed establishing the principles in virtue of which Napoleon had commenced his reign, and in virtue of which the Council of State had not hesitated to resume its functions, as though nothing had intervened between the April of 1814 and the March of 1815. The following are the reasons adduced.

In 1789 France abolished feudal monarchy, for which it substituted a representative sovereignty founded on equality of rights, and a just participation by the citizens in the government of the State.

In 1790 the Bourbons affected to adopt the new principles proclaimed by the nation, but by their silent resistance soon provoked and merited a downfall, which a series of national decisions had afterwards confirmed.

In the years VIII. and X., France, after long and severe agitations, had confided her government to Napoleon Bonaparte, crowned *already by the hand of victory*, and entrusted the care of her destinies to him under the successive titles of First Consul and Emperor. The people had twice confirmed these delegations of sovereignty by their votes.

In 1814, the allied powers, profiting by a moment of disaster, penetrated into our capital, and the Senate gave up the national constitutions they were bound to defend, and depending on foreign aid, abolished the empire, and recalled Louis Stanislaus Xavier to the throne. In doing this, that body had assumed rights to which it had no claim. It had, however, attached as a condition to his return the formation of a constitution by which the rights of the nation would be partly secured, and which the monarch was bound to accept before ascending the throne.

Louis XVIII. had not fulfilled even this preliminary condition, for having entered Paris under the protection of foreign bayonets, he dated his acts from the nineteenth year of his reign, thereby annulling all anterior acts of the nation. He gave an imperfect constitution, made still more imperfect by the manner of its execution; he humbled the glory of France, favoured the pretensions of the old nobility, allowed the claims to national property to be disputed, deprived the Legion of Honour of its allotted funds, and lowered the value of the insignia by making them too common, and in a word, had put in peril all that the Revolution had made sacred.

All, therefore, that had been done since 1814 may be considered as null in principle, as bad in effect, for the Senate did not possess the right to abolish the empire, and even admitting that it had, Louis XVIII. had not fulfilled the conditions in virtue of which he had ascended the throne. In fact, the government of the emigrants had acted in a manner consistent with the illegality of its origin.

Napoleon, by his miraculous return from exile, and received on landing by the unanimous acclamations of the people and the army, had re-established the nation in its most sacred rights, and he alone was lawful sovereign, for no power is legal but that conferred by the nation.

However, time and the actual state of France made modifications necessary in the institutions of the first empire. Napoleon had promised that these modifications should be made. He would keep this engagement, and would have the promised modifications confirmed in an assembly of the representatives of the nation convoked for the month of May. Until the meeting of this assembly, Napoleon and his ministers would govern in conformity with existing laws, and the Council of State, which he had previously commissioned to watch over the

application of these laws, had come to offer him its loyal and constitutional assistance.

It was Thibaudeau, who had been successively conventionalist and prefect, that had aided in the construction of this closely reasoned but artificial logic, to which indeed no answer could be made if the legitimacy of governments were made to consist in certain conditions dependent on their origin, and not in their form and mode of proceeding. Governments indeed spring from all the sudden changes of revolutions, and it is difficult to mark the precise signs that legitimise their origin. They are sometimes the result of popular feeling, sometimes the offspring of victory, sometimes of defeat, and sometimes spring from the revival of affection in a nation, disabused of its errors, for a dynasty which their common misfortunes has made it regret; and each form of government must be accepted, imposed as it is by necessity, and each in turn asserts its own legitimacy, alleging theories admitted by some, disputed by others, and concerning which the world will never agree. Without denying all that there is of respectable, august, and solid in titles founded on a long hereditary transmission, we must, however, say that for persons of plain good sense, governments that were the result of necessity at their commencement, become legitimate with time, when the nation for which they were established, finding them suited to its habits and intelligence, and acting in conformity with its general interests, support them with a well-weighed and abiding approbation. This is practically, if not theoretically, the best founded legitimacy; for though a government had been proclaimed by a whole nation, men and women, old and young, voting before mayors and notaries, or even did it descend in uninterrupted succession from Mount Sinai, it loses claim to existence once it jars with the faith, manners, honour, or interests of a nation. It is by its deeds, and by its deeds alone, that a government is to be judged, or its legitimacy determined. Beyond that, all is artificial and mere sophistry. But no better reply could be made to Louis XVIII. dating his acts from the nineteenth year of his reign, than by asserting the sovereignty of the people, exercised by writing "yes" or "no" in miserable registries in the offices of mayors or notaries. One was as good as the other.

Napoleon appreciated these theories at their just value, but he adopted the conventional reasoning to reply to the royalist logic, and gave his consent in the following terms.

"Princes are the first citizens of a State. Their authority is more or less extensive according to the interests of the nation they govern. Sovereignty is hereditary only because the interests of the people require it. I know of no legitimacy not contained in these principles.

"I have renounced all ideas of the vast empire of which in fifteen years I had only laid the basis. Henceforth the consolidation and happiness of the French empire shall be the object of all my thoughts."

What was really of importance in all these manifestations was the formal renunciation of the ancient system of a warlike and conquering empire, the renunciation of arbitrary power, the promise of exact conformity to the laws, and the pledge to give institutions which would guarantee the liberty of the nation and the protection of her interests. Napoleon was ready to enter into this engagement at once, were it only to justify himself for having thrown France into a new revolution; but it was only natural that having been at Paris but six days, that the necessity of seizing the reins of government, of establishing relations abroad, and preparing the reorganisation of the army, and expelling his rivals from the country, should have occupied him exclusively. This latter part of his task was not yet completed, for the south was still to be delivered from royalist insurrections; he was earnestly engaged in doing this, and needed only a few days to be completely successful.

Indeed, the re-establishment of the imperial authority met with but few serious obstacles, though there was some great but not extensive excitement, that passed away quickly. In the west, the Vendean leaders, stunned by the second downfall of the Bourbons, had a confused idea of being in some way implicated in the catastrophe, but did not dare to think of a revolution whilst they saw the rural districts so depressed, the cities so joyous, and when they considered the enemy with whom they had to do, an enemy that would treat them with leniency or severity according to their conduct. Some professional Chouans, and a few Vendean or Breton peasants, full of their ancient zeal, were quite ready to rise; but their generals, unsupported by England, unaided by her money and armaments, above all, in the absence of a European war, dared not think of a civil one.

General Morand consequently met no opposition in Vendée, and having unfurled the tricolor flag on both banks of the Loire, he hastened to the assistance of General Clausel, who had not indeed any great need of his aid. The latter general having assembled at Angoulême some detachments of national guards and gendarmerie, advanced towards the Dordogne, first sending on a confidential officer to strengthen the garrison of Blaye. This garrison consisted of some companies of the 62nd regiment quartered in Bordeaux. This regiment immediately, on hearing of the events in Paris, sent a detachment of 150 men to join General Clausel at Cubzac. This illustrious general

therefore arrived on the banks of the Dordogne with 100 gendarmes, 150 men of the 62nd, and 300 or 400 national guards. The bridge of Cubzac having been cut away, the general took his station on the right bank, whilst the Bordelais volunteers occupied the left. Having borne some ill-directed discharges of cannon, he succeeded in forming a passage by the help of boats collected here and there, and commenced a parley with the leader of the Bordelais volunteers, who had hastily evacuated the *entre-deux-mers* (as the land enclosed between the Dordogne and the Gironde was called). The volunteers were commanded by M. de Martignac, afterwards minister of Charles X., and who was highly esteemed by his contemporaries for his amiability and eloquence. General Clausel informed him of what had taken place at Paris, and which had been kept secret at Bordeaux, in order to prolong the delusions and opposition of the people. It was not difficult for the general to convince M. de Martignac that it would not be possible for him to make any serious resistance, and that attempting it would only injure an important and interesting town. M. de Martignac promised to repair to Bordeaux, and be the bearer of the general's communications, and to bring back quickly an answer dictated by necessity.

The general followed M. de Martignac closely, and encamped with his little troop at Bastide, on the right bank of the Gironde, and opposite to Bordeaux in a diagonal direction.

The greatest confusion prevailed in this town at the time, as M. de Vitrolles, in passing through on his way to Toulouse, had communicated to the authorities the orders of Louis XVIII., to which he had added his own advice. The principal object of the royalists had been to defend the banks of the Loire from Nantes to Auvergne, profit by the mountainous country between Auvergne and Cévennes, to take up a position there, and to keep possession of both banks of the Rhône as far as Arles, Marseilles, and Toulon. They had written to England for arms and money, and to Ferdinand VII. for Spanish soldiers. By this imprudent appeal to foreigners, our ports were as open for the British flag as for that of the Bourbons, and the royalists thus ran the risk of renewing the scenes of 1793 at Toulon. But passion and necessity do not reason, especially when patriotism is blinded by party spirit. All this, however, had not prevented the loss of the Loire, and the Loire being lost, an effort was made to preserve the line of the Garonne, prolonged by the Southern Canal as far as the Rhône—that is, as far as Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nîmes, Marseilles, and Toulon. Great hopes were entertained that the Duke d'Angoulême would be successful on the banks of the Rhône.

As the royalists had possession of the line of the Garonne,

the Duchess d'Angoulême did all in her power to preserve it. She had been joined by M. Lainé, who assisted her as far as he could. It would have been a great advantage had M. Lainé succeeded in enlightening the Bourbons at Paris, and thus prevented the revolution of the 20th of March, which could produce nothing but misery. But as Napoleon had got again possession of the French throne, and as a last and desperate struggle with Europe was inevitable, the wisest and most patriotic course would be to join him as quickly as possible, that he might have the entire strength of the nation under his command. A few amongst the sensible and intelligent population of Bordeaux understood this ; but the mass, irritated by the sufferings of twenty years, and afflicted at seeing the sea again blockaded, sympathised, both through self-interest and through conviction, with the Duchess d'Angoulême, and were ready to aid her at the expense of their lives. Under such circumstances everything depended on the conduct of the troops. These consisted of two regiments—the 62nd of the line and the 8th light infantry. These troops took exactly the same attitude as that assumed by the garrison at Lille ; that is, they treated the august daughter of Louis XVI. with the most profound respect, but showed unmistakably that Napoleon possessed their affections.

M. de Martignac having come to Bordeaux to announce the arrival of General Clausel, and to present his propositions, the barracks were visited and the soldiers spoken to ; but though the Duchess d'Angoulême took part in this herself, the result was not at all satisfactory. The troops declared unanimously that they would not allow any one to fail in respect to the princess, but that they would not fire on General Clausel, nor permit others to fire on him. After such a declaration nothing could be done but to retire, which was the opinion of the most rational amongst the national guard. The more ardent portion of the population, who had enlisted as volunteers, wished to persevere ; but their opinion could have no weight, as they would themselves have been obliged to fly before the regular troops after exchanging a few shots.

M. de Martignac returned to General Clausel, and assured him of a speedy surrender, provided he did not precipitate events, and allowed the Duchess d'Angoulême sufficient time to leave the city. General Clausel, appreciating the difficulty of the position, promised to remain at Bastide until prudence should have prevailed over passion. On the 1st of April he took up his position on the right bank of the Gironde, whence he could tranquilly observe the tumult that reigned at Bordeaux. Opposite to him, on the other side of the river, the national guard and volunteers were drawn up under arms. It was

already known that the Duchess d'Angoulême was about to abandon the city, and for this the volunteers blamed the national guard—some battalions in particular, that had the reputation of being too moderate. A collision soon followed; an esteemed officer of the national guard was killed, and the men, excited by the violence of the volunteers, declared for an immediate surrender. The Duchess d'Angoulême embarked; and General Clausel, having got possession of the bridge of the Gironde, entered Bordeaux, and without a single act of severity quietly re-established the imperial authority in the town.

M. de Vitrolles, as we have already said, had tried to establish at Toulouse a royalist government, which was to serve as a connecting link between Bordeaux, where the Duchess d'Angoulême was exerting herself, and Marseilles, where her husband, the duke, was making preparations for an offensive campaign. M. de Vitrolles levied taxes and raised troops, formed battalions of volunteers, and placed them, together with the few detachments of the line that still supported the royalist cause, under the command of Marshal Perignon, who resided in Languedoc, and who was neither of an age nor character to serve the royal cause effectually. In addition to these measures, M. de Vitrolles got up a *Moniteur*, which was to contradict all reports favourable to the imperial cause, and to propagate such as were favourable to the re-establishment of the Bourbons. This little Toulouse government sent out expeditions, some of which proved successful, others unsuccessful, against neighbouring towns, which, according to information received from Paris, had displayed the tricolor flag. M. de Vitrolles had reckoned upon being able to maintain his position here with the assistance of the Spaniards; but M. de Laval had sent him word from Madrid, that though Ferdinand VII. felt a deep interest for the house of Bourbon, he was himself so embarrassed that he could not spare a single regiment.

The news of General Clausel's entry into Bordeaux put an end to this royalist attempt of uniting Bordeaux and Marseilles. General Count Delaborde, who had fought so well against the English in Spain, was in Toulouse, only waiting an opportunity to raise the imperial standard. General Charton had been sent to him by the war minister, conferring upon him extraordinary powers, and orders to dispel this royalist phantom, that was so uselessly disturbing the country. A part of the 3rd regiment of artillery was at Toulouse, the greater part having been sent to Nîmes, on the service of the Duke d'Angoulême. One company of this regiment, whose fidelity was suspected, had been sent back to Toulouse. General Delaborde profited by this circumstance, and with the assistance of some half-pay officers opened a communication with this regiment, persuaded

the men to mount the tricolor cockade, and then placing himself at their head arrested Marshal Perignon and M. de Vitrolles in the emperor's name. The marshal he allowed to return to his estates, but kept M. de Vitrolles prisoner until the government should decide his fate. This little revolution, executed on the 4th of April, did not cost a single drop of blood, and was the signal for hoisting the tricolor flag along the Pyrenees from Bayonne to Perpignon.

The Duke d'Angoulême had Provence and both banks of the Rhône as far as Valence under his authority, and he had some prospect of success in these parts.

By his visit to Marseilles and Toulon, and his return through Nîmes, this prince had given additional impetus to the royalism of the south, which indeed did not need any. Marshal Massena did not interfere, contenting himself with maintaining the public peace until party spirit should put our ports in danger, and giving up a portion of the troops to the Duke d'Angoulême, only keeping what would be necessary to defend Marseilles and Toulon against any attempt of the English. He had left Toulon in the care of the 69th and 82nd regiments of the line, and had led the 16th to Marseilles, to preserve order there, which indeed was not an easy task amid that excited population.

On the other hand, the Duke d'Angoulême having left Nîmes, ascended the Rhône, and sent a second column through the valley of the Durance, with orders to proceed through Sisteron and Gap to Grenoble. His plan was, that should his party succeed in getting possession of Montélimart, Valence, and Vienne in the valley of the Rhône, and of Gap and Grenoble in the Alps, to unite both columns before Lyon, and recover this capital of the south, and in Napoleon's rear again raise the white flag that had been lowered for a time. This plan, sketched by Generals Ernouf and d'Aultanne, both of whom had remained faithful to the royal cause, failed merely for want of means of putting it into execution. Could the troops be relied on? And if they failed, would the excited people of the south be equal to conquering the less demonstrative, but not less firm and courageous inhabitants of Dauphiné, Lyonnais, and Auvergne? This question could only be solved by a practical test. Here also help was sought from abroad; for the Duke d'Angoulême had sent an officer in whom he could confide to ask the King of Sardinia for some thousand Piedmontese.

The Duke d'Angoulême had under his command the 58th and 83rd regiments of the line, that had been sent in pursuit of Napoleon at his arrival, and had since remained in the valley of the Durance, and also the 10th of the line and the 14th of the cavalry chasseurs, that had been brought from Languedoc.

The 10th was commanded by M. d'Ambrugeac, and called the Colonel's regiment: the officers were all reliable, though animated by the same feelings as the rest of the army. This regiment showed no symptoms of disaffection, because its members were kept by circumstances in another train of ideas. The presence of the prince and of numerous royalist volunteers had led the 10th into a path it would not have chosen for itself. The 14th chasseurs had obeyed, but less ardently, the general impulsion. These troops were joined by a detachment of the 3rd artillery, a company of which had just effected the revolution of Toulouse; and they were also reinforced by bands of volunteers from Nîmes, Avignon, Arles, Aix, and Beaucaire. As little confidence was felt in the regiments of the line, however well they might seem disposed, an effort was made to weaken or dissolve them by offering sixty francs to every man that would leave the line and join the royalist volunteers. It was accepted by some who, having left their country at fifteen or twenty, had become in some sort mercenaries, and were willing to fight for any cause, provided it was not that of another country. It was hoped that these well-drilled men would give that consistence to the volunteers in which they failed, not for want of courage, but of experience.

In pursuance of the arranged plan, General Ernouf took the 58th and 83rd regiments that had remained on the banks of the Durance, and undertook the execution of the expedition which, proceeding along this river, was to terminate at Grenoble. He was also accompanied by a contingent of volunteers. The Duke d'Angoulême, with the 10th of the line—the Colonel's regiment—the 14th chasseurs, a troop of volunteers, and four hundred men of the 1st foreign regiment, altogether amounting to about five thousand men, undertook the principal object of the expedition, which was to ascend the Rhône and successively take possession of Montélimart, Valence, and Vienne. General Ernouf had promised to be as expeditious as possible, and reach Grenoble by the time the duke arrived at Vienne.

On the 28th of March the Duke d'Angoulême boldly took possession of the bridge St. Esprit, and leaving a detachment there entered Montélimart on the 29th. The people of the Lower Rhône were eminently royalist, whilst those of the Upper were Bonapartist; but there was always a sufficient minority in each place to allow each party to make a demonstration in turn. The Duke d'Angoulême was well received at Montélimart, where he sought to strengthen his position by seizing the bridge of the Drôme.

At the first intelligence of this movement the authorities of Dauphiné and Lyonnais hastened to collect what troops they had, which were not many, for the greater number of regiments

had followed Napoleon to Paris. They had none but the national guards, who, though most zealous, were not equal to encounter troops of the line. General Debelle left Valence with some national guards, and tried to make a stand on the other side of the Drôme, but was repulsed by Count Amédée d'Escars with a detachment of the 10th of the line, together with some troops composed of volunteers and old soldiers. Though General Debelle had been forced to repass the Drôme, he endeavoured to preserve the line of the river by defending the bridge of Loriol.

The Duke d'Angoulême feeling more confident, determined to advance from Montélimart to Valence. He remained a day or two at Montélimart to organise the places in his interest, and on the 2nd tried to force the passage of the Drôme. General Debelle had given the bridge of Loriol in charge to Noël, the commander of the battalion of artillery, an honest man, who would not re-enter the service until freed from his oath by the departure of Louis XVIII. He had under his command three hundred men of the 39th, a half squadron of the guards of honour, and four hundred national guards from the neighbourhood. Noël placed his artillery on the bridge, defended by a detachment of the 39th, and dispersed the remainder of his men along the Drôme to defend the quays of the river above and below Loriol bridge. He kept this position for some time, and would have succeeded in arresting the progress of the royalists but for a curious accident, which was interpreted in various ways at the time. The Bonapartists counted with certainty on the defection of the 10th regiment of the line and the 14th chasseurs, and were ready to receive them with open arms. Some soldiers of the 10th thinking the moment was come to declare themselves, left their regiments, and sprang on the bridge, holding their muskets reversed. They were received as brothers, and it was thought that the troops that followed were coming in the same spirit. But two companies of the 10th, kept in good order by their officers, fired, and then mounted the bridge with fixed bayonets. The men of the 39th were taken by surprise, and retired in disorder, crying that they were betrayed. By this accident the royalists conquered the whole course of the Drôme, and entered Valence on the 3rd of April with the Duke d'Angoulême at their head, amidst the acclamations of the royalist party.

The duke acted at Valence as he had done at Montélimart : he remained there for two days to appoint authorities devoted to his cause, and to await intelligence from the column which, passing through Sisteron and Gap, was to advance on and take Grenoble. But this column had not been so successful as the other.

General Ernouf, following the route by which Napoleon had arrived at Grenoble, had in passing from the Durance to the Isère to traverse the long and narrow gorge of the defiles of St. Bonnet, the same where the Elba column had narrowly escaped being stopped in its progress. To avoid this danger, the general determined to force the passage simultaneously at two points. The 58th regiment and some royalists under the command of General Gardanne were to advance along the highroad to Gap, then turn to the left, and enter the defile of St. Bonnet, whilst the 83rd, under General Loverdo, leaving the highroad that led to Gap, were to advance by a lateral gorge, and reach La Mure through Serres and Mens, thus effecting their purpose by turning St. Bonnet.

This plan was followed exactly, and the two detachments advanced towards the appointed places, whilst the Duke d'Angoulême proceeded to Montélimart. General Gardanne, formerly governor of the pages under the empire, unwillingly aided the royal cause, and served under the Bourbon only because he dreaded Napoleon's resentment for his inconsistent conduct since 1814. He appeared before Gap with troops as discontented, but not so irresolute as himself, and who only waited for a favourable opportunity to change sides. On their way they met the Mayor of Gap, who came in the most friendly manner to offer them provisions, and express his astonishment at seeing them engaged in a warfare so unnatural and useless as resistance to the empire. The soldiers smiled as they listened, and looking at each other, asked if it were time to follow their own inclinations. Still the demonstrations of the people around were not yet sufficiently marked to encourage them.

The next day they entered the defile of St. Bonnet, and were again met by the mayor and inhabitants, bringing provisions in abundance, as on the day before, but now crying *Vive l'Empereur!* with all their might. At this the soldiers yielded, drew the tricolored cockade from their knapsacks, fixed them in their shakos, and declared for the emperor. General Chabert, who now arrived, reassured General Gardanne by telling him that the past had been pardoned, and thus induced him to follow the example of the troops. The royalist volunteers, who were allowed to depart unmolested, returned to Sisteron under the command of some officers who had remained faithful.

Whilst the detachment under General Gardanne behaved in this manner, that under General Loverdo did not act much better. During the 28th, 29th, and 30th of March, General Loverdo, with the 83rd regiment and the two Provençal columns, had advanced towards Serres and St. Maurice, and were approaching La Mure in the rear of General Chabert, opposed to General Gardanne. He there learned how the 58th had

behaved, and met Generals Gardanne and Chabert, who were come to convert him. Immediately after the landing at the Gulf of Juan, General Loverdo, yielding to his personal feelings, felt inclined to join Napoleon. Since then, placed in the very focus of royalism, he had become so engaged with the partisans of the Bourbons that he could not free himself with honour. He therefore remained faithful to the cause to which accident had bound him; and though tempted to yield to the entreaties of Generals Chabert and Gardanne, he retraced his steps, taking with him the highly discontented 83rd. But scarcely had he arrived at Sisteron when the regiment that had so unwillingly followed its general deserted to a man, and hastened to join General Chabert on the road to Grenoble. These two regiments were a powerful reinforcement to the partisans of the empire in this district, and were soon to be sent to oppose the Duke d'Angoulême between Vienne and Valence.

Whilst such untoward events were taking place in the very bosom of that column that was sent to take possession of Grenoble and then join the Duke d'Angoulême on the road to Lyon, still more disagreeable events were occurring in his rear. The Duke d'Angoulême had left the people of Languedoc influenced by different feelings, some ardent in the royal cause, and others inflamed with a revolutionary and Bonapartist spirit. The news from Paris, at first contradicted, was now universally known to be true, and inspired the partisans of the empire with hope and the desire of triumph. General Gilly, who had been exiled to Remoulins, near Nîmes, was with many other half-pay officers only waiting for an opportunity to rise. He came to Nîmes, where, assisted by some of his old companions-in-arms, he communicated with the 63rd of the line and the 10th chasseurs, whom the Duke d'Angoulême had left in that town, and induced them to assume the tricolor cockade. This was not a difficult enterprise, for there were no troops to oppose the movement; and as the Protestant population hastened to follow the example of the soldiers, the revolution was accomplished in an instant at Nîmes. General Gilly then, putting himself at the head of the 63rd regiment of the line and the 10th chasseurs, advanced to the bridge St. Esprit, and took it from the detachment of royalist volunteers left to guard the position. Thus what the Duke d'Angoulême had sought to do to Napoleon befell himself—that is to say, that as he advanced, the work which he had accomplished and left in his rear was destroyed.

Abandoned on the right by the column he had sent towards Grenoble, threatened in the rear by the troops left at Nîmes, the Duke d'Angoulême would have no chance of escape unless

able to advance and force the gates of Lyon. But every path seemed to close before him instead of opening. General Grouchy arrived at Lyon on the 3rd of April, and found the inhabitants in an extraordinary state of excitement. From the moment that it had been known in Lyonnais, Franche-Comté, and Auvergne that the Marseillais, with the other inhabitants of the south, were advancing on Lyon, an inverse movement had sprung up amongst the inhabitants. Besides the jealousy entertained against the southern populations, they were looked on with peculiar prejudice in the district of the upper basin of the Rhône. Of course a great deal of calumny was added to a little truth; they were called fanatics, cruel-hearted, and devastators. Still they were not more hated than feared. In consequence of this, the inhabitants of the Lyonnais, and of the districts for thirty leagues round, rose at once, and numerous companies of national guards hastened to the defence of Lyon. Lyon alone furnished more than 6000 men, and at least 30,000 were on their way to join them. Nearly all Dauphiné was preparing to make a descent on Vienne and Valence.

General Grouchy sent the Lyonnais national guards to St. Vallier, and ordered General Piré to lead the 6th regiment to the Roman bridge, and protect the line of the Isère. He next sent a battalion of the 39th together with the 83rd, which had just joined the imperial cause, to St. Marcellin. The Isère was thus guarded on all sides; and the Duke d'Angoulême, who had seen the gates of Grenoble closed on his right, and the bridge of St. Esprit taken in his rear, while he had no hopes of taking Lyon that lay before him, saw himself, as it were, enclosed by an iron circle. No course remained but to retrace his steps as quickly as possible, and endeavour to regain Avignon and the road to Marseilles before the Languedocians should come up.

On the 5th of April he determined to retreat, and left Valence at six in the morning. While he was retreating, the Isère was crossed at every point by the Lyonnais, the 6th light infantry, and the 39th and 83rd regiments of the line. All the 14th chasseurs on the bridge of Lorient and on the Drôme abandoned the royal cause. The 3rd artillery showed the worst dispositions, but the 10th regiment of infantry (Colonel General), surrounded by three thousand royalist volunteers, acted with more fidelity. The prince arrived at Montélimart on the 7th of April, where he learned that the road to Avignon was occupied by General Gilly's forces, that had passed the bridge of St. Esprit and been reinforced by a mass of national guards from Dauphiné. He was evidently doomed to become Napoleon's prisoner, and had no other resource than an honourable capitulation to save himself and his troops. He sent Baron Damas to negotiate

with General Gilly. As far as the prince himself was concerned there would be no difficulty, and General Gilly, interpreting Napoleon's sentiments by his own, said that the prince should be free on condition of evacuating the country immediately. But unfortunately General Gilly's officers and soldiers did not share his sentiments, which prevented his dealing as leniently with the prince as he would wish.

However, the conditions on both sides were stated in such a manner, that after a few objections everything was arranged. It was decided that the prince, with some officers, should be at liberty to retire to one of the ports in Provence or Languedoc and there embark; that the troops of the line should again put themselves under the imperial authority, whilst the royalist volunteers should be at liberty to depart as soon as they laid down their arms; that the money belonging to the State should be restored to the proper agents; and thus every trace of the royalist insurrection would disappear. These conditions were accepted and signed on the 8th of April by Baron Damas and General Gilly, subject, however, to the superior authority of General Grouchy, commandant in the southern provinces.

No sooner were the terms of this capitulation made known than the national guards hastened in crowds from Dauphiné, and taking possession of the road to Avignon, became fearfully excited, and demanded loudly that these conditions should not be ratified.

At this moment General Grouchy, having arrived at Valence, was preparing to descend on Montélimart and Avignon to continue the pursuit of the royalists. When he learned, on the 9th, that the Duke d'Angoulême was a prisoner, and that the decision of his fate was referred to him, he felt greatly embarrassed. Although greatly irritated against the Bourbons, he was not forgetful of the bonds that subsisted between him and them; and to act with harshness towards the Duke d'Angoulême would be as repugnant to his family traditions as to his natural inclinations. Instead of seizing his person, he would prefer impelling him gently towards the sea, as General Exelmans had impelled Louis XVIII. towards the Belgian frontier. And this would have been conformable to Napoleon's instructions: his words to him were, "Get the prince out of the country." But as the prince was in his hands, he was bound by his very instructions to refer the matter to Paris. He sent a courier to Lyon, that the emperor's orders might be demanded thence by telegraph. The Duke d'Angoulême and his companions were therefore detained at St. Esprit until an answer should arrive from Paris. In every other respect he was treated with all the attention due to his rank and gallant conduct. Meanwhile the 10th infantry (Colonel General) and the 3rd artillery passed over to the imperial camp.

During this delay the southern insurrection died away, after a few unimportant attempts. As Generals Ernouf and Loverdo had promised the Duke d'Angoulême that they would reach Grenoble at the same time that he would arrive at Vienne, they endeavoured notwithstanding the number of desertions to keep their word. Unsupported, except by some royalist volunteers, they attempted to get beyond Sisteron, in the direction of Gap. General Loverdo encamped on the evening of the 6th at the village of Saulce, situate at the entrance of a defile formed by a steep rock on one side and the Durance on the other. This defile was defended by a battalion of the 49th, provided with cannon. The peasantry, who hated the royalists, had assembled on the summit of the rock, prepared to throw down large stones on the assailants.

On the morning of the 7th the commandant of the battalion of the 49th advanced between the two rival troops in order to hold a parley. He was answered with a fire of musketry. He immediately ordered that General Loverdo's column should be attacked with grapeshot, whilst the peasantry poured down on them an avalanche of stones. Then the royalist volunteers, though brave, fled, being neither disciplined nor accustomed to warfare. Some who tried to swim across the Durance were shot from the banks, and the remainder retired towards Sisteron, leaving one hundred and fifty dead on the field.

Whilst these events were taking place on the Durance, Massena was placed in a very delicate position between the Bourbons, whom he did not love, and Napoleon, towards whom he did not feel much better disposed, but who, he considered, represented the cause of the Revolution, whilst he felt himself bound to the prince by a sense of military duty. He did not wish either to serve or betray the prince, but remained at Marseilles to preserve tranquillity and prevent any outbreak. Having learned that a project was entertained of combining the French and English navies, and that under pretext of uniting the two flags there was a risk of Toulon being given up to our rivals on the sea, he thought the time was come to declare himself. He went to Toulon, assembled the troops, and displayed the tricolored flag. He then sent an officer to Marseilles, and allowed that city twenty-four hours to lower the white and raise the tricolored flag. Threatened by Massena on one side, and by General Grouchy on the other, Marseilles yielded, and with great regret proclaimed the re-establishment of the empire. On the 10th of April all this part of the south had submitted to Napoleon, who was now acknowledged from Antibes to Huningue, from Huningue to Dunkirk, from Dunkirk to Bayonne, and from Bayonne to Perpignan. The Duke d'Angoulême was still a prisoner at

St. Esprit; and though he had given unmistakable evidence of courage, he was not free from apprehension, because he judged Napoleon according to the prejudices of his own party. He preserved the dignity that became his rank, piously resigned to whatever might happen, though punished for his unjust prejudices by secret uneasiness.

He was in no danger, as may well be supposed, and had only to suffer the weariness of awaiting the end of his captivity in the midst of an excited people, amongst whom his enemies alone were visible, whilst his conquered friends were obliged to keep themselves concealed.

It was on the morning of the 11th that Napoleon heard how affairs had terminated in the south, the Duke d'Angoulême's captivity, and the capitulation, in virtue of which this prince was to embark at the port of Cette. He unhesitatingly approved of what had been done, supposing from the despatches he had received that the capitulation had been already executed, or was on the eve of being so. By his orders M. de Bassano wrote that the capitulation was approved of, and ought to be executed immediately. As soon as this was known, and no attempt was made to conceal it, many persons attached to Napoleon and the cause he represented found fault with what he had done, and blamed his want of prudence. Without pretending that he ought to avenge himself for the ordinance of the 6th of March, or the declarations of the 13th, they said that they were engaged in a fearful struggle, during which numerous and strange turns of fortune would occur; that many beloved of France might fall into the hands of the enemy; and that whilst treating the Duke d'Angoulême with all the consideration that was due to him, it still might not be useless to detain him as a hostage. Napoleon did not deny the apparent advantage of this plan, but still persisted in his design of contrasting his conduct with that of his enemies, and thought this contrast more useful to him than would be the most valuable hostage. He did not regret what he had done, even when, on the evening of this day, a fresh despatch informed him of what he had not known before, that the capitulation had not been yet executed, and that the prince was still a prisoner at St. Esprit. There was time still to change his resolution, and adopt the opinion of those who did not approve of the capitulation. He had a long conversation on this subject with M. de Bassano. "Perhaps I ought," he said, "to retain the Duke d'Angoulême as a hostage that would be useful in our present hazardous and uncertain position. But I will not do so; it is better to let the sovereigns opposed to us see the difference that there is between them and me." This was proper pride, which shows the want Napoleon felt of public opinion, and the progress that morals had made since

the bloody catastrophe of Vincennes. He immediately confirmed the orders sent by M. de Bassano; and the next day the *Moniteur* published the letter sent to General Grouchy, in which Napoleon said that though the royal ordinance of the 6th of March, and the declaration of Vienna of the 13th, would justify his treating the Duke d'Angoulême as the allies had wished to treat himself, still he would not retaliate, but allow the Duke d'Angoulême to leave as freely as the other members of his family. Napoleon confined himself to obliging the prince to promise that the crown jewels should be restored, without, however, detaining him till the fulfilment of the promise.

Napoleon was delighted at the prompt and happy termination of the troubles in the south. He had never doubted of a successful termination, but days and even hours were of great value in his present position; and it was of the utmost importance that his troops should not be exhausted in repressing a civil war. The division sent to Lyon continued its route, to help in the formation of the 7th corps, which was to guard the Alps under the command of Marshal Suchet. Napoleon summoned Marshal Massena to Paris, in order to seal a reconciliation with this old companion-in-arms, who was to return to the south if he chose. Marshal Brune was sent meanwhile to command at Marseilles, Toulon, and Antibes. Having learned from some intercepted letters the disposition of the Spaniards, Napoleon thought that the 8th corps, intended for General Clausel, and which consisted of twelve regiments, would be sufficiently strong with six. Of these he formed two divisions, of which one was to be stationed at Bordeaux, and the other at Toulouse; more, indeed, to restrain the royalists than to oppose the Spaniards. Of the six remaining regiments, four were sent as a reserve to Avignon, and two were ordered to Marseilles, where, together with the troops from Corsica, they were to form the 9th corps, which was to defend Var. The regiments at Avignon were to reinforce Marshal Brune or Marshal Suchet, according to the direction the war should take on the frontier. Although Napoleon had advised Murat not to hasten to make a demonstration, he still dreaded some imprudence on his part, and for that reason summoned Marshal Suchet from Strasburg, where he commanded the 5th corps, and sent him into Savoy to superintend the formation of the 7th. For the same reason he had prepared a reserve at Avignon, and even thought of giving him the entire of the 9th corps, which was to be organised at Var, under Marshal Brune. Napoleon, unceasingly occupied with this general plan, had made a fresh alteration. Five corps, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th, together with the imperial guard, were to act under

his orders on the northern frontier; the 5th, under Rapp, since Marshal Suchet had taken the command of the 7th, was to continue in Alsace. In B  fort, where there is, as is well known, a gorge between the Vosges and Jura chains, he determined to form an intermediary corps from one division of the line and several divisions of the mobile national guards. The command of this was given to the general most skilful in mountain warfare, the illustrious Lecourbe, who had not been employed since the process against Moreau. If Switzerland remained neutral, Lecourbe was to go either to reinforce the 5th corps in Alsace, or the 7th near the Alps, as circumstances might require. If he were not needed at either place, he was to remain where he was, and keep watch on the debouches of B  le and Poligny.

These additions being made to his plan, Napoleon ordered that those regiments (the 10th in particular) that had taken part in the civil war, with their principal officers, excepting those who had compromised themselves too deeply, should come to Paris. He wished to see them, seal a reconciliation, and attach them to his cause. He also summoned General Grouchy, to reward him in an extraordinary manner; not because this general had accomplished anything very difficult, but because he wished to show the army that in the present circumstances fidelity should not remain unrewarded. By this short expedition, in which scarcely a single shot was fired, and of which the merit, if there were any, belonged to General Gilly, General Grouchy gained a marshal's baton, which had never before been given but as a reward for a successful battle. But Napoleon wished to encourage devotion to his cause, and at the same time elevate to a high rank an officer accustomed to command cavalry, as he wished to have a commander for the reserve of cavalry, as death or desertion had successively deprived him of Lasalle, Montbrun, Bessi  res, and Murat. Alas! he soon had reason to regret this lavish bestowal of favour, in which policy had more weight than sound military reasons.

Napoleon was right in thus hastening his preparations for war, for each day brought fresh signs of the implacable hatred excited against him throughout Europe. We have already seen how, immediately after the departure of the foreign legations, he had sent couriers to recall our ambassadors, and at the same time to order them to declare that France was willing to keep peace with the European powers on the conditions of existing treaties. These couriers, who had left on the 28th and 29th of March, had all been stopped at the frontiers. The courier who had presented himself at the bridge of Kehl had been sent back by an Austrian commander, who would not allow him to enter even guarded. Another, trying to pass through Metz, had been stopped by the Prussian commander, and grossly ill-

treated. A third, passing through Switzerland and Lombardy, had not been able to cross the Alps. These were unusual proceedings, even in time of war ; for, as Napoleon remarked, war is made only for the purpose of securing peace, and never, even during the most violent hostilities, had communications tending to put a period to the effusion of blood been interdicted. This unexampled species of diplomatic excommunication was evidently personal, and a consequence of the strange declaration of the 13th of March.

Far from seeking to conceal the reception his couriers had met, Napoleon arranged another mission still more remarkable, and whose failure he wished should be still more conspicuous. An occasion presented itself quite naturally. On reascending the French throne, it was etiquette that he should write to the different sovereigns to inform them of the event. Having frequently corresponded with them as ally or master, he could not be accused of the presumption of a parvenu in doing so now. He himself wrote a few lines full of moderation and dignity, in which he declared that he accepted existing treaties, and that, were his sentiments shared by the other monarchs, *justice seated on the frontiers of nations would be sufficient to defend them.* As the greater number of sovereigns were at Vienna, it was to that capital his envoy ought to be sent, and etiquette required that for this mission he should select one of his aides-de-camp, as such are generally the bearers of royal letters. He chose the Count de Flahault, one of the most distinguished of his aides-de-camp, one of the best connected, and who had been most frequently sent to foreign courts. Simple couriers had been stopped, but it was possible that more respect would be shown to a lieutenant-general.

Count Flahault left on the 4th of April, passed the bridge of Kehl, which the cabinet couriers had not succeeded in doing, advanced into Germany, and when he flattered himself that he had surmounted all obstacles he was arrested at Stuttgart by an order from the court of Wurtemberg. He was deprived of his despatches, with a promise, however, that they should be transmitted to Vienna. A commander in the imperial navy was equally unsuccessful in trying to cross the Straits of Dover. As he had been sent to negotiate on the coast of England, he was not treated as an enemy, but prevented from advancing. His despatches were taken and sent to London, and he was told that they would be opened at Vienna, whence an answer would be sent if necessary.

In order to explain this strange prohibition of all communication, we must relate what took place at Vienna when Napoleon's arrival on the coast of France was announced. When Napoleon left Elba, he thought that the Congress of Vienna

had been dissolved, or at least that the sovereigns had left the Austrian capital, and that their ministers alone remained to arrange some unimportant questions. This intelligence was correct when sent to Napoleon, but the late arrival of the King of Saxony at Presburg, his opposition to the decisions of the Congress, together with Murat's military demonstrations, had delayed the departure of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, who would not leave while any difficulty remained to be solved. Therefore, when intelligence of the landing in the Gulf of Juan, despatched from Genoa, arrived at Vienna, the sovereigns, with their ministers, except Lord Castlereagh, who had been replaced by the Duke of Wellington, were still there. All were at a fête when the news arrived. They were thunderstruck. Let us picture these potentates to ourselves for a moment: some of them had been deprived of their dominions by Napoleon, others kept in continual apprehension of the same fate, and all had been suddenly transformed from conquered to conquerors—from slaves they had become masters, and had not only recovered what they had lost, but had increased their possessions, some by half, others by a fourth or fifth. Let us imagine them now overpowered by an unexpected blow, and almost fancying themselves transported back to those terrible years 1809, 1810, 1811, when they were plundered, humbled, and submissive, and we may form some idea of what they felt. Their first sentiment was terror, a terror, alas! flattering to us, for it made them believe that eleven months had been sufficient to restore the exhausted strength of France. This terror was so evident that it excited the malicious mockery of the English diplomatists, who, thanks to the ocean, had nothing to fear for their country. But consternation gave place to violent anger against the real or supposed authors of the coming misfortunes. First, all blamed the Emperor Alexander, who had had the imprudence to give Napoleon the island of Elba by the treaty of the 11th of April. Next the Bourbons were blamed for having, by their maladministration, facilitated his return to France. In fact, there was a general outcry against Alexander's thoughtlessness and the Bourbons' want of ability. And those who uttered these complaints added that they were themselves to blame for having confided the government of France to such hands.

Alexander was fully aware of the outcry that was raised against him, for the Russians were amongst the loudest in condemning what had been done. He defended himself by saying that the treaty of the 11th of April was unavoidable; that at the time it was concluded nobody had made a serious objection, for all were anxious to get rid of Napoleon at any price, he being then at Fontainebleau at the head of seventy thousand

men, and able to summon a hundred thousand more from the Pyrenees, Lyon, and Italy by falling back on the south of France; that the Bourbons were alone to blame, because they had refused to execute the treaty, and had induced Napoleon to break it by refusing to pay his subsidy, and finally, had opened him a path into France by their bad government. He added that if he had caused the evil he would repair it, by employing his last soldier and his last crown in the coming struggle. He tried to conceal his annoyance by his anger, and from that day forth amongst the allies he was the most violent in language and conduct.

So excited were the members of the Congress that not one thought of asking himself whether Napoleon had not returned changed, or at least ameliorated, by misfortune; whether, for example, he would not be willing to accept, not only the Treaty of Paris, but that of Vienna; in which case nothing need be asked of him but good faith. But the idea of Napoleon inclined to peace, corrected by misfortune, or modified in his views, never entered the mind of any.

They could only see the dreaded leader who had made such fearful use of the armies of France, who had displayed in the heart of Europe the devastating ambition of an Asiatic despot; and these men, filled with terror, came to the instant resolution of struggling with their adversary unto death. There are moments when fear itself gives birth to heroism. There was now but one thought, one wish—universal, relentless, bloody war, which was to terminate only with the destruction of one party or the other.

However, it was necessary to wait some days before drawing up a declaration, in order to know whether Napoleon had succeeded—of which there was little doubt whether France alone was his aim—of which there was still less doubt; and finally, it would be necessary to wait for fuller information, and not incur the risk of merely beating the air. In fact, many were doubtful as to what might be the designs of him who had escaped from Elba; for the allies in their anxiety not only shifted the blame, but the danger from one to the other. Talleyrand wished to believe that Napoleon had landed in the Gulf of Juan with the intention of proceeding by Nice and Tende into Italy. "Do not mind us," said M. de Metternich harshly to him, "but think of yourselves. Believe me, Napoleon is on the road to Paris; perhaps he is at Lyon this very moment, and will be at the Tuileries in a few days."

Whilst awaiting the solution of these doubts, the allies turned their attention to what was most urgent, and that, for these co-spoilers of Europe, was to take immediate possession of the lands allotted them, and to seize them in the very presence of the

former ruler of the continent. For this, the first thing necessary was to get the King of Saxony's consent to the sacrifices required of him. According to the existing theory of international law—a theory true at all times, but now put forward with a good deal of affectation—no territory could be ceded but what the ceder *abandoned himself, of his own free and unconstrained will*. It was therefore necessary that the King of Saxony should abandon the provinces that Prussia coveted, after which Prussia would yield to Russia what she desired in Poland, and the latter could make the necessary concessions to Austria; and thus the series of stipulated concessions, which were sacrifices for some, aggrandisements for others, would follow in natural succession.

The three plenipotentiaries who had defended the King of Saxony were chosen as envoys, and sent to meet him at Presburg. These were M. de Talleyrand for France, M. de Metternich for Austria, and Lord Wellington for England. They proceeded to Presburg, whither Frederick Augustus had been removed, and found him determined to resist, and very little influenced by the services they said they had done him. Several days of intense importunity having passed without producing any change in the king's determination, the three diplomatists assured him that if he did not formally sign the decisions of the Congress, that Prussia would take possession of the provinces allotted to her, whilst he should not be put in possession of those left to the crown of Saxony, but remain prisoner of the allies.

Though this unhappy prince did not yield to these threats, it was evident that he would not resist much longer. The three negotiators then returned to Vienna to make the final arrangements. They arranged the dispute between Bavaria and Austria concerning Salzburg, and nothing then remained but for the sovereigns to assume the titles of their new States. Alexander immediately assumed the titles of Emperor of all the Russias and King of Poland. Frederick William called himself King of Prussia, Grand Duke of Posen, Duke of Saxony, Landgrave of Thuringia, Margrave of the two Lusatias, &c. Besides the title of Emperor of Austria, which he had substituted for that of Emperor of Germany in 1806, the Emperor Francis assumed the title of King of Italy, and by a solemn act, which was immediately published beyond the Alps, he constituted the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, which was to consist of the Italian provinces between the Tessino and the Isonzo. By this act the Italians, like the Poles, were allowed the consolation of forming a separate kingdom. The King of Sardinia, to whom Genoa was conceded, and the King of the Low Countries, whose possessions had been doubled by the addition of Belgium, assumed

the titles of their new States, together with the qualifications resulting from them. The sovereigns took care to take possession of their acquisitions in a few days, in order that the war about to commence might make no change in these arrangements, except to make them more secure in case of victory.

Whilst each was thus occupied with his own interests, intelligence of Napoleon's triumphal entry into Grenoble arrived on the 12th of March, and the nature and success of his designs could be no longer doubted. A meeting was immediately held, and to M. de Talleyrand was left the initiative in the propositions to be laid before the Congress. However much displeased with the Bourbons, none disputed his being the representative of Louis XVIII., nor that his sovereign was King of France. As the common interest demanded that the restoration of Napoleon and his family should not be permitted on any account, it became a necessity to support the Bourbons, the only possible dynasty. Although M. de Talleyrand had personal reasons to be dissatisfied with the Court of France, he, for the same reasons as the Congress, saw the necessity of upholding the Bourbons, and indeed he was too deeply committed to their policy to hesitate.

Aware that the surest means of rendering Napoleon unpopular in the eyes of France, exhausted as she was by twenty-two years of warfare, was to prove the impossibility of his reconciliation with Europe, he suggested that the Congress should republish in its integrity the ordinance of Louis XVIII. of the 6th of March, and treat Napoleon as a malefactor, who, having broken his ban, ought to be instantly put to death upon his identity being proved. This was a strange proceeding with regard to a man who had reigned so long and so gloriously; but so violent was the general irritation that none paused to reflect on public acts nor their mode of execution. M. Talleyrand proposed, therefore, that a declaration should be drawn up to the effect that Bonaparte, having violated the treaty of the 11th of April, and thus destroyed the sole legal title that secured his existence, he should be looked on as an outlaw by all nations, and treated as such in case he should be taken. Alexander's generosity and Austria's moderation ought to have raised some objection to such a declaration, but every objection was overruled in the former by anger, and in the latter by the fear of being suspected; and the declaration, with the exception of one or two offensive terms, was adopted, dated the 13th of March, and sent by a courier-extraordinary to Strasburg, that it might be published along the frontiers, and if not too late, serve the royal cause by letting France know how unanimous Europe was in her enmity to Napoleon.

Some days more were spent in awaiting intelligence, some-

times with full faith in Napoleon's success, sometimes doubting this success when there arose the slightest gleam of hope; but during these few days none thought of anything but immediate and relentless war, Prussia through revival of all her former hatred, Russia through anger at being the dupe of her own generosity, England through fear of losing the great advantages she had obtained, and Austria through the cold conviction of the impossibility of avoiding the struggle, and through fear of exciting the distrust of her allies. This latter power, though having as much at stake as the others, was the only one that, thanks to the *sang froid* of the emperor and of M. de Metternich, was able to judge calmly of the actual state of affairs. Austria was inclined to believe that Napoleon would offer to accept the Treaties of Paris and Vienna; she believed even that, enlightened by experience, he would consent to territorial losses, and that covered with military glory, he would now seek that of peace, and endeavour to add an olive branch to the many laurels that encircled his brow. But she was not sure of this. And it was also possible that, inconsolable for having diminished the glory of France by his own fault, he would first allow himself and France some rest, and that when he had given the European union time to be dissolved, and having recruited his own military resources, whilst those of the enemy would be lessened or dispersed, he would recommence the struggle, and again be in a position to propose treaties, if not such as those of Tilsit and Vienna, at least such as those of Campo-Formio and Luneville. This second supposition was as possible as the first; and even were it less likely to be true, in doubt it is better to choose the surest plan, and the surest in this case was to seek Napoleon's ruin by every possible means. Thus, though not influenced by hatred like Prussia, nor by wounded vanity like Russia, nor by avarice like England, Austria was calmly and coolly resolved. But there was some difference of opinion in her councils as to the surest means of ruining Napoleon. Some Austrian statesmen were of opinion that Napoleon, returning after the Bourbons had reigned eleven months, would be greatly embarrassed by the numerous parties by whom he would find himself surrounded, and that by merely encouraging domestic factions the allies would be dispensed from the necessity of employing against him the terrible and doubtful engine of war. But this astute calculation, little in harmony with the violent passions of the time, might cause Austria's intentions to be suspected, and would give room for the suspicion that she wished for some such measure as the regency of Marie Louise, and thus the union of the coalition, which was looked on as the safeguard of Europe, would be destroyed. Austria therefore adhered calmly but firmly to

the plan of a destructive war, and that for two reasons—distrust of Napoleon, and the consciousness of the necessity for union amongst the allies.

Exceedingly anxious not to give the slightest cause of offence, the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich employed every means to get Marie Louise into their power, and prevent all imprudence on her part. This was not difficult, as they had the power in their hands, and the Duchy of Parma would provide them with the means of persuasion. It did not need so much, alas! to influence this princess. She had already yielded not only to her father's wishes, which might be excusable, but also to those of Count Neiperg, who exercised the most absolute dominion over her, and was become her guide, defender, and only friend. In her isolation and her weakness she had not been able to resist the attentions and personal attractions of the count, and had quite forgotten her duties, the obligations of her rank, and her sad but glorious destiny. When she heard of Napoleon's first success she was deeply moved, and yielded to a momentary feeling of regret. But soon recalling the Austrians' bonds, through which she must break, and above all, remembering her own faults, she chose the tranquil, opulent, and free existence that awaited her in Parma in preference to all the risks of a stormy career, which indeed were more than she had courage to meet. It must be added, in justice to this princess, that if she were a weak-minded wife, she was an excellent mother; and though not endowed with great mental power, she possessed common sense. She believed in her husband's genius, but distrusted his prudence, and had strong doubts as to his being able to retain possession of the throne; she feared that by returning to him she would only endanger her son's inheritance, without securing him the crown of France; and thus fashioning her son's destiny according to her own tastes, she preferred securing him a certain patrimony in Italy to a chimerical grandeur in France; an undignified calculation, but not incorrect, as events soon showed.

The Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich found her already persuaded, and quite satisfied with their policy, with the understanding, however, that she was to have the Duchy of Parma. The conditions imposed by them were, that she would not leave Vienna; that she would place her son for a time under the guardianship of the Emperor Francis; and remit all communications, whether direct or indirect, which she should receive from her husband, to the Austrian Cabinet, by whom they would be laid, with the seals unbroken, on the table of the Congress. She accepted these conditions, humiliating as they were: she gave up her son to the Emperor Francis, who indeed showed the greatest affection for the child; and what was more

inexcusable, she gave up all the letters she had received from Napoleon. However, in order to make some show of sincerity, she had a conversation with M. Meneval, who was still with her, and who continued Napoleon's faithful friend. She told him that she would not return to France; that as she had not joined her husband when conquered and a prisoner, she would not do so now that he was victorious and on a throne; that, weary of excitement, she would retire into private life, and devote herself to her son, and secure him a small but certain inheritance. M. Meneval having remarked that though the Duchy of Parma had been hereditary, she was only to have a life interest in it, she replied, that that was all she had been able to obtain, which, of course, was to be regretted; but that she would be able to save money, and that in twenty years she could in her duchy amass a large fortune for her son, which as simple archduchess she would never have been able to do; that besides, he would have several large fiefs in Bohemia as a compensation for not inheriting Parma; that he would be an archduke, and what was not usual in Austria, a rich archduke; that she sought his advantage according to her own views; that in all she acted as a mother, and as she considered, an affectionate and devoted one. Thus thought and spoke the wife of Napoleon, not she whom he had chosen in a private station, but she in whose veins the blood of the Cæsars flowed! M. Meneval bent his head in sadness as he heard her words, but spoke not, merely showing in his manner the respectful disapprobation that he did not wish to express.

In consequence of these resolutions, Napoleon's son was taken from his mother, and spite of his infantile complaints, carried to his grandfather's palace, which he was destined never more to leave. The letters which Marie Louise had received through M. Meneval and M. de Bubna were placed before the Congress; for Austria was most anxious to prove to her allies that no secret alliance existed between her and Napoleon. As the reward of this submission, all the powers assured Marie Louise the sovereignty of Parma and Placentia for life.

Soon fresh letters arrived, from which the best results had been anticipated at Paris, but which produced a very different effect at Vienna. The courier sent to Prince Eugène by his steward, and whom Queen Hortense had entrusted with letters for her brother, for Marie Louise, and other persons of distinction, had been arrested, his despatches taken and placed before the Congress. When these letters were read, they produced a most unfavourable effect, especially upon the Emperor of Russia. Alexander, who carried everything to excess, had whilst in Paris been a constant visitor of Queen Hortense, and at Vienna made Prince Eugène his daily companion. He had obtained the

Duchy of St. Leu for Queen Hortense, and had endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to procure a small sovereignty for Prince Eugène. In his anger at Napoleon's return he persuaded himself that the brother and sister had been aware of the expedition from Elba, that he had been deceived by them, and he gave way to a displeasure that was at once sincere and affected; for it was more flattering to his self-love to appear to have been betrayed rather than duped. He therefore spoke of arresting and imprisoning Prince Eugène. After a little reflection and some personal explanations he was appeased on receiving a promise from Prince Eugène that he would not leave Vienna.

All these letters proved what might have been foreseen, that Napoleon had neither been killed nor arrested on his road; that in return, he had not sought to kill the Bourbons, but only expelled them from the kingdom; and had ascended the throne, promising to keep the peace and observe treaties. But it was of very little importance to the sovereigns assembled at Vienna whether Napoleon had returned cruel or generous, corrected by misfortune or not, whether he was inclined for war or peace, free or restrained by treaties; even the least prejudiced were convinced that once re-established on the throne, and his armies recruited, whilst those of the coalition would be dispersed, he would attempt to recover the French frontiers, by which some of the allies would be forced to surrender half the Low Countries, and others half of Poland, Saxony, and Italy. There was no time for hesitation, for the counsels of pride as well as prudence recommended the allies to profit by the dispersion of the French forces, while those of the allies were still united, and destroy at once the powerful man who by his coming made their domination over Europe doubtful, and endangered the lion's share that they had secured at Vienna.

Now that they were better informed, the first violent declaration of the 13th of March gave place to proceedings more practical and serious, though less violent in form. Immediate warfare was agreed to by a treaty that simply renewed the alliance of Chaumont. This alliance stipulated, as the reader may remember, that each of the four allied powers should keep 150,000 men on foot until the object of the alliance had been attained. This contingent was far from indicating all the efforts that were to be made against Napoleon; for it was understood that each power, formally obliged to furnish a stipulated number of men, would also employ all its disposable resources to secure the success of the common cause. It was agreed that the former arrangements for the direction of the allied forces should be renewed; that one power should not act without the others; and especially, that no communication should be received from the enemy without being immediately

referred to the coalition, alone authorised to negotiate in reply. According to this treaty, England was again to furnish the subsidy of six millions sterling, which she had engaged to pay during the continuance of the war, besides a compensation in money for any deficiency in her contingent of 150,000 men.

For her consequently the engagement was more burdensome, if not more serious; but her animosities and her interests were so served by the war, that the allied powers considered themselves under no obligations for her money. She alone was not represented at Vienna by a monarch or a prime minister, for Lord Castlereagh had left for London. But Lord Wellington, who had replaced Lord Castlereagh, confiding in his past services and his popularity in England, did not shrink from the responsibility. Though he had not received instructions—for the time was too short—he did not hesitate as to how he should act. He considered that the state of things that England had brought about in Europe was worth maintaining at the expense of a war: he had a vague idea of increasing his own fame in the coming campaign, and did not hesitate to implicate his government, certain that whatever might be thought of his conduct, not one in England would venture to disavow his acts.

The representative of France wished to take part in this treaty, that he might the better secure the position of the Bourbons; for he saw that their want of ability had brought them into bad odour, and that though all agreed as to the necessity of dethroning Napoleon, the question of who should replace him was by no means decided. M. de Talleyrand was so interested for the Bourbons, that on this occasion he forgot that sense of propriety which he possessed in so eminent a degree, and did not perceive how ill-placed would be the signature of a French plenipotentiary appended to a treaty which proclaimed an exterminating war against France. He asked permission to sign, but the personal motives of his co-operators saved him from this impropriety. The allied sovereigns did not wish that their subjects, and more especially the English people, should think that they were about to make war for the re-establishment of the Bourbons, and desired to seem entirely occupied by the interests of Europe. They therefore decided that they should be the sole contracting parties; but that the other powers should be allowed to give in their adhesion. The treaty in question, which was, in fact, the renewal of the alliance of Chaumont, dated the 25th of March, was sent to London to receive the adhesion of Great Britain. Until then it was to remain a secret, not as to its general bearings, but at least as to its details.

Now that the object and means were decided on, the next question was how these means should be employed. Military

conferences were held at Prince Schwarzenberg's house, at which Alexander insisted on being present. The plan of the campaign was discussed by Prince Schwarzenberg on the part of Austria, the Emperor Alexander and Prince Wolkonsky for Russia, M. de Knesbeck for Prussia, and Lord Wellington for England. They were anxious to commence hostilities at once, and especially Lord Wellington, who already put forth his pretensions to play the principal part in this campaign. But in order to act with more certainty, it was decided that nothing should be done until considerable forces were assembled, so that each of the allied armies should be sufficient to meet the enemy alone. The allied forces were divided into three principal columns. The first was destined for operations in Italy, where the Austrians supposed that Murat would act in concert with Napoleon. The Austrians, in their zeal for all that concerned that country, offered to send 150,000 men there. This body of the allied forces received orders to enter Savoy by Mont Cenis, after having conquered Murat.

The two other columns were to operate against France, Paris being the final object. A column composed of Austrians, Bavarians, Badeners, Wurtembergians, Hessians, and Russians, and consisting of 200,000 men, was to appear on the east, between Bâle and Mentz. This column would not be able to act on the offensive until joined by the Russian contingent of 80,000 men, that, having to pass through Galicia, Bohemia, and Franconia, could not possibly arrive before the middle or end of June.

The last column, though the first in importance, was to commence operations from the north. It was wished that this column should be composed of English, Belgians, Hanoverians, and Northern Germans, especially Prussians, and placed under the command of Lord Wellington, in whose prudence the most perfect confidence was felt. In this case the northern column would have consisted of 250,000 men, which would complete the number of 600,000 active troops that was hoped could be assembled, without counting the Russian, Austrian, and German reserves, which would raise the entire number from 750,000 to 800,000 combatants. The Prussians, whose pride was overruled by their hatred, would have willingly given the command to Lord Wellington, but Blucher's self-love presented an obstacle to this arrangement. It required great tact to overcome this difficulty. It was arranged that the Hollando-Belgians should furnish at least 40,000 men; and as they had a more than ordinary interest in the war, they were to be placed under the command of Lord Wellington, notwithstanding the merit and the well-founded pretensions of the brilliant Prince of Orange, son of the new King of the

Low Countries. The Hanoverians and Brunswickers could have no objection to serve under the British generalissimo. Lord Wellington would thus have 40,000 Hollando-Belgians, about 20,000 Northern Germans, and if to these 60,000 English were added, he would have under his command 120,000 soldiers, without counting the 12,000 or 15,000 Portuguese he hoped to obtain from the court of Lisbon. He did not expect any aid from Spain. But it would not be prudent to meet Napoleon with 120,000 men. Still it was believed that Blucher was too ardent to allow Lord Wellington to take the field first, and it was supposed that he would advance with 100,000 or 120,000 Prussians, that his desire to fight would make him compliant, and induce him to place himself, though not avowedly, under the direction, if not under the orders, of the English general. Lord Wellington would thus find himself at the head of 240,000 men; and this body advancing from the north, whilst that commanded by Prince Schwarzenberg advanced from the east, the result would be as in 1814, for each urging the other towards Paris, Napoleon would be finally stifled there by the hundred-armed coalition. A second Russian army, under the command of Barclay de Tolly, was to follow the first, whilst the Prussian reserve would soon join Blucher. The allies would thus have an additional 150,000 men; and they did not doubt that with 600,000 they would overpower Napoleon, whom they did not suppose would be able to raise more than 200,000 in the then exhausted state of France.

These calculations, which were a little though not much exaggerated, were considered correct, and the proposed plan was immediately adopted.

The Austrian troops were already marching towards Italy, for on this point there was no need of urging the Austrian Cabinet. It was arranged that the second Austrian army should be sent as quickly as possible to Bâle, and that the Bavarians, who had already 30,000 men, should hasten to raise 50,000 more; that the Wurtembergians, Badeners, and Hessians should also be urged on; and that England, in addition to her financial largesses to the greater powers, should be requested to accord some help to the allies of the second order, and that she and the Low Countries should not lose a day in collecting a body of forces capable of opposing Napoleon, in case he should anticipate the expected period of hostilities, that is to say, the middle of June. Lord Wellington wished to leave immediately, that he might consolidate the Belgian, Dutch, Hanoverian, and German troops assembled in the Low Countries. He also wished to be nearer London, in order to support the courage of the British Government, and get the engagements ratified which he had entered into without authority.

He was requested to give some good advice to the Bourbons, who had retired to Belgium; and all wished him success in the coming struggle. The sovereigns determined to remain at Vienna until the arrival of their troops, which they hurried as much as possible, determined, as soon as all were in marching order, to follow Prince Schwarzenberg's headquarters, as they had done during the campaign of 1814.

Meantime M. de Montrond, charged with a secret mission, arrived safely at Vienna, thanks to his address, courage, and numerous disguises. His first visit was to M. de Talleyrand, to whom he was bound by the ties of an old friendship. He was too sagacious not to see at once how deeply this distinguished man was pledged to the cause of the Bourbons, and how useless it would be to seek to win him over. He checked himself when he saw how decided M. de Talleyrand was; but he wished to learn whether the other legations, less interested in the dynastic question, were as impracticable as the French minister. He addressed himself to M. de Nesselrode, whom with the others he sought to persuade that the revolution of the 20th of March not only responded to the feelings of the army, but to those of the French people both in town and country; that numbers were ready to fight for Napoleon, and that consequently a struggle with him would be most formidable; that it would be wiser to calculate the difficulties before commencing a war which would cost more than its object would be worth, if that object were the restoration of the Bourbons. M. de Montrond was sufficiently intimate with these diplomatists and possessed sufficient tact to induce them to explain their views to him. They seemed neither surprised nor discouraged, though fully aware of the importance of his communication. They told him that no one at Vienna was ignorant of the gravity of the coming struggle, but that all were determined to push it to the last extremity, that is to say, to the downfall of Napoleon; that as far as he was concerned, a definite resolution was already taken; but as to who should succeed him, though the allies would prefer the Bourbons, they were ready to do whatever would be considered best.

Napoleon's strange envoy having become subsidiarily envoy of M. Fouché, endeavoured to ascertain whether there was any chance for the regency of Marie Louise. But he found Austria as well as the other powers totally opposed to such a measure; and anxious to learn the feelings of that princess herself, he endeavoured to gain admittance to the gardens of Schönbrunn. He succeeded by representing himself as a great amateur of flowers, and obtained an interview with M. Meneval without exciting the suspicions of the Austrian police. He told him that if Marie Louise would lay aside the restraints of etiquette

and trust herself to him, he would promise to conduct her and her son safely to Strasburg. M. Meneval told him that Marie Louise was as indifferent about the regency as the sovereigns themselves, and desired no other future than that which she had planned for herself, and in which her son was not the only actor. M. de Montrond said no more, faithfully presented the letters with which he had been entrusted, and received the answers, which he was determined to deliver as faithfully; but as he saw that Napoleon's recognition was impossible, excepting that he achieved some extraordinary success, and that no one thought of Marie Louise, he determined to try before he left whether the practical good sense of the allies would not approve of the Duke d'Orléans, a prince to whom he was personally attached, and whose exile he had shared in Sicily. He found England still personally devoted to Louis XVIII., Austria obstinately attached to the principle of legitimacy, Prussia indifferent to everything but Napoleon's fall, and the Emperor of Russia alone inclined to a change of dynasty in France in favour of the younger branch of the house of Bourbon. Having obtained this information, M. de Montrond left Vienna without betraying him whose emissary he was, and without doing him any service—for none could be done—having made an effort for the prince, his friend, and determined to tell the exact truth, an inclination common to all superior minds. M. de Meneval gave him a long letter for M. de Caulaincourt, in which, though speaking with his wonted deference, he gave him the most minute information concerning Marie Louise and the Austrian court—all which it was most important Napoleon should know. M. de Montrond hastened to Paris with the information he had so skilfully acquired.

We should not be sufficiently acquainted with the state of Europe if, limiting our observation to what was passing at Vienna, we did not turn our attention for a moment to what was going on in London at this time. Though the sovereigns at Vienna showed by their conduct and their sentiments that they still entertained an implacable hatred against Napoleon, in England, though none were willing to resign what had been gained, a certain modification of opinion had taken place. Self-interest is unquestionably the spring of action in England as in every other nation, however enlightened; but her resolutions are also modified by a sense of justice, by sympathy for the oppressed, that is to say, for those she does not oppress herself, by a certain poetic feeling and an admiration of what is noble in action, and it would be impossible to appreciate the English character without taking these different qualities into account. Though Great Britain was not become the friend of France or Napoleon, it is certain that she was not influenced by the same

violent passions as a year before. When the intoxication of victory had calmed down, she had given herself to the enjoyments of peace, and fed her imagination with visions of boundless commerce. The eleven or twelve months' repose she had enjoyed had allowed her to send her merchandise to all parts of the globe, and she fully appreciated maritime freedom, so advantageous to her manufactures. The brief reflections she had had time to make had shown her the immense cost of the late war, and she saw that if it had brought her great advantages, it had also entailed upon her vast expense. Her acquisitions in both hemispheres were more than balanced by the tripling of the national debt, which now absorbed one-half her revenue, and by the income-tax which, so hateful in principle and the mode of collecting, was become a permanent financial necessity. The commissariat, that is the ambulant administration attendant on the army, had left large debts unpaid in Spain, and another had been contracted in America, whose payment was urgent. In such a state of things no one was desirous of a renewal of war. Besides, for whom and for what was it to be recommenced? There was no danger of losing what had been gained, for Napoleon had announced his intention of preserving peace on the bases of the Treaties of Paris and Vienna, and though his promise might be doubted, his own interest would be a sufficient security. Besides, he had shown his desire to please England by abolishing the slave trade—Napoleon had, in fact, just abolished it voluntarily. Not knowing for what they were to go to war, the English naturally asked for whom. It was evidently for the Bourbons and against Napoleon. Now the Bourbons had sunk in the estimation of the English, whilst Napoleon had risen a little.

The compliment which Louis XVIII. had paid the regent had certainly flattered the nation, but the people had conceived a bad opinion of the Bourbon government. The government of Ferdinand VII. in Spain was esteemed hateful in England, and that of Louis XVIII. in France was pronounced to be talentless, stultified, and eminently calculated to entail upon his family the misfortunes that had just occurred. Nobody could see the common sense of taking up arms for the Bourbons, for the purpose of imposing on France a government that England would not choose for herself. As to Napoleon, he gained in public opinion in proportion as the allied sovereigns lost. He had been censured most for his insatiable and subversive ambition. The English people were greatly displeased at seeing Poland abandoned to Alexander, and Saxony dismembered for the advantage of Prussia, at the annexation of Venice to Austria, and of Genoa to Piedmont, without considering that these sacrifices were the necessary consequence of the arrangements which

they had laboured to effect, and without reflecting whether they were not doing themselves precisely that which they blamed in others, they said that the ambition of Napoleon ought not to be blamed by those who were guilty of as great themselves. Besides, as the English are gifted with a strong imagination, his miraculous return from Elba had reinvested Napoleon with his former prestige. Napoleon having returned with the apparent approbation of the French people, he was, in the opinion of the English, sheltered by the principle of *de facto* government, a principle which they had now asserted for twenty-five years against many successive ministries. And under such circumstances to recommence a desperate struggle, to perpetuate the income-tax, from which they had hoped to deliver themselves, to increase an already overwhelming debt, to bar up the paths of commerce so lately opened, in short, to plunge again into the horrors of war within a few months after being delivered from them, and all this for incompetent princes, and against a prince, too, competent, but without giving themselves time to inquire whether he did not return corrected by adversity—this seemed to the unprejudiced masses most irrational conduct, inspired by the inveterate prejudices of the Pitt school.

The English ministers were conscious of this change in public opinion, and had they been present at Vienna, would not have pledged themselves to the coalition so readily as Lord Wellington. Lord Liverpool and Mr. Vansittart, who were certainly no friends of France, had the greatest objection to recommencing war, and even Lord Castlereagh, though so much influenced by the connections he had formed on the continent, was no less uneasy than his colleagues at the state of public opinion, nor less desirous to conciliate it. The French emigrants who had arrived in London endeavoured to change the feelings of the British ministry. The Duke de Feltre, sent over by Louis XVIII., communicated to them not only all that he had learned by a long acquaintance with the imperial administration, but also the newest and most certain documents which he had been able to collect during his late ministry. He assured them that war could not be very hazardous, since when he left Paris on the 19th of March there were but a hundred and eighty thousand men under arms, of which fifty thousand could not be concentrated on any one point, and that by all imaginable exertions Napoleon could not bring a hundred thousand men into the field, after supplying the fortresses and interior with the necessary troops. To these reasons were added the promises of certain royalists in the west, who declared that were some troops and matériel sent to Brittany and Vendée, the peasantry of these districts would rise as in former times, and effect a serious diversion, which, dividing Napoleon's

forces, would render them less formidable. It was therefore concluded that a prompt and vigorous effort would destroy Napoleon, and secure to each power the possession of the advantages acquired in 1814. The English ministers were still considering the arguments for and against this measure when news arrived of Lord Wellington having without permission engaged them in a new coalition, and then the fear of disturbing the continental union, a feeling of complaisance for their negotiator, and Lord Castlereagh's inclination to adopt the continental policy, together with the hereditary bias of the Tory ministers, induced them to declare for war. However, as public opinion was so much opposed to this measure, it was necessary to use some deception, and Lord Castlereagh condescended to dissimulate in a way which, thanks to the advance of public morality, no English minister would now dare to attempt.* The Cabinet therefore resolved, when all that had been done at Vienna was known, to introduce some restriction, as it were, in deference to British principles, and to announce the contracted engagements gradually as the course of events might seem to justify the conduct of the ministers. The treaty of the 25th of March, by which the alliance of Chaumont had been renewed, was ratified, with a reservation, however, added to the eighth article. This article, by which Louis XVIII. was allowed to join in the treaty, must be understood, they said, as binding the European sovereigns for their common interest to a general effort against Napoleon, but not as binding his Britannic majesty to go to war for the purpose of imposing any particular government on France. This treaty was brought to London on the 5th of April, there ratified, and then sent back on the 8th with this specious but false reservation, for the desire of the government was to substitute the Bourbons for Napoleon.

In a country constituted as England is, it would not be possible to conceal these proceedings from the Parliament, which really exercises the power attributed to the Crown. On the 6th of April, the day after the treaty had arrived in London, it was therefore determined to send a message to the two Houses. The substance of this message was, that in consequence of the events which had lately occurred in France, the Crown considered it necessary to increase the national forces both by land and sea, and to enter into communication with her allies, in order to concert measures with them for the present and future safety of Europe.

The Cabinet requested that this message should be discussed immediately, which was done, notwithstanding the efforts of

* The dissimulation practised is proved by the recently published Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh; as also by unpublished documents connected with the Congress of Vienna, and which are at this moment before me.

the Opposition to delay it. The discussion was animated, and the arguments adduced strong. In the Upper House, Lord Liverpool represented the Cabinet, and Lord Grey the Opposition. In the Lower House, Lord Castlereagh was the ministerial leader, Sir Francis Burdett and Mr. Whitebread represented the Opposition. With a very slight difference the same reasoning was employed in both Houses.

The Cabinet made the following statement. France had been treated most generously in the April of 1814. Instead of destroying this nation, which during twenty-five years had not ceased to disturb the peace of Europe, the allies had treated her with the greatest consideration. She had been allowed to retain a little more than her frontier of 1790, that is to say, Marienburg to the north, Landau to the east, and Chambéry to the south; and she was left in possession of a museum filled with the spoils of the museums of Europe. As to Napoleon, the treaty of the 11th of April granted him conditions that were only too favourable. The English ministry would not have consented to sign this imprudent treaty were it not that Lord Castlereagh, on arriving at Paris in 1814, had found it drawn up and warmly supported by the Emperor Alexander. Besides, at that time Napoleon had still a hundred and fifty thousand men at Lille, Paris, Toulouse, and Lyon, and the danger of a prolonged contest had to be taken into consideration. The treaty of the 11th of April conferred on him the sovereignty of the island of Elba, together with a large revenue: this treaty he had daringly broken by quitting the island, and afterwards seducing an army that detested peace, and only dreamed of promotion and plunder. It is true that it had been said in Napoleon's defence that the treaty had been first broken by others. If this were so, why did he not demand redress? He had said nothing, done nothing. The British Cabinet had accidentally learned that he was in want of money, and immediately insisted that France should pay his subsidy. As to the assertion of his not being closely watched, those who made the assertion forgot that in Elba Napoleon was a sovereign, and not a prisoner, for which reason he could only be watched by a cruising party, and a cruising party, however numerous, might always be evaded. Colonel Campbell lived alternately at Leghorn and Porto-Ferrajo; he was not, unfortunately, in the latter town on the 26th of February, and had he been, he would have met the same treatment as the other Englishmen who had been given into the custody of the gendarmerie; consequently the British Cabinet was not to blame, whilst the fact was patent that Napoleon had been replaced at the head of the government by the treachery of an army that only cared for war and booty; but Europe could not consent to live in constant alarm merely to

procure French soldiers occupation, promotion, and money; nor was there any necessity for immediate war, or of imposing any particular sovereign on France; it was only necessary to continue in close alliance with the continental powers, the only means of avoiding an insupportable yoke. England would much prefer peace to war, but how could peace be hoped from a man who broke to-day the promise of yesterday; that besides, it was better to leave the decision of this question to the continental powers, that were in more immediate danger than England, who had but one course to pursue, to maintain an unchangeable union with those powers. This message had evidently but one object—to keep up a close alliance with the continental powers, and to be in a position to answer their call, should they need the assistance of Great Britain by land or sea.

It would be impossible to dissimulate more adroitly under general truths the essential fact of the war that had been resolved upon at Vienna. But the Opposition did not fall into the snare, and victoriously repelled all Lord Liverpool and Lord Castlereagh's arguments.

They first asked whether the government had not already signed a positive engagement to make war with France for the purpose of dethroning Napoleon and restoring the Bourbons. As the Opposition only suspected, but was not certain, that this was true, the question was put in terms that gave Lord Castlereagh an opportunity of giving an evasive reply, and speaking with a want of candour unworthy of the minister of a free country. As indeed these exact terms had not been used, as it had not been formally said, that war would be declared against France for the purpose of replacing Napoleon by the Bourbons, although this was the real object of the treaty, Lord Castlereagh, who had had the treaty of the 25th of March in his possession for two days, replied with ill-disguised insincerity, that England had not signed any treaty of the kind, and tried to show that none but precautionary measures had been taken, exactly in conformity with the words of the message which had given rise to the discussion.

Though deceived as to facts, the Opposition did not allow themselves to be deceived by arguments. They said that it might have been right to oppose Napoleon to the very utmost formerly, but that making the evident though dissimulated engagement of doing so now, was only yielding to the old aristocratic notions of the Tory party; that the treaty of the 11th of April, the natural consequence of the state of things in 1814, had been shamelessly violated in every possible way; that not only Napoleon's subsidy had not been paid, which reduced him to selling some of the cannon of Elba, but that

a doubt was expressed as to whether the Duchy of Parma would be given to his wife and son, the dotation promised to Prince Eugène had been refused, and the question had been almost publicly discussed whether Napoleon himself should not be transported to an island in the ocean; that he had consequently every right to break the treaty of the 11th of April; that when he had come to France he had found not only the army but the whole nation ready to receive him with open arms; that aided by the army alone, he would not have reached Paris in twenty days, but he had reached that city attended by the acclamations of the people from town and country; that it was not at the head of a troop of bandits, as was said, for he had come without firing a single shot, but as the true representative of the French Revolution; that, on the other hand, not an arm had been raised to aid the Bourbons, which did not prove that the nation preferred them to Napoleon; that the war, which was denied, though it was immediately to commence, was only taking part with the Bourbons, whom the majority of the French nation suspected and disliked, and this against Napoleon, whom the greater part considered as the representative of their true interests; that this interference in the domestic policy of a free nation was quite opposed to the principles of Great Britain, an interference which a sense of morality ought to interdict, were it even advantageous to British interests, but which should be most carefully avoided when opposed to them; that Napoleon could not be what he undoubtedly was, a man of great genius, if misfortune had not modified his opinions; that such a change must have taken place to a certain degree, since he had at once accepted the Treaty of Paris, which he had so obstinately rejected in 1814; his sincerity had been doubted, and his old ambition blamed; what had been said of his ambition was indeed true, but since the Congress of Vienna his ambition ought not to be mentioned without adverting to the ambition of those powers that had seized on Poland, divided Saxony, and deprived Venice and Genoa of their nationality; that experience had shown that these powers also were dangerous, and would need restraint as much as Napoleon; that consequently if, profiting by the lessons of 1813 and 1814, he seriously proposed peace, the offer deserved consideration before declaring war; that he was as good on the French throne as any other; that to recommence war, double the national debt, perpetuate the income-tax, in a word, to brave all the risks of a struggle that would be terrible if France should look on it as a national one, would be sacrificing the true interests of England to old Tory prejudices, and that, however flattering the compliments of Louis XVIII. might be, they were not worthy of such a price.

Parliament was evidently influenced by these arguments, which indeed had great weight with the public mind in England. Some politicians, who saw that England had gained as much at Vienna as the most ambitious powers, felt inclined for war as the surest means of securing these advantages; but even those were doubtful as to the result, and considered it wiser to reflect before coming to a decision. Mr. Ponsonby, who held a position between the ministry and the Opposition, was the organ of this opinion. In reply to the message from the Crown, the Opposition proposed a resolution equivalent to recommending the government to preserve peace. To adopt such a resolution would be to declare formally against war, and therefore the majority demanded that events should be allowed to develop themselves before coming to a decision. Mr. Ponsonby said, that were the message from the Crown to be considered as a formal declaration of war, he would not vote for it, as he coincided with those who thought it wiser not to reject every overture coming from Napoleon; he did not believe what had been said, that he had been recalled by the army alone; that evidently the greater portion of the nation favoured him; that such being the case, the risks and advantages of war should be weighed; that peace ought to be preferred if it could be obtained on a sure basis, and war entered on only when indispensable and presenting reasonable chances of success; in a word, that the House ought to examine and reflect, and then send a reply to the message of the Crown conformable to its sentiments, which were averse to recommencing immediately a desperate struggle, but preferred to continue in alliance with the continental sovereigns, and to keep up a sufficient force to be able to assist them if necessary. It was for these reasons, and these alone, that Mr. Ponsonby did not join the Opposition. The members of the Opposition, in order to decide the question, appealed repeatedly to the members of the government; called upon them to declare the truth, and to avow that voting in the sense of the message was voting for war certain and close at hand.

A decided and repeated negative was given to this by several members of the Cabinet, who did not hesitate to utter downright falsehood; conduct which, to the honour of their institutions, it must be said, no British ministers have since ever carried so far.

The proposal of the Opposition was not supported by more than forty votes, while more than two hundred sided with the ministers.

The motion being carried, the treaty of the 25th of March was ratified and sent to Vienna, with the illusory reservation of which we have already spoken, whilst two members of the Cabinet proceeded to Brussels to arrange the different points

with Lord Wellington. These were desired to tell him that the Cabinet was as anxious for war as he, and would support him most energetically; that all that had been said was but a trick necessitated by the state of public opinion in England; that he should explain the real meaning of the reservation added to the 8th article to Louis XVIII., and tell him that it was a mere salve for the feelings of some persons, but would neither prevent the English Cabinet from desiring the restoration of the Bourbons, nor from assisting them as earnestly as before. Lord Wellington was also to be told that the six millions sterling that had been promised should be sent to the three great powers, but that they must not expect more; and that as to the lesser German powers, an effort would be made to compensate them in money for the deficiency in the promised contingent of a hundred and fifty thousand men. Lastly, Lord Wellington was earnestly pressed to tell his plans and those of the coalition, that, knowing, his Government might feel confidence in advancing them. In order to give an appearance of truth to the statements made in Parliament by the ministers, the Admiralty gave orders that the English navy should respect the tricolor flag, which before was fired on, whilst the white was allowed to pass unmolested. The Admiralty further permitted the merchant vessels of the two nations to frequent the ports of both countries. This was a feint to be kept up for two or three months until the commencement of hostilities.

When the emissaries of the English Cabinet arrived at Brussels, they found Lord Wellington quite ready to admit all these little deceptions of form, provided that nothing essential was changed; and he immediately exerted all his energy to prevent any imprudence being committed by the Prussians on the one hand, or the French emigrants on the other. This was no very easy task, as the passions of both were violently excited. The rage of the Prussians was roused to an almost incomprehensible degree. They talked of again entering France, where they would spare neither palace nor cottage. The greater number of their troops was encamped near Liège, and as the inhabitants of this town were favourable to France, the soldiers committed all sorts of violence, exercising a species of inquisitorial police, imprisoning or exiling all accused of connivance with the French, and directing their severity in particular against the Saxon troops, who, since the dismemberment of Saxony, bitterly repented their conduct at Leipsic, a repentance they took no pains to conceal. So violent had been the manifestation of feeling on the part of these troops, that it was found necessary to send them to the rear and disarm them. Blucher wished to select some of the Saxon soldiers, who, in virtue of the late arrangements at Vienna, had become Prussian subjects, and

incorporate them with his own army. The Saxons refused to submit to this dislocation, and threatened a desperate resistance, aided by the inhabitants of Liége. Blucher had been advised to defer this measure, but he would not listen to any counsel that suggested moderation. The *Mercur du Rhin*, a rabid journal, was the organ of Prussian feelings. According to this journal, the French ought not to be treated as ordinary adversaries, but *like mad dogs*, who are dealt with by being knocked on the head. War was, of course, to be declared against Napoleon, but less against him than against the French nation, whose pride and ambition had been disturbing Europe during twenty-five years. France should no longer be allowed to exist as one nation, but be divided into Burgundians, Champenois, Auvergnats, Bretons, and Aquitanians, each with their respective king; whilst Alsace, Lorraine, and Flanders should be again incorporated with the German empire, which should be restored to its ancient unity by being placed under an emperor; and so Germany was to be treated on a system diametrically opposed to that which was to be applied to France, since her kings were to be removed to give place to an emperor, whilst France was to exchange her emperor for five or six kings. The national property, the fruits of revolutionary pillage, was either to be bestowed on the allied armies, or serve as security for a paper currency wherewith to pay the expenses of the new war. These extravagant plans, elaborated in articles as revolting in language as in principle, were reproduced each morning in this journal, and circulated all along the Rhine.

To language such as this the Prussians added military projects not a whit wiser. They wanted to advance immediately on Paris, without considering whether the other armies of the coalition were ready to support them. They asserted that they alone, aided by a few English, Hanoverians, and Dutch, would be able to overcome every obstacle, and finish the war at once.

Ghent, where Louis XVIII. had taken refuge, was the seat of equally irrational excitement. If some of the ministers, such as M. Louis and M. de Jaucourt, who had accompanied Louis XVIII., saw a lesson for the future in the events that had just occurred, others considered them as only motives for exercising a too long deferred severity. It was commonly said that the French army was nothing but a collection of brigands that must be got rid of; that its commanders had been too much flattered—a policy that must be changed by taking off the heads of a few generals and distinguished revolutionists, and thus make weakness give place to energy. These persons considered Napoleon's return as the result of an extensive conspiracy, and the conduct of those who had assisted him as deliberate treachery, and not the consequence of exalted feeling.

One unfortunate man, Marshal Ney, was loaded with maledictions, and marked out for signal vengeance. Thus, far from thinking of doing better for the future, the royalists only thought of vengeance, and of shedding blood that they would never cease to regret.

It must be said, to the praise of Louis XVIII., that if deficient in warmth of feeling, he was not subject to such deplorable excitement, and that whilst he listened to these follies, he neither encouraged nor repeated them, merely confining himself to hoping that the allies would soon restore him to the throne. He even admitted the necessity of allowing a larger share of power to his ministers, and less to his brother, nephews, and others of the Court. Unfortunately some foreign diplomatists, whose good sense ought to have saved them from participating in the folly of the time, often set the example. One of these, Count Pozzo, wrote a letter to Lord Castlereagh, in which much political good sense was joined with the following outrageous expressions: "We left Louis XVIII. to confront the demons of the Revolution, and we have made him responsible for our imprudences in addition to his own. Bonaparte arrived while things were in this state, the troops overturned the throne, which they were bound to support, whilst the people were stunned and stupefied; but they will applaud a different scene in which we, I hope, will soon perform. But we must not content ourselves with the compliments that we expect; we must put the king in a position to dismiss this army and assemble another, and to free France of about fifty great criminals, whose existence is incompatible with peace. The French ought to undertake this task, but it is the allies who must put them in a position to do so. We are indebted for our safety to our union, and this union is the result of a happy combination of circumstances that may not easily occur again." Such words, uttered by a man of superior intellect, of which he afterwards gave undeniable evidence, shows what blind infatuation animated all Europe at the time.

It was this wild excitement that the sage Lord Wellington was called on to appease, and as may be supposed, he had no easy task. But as it was principally a question of military operations, in which he had great authority and real power, he contented himself with acting prudently in that department, and allowed talkers to prattle as they pleased. He blamed indeed the language of the journals published along the Rhine, and expressed his fear that they would be as injurious as the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto. He advised Marshal Blucher to deal leniently with the Saxons, and to defer the incorporation into his own army of such of them as belonged to Prussia. He advised Louis XVIII. to rid himself of the influence of his

Court, and copy the example of England by choosing a really responsible ministry, concentrating both power and responsibility. As to the military question, he held conferences at Ghent with the representatives of the British Cabinet, the Prussian generals, and the Duke de Feltre, war minister to Louis XVIII. Although in all these conferences the French forces were estimated very low, Lord Wellington saw more reason for prudence than for precipitation. He succeeded in persuading General Gneisenau, Blucher's representative, that it would not be wise to hurry, that it would be better to unite the English with the larger portion of the Prussian army, and thus form a mass of 250,000 men in the north, and wait until an equally large force should be ready to advance, under Prince Schwarzenberg, from the east, and even to wait until it should be sufficiently near to act with effect. Wellington's plan, sketched according to the campaign of 1814, but freed from Blucher's imprudences, was to defer victory that it might be more certain : to advance methodically in two great columns, each of which would be larger than the supposed army of Napoleon ; to make the passage secure by taking possession of all the fortresses on the way, and thus drive Napoleon back on Paris, and overwhelm him with 400,000 or 500,000 soldiers, and deprive him of the opportunity of employing those military stratagems in which his genius was so fertile. General Gneisenau, a man of intelligence, saw the wisdom of this plan, and promised, on the part of the Prussian army, as much deference to the counsels of the English general as devotion to the common cause. It was agreed that the concentration of forces destined to operate by the north of France should be executed as quickly as possible ; that the English, the Hollando-Belgians, the Hanoverians, the Brunswickers, &c., composing Lord Wellington's army, should immediately assemble between Brussels and Mons, along the left bank of the Sambre, whilst the Prussians should take up a position on the right bank, advancing from Liége to Charleroi without loss of time ; that constant communication should be kept up by means of numerous bridges, and that they should be ready to aid each other if, whilst awaiting the other allies, their terrible enemy should descend on them unexpectedly. From this time forward Lord Wellington's calm, strong sense took an ascendancy in the Prussian councils, which, unfortunately for us, exercised an immense influence on succeeding events.

Such were the negotiations and military combinations made by the allies from the 20th of March to the 10th of April. Napoleon had been prepared for this ; but when he found that his couriers had been arrested at Mentz, Kehl, and Turin, and that M. de Flahault, though successful in getting as far as Stras-

burg, was there obliged to turn back, he saw that the passions excited against him were still more violent than he had imagined. And when M. de Montrond, his private envoy, returned, and to the general knowledge of facts added minute details, he would have been indeed pained, but that he was now accustomed to such strokes of fate. From M. de Montrond he learned that his wife, influenced by love of ease, and the mean wish of getting Parma, and perhaps by more unworthy motives, had put herself and her son under the authority of the Congress, and would not return to Paris. He saw that the determination to war against him was carried even to passion, that a political excommunication had been pronounced against him, interdicting the simplest communications, even those which public justice, for the sake of humanity, commands in time of war. He had been prepared for something of the kind, but the reality far exceeded his anticipations; still he was neither surprised nor angry, for he knew that it was he who had filled the vial of wrath that was being poured out on him. There is no more correct judge of his own faults than a great man who is conscious of his errors and wishes to repair them. Napoleon was determined, notwithstanding his excitable temperament, not to show the least anger, to bear everything, and tell all to the public. Up to this time he had contented himself with saying that he would not interfere in the affairs of other nations, nor allow them to dictate to France, and more he could not say, not having received any declarations of war. Had he by any act anticipated the manifestations of foreign cabinets, there is no doubt but that his quickness in attributing hostile intentions to Europe would have been attributed to his own love of war. But after the public and official events that had just taken place, he need no longer hesitate; he must speak out, that France might know to what a state of dependence foreigners sought to reduce her, for she would not even be allowed to choose her own government. It was necessary to speak, that the nations of Europe might know that their blood was about to be again shed, and that not with the view of achieving their independence, or satisfying their ambition, for Napoleon was willing to accept the arrangements made at Vienna, but to gratify the passions of their rulers; and lastly, it was necessary to speak, that the English people might know how grossly they had been deceived. It was most urgent now to promulgate the decrees relative to the retired soldiers, the mobilised national guards, and concerning all the other military preparations; for though the preliminary labour had up to this time been carried on in the different departments of the government, an official announcement in the *Moniteur* was become necessary to ensure the obedience of those who were to be summoned to the defence of their country. It was only

Napoleon's pride that could suffer from the announcements he was about to make, for his former glory was sufficient to enable him to bear still greater humiliations; and indeed that pride which had so often erred could only interest the world now by humbling itself for a great end—that of showing Europe the justice of his cause.

He commenced by publishing the declaration of the 13th of March as an official document, though it had been spoken of only in a vague and undecided manner. This was followed by a consultation of the Council of State, which was at that moment the highest moral authority, the chambers being dissolved. This body, having verified the authenticity of the declaration of the 13th of March, asserted that this document, which had emanated from the sovereigns in Congress, was at once opposed to justice, truth, and good sense, and was in reality an incitement to assassination. The Council further maintained that by the treaty of the 11th of April, Napoleon in the island of Elba was a real sovereign, the extent of his possessions being of little consequence, and that consequently he might claim the rights of a monarch; that when he landed in the Gulf of Juan, and thus committed an aggression against the sovereign that had been imposed on France, he had only incurred the consequences attached to the rights of war, that is to say, the diminution or privation of his States, or captivity if conquered, but he had by no means incurred the penalty of death, which was only lawful in the case of combatants on the field of battle who refused to surrender. But by declaring him an outlaw, the king's ordinance of the 6th of March, and the declaration from Vienna on the 13th, had assumed the character of an invitation to assassination, a crime forbidden in civilised nations; that the declaration of the 13th of March had outraged truth as well as justice; that the treaty of the 11th of April had been violated in every possible manner, that the private property of the Bonaparte family had been sequestered, and the stipulated subsidy refused to Napoleon or his relatives, nor had the sum of two millions which Napoleon had been authorised to distribute to certain military classes been paid; that there was a hesitation about giving the Duchy of Parma to Marie Louise, though it had been promised her, and it was altogether refused to her son; that the promised dotation had been refused Prince Eugène; and lastly, that Marie Louise and her son had been prevented (which indeed was true for a time) from joining their husband and father in the island of Elba; that consequently it was the conduct of the royal government, and not Napoleon's leaving the island of Elba, that had broken the treaty of the 11th of April; that he therefore was not the aggressor. But he had a still better reason for what he had done, and that was the

wishes of France, for he knew how the French nation, clipped of her glory, threatened in her rights, was every moment menaced with subversion by the incessant attacks on the holders of national property, and was desirous of being delivered from the many dangers that lowered upon her; that Napoleon, who was bound by no conditions since the treaty of the 11th of April had been broken, had received the most evident approbation of what he had done, in the reception he had met in France; that therefore it was not he who was in the wrong, but his adversaries—more especially since they had legalised his assassination, a line of conduct to which he had replied by setting the Duke d'Angoulême at liberty, and by allowing the Duchess d'Orléans and the Duchess de Bourbon to remain in France.

This declaration, however correct, was in reality nothing more than a recrimination; but it was soon followed by a more important document—M. de Caulaincourt's report of the unsuccessful attempts to establish diplomatic relations with the European powers. In this report, which was inserted in the *Moniteur* on the 13th of April, there was no mention, as may be supposed, of M. de Montrond's secret mission, but only of the couriers that had been sent to announce the emperor's pacific intentions, and who had been stopped at Turin, Kehl, and Mentz. M. de Flahault's arrestation at Stuttgart was mentioned, and the refusal at Dover to receive the message addressed to the prince-regent, and how this message had been sent to the Congress of Vienna. These facts were related with perfect moderation of language, but with a firmness that showed the absence of all fear. The rejected documents were also inserted in the *Moniteur*, that France and Europe might judge of the conduct of both parties, of those who wished to speak, and of those who would not listen. The conclusion to be drawn from these communications was, that France had no reason either to be sanguine or alarmed, but ought to look on things as they really were, and be prepared to meet hostilities, which, though not absolutely certain, were extremely probable.

Napoleon also ordered the debates of the British Parliament to be published, together with the most significant articles of foreign journals, more especially those of the *Mercure du Rhin*. The public were thus warned, and could have no longer any doubt as to the intentions of the powers. There was nothing now to prevent the promulgation of the decrees relative to arming France, and it became the duty of the army, that had wished for the restoration of the empire, of the inhabitants of the rural districts, who wished to guarantee the inviolability of national property, in short, it was the duty of all who wished to see the Revolution avenged for the attempts of the emigrants, to arm in support of the chief they had recalled to

the throne. The zeal of these different classes might be reckoned on, and their exertions, which, if well directed, had every chance of success, provided that fate were not adverse.

Napoleon therefore published, together with the documents of which we have already spoken, the decrees relative to the recall of the retired soldiers and the organisation of the mobilised national guards. These decrees, founded on certain laws, whose execution they enforced and regulated, were perfectly legal, and altogether free from that semblance of absolute power which Napoleon had formerly arrogated to himself. The old soldiers were summoned to defend the cause of France, so dear to their hearts, with the promise of being dismissed to their homes as soon as peace should be established. They were left the choice of returning to their former regiments, or of joining those nearest them. The national guards were bound to sedentary service from twenty to sixty years of age. From twenty to forty they might be summoned, according to their age, strength, tastes, and state of their families, to join the select companies, and serve in the fortresses or the wings of the active army. A committee of the arrondissement, consisting of a sub-prefect, a member of the council of the arrondissement, and an officer of the gendarmerie, was ordered to select the men who were to compose these select companies, either as grenadiers or chasseurs. Those who could afford it were expected to buy their own uniforms, whilst the others would be equipped at the expense of the department. The State would provide arms for all. All officers above the rank of commanders of battalions were to be appointed by the emperor, and all under that rank by the committees of the arrondissement. Together with these decrees, the ministers of police and of the interior sent circulars to the prefects, in which they sought to excite the enthusiasm of the citizens, and adduced many reasons to show that it was the interest of all to defend the imperial dynasty, and this in terms which came better from their lips than they could from those of the emperor.

Napoleon needed no stimulus; he worked day and night, either directing or urging the administration with that universal and indefatigable attention which embraced at once the whole and the details. He had not been able to insert earlier the articles relative to the old soldiers and the national guard in the *Moniteur*, as the publishing such significant documents before foreign cabinets had shown hostile symptoms would have the appearance of a provocation rather than a legitimate defence. But fortunately no time had been lost, for had these decrees been published earlier, there would not have been agents either in Paris or the provinces to put them into execution. The decree relative to the national guards needed the

creation of an entirely new system of organisation; and the delay of that concerning the retired soldiers was not of much consequence, for as these men were perfectly well drilled, they could join their respective battalions the very moment of their arrival. As the men on six months' leave of absence began to come in, Napoleon ordered that the third battalions should immediately join the main body of the army, even though they consisted but of four hundred men, as they could be completed afterwards. He ordered that the mobilised national guards should be immediately drafted into the battalions *d'élite*, that each man should be provided with a simple blouse with a coloured collar, an unrepaired musket, and the troop then sent to the nearest fortress, in order that the regular troops might be rendered immediately disposable. The organisation, equipment, and arming of the battalions was to be completed in the fortresses. Napoleon, finding that the purchase of horses for the cavalry went on but slowly, and that the dissolving of the household troops had furnished but three hundred instead of the three thousand he had expected, determined to take seven or eight thousand horses from the gendarmerie, and pay ready money, that they might be replaced without delay. These horses were well fed and well trained, and only needed being accustomed to fatigue. He renewed the order for officers to seek horses all through the country, and purchase them with ready money. He repeated that he could have bought as many as he wished between Cannes and Grenoble, that great numbers might be got in the rural districts, and that it was only by employing many plans that the necessary supply could be obtained. Meantime he did not neglect the dépôt at Versailles, of which he took the whole charge upon himself. The military workshops were so well managed that they produced each day a thousand new muskets, and repaired two thousand. The clothing establishments produced each day a thousand uniforms. It was by constant supervision and by paying ready money that Napoleon succeeded in producing such satisfactory results.

Not content with giving publicity to the manner in which the sovereigns had acted towards France, he determined to make a personal manifestation, and that in presence of the Parisian national guard, who, on his arrival at Paris, he had been advised not to trust. This guard was composed of commercial men, more or less wealthy; honest citizens, in a word, who would prefer correcting the Bourbon faults by legal resistance, than dethroning them for the advantage of Napoleon, from whom they expected war and a very small share of liberty. Napoleon had returned without their assistance, and almost against their will; he had returned as it were by a miracle, and

without shedding a drop of blood, he presented himself improved in all essential points; he had repelled the emigrants, restored the principles of 1789, again revived the glory of France, so dear to the citizens of Paris; and lastly, he was threatened by Europe, who sought to destroy him by means that were at once revolting to morality and subversive of the national independence. These were motives sufficient to win him favour in the eyes of the Parisian bourgeoisie, and let us add, in the eyes of all good citizens. They certainly would not have allowed him to return, they would have prevented his return at any risk had they been able, but being returned, and in possession of supreme power, giving unmistakable signs of intending to maintain a healthful policy at home and abroad; now, too, that he was proscribed by Europe in a manner that seemed a denial of the just rights of France, it was both good sense and true patriotism to support him.

In every large body there will be always found many shades of opinion more or less great according to the spirit that prevails, and it is sufficient to silence some and allow others to speak, in order to change the apparent or even real sentiments of the whole. Besides that, the fact of Napoleon's peaceful re-establishment and promises had greatly calmed the national guards, many of the officers had been changed, and great pains had been taken to rouse the zeal of those who detested both emigrants and foreigners. The Parisian national guards were consequently much better disposed to give the emperor a favourable reception than they had been on his arrival.

On Sunday, the 16th, the forty-eight battalions of the guard were drawn up on one side of the Place du Carrousel, and on the other the numerous and well-drilled troops who were passing through the capital on their way to the frontiers. Napoleon had kept the supreme command of the Parisian militia for himself, and had made General Durosnel, his aide-de-camp, only the second in command. He rode along the ranks with an imposing air, the result of natural firmness of character and twenty years' command of the greatest armies in the universe. The warm acclamations of an ardent minority, which were not contradicted though not joined in by the greater number, gave an almost enthusiastic air to the whole review. After having rode along the ranks of the forty-eight battalions, Napoleon called the officers in a circle round him, and addressed them in the following terms:—

“Soldiers of the national guard of Paris, I am glad to see you. It is now fifteen months since I organised you, that you might watch over the peace and security of the capital. You have fulfilled my expectations; you have shed your blood in defence of Paris, and if the enemy has entered within your

walls, it was not you but treason that was to blame, and still more that fatality which at that time overshadowed all our undertakings.

"The royal authority was not suited to France. It gave the people no security for their dearest interests. It had been imposed on us by foreigners, and would have been, had it continued, a monument of shame and misfortune. I am come, supported by all the strength of the people and the army, to wipe away this stain, and to restore to the honour and glory of France all their former splendour.

"Soldiers of the national guard, this morning's telegraph announces that the tricolored flag floats from the walls of Marseilles and Antibes. A hundred cannon fired on our frontiers will announce to foreigners that our civil dissensions are at an end; *I say foreigners, for as yet we have no enemies.* If they assemble their troops, we shall assemble ours. Our armies are composed of heroes that have distinguished themselves in a hundred battles, and who will oppose a barrier of iron to the enemy, whilst the numerous battalions of the grenadiers and chasseurs of the national guards will protect our frontiers. I shall not interfere in the affairs of other nations, but woe to the governments that attempt to interfere with ours!

"Soldiers of the national guard, you have been compelled to display colours that had been rejected by France, but you still cherished the national colours in your hearts. You swear to make them your rallying-point, and to defend the imperial throne, the natural and only security of your rights. You swear never to allow foreigners, whose masters we have so often been, to interfere in our government. In short, you swear to make every sacrifice for the honour and independence of France!"

This discourse, so well suited to the auditory, and which so plainly showed the difficulties of the actual position of affairs, was warmly applauded by the officers, to whom it was addressed. "We swear! we swear!" they cried as they waved their swords. Napoleon then saw twenty thousand of the national guard and almost as many regular troops defile before him, and had every reason to congratulate himself on the proceedings of that day. He had told France what he wished her to know, he had made his peace with the Parisian national guard, that is, with the rational and sincere portion of the population, who exerts so decisive an influence on the fate of every government.

The next day, the 17th, he left the Tuileries, and took up his abode in the palace of the Elysée, which he found more agreeable in spring, and where he could refresh himself occasionally during his immense labours by a stroll through its shady retreats. He had also changed his bearing towards his subjects.

He had always been simple, natural, and even familiar, but never very accessible. But now his changed position required that he should be so, that he might be able to influence those whom he wished to win to his cause and to his new opinions. At the palace of the Elysée, where Queen Hortense did the honours, he could more easily invite to his table those whom he wished to influence, not only by the superiority of his genius, but by the powerful charm of his wit.

His brother Joseph had returned most *à propos* from Switzerland, for he was to have been arrested the very day of his departure by order of the coalition. Napoleon installed him at the Palais-Royal, with the title of "Prince" and with a suitable income, and with the express recommendation to act with economy and reserve. These precautions were necessary, as this brother's presence already excited a certain degree of distrust. Everything that recalled the ancient empire was feared, and more especially those family royalties which had mainly contributed to raise Europe against France. Napoleon had sent a frigate for his mother, who had gone from Elba to Naples, for his sister, who was detained at Leghorn, and for such of his brothers as had been able to escape the allies. It was a pleasure for him to have them near him, but he was anxious that they should not in any way offend the newly awakened spirit of France, and meant that they should adopt that simple mode of living which he practised, as much through taste as policy. But each succeeding hour Napoleon became sadder, but concealed his feelings, and his partisans became depressed, they scarcely knew why, but did not possess the same power of self-control as he.

Napoleon's triumphal return to France had made a powerful appeal to the public imagination, but all those whose passions, interests, or prejudices were gratified by the re-establishment of the empire had been carried away by an irresistible burst of enthusiasm. But this exultation had not lasted long; soon the great difficulties both at home and abroad became apparent; at home, the disunion of parties, and the absolute opposition in their views; the Bonapartists merely wishing for the continuance of the empire, whilst the revolutionists only intended to make use of Napoleon for a time, and get rid of him when he had repelled the enemy. Abroad, the frenzied desire to destroy the formidable man who had again made himself master of the power of France, and even to destroy France herself, whose ever-reviving energy made her abhorred by her enemies. Although Napoleon's partisans had formerly felt unbounded confidence in his good fortune and genius, and although this confidence had partly revived under the influence of late events, still a secret uneasiness oppressed them when they thought of

the incredible eagerness with which the powers of Europe were arming against us, and they asked themselves, would France be able to resist so many enemies, could she in less than a year recover strength to oppose them all, and would Napoleon's genius be able to crush them, for nothing less than total destruction could disarm their implacable hatred. And he himself, though endowed with unconquerable firmness, was no longer under the influence of that calm daring with which a succession of successful enterprises had inspired him in former days. He was thoughtful and even sad, but was able, thanks to his great mental vivacity, to conceal it from all. But his spirits sank when he was alone, or when with only five or six persons, such as Queen Hortense, Prince Cambacérès, M. de Caulaincourt, M. de Bassano, M. Lavalette, and Carnot, who from their more intimate intercourse were warmly attached to him. With those, who were always ready to counsel, but never to reproach, Napoleon spoke with the most perfect frankness, and even most nobly whenever his own errors were the subject of conversation. He said that the negotiations that had been attempted abroad were scarce deserving the name, that in two months all Europe would be in arms against him, and he should be obliged to meet the enemy with troops so far inferior, though revived by a year's repose, that it would require a miracle to conquer. He considered that the sovereigns whom his downfall had raised to a position they had never before enjoyed would not willingly consent to resign it, and if conquered in one campaign, would at once commence a second, and that consequently France must look forward to a struggle to the death, a struggle that the army and some frontier provinces would sustain with vigour and perseverance, but which the nation, prejudiced against the wars of the first empire, would most unwillingly support, as it would consider itself as again sacrificed for the benefit of a single individual. By this we see that Napoleon was not deceived, that he did not mistake the rejoicings of the soldiers at the return of their old general, nor the delight of the holders of national property at seeing themselves secured in their possessions, nor the satisfaction of the revolutionists freed from the insults of the emigrants, as the serious and unanimous consent of the nation. He had no faith in the enthusiastic effort of 1793, nor in the sincere and generous one made in 1813; he had no confidence but in his soldiers, and if he entertained any hope, it was in the unforeseen chances of war, which would afford an opportunity to a man of genius like him to change the whole face of affairs in a day. What gave him most pain, though he could not complain of its injustice, was the incredulity which his promises of peace and liberty met with from all. "Yes," he said, "I entertained vast designs,

but can I do so still? Can any one suppose that my thoughts are now directed to the Elbe, the Vistula, or even the Rhine? It is indeed a sad thing to give up our geographical frontiers—the noble conquest of the Revolution; and could they be regained by the loss of my life and that of my soldiers, the sacrifice would soon be made. But there can be no question of such patriotic ambition since I am willing to accept the Treaty of Paris. We only seek our independence, and to avoid a counter-revolution effected by foreigners. I ask of fate but one or two victories, to re-establish the prestige of our arms, and recognise the right to be our own masters, and this once done, I am willing to accept peace even on moderate terms. But alas! neither Europe or France believe this.” It must be understood that Napoleon spoke thus only amongst his most intimate friends, with whom he also discussed another and not less important subject, the new constitution that was to be given to France. At Grenoble, Lyon, and every other place through which he had passed, he promised to make important alterations in the imperial laws. France had taken him at his word, and it would be impossible to retract now. The nation, no longer able to endure that a single individual should possess the power of transporting the fate of France to Moscow, was almost unanimous in its desire for what since that time has been called a constitutional monarchy, namely, one where the monarch would be represented by responsible ministers, responsible to chambers that could refuse or grant their confidence to these ministers, and could oblige them to govern openly, and make a daily report of their proceedings. Whether this constitutional monarchy was agreeable or not to Napoleon, he was determined to make a trial of it, being too wise to struggle against necessity.

Independent of the intrinsic merit of the institution itself, there was a more pressing reason for its adoption in the present state of things. In order to excuse himself for having expelled the Bourbons and exposed France to a fearful war, it was necessary that he should prove himself to be different to them. Being the personification of the national glory and of civil equality, there was no fear of his appearing the flatterer of foreigners or the accomplice of the clergy or nobility. But there was one thing he did not represent, and which the Bourbons did represent more than he, and that was liberty, and it is a fact that the nation could more easily believe that he was become pacific than liberal. Having expelled the Bourbons at the risk of such great dangers to France, he was bound to give her liberty; and that not as Louis XVIII. had done, unwillingly and hesitatingly, and afterwards seeking to resume the half, but fully and freely. Therefore, we repeat, that his

resolution was already formed, under the dictates of prudence, if not of inclination.

As to the merit of the institution itself, which could not be altogether agreeable to him, for a will like his could ill brook restraint, he seemed to be fully converted, especially on the important point, the free discussion of the proceedings of those in power by a daily press.

Certainly if there is anything that at first view is repulsive to men of sincerity, it is the daily hearing of mingled truth and falsehood, with a superabundance of the false; to hear ignorance and dishonesty presume to dictate to the most honest and wisest men, and disfigure facts, shamelessly, cynically, and without measure. But the opposite condition, that is, the compelled silence of an enlightened nation, is more to be deplored than any inconvenience arising from excessive liberty. Power protected by silence may do what it will, and he who can do what he will is very likely to do it; therefore, on reflection, we find that we have but this alternative, either to grant liberty of discussion, or allow opportunity for doing wrong; which is the wiser there can be no doubt, for experience shows that it is better that those who govern should be judged unjustly, than allowed an opportunity of acting with injustice. Besides, the opposite system gradually engenders so much distrust that it is more difficult for a government to defend itself against false reports, or the calumnies that circulate from one person to another, than against the open attacks of the press. Indeed, under the régime of silence, calumny is ever welcome to the distrusted public, and this evil, undermining slowly and unseen, becomes thus the punishment of absolute power, and is at the least as dangerous when it infects the masses as the unrestrained licence of the press. The latter may be overcome by a contradictory reply, but it is impossible to reach the other in its hidden retreat. Without taking into consideration that a day will come, and that ever the luckless day of misfortune, when all barriers being removed, long-restrained passion pours forth on you the accumulated wrongs of twenty years, and overwhelms you when there is not one disposed to listen to you, not one willing to defend you.

Such had been Napoleon's experience, and destined to extremes in all things, his experience in this had been both complete and terrible. Holding during his former reign all the organs of public opinion in his own power, he had seen such distrust arise amongst the people, that he could no longer contradict a false or support a true assertion, and this to such a degree that his power was as it were dumb; and more reliance was felt in the false bulletins of the enemy than in those of the government that spoke the truth. Thus, as we have seen,

Napoleon ceased to send bulletins in 1813 and 1814, and contented himself with inserting in the *Moniteur* letters purporting to be written by officers in the army to different persons of the State. In the day of trouble, when he was alone, or almost alone, at Fontainebleau, Napoleon heard that cry of malediction rise that afterwards accompanied him to Elba, and which did not leave him a single moment of repose, mingling with its just reproaches the vilest and most revolting calumnies not only on his public acts, but even on his private life. His pride, which was as great as his genius, had floated, as we may say, over this sea of infamy, and after all these horrors—though his faults still remained patent—he had lived to see his glory revive, and bring back the people and the army to his feet.

Having escaped this storm, he saw, clearly and loudly proclaimed that it was but false prudence to restrain the press, and consequently, as we have seen, he abolished the censorship on the 25th of March.

But where the press is permitted to write freely on public affairs, it is but a step further to allow them to be discussed in an assembly, and Napoleon was inclined to believe that it would be possible to govern, though with chambers that would attack, torment, and dismiss his ministers. Experience has shown that even if the calumny of the press may often be unanswered, the calumny spoken in the forum is instantly refuted in the presence of those who had heard it, and further accompanied by the solemn reparation of public justification. There is no rational and upright man that would not prefer to have his actions discussed before an assembly bound to hear the defence as well as the attack, and to pronounce immediate judgment, to replying by writing before readers, who had believed the accusation from a malicious feeling, and whom thoughtlessness prevents from reading the defence, and who take no trouble to judge truly because that they are not expressly bound to do so.

Consequently, once that liberty was granted to the press, there could be no objection to freedom of discussion, and free assemblies followed as a matter of course. All the time that Napoleon was waging a fearful war against England he was closely observing her institutions, because he sought the revelation of her plans in the discussions of Parliament, and he was far from feeling that repugnance to the English constitution that is felt by narrow or timid minds. He could see nothing in such a constitution but obstacles to his will, and for the moment at least he was willing to encounter many and powerful ones, he was satisfied to have his ministers attacked, his laws rejected, and to hear resolutions formally carried. "Formerly," he said, "such opposition would have interfered with my plans; but now my only plan is to gain one battle, recover our independence,

avenge the insult of having had two hundred thousand foreigners in our capital, and then to make peace! Peace being obtained, and that on the sole basis of our independence, we shall have nothing more to do than to rule our fair empire of France, and it will be no humiliation to me to hear the objections or even refusals of her representatives. Having conquered and ruled the world, there will be nothing so terrible in submitting to a contradiction. In any case, my son will accustom himself to it, and I shall endeavour to prepare him by my instruction and example. But all that I ask of Heaven and France is to allow me to conquer once, and only once, these arrogant monarchs that were once so humble!"

Napoleon was sincere when he spoke thus, but he did not know himself! When he should have conquered Europe that once which he had implored God and men so earnestly to allow him, would he be able to endure contradiction, not only a just and moderate contradiction, but also that ridiculous opposition that often appears in a revolting form in some free States; could he smile then, and wait a tardy vindication from time? Nobody could tell how that might be, and he no more than another; but he considered that his very position obliged him to make a complete change in the imperial institutions; for not being able to give peace, he ought at least to grant liberty. His supporters, that is to say, the revolutionists, all men of sense, and the youth of France, all wished for full and entire liberty, and would not by any means be satisfied with civil equality, or what was called the principles of '89. This Napoleon was determined to grant, for whether convinced or not of the intrinsic merit of liberty, he was at least convinced of its necessity. What effects it might produce hereafter he could not tell, nor did he care to inquire, for his mind was occupied by something very different from a desire to know whether he would be more or less inconvenienced by new institutions hereafter; he was interested in another question, whether he should be able to conquer Europe, which was indeed of vital importance to him and his supporters, all soldiers, revolutionists, and holders of national property. That was the sole subject of his thoughts, one that effaced all others. He was prepared to do everything to please those who upheld him, as their zeal would be in proportion to his concessions, and with the clear-sightedness of a superior mind he did not hesitate to do what he could not avoid. He was therefore determined to give a fair trial to constitutional monarchy, and even hoped it might succeed, for its failure would have been a triumph to the Bourbons. However, he was not without fear as to the result of the first attempt. If free assemblies are an excellent instrument of government in a country where they have existed

for ages, they are at the commencement of their existence doubtful and often dangerous. When the art of guiding them has become a true science, in which those leaders excel who to large political views unite the talent of addressing public assemblies, and especially when they have existed a sufficient length of time to be accustomed to the shock of circumstances, and to have accustomed the people to look unmoved upon their stormy agitation, then they are not to be feared, and present more resources in time of danger than an absolute government that has no bond in common with the nation. But when free institutions are but a day old, when the nation possesses no men trained to the trade of guiding them, when their début is made in the midst of a formidable war, the enterprise is dangerous, and one that filled Napoleon with fear.

In modern times, the British Parliament, either from habit, or confidence in the protection of the sea, preserved a becoming deportment during war. In ancient times, the Roman Senate, an institution no less deserving of admiration in another sense, sold the ground on which Hannibal encamped. But this was an old assembly, accustomed to govern Rome in good and evil fortune. Nobody could hope to assemble a Roman Senate or a British Parliament in France in 1815. Napoleon saw that in the coming struggle great trials must be endured, and that with the loss of self-possession all would be lost. But if, on the other hand, the public remained as tranquil as after Brienne, Craonne, and Laon, it would be possible to succeed. Unfortunately it was not the courage but the self-possession of the new assemblies that he distrusted, assemblies a day old, divided into numerous parties, that would often consider a reverse but as a happy opportunity of giving vent to their passions. He feared that at the first disaster the apprehensions of some, the anger or intrigues of others, would create a chaos, by which the enemy would profit to penetrate again into the heart of the country. Therefore, though quite willing to make a trial of liberty, he dreaded doing so at once, and as it were within reach of the cannon of Europe.

This apprehension suggested to him the idea of giving a constitution very similar to that of England, but which was not to come into operation until after the commencement of hostilities. This project did not arise from perfidy, but from a secret presentiment of the danger of convoking an inexperienced assembly whilst foreign armies were marching towards Paris. Had he been insincere, he might easily have deceived the friends of liberty, by removing all blame from himself, and throwing it on them, by immediately summoning a constituent assembly, and ordering its members to elaborate a constitution in revising the imperial *senatus-consultes*. In the existing state of

opinion, with some of the old revolutionists attached to the constitution of 1791, others to those of 1793 and 1795, and the new liberals preferring the British institutions, the struggle would have been both long and violent, unity of opinion impossible; and whilst this struggle continued in the political arena, Napoleon, exercising provisionally the fulness of imperial power, might gain battles, put an end to the war, and afterwards turn against the assembly the inconsistency of its views and the folly of its conduct, dissolve it, and constitute France in any way he pleased.

The success of such a plan was almost certain, but it should be commenced by convoking an assembly, a proceeding that Napoleon dreaded during the first months of a fearful war, whose theatre was to be between Lille and Paris. Besides, not knowing what constitution might be proposed to him, he preferred to frame one himself at once, to frame the best possible constitution, and then seek the approbation of the country, after the fashion of the time, by written votes, a deceptive method, but of little importance if exercised in favour of a popular measure. This was his real plan; but could he, even when acting sincerely, overcome the rooted distrust of all? He was not believed by Europe when he spoke of peace; would France believe him when he spoke of liberty? and would not his prudence be considered as only the wiles of a despot? There was the danger. On the rugged path he had trod since his return from Elba he was compelled to walk, bowed beneath the heavy burden of his past errors, and perhaps Providence laid on this latter part of his career a punishment often inflicted on illustrious criminals—that of having their sincere repentance disbelieved.

The time was now come for deciding these constitutional questions, and determining what form of government France should have. The public excitement on this subject had reached the acme. Articles were written representing every shade of opinion, but most frequently the extremes. Old republicans awakened from a long sleep, and even royalists, who had formerly considered the slightest wish for liberty a crime, demanded a republic, or something very like it. Others wished for royalty stripped of the appendages of 1791; and many, particularly young men, who were free from the prejudices of the old and the new régime, entertained a penchant for the British constitution without exactly understanding its mechanism. However slight their knowledge, this was the government they preferred, and it must be added that the majority was on their side. The Charter of 1814, a little enlarged, would gratify the general wish.

In general, all who were not obstinate revolutionists, on whom

experience had no effect, or royalists whom party feelings urged to excess, wished for a constitutional monarchy. The illustrious Sièyes, whose great mind had penetrated the profound mechanism of the English monarchy, asked nothing better for France, and though not liking Napoleon, he considered it wiser to join him, that with his assistance the cause of the Revolution and of the national independence might be saved. Carnot, enraged at the events of the Bourbons' twelve months' reign, and touched by Napoleon's conduct, and above all, by the acknowledgment of his faults, was satisfied to give constitutional monarchy a trial under his authority. Fouché cared little for theories; he feared Napoleon, whose return he had beheld with regret, and though he did not desire his fall, which would immediately bring back the Bourbons, he sought to bind him by guarantees, and looked forward to diminishing his power by the aid of any opposition party that might spring up in the future chambers, and whom he hoped by his intrigues to lead. Like everybody else, he wished for constitutional monarchy, but he wished that the power of the monarch should be restricted as much as possible.

The constitutional party—as it was called under Louis XVIII.—had been dispersed by the revolution of the 20th of March; its principal leaders, being compromised, had fled the dreaded vengeance of Napoleon. Reassured by his mode of proceeding, many of them had remained in Paris, where he allowed them to live in peace. Madame de Staël had not left her house; M. de Lafayette had returned to his chateau of Lagrange. M. Benjamin Constant, the most active and most compromised of all, particularly by his fierce tirades against the empire, and especially the famous article inserted in the *Journal des Débats* of the 19th of March, had got a passport from Mr. Crawford, the American minister, and remained concealed until such time as it would suit him to make use of it. Late events had detached all these persons from the Bourbon cause, and they were prepared, if reassured as to their safety, and if what was said of Napoleon's intentions were true, to try that constitutional monarchy under him which had failed under Louis XVIII. Prince Joseph, regretting that Napoleon had been left the power of doing everything, even to ruining himself, coincided in the opinion of the constitutional party, and even made advances to the chiefs, especially to M. de Lavalette and Madame de Staël, and sought to make Napoleon do the same, to which indeed he was not disinclined.

The statesmen of the empire, who were for the most part old revolutionists disgusted with liberty, or royalists won over by Napoleon's genius and glory, and who under him had acquired the habit of passive obedience, engendered by absolute authority

—these persons felt no inclination to make the proposed essays in liberty, in whose success they felt no confidence. The High Chancellor Cambacérès, with his practical good sense, saw, however, that nothing else could be done; but as since the 20th of March he had only acted from obedience, he confined his co-operation to the administration of justice. MM. Mollien, de Gaëte, and Decrès had resumed with their customary functions the habit of allowing Napoleon to decide all difficult points himself. M. de Bassano approved, as usual, what Napoleon did, though he did not feel his wonted confidence in the result. M. Molé disliked both the men and measures of the day, and expressed his doubts, so that he might seem half to approve, half to condemn. He had accepted only the administration of roads and bridges, a position that did not compromise him much. But still the majority were for a very liberal constitutional monarchy. Many articles and many pamphlets were written on this subject, and even several memorials concerning the new constitution were sent to Napoleon, strange productions for the most part, for in general persons who present to a prince plans unasked are either intriguers that seek to bring themselves into notice, or dreamers seeking to give publicity to their fancies. As Napoleon read these *factums*, he sometimes smiled, sometimes got angry, but oftenest became sad at seeing the public mind in such a state on the eve of a fearful struggle with all Europe. M. de Lavalette was his real confidant. Napoleon esteemed old Cambacérès just as much, and had as much affection for M. de Bassano; but his warm feelings, which must find vent, found but a faint echo in the first, and a monotonous response in the latter. He spoke more freely with the astute, reliable, and independent-minded Lavalette, who advised freely, but never assumed the airs of offended wisdom when his counsels were not followed. Napoleon often spent the greater part of the night talking with him, even after a day of hard labour.

Sometimes when he read certain papers that gave advice not only in an exacting but even threatening tone, he became excited, walked rapidly up and down the salons of the Elysée Palace, and declared that France knew nothing of such tribunals, that she had confidence only in him, and that had he given permission, the army and the people would quickly have crushed the royalists, and silenced the fault-finders. But before M. de Lavalette could find time to remind him how ill such language became him, he had recovered his self-possession, and smiling at the extravagant productions on his table, and comparing the France of 1800, that implored him to deliver her from *babblers*, with the France of 1815, seeking unbounded liberty, he began to question whether all that were seriously meant, and whether

such variability of opinion could represent real necessities and profound convictions. M. de Lavalette replied with justice, that the sentiments of France ought not to be judged by the exaggerations of a time of excitement, but estimated by her aspect in ordinary times, and it would be seen that she always wished for moderate liberty, which would protect her alike from the rash enterprises of an individual, or the licentious extravagance of the multitude; that she had never changed her opinion as to the principle of liberty; the only question had been about the measure meted out to her; and that reflection would show that since 1789 her wishes had been the same as they were at the existing time. Napoleon was convinced by these rational observations, but mourned over the variety and confusion of ideas that prevailed at a time when a great military crisis was at hand, and began to question whether, embarrassed by the too evident *maladresse* of the friends of liberty, it would be possible to encounter the impending struggle.

"To make a first trial of constitutional liberty," he said, "midst the roar of cannon, and such a roar, the world has yet heard nothing like it." Still he did not think of opposing the liberals, for he had no choice but to join them or the royalists, and as he could not depend on the latter, he was obliged to trust the others. As in time of war he had ever been mild and calm in the presence of danger, so now in his new position he was wonderfully gentle, exhibiting no appearance of anger, but seeking to soothe those who did, and was in reality less anxious about what proportion of power would remain to him than concerning the means that would be given him of conquering the external enemy.

We have already mentioned his secret plan, which was not to burden himself with a constituent assembly, though that would be an infallible means to destroy liberty by the ridicule which the consequent confusion of ideas would entail; he intended to take into confidence a few sensible men, with whom he would draw up a constitution that could not fail to satisfy the true liberals; this he would promulgate solemnly, and then hasten to meet the enemy; but he did not intend to assemble the new chambers until he should have driven back the allied army to a sufficient distance from the capital. Accident had unexpectedly provided him with the best possible person for drawing up a constitution. M. Benjamin Constant, that impetuous writer who on the 19th of March had denounced Napoleon as a calamity to the country, and had promised in the names of the friends of liberty never to support him again, was still, as we have said, concealed in Paris, less desirous of seeking the means of escape than of discovering whether he might safely remain. For this purpose his friends had sought

the assistance of General Sebastiani, a man of moderation, as all true politicians are, sure that with him M. Constant's secret was safe. When the general heard that he was still in Paris, he hastened to the emperor, told him that M. Benjamin Constant was in France, and at his disposal. "Ah! you have him!" cried Napoleon, as if he were glad of an opportunity of revenge. The general was surprised, and almost alarmed; but Napoleon quickly added, "You need not be alarmed; I don't intend to injure your protégé; send him to me, and he will have no reason to be dissatisfied." Napoleon saw at a glance that he now had an opportunity of displaying the highest degree of generosity, and at the same time of securing the services of the first writer of the time, and the best suited to draw up his future constitution, by pardoning the most violent of his opponents, and raising him to a considerable post. He no sooner perceived the possibility than he resolved to put it into execution. It may be asked whether in acting thus he did not display more contempt for human nature than true generosity; but such an inquiry shows ignorance of his character. The feeling that influenced him was identical with the so much lauded clemency of Cæsar, that is, a profound knowledge of men, an acute perception of the short duration of their passions, united to great pliability of disposition in their regard, and great power of influencing them. However this may be, Napoleon sent the chamberlain with a most polite invitation to M. Benjamin Constant to come to him.

Now that forty years of public discussion has instructed us in the operation of (forgotten but for a moment, I hope) free institutions, and consequently taught us self-respect, few persons could be found who would accept such an invitation, or if they had, it would have been only to ask their sovereign's permission to retain their personal respectability by not taking part in a government they had so violently opposed. M. Benjamin Constant accepted Napoleon's invitation at once, because he was dissatisfied with the Bourbons for acting so badly to the constitutional party; and deeply impressed by Napoleon's liberal promises, he considered it necessary to support him as the only man that could save France from invasion.

Napoleon had the choice of many ways of receiving this distinguished man, who for the moment was at his mercy. He might have been flattering or harsh, but neither would have been worthy of him. He was simple, polite, and frank.

He did not allude to the past; he only spoke of the business about which M. Benjamin Constant had come. He told him that having promised France a free constitution, he now wished to give it without the restrictions of timid tyranny, or the astute compliance of a wily ruler who gives at first more than is

demanding only that he may have the power of withdrawing everything afterwards. He said that the public mind was greatly excited on this subject, and as was to be expected, not very logical. He did not know whether this would be the final demand of the people, for their opinions had often varied since 1800, when they would not have liberty on any terms, whilst now, they could not obtain too much; but the truth was, that only a minority wished for a free constitution—the mass of the people wished only for Napoleon himself, and only asked him to rid them of the nobles, priests, and foreigners; but that he felt great deference for the opinions of enlightened men, and wished to show that he was as enlightened as they; that he was therefore determined to grant a constitutional monarchy; that he knew well that there was but one form under which that could be given, and that was to have responsible ministers obliged to discuss public affairs openly in the two chambers; with unrestrained liberty of the press, and no preliminary censorship; that of the last point he was firmly convinced that it was childish to think of restraining the press, that consequently he would offer no fundamental opposition, and only wished to give it in a suitable form that should not be humiliating to him, that it might be doubted whether he would submit ultimately to the restraints he was preparing for himself, that such distrust was very natural, and would not offend him in the least; that he was quite prepared to endure the inconvenience of the constitutional régime, but he hoped that consideration would be shown for him. Formerly he had great designs to whose execution a constitutional monarchy would be an obstacle, but that now he had but one desire, to overcome the external enemy. It could not be denied that the struggle would be terrible, that negotiations had been mentioned, but in reality there had been none, that it would be absolutely necessary to fight to the death, and he hoped that the proper supplies would not be refused him; that immediately after subduing the enemy he would conclude a peace, and that then when nothing was to be done but to administer the government at home, the assistance of the representatives of the country would not displease him though sometimes opposed to his views. He added that a man's disposition was not the same at forty-six as at twenty-six, that he felt the change in himself, and that in any case the divided but well supported authority of a constitutional monarchy would be best suited to his son; that he laboured now more for his son's interest than for his own; that consequently there could be no serious disagreement between him and the true friends of liberty, that nothing remained but to consider the form, and he hoped that his dignity and fame, which were identical with those of France, would be respected.

These words, spoken in a calm, firm, and decided tone by a man whose brows were shaded with innumerable laurels, made a deep impression on M. Constant's excitable imagination, and almost completely convinced him, and he blessed the destiny that made him the prisoner of such a conqueror. Napoleon then gave him numerous plans for a constitution, some bearing signatures, some anonymous. Up to this time he had been polite but serious, but he smiled now in taking up several of these plans, of which he first announced the contents and then the name of the author. "This one is by a republican," said he; "this by a monarchist of the Mounier school, and this third by a pure royalist." Then making a summary of the contents, Napoleon laughed at the contrast presented between the ideas and the authors' names, for despotism was frequently proposed by republicans, and anarchy by royalists. "Do what you will with all these," he added, "arrange your ideas, probably you have done so already, put them in a proper form, then come to me, and we shall find no difficulty in coming to an agreement." Napoleon then dismissed M. Benjamin Constant without having either flattered or treated him haughtily; but he conquered him by his simplicity, grace, and vast mental power, before which no question seemed to present matter for argument, but to be already decided.

M. Benjamin Constant, besides possessing a clear, piquant, and sententious style as a writer, was the best informed man of his time in all that concerned the theory of constitutional monarchy. He was only deficient in that experience which shows what are the most essential points of this mechanism; for though he was better informed on the subject than any of his contemporaries, he still could not tell exactly what should be insisted on as essential, and what might be yielded without a compromise of principle. But he was not influenced by any of the prevailing errors, and having been the publicist employed by the liberal party against the first Restoration, he possessed an influence as far as regarded the framing of a constitution greater than that of any other man in France.

As his opinions were already decided, he did not spend much time in putting them into a proper form, and soon sought Napoleon again. He found him as simple and more friendly than before, and at each succeeding interview these two men became more at ease with each other, if not more familiar. Their conversation turned on the details of the future constitution, and never did the least disagreement arise between them. Napoleon admitted without the least hesitation that the daily press should not be submitted to a preliminary censorship, and should be accountable to the legal tribunals alone for any deviations from rectitude. This was yielding at one stroke all the

contested points of the question. As we have already said, experience had entirely changed Napoleon's opinion on this subject. As to the two chambers and the obligations on the part of the ministers to appear there and justify their acts, M. Constant met with no difficulty from Napoleon, and this was equivalent to sharing the government with the chambers, and more than sharing it, for if under such a system the monarch reserves to himself the privilege of sanctioning acts, he leaves their direction to the chambers, which is nothing more than submitting to necessity. In fact, it is impossible to govern a country in opposition to the real opinions, the dominant ideas of the nation; if it be attempted for a few days, it is soon of necessity given up. It is better therefore to submit with a good grace to what cannot be avoided, and accept the most direct means of introducing the general feeling of the nation into the government, which is, in other words, making all ministerial acts depend on the vote of the chambers.

Napoleon agreed also that the chambers might revise the laws as they pleased, but that the government should not be obliged to sanction the laws so amended; that the chambers might, not *beg*, as it was expressed in the Charter of Louis XVIII., but *invite* the government to propose such laws as might be required by public opinion, and even name the different points of them, but under the express condition that the invitation should not be presented to the emperor until the two chambers had agreed on the question. The Chamber of Deputies was to decide the first on all questions of taxation, and the Chamber of Peers to possess jurisdiction over the ministers, military commanders, and all persons invested with great authority. This was constitutional monarchy without the least reservation. The next thing to be considered was how the chambers were to be constituted.

Napoleon agreed that the Chamber of Deputies, which, though least in dignity, was greatest in influence, should be chosen by direct election. Did time permit, a law might have been drawn up pointing out what classes of citizens should have the right of voting for deputies. The subject was new and important, and it was difficult in the existing state of knowledge to decide on the different questions that might arise. It was thought better to employ the existing system a little modified. This was Sièyes's system of having the great mass of citizens choose about a hundred thousand electors for life, and these divided into two classes, colleges of the *arrondissement*, and colleges of the departments. This had the apparent advantage of allowing all the citizens to vote, but the real defect, inherent in universal suffrage, of being but an illusion, for the important point to be attained in admitting the intervention of the country in

the government is to ascertain the feeling of the enlightened portion who are capable of forming an opinion. However, the hundred thousand citizens whose names were at that time inscribed on the list offered a sample of the nation sufficient to represent its real feelings. The plan of having the candidates proposed by the colleges of the *arrondissement* to the colleges of the departments, and by these to the Senate, was abandoned as being calculated to produce a misrepresentation of the real opinions of the country by submitting them to the action of two ballots. Napoleon agreed that the colleges of the *arrondissements* should choose without intervention three hundred deputies, and the colleges of the departments about the same number; which would give an assembly almost equal in number to the English House of Commons. M. Benjamin Constant was satisfied with this basis, which indeed offered a great amelioration, for even the Charter of 1814 allowed only the old legislative corps chosen by the Senate from the lists drawn up by the electoral colleges. Napoleon also agreed to the total renewal of the second chamber every five years, an arrangement which experience has since consecrated as the only rational one.

The formation of the second chamber caused greater difficulty between Napoleon and M. Constant, not that the one would yield less, or the other demand more, but the most serious difficulties arose naturally out of the question itself.

Though not quite decided on the point, M. Constant was inclined to favour an hereditary peerage. He considered that such an institution would afford the happiest union of stability and independence of conduct in the formation of an upper chamber. Though Napoleon was more convinced of this than M. Constant himself, he had the greatest objection to introduce hereditary rights into the new constitution. In his own concise and figurative language he said: "An aristocracy is necessary, especially in a free State, where the democratic principle has always a preponderating influence. A government that seeks to move in one element alone, is like a balloon in the air, that will be borne along according to the direction of the wind. But on the contrary, one that is exposed to the action of two elements can use each at pleasure, and is controlled by none. It is like a vessel borne along by the waves, and using the winds only to assist its progress. The wind impels, but does not rule its action." Here is a profound thought ingeniously expressed. But notwithstanding that he held this opinion, Napoleon feared that in the existing state of things the representatives of the aristocratic principle then in France could not be brought to bear usefully on his project. "The old nobility," he said, "are opposed to me, and the new are very new. They

are not like the English aristocracy, coeval with the English constitution, to whose formation they have contributed, and whose institutions they have not ceased to uphold. Besides," added he, "we have a people extremely prejudiced against hereditary nobility. The sentiments that animate the people at this moment, and made them receive me so enthusiastically, is their hatred of the nobility and the clergy, and if you talk to them of an hereditary peerage, you will only excite their indignation, without the certainty of having created a real aristocracy, with a Chamber of Peers that for a long time will be composed of chamberlains and generals.

These different considerations perplexed Napoleon very much, for if he were conscious of the necessity of an hereditary nobility, he dreaded its effects on the excitable temperament of the French liberals.

As to general guarantees, he admitted without objection the immutability of the magistracy, the personal liberty of the subject, freedom of worship, &c., only asking that all should be expressed in clear precise terms that would leave no room for equivocation. One, and one only, he objected to, and that most warmly—the abolition of confiscation. He did not seek to stipulate for the contrary, he only wished that point to be passed over in silence. "I do not wish," he said, "to take anybody's property, nor to imitate the National Convention in anything. But a new emigration is about to commence. If the war continues, you will have a rising in Vendée. Whether it continue or not, you will have such assemblings as that at Coblenz on our frontiers. There is one already forming at Ghent, in which men whom I have loaded with honours and riches are figuring. This combination will increase every day, and if I do not end the struggle in three months, a government will be organised there whose orders will be better obeyed by a certain class of Frenchmen than mine. Do not think that I wish to deprive anybody of his life or fortune. But I must defend myself, and how can I do that against a government that abides abroad, and is obeyed at home, if I have not in my hands some means of intimidation. At this very moment there are secret orders issued by the former prefects of Louis XVIII. both at Besançon and Marseilles. I shall expel them; but they will remain on the frontier, where they will do as much harm as if in the country itself. I must have the means of restraining my declared enemies, and of winning over the wavering. Be sure that while I can sequester property without confiscating it, I can influence even Talleyrand himself. However, I am determined, when we shall have peace, to restore this guarantee, of whose necessity I am convinced, and I only ask to have it passed over in silence until then."

Napoleon continued obstinate in this, the only point of the new constitution in which he showed a despotic feeling. He was wrong in trying to keep any share of arbitrary power, for possessing greater or less means of intimidation could neither injure nor serve him; it was the battlefield alone that could decide his fate. But in justice it must be admitted that the conduct of the royalists was such as to excuse Napoleon's intentions. They had kept quiet at first, because they were afraid; but taking courage when they found that all parties were allowed to speak, write, and act as they pleased, they went openly from Paris to Vendée and Ghent, evidently preparing civil war in the former province, and exciting royalist movements in the capital. There was no absolute danger for the moment, but should the enemy come up to the walls of Paris, the danger might be serious; and it is evident, however much one may disapprove of Napoleon, that it was only natural that an energetic man, one not accustomed to yield to any obstacle, and living at a time not far removed from revolutionary influences, should wish to possess the means of intimidation, even without the intention of putting them in force.

M. Benjamin Constant said no more on the subject at that time, though he was determined to return to it again. A last question remained, a mere matter of form, but one on which Napoleon was if possible still more decided; this was the title to be given to the new constitution. He wished to grant this new charter in the same way as Louis XVIII. had granted his, but without allowing his intention to appear; and appearances were all important in this case, as on them depended the recognition or denial of a right. "I have recognised the national sovereignty," he said, "but that is not conferring a favour, for the nation is the real sovereign, and no monarch is firmly placed on his throne but he whom the people support. I do not mean to follow the example of Louis XVIII. and give the new constitution as if emanating from my sole authority; but if I do not present it as an emanation of my rights, I offer it as the offspring of my good sense. I wish to make it as excellent as possible, and to accomplish such a work you and I are more competent than an assembly of men who could never agree in their opinions, and who perhaps would convulse the country before coming to a conclusion. When we shall have finished the work to the best of our ability, I shall present it for the national acceptance, in the same way as the old imperial constitutions, that is, by votes registered in the offices of the mayors. Some will call this a deceptive method; I admit it. But it is not more deceptive than the convocation of primary assemblies, a method much more complicated, though not more satisfactory. In affairs of this kind the important

point is to do what is right ; and as to the form, provided it does not negative the principle, the simplest is what should be preferred. The true acceptance of the people is the duration of the constitution, which is the enlightened assent of the nation ratified by experience."

M. Benjamin Constant was not inclined to dispute this, for he also thought it would be better to avoid a constituent assembly that might work for a year without result, or primary assemblies that might cause disastrous confusion. He thought it better to adopt the shortest form of acceptance, provided it involved the recognition of the national sovereignty. However, he wished that the new constitution should differ from the old imperial constitutions, not alone in essential principles—which it did—but in form as well ; he wished that the title should be different, in order to inspire confidence, that it might not be confounded with the old *senatus-consultes*, which, once they had emanated from Napoleon's mind, were converted by the servile Senate into fundamental laws of the State. He said, therefore, that without attaching any real importance to a mere form, it would be necessary by some means or other to allay the public distrust, perhaps by giving the new constitution a character that would distinguish it from all its predecessors. "No, no," replied Napoleon, "a wish is entertained to deprive me of the past, to make me a different man from what I am, to efface my fifteen years of sovereignty, to blot out France's glory and mine, as if everything in my former reign had been bad. . . . I will not consent to it. I yield to experience and to circumstances, which will no longer allow such a dictatorship as I have enjoyed, but I will not submit to humiliation. Besides, believe me, France wishes for her old emperor, changed a little, of course, but still she desires him and no other." On this point Napoleon was inflexible, for he considered that a new form was only meant to humiliate him by compelling him to disavow his past career. The new constitution was consequently to be considered as a modification of the old, and by no means as inaugurating a new order of things. In this Napoleon was as obstinate for what he called his glory as Louis XVIII. had been for what he called his rights. This was a serious fault, for the constitution of 1815 was totally different from those of 1802 and 1804, and though men in general seek to appear to give more than they really do, Napoleon in this instance ran the risk of seeming to grant less than he really did. Silly precaution, and mournful consequence of pride ! In the existing state of public opinion it would have been far better to promise more than was intended to be given, than to give more than was promised.

The result of this consultation was the new and unfortunately

celebrated title of "Additional Act added to the Constitutions of the Empire," a title calculated to persuade the nation that it was getting only a modification, instead of, as was really the case, an entire change of constitution. M. Benjamin Constant, delighted at obtaining what was essential, yielded what concerned the mere form, which was wrong in him, though it was natural that a philosophic mind should attach but little importance to externals. He took his pen and drew up in clear, simple, and elegant language the best written and best constructed charter that was granted to France during the long course of her revolutions. He saw the emperor again and again, and came to an agreement with him on all points, even on that relating to an hereditary peerage. Napoleon having objected to this last point for the reasons we have already stated, after having again repeated that it involved the risk of making the new constitution unpopular by introducing an hereditary peerage, he changed his opinion after having profoundly reflected on another point, namely, the difficulty of utilising the nobility in the existing state of France. He said that should he gain three or four battles, and be able to conclude a peace, that perhaps the ancient noblesse would side with him as they had done before, and that an hereditary peerage would be a greater attraction for them than the Senate; that he would thus possess the means of luring them back, and the two classes of nobility, the old and new, fused into one, would perhaps ultimately form a sufficiently imposing aristocratic body. He therefore yielded this point, but insisted on the article relating to confiscation.

The new constitution was drawn up very quickly, for its authors disagreed but on one point, and the editor wielded a practised pen; but it was time that it should emerge from obscurity and receive the support of an influential authority. It had been already spoken of by the public, nor were the secret conferences on this subject unnoticed, and some jealous feeling was excited both in the Council of State and amongst certain revolutionists, who, having assisted in drawing up the former constitutions, were offended at being refused all participation in this. It was now time that it should be submitted to the Council of State, and it was necessary that M. Benjamin Constant should have a seat in that assembly, that he might be able to justify his work.* This created a very natural opportunity of appointing him Councillor of State, and thus in a simple and

* M. Benjamin Constant in his "Letters of the Hundred Days" acknowledges the great part he had in the Additional Act, but does not say that it was the work of his hand. Still there is no doubt the entire was written by him, and that, with the exception of some modified articles, the whole work was his. Besides, it is easy to see from the unity, precision, and elegant simplicity of the style, that it was the work of one pen, and that the best of its time. Napoleon's style, which was loftier, was more dogmatic and more nervous.

adroit manner Napoleon conquered his once most violent enemy, and this enemy had the satisfaction of being conquered in a way that reflected no disgrace upon himself. This sudden friendship excites more surprise now than it did then. So many strange changes of opinion had occurred in 1814, and political morality was so little understood, that though this intimacy was remarked, it excited neither surprise nor displeasure. M. Benjamin Constant was therefore appointed Councillor of State that he might assist officially in framing the constitution. Some persons, such as Prince Cambacères, M. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angély, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, and the presidents of the different sections of the Council of State, were summoned to the Palace of the Elysée to assist at some preliminary conferences, in which few objections were raised, for indeed, with the exception of the title and the silence on the subject of confiscation, there was no room for objection. However, some few alterations were made, and another article inserted, which, though quite unnecessary, was still in conformity with the passions of the time. The most important of all objects for the Bonapartist was the dynastic question; the sale of the so-called national property for the holders thereof; the abolition of tithes and feudal rights for the agriculturists; and for the revolutionists of every shade of opinion, the irrevocable condemnation of the ancient régime. A final article, numbered 67, was consequently inserted, in which it was declared that the French people, in delegating their power to the authorities appointed by the constitution, did not give them the right of proposing the restoration of the Bourbons—even though the imperial dynasty should be extinct—nor of re-establishing the feudal nobility, seigniorial privileges, tithes, or religious privileges, nor more especially was any power recognised that could attain the validity of the sales of national property, and every one, no matter whom, was forbidden to make any proposal of the kind. The only advantage of this article was, that it enumerated the more essential points in a separate category, and endowed them as it were with a sacred character, sacred indeed only as long as the constitution itself would be esteemed such.

The new Act was then laid before the Council of State. Scarcely any objection was made at the meeting; but in private conversation the title of “Additional Act added to the Constitutions of the Empire” was very much criticised as not distinguishing it sufficiently from former constitutions, and which would give an opportunity of introducing other modifications, as had formerly been done by a *senatus-consulte*, adopted by the Senate, and sanctioned at the mayors’ offices by some million *ayes* against some million *noes*. It was universally remarked that nothing had been said of confiscation, and many

persons became alarmed. Everybody even in the general meeting remarked that the abolition of confiscation had been announced in the Charter of 1814, and that the nation would be irritated at not finding it in the Additional Act, consequently the presidents of the sections, and M. Benjamin Constant in particular, were requested to press the emperor to consent to fill up this so much to be regretted omission, and which might give room to so much misinterpretation.

A final meeting took place in the Palace of the Elysée, on the evening of the 21st of April, when the constitution was definitely drawn up. The task imposed on the different co-operators in the new constitution was faithfully performed, and Napoleon was requested to fill up the omission relative to the abolition of confiscation. The article of the Charter of 1814 which abolished this barbarous punishment was referred to. Napoleon replied that it was an act of pure hypocrisy on the part of the Bourbons. He said that their eagerness to nominally suppress confiscation arose solely from a desire to invalidate the origin of national property, which was the confiscated property of nobles and priests. But their respect for property was but a pretence, for they had taken every opportunity of plundering the holders of national property directly or indirectly. These false appearances should be distrusted, and no credence accorded to fraudulent intentions. As to him, he had no desire to seize on any person's property, but by persisting in their present demand they would deprive him of the only means he possessed of intimidating the new Coblentz. Though the council did not deny what he said of the Bourbons, they persisted in asserting the principle of property, which was sacred in itself, and which it would not look well not to recognise at a time that such pains were being taken to proclaim the rights of citizens, till then unknown, or but partially recognised. At this Napoleon rose with sparkling eyes and menacing gesture, and pacing the room with rapid strides, said, that they sought to lead him into a course foreign to his nature, by which they would impart a dangerous vitality to the evil doctrines of the day, which they were encouraging and exciting; that public opinion was becoming worse every hour; that France, the real France, looked for *the old arm of her emperor, but did not find it*; that he would be left unarmed a prey to every faction; that both the people and the army abhorred the emigrants, and would blame him for every indulgence shown them, and would not pardon his leaving them riches that would be employed in supporting a foreign war; that circumstances alone must be blamed for this slight deviation from the mildness of the liberal régime; *that they wished to make him an angel, but that he was not one*, and they must be content with him such as he was—

a man not accustomed to allow himself to be attacked with impunity. After this outburst, which was but the repetition of what was said every day by men alarmed at the pretended revolutionary movement, Napoleon became calm, but did not yield the point relative to the abolition of confiscation, though he solemnly promised that this article should be recognised after the establishment of peace. He acted like all rulers who promise to renounce the exercise of arbitrary power when the existing necessity shall have ceased, that is, when the evil has become incurable both with regard to themselves and their victims.

All yielded before Napoleon's anger, M. Benjamin Constant as well as the rest, for he was anxious to see published in the *Moniteur* a work of which he was proud, and which might have done him lasting honour but for this one omission.

On Sunday, the 23rd of April, the *Moniteur* published the new constitution under the title of "An Act added to the Constitutions of the Empire." The preamble was very skilfully drawn up. It told how the emperor, profiting by experience, had at different times modified the preceding constitutions, particularly in the years VIII., X., and XII., always, however, submitting these modifications to the consent of the nation; that in those days, solely occupied with the project of establishing a vast federal system in Europe—this was the title Napoleon gave to his plan of universal monarchy—he had been obliged to defer many arrangements necessary to the liberty of the nation; that having been induced to abandon this vast federal system, and devote himself to the welfare of France, he was determined to modify the imperial constitutions, preserving all that was good in the past, and borrowing from the advanced intelligence of the country all that could tend to secure the rights of the citizens, and *this by giving the greatest possible extension to the representative system; by combining the highest possible degree of political liberty with the energy necessary to make foreign nations respect the independence of the French people and the dignity of the Crown.*

According to the terms of the new constitution, the emperor was invested with the executive power, and exercised the legislative power in concurrence with two chambers. One of these, the Chamber of Peers, was hereditary, the members, whose number was not fixed, to be appointed by the emperor. The other, the Chamber of Deputies, was to be elective, and to consist of six hundred and twenty-nine members, elected for five years by the two series of colleges—those of the departments and the arrondissements. At the expiration of five years fresh elections were to be made. The commercial interests were to be represented by twenty-three members, chosen after a special

fashion. The Chamber of Representatives was to appoint its own president, subject, however, to the emperor's approbation. The Chamber of Peers was to have supreme jurisdiction over ministers, military commanders, &c. The Chamber of Representatives was to have the initiative in all questions relating to finance and levying of troops. The budget was to be voted every year. The chambers were to have the power of amending the laws, and could even propose laws, in virtue of their initiative, and these laws, if approved by the chambers, might be submitted to the emperor. The ministers might be members of either chamber, or might take a seat there, though not members, and were bound to appear before the chambers when called upon, and explain their acts. They were responsible to the Chamber of Representatives, by which they might be impeached; but were to be judged by the Chamber of Peers. The emperor could dissolve the Chamber of Representatives, but he was bound to summon another within six months at the latest. The appointment of magistrates was permanent; the military tribunals were to have jurisdiction only over military misdemeanours. Personal liberty was guaranteed to all Frenchmen. They could neither be imprisoned nor exiled arbitrarily, and should only be subject to their natural judges. A state of siege could only be proclaimed in case of foreign invasion or civil war. In the latter case a state of siege could only be declared by passing a law, or if the chambers were not sitting, by issuing a decree, which should be converted into a law as soon as possible. Every Frenchman should have the right of printing his opinion without a previous censorship, and was answerable only to the law of the land. Misdemeanours of the press were to be tried before a jury. The right of individuals to petition was recognised. Equality and freedom of religious worship was established. Lastly, the dynasty, the national property, the abolition of titles and ancient privileges, were placed, as we have seen, under a special guarantee, since the members of both chambers were forbidden to propose any measure inimical to them.

All enactments made by former *senatus-consultes* that were opposed to this new Act were annulled. The others remained in force. The present Additional Act was to be presented for acceptance to the French people in the offices of mayors, advocates, &c., where they would express their approval or disapproval by *aye* or *no*, inscribed on registers kept for that purpose. The revision of the votes was to be made in an assembly of the Champ de Mai composed of all the members of the electoral colleges that should happen to come to Paris.

Never before had so much liberty been accorded to France, liberty as great as could be reasonably expected, and complete,

with the exception of the article relative to confiscation, the consideration of which was adjourned. It was not from any covert motive that Napoleon was so liberal ; but because his great mind saw that as he was obliged to grant liberty it would be necessary to grant it as fully as possible, and being at that time entirely occupied by one idea—that of conquering Europe, arrayed against him—he felt that this once obtained, the more or less of power he would enjoy would be but a secondary object ; besides, he considered that in the working of the constitution more would be conceded to him than to another, thanks to his glory, genius, and strength of will ; besides, he thought less of himself than of his son, whom he did not desire to see possessed of more power than that enjoyed by a king of England.

We are now to see how this liberty was received, and the following recital will show that in politics as well as in everything else it is not sufficient that a remedy be good, but that it also be applied at a proper time.

BOOK LIX.

THE CHAMP DE MAL.

NEVER had liberty been so extensively granted to France as by the Additional Act, and never had it been so badly received. All, both young and old, after the long sleep of the public mind, had awakened to their love of liberty, and understood it in a different manner, because experience had not yet led them to adopt a common system. It was generally expected that some hundreds of constituents would be summoned to deliberate on the different forms of government, and each fancied that the form of constitution he preferred would emanate from these discussions. The greater number flattered themselves that they would be of the number of these constituents, and even the Council of State had expected to be called on to draw up the new constitution, instead of which, their sanction to a completed work was all that was asked. Thus the mode that was adopted was at once offensive to personal pretensions and to the advocates of certain systems. Besides, all disliked the old imperial constitutions, which they justly considered responsible for the misfortunes of the first empire, and a radical change had been hoped for, absolutely different from the old system both in substance and form.

There was a feeling of general and bitter disappointment when one morning there appeared in the *Moniteur*, completely finished and beyond the possibility of alteration, a simple Act, qualified as "additional" to the imperial constitutions, of which it appeared to be only a modification, whilst the public desired a complete change; and for the stability of this Act no other guarantee was offered than its mute acceptance in the offices of the mayors, justices of peace, &c. Instead of the perfectly new order of things that had been expected, a work in which all should join, and which should be consecrated by universal approbation, there was given what was considered but an insignificant modification, doled out by the hands of power, and ratified in a common-place manner, in which no confidence could be felt, as it offered no guarantee that a succession of Additional Acts might not be published after the fashion of the ancient *senatus-consultes*. The people could not but feel and

say that they had been deceived in the most unworthy manner when so little had been conceded, and that little not even secured.

The public was prejudiced by the title of the work before reading it. It would require more knowledge than was then general to see that this contained the principles of a constitutional monarchy, such at least as a legislator could write, as bringing it into operation could only be the work of time. But however well informed the friends of liberty may have been at this time, they were totally devoid of experience. Some were displeased because the Additional Act announced the formation of two chambers, others because it did not declare something like a republic, and all, as Napoleon had foreseen, were indignant at finding that one chamber would be hereditary. To the discontent excited by the title announcing a modification instead of a total change, and to the discontent excited by the form, which recalled the Charter granted by Louis XVIII., was now added the displeasure felt against the work itself. The old republicans looked on it as a monarchy, the royalists of 1791 as a monarchy with two chambers, that is the Mounier monarchy, whilst the young liberals, better informed than the other two classes, considered it an aristocratic monarchy because of the hereditary peerage. The journals unanimously repeated the same diatribes, and the royalists, taking courage from the leniency of the imperial police, joined with the republicans, the enemies of monarchy, with the monarchists opposed to the two chambers, and with the young liberals who objected to an hereditary nobility, saying, what indeed ill became them, that the Additional Act was only a charter, like that of Louis XVIII., which perpetuated feudal monarchy by two chambers, of which one was to be hereditary. They thus helped to propagate the idea then prevalent, that Napoleon was not at all changed, that now that he was established in authority, he had no idea of keeping the promises he so liberally made at his arrival; that he returned to his old practices—he had drawn the semblance of a constitution from his own personal despotism, enunciated in the same form and almost in the same terms as the Bourbon Charter, and ratified in a manner peculiar to himself, that is, by registers in public offices, a manner of proceeding quite as insolent and deceptive as that employed by Louis XVIII. This opinion was at once adopted by all those inclined to distrust Napoleon, and had the bad effect of cooling the zeal of the friends of the revolution and liberty, the only persons inclined to hasten to the frontiers. Every man that felt displeased or disheartened was not only a partisan lost to Napoleon, but a soldier withdrawn from the defence of the country. Whilst patriots of every shade of opinion, excited by the royalists,

declared that the Additional Act was nothing but a dark emanation of despotism, on the other hand, those who accused the government of joining the revolutionary party, and who made their affected fears an excuse for keeping aloof until victory should have been pronounced in favour of one party or the other—these men asserted that Napoleon was not recognisable, that he no longer possessed will or energy, that he allowed himself to be led by fools, that he had given an anarchical constitution, and that having once consented to be the instrument of regicides and Jacobins, he would end by being their dupe and victim.

But everybody's mind was disturbed by the prospect of the great impending crisis that now was seen approaching with giant steps in the train of the European powers. All parties felt that their fate depended on this crisis, and excitement being added to want of judgment, they were more impressionable, and consequently more unreasonable than usual.

Napoleon saw all this, and was much affected by the distrust he inspired. He had foreseen that the hereditary peerage would not please, but he had no idea that the title of the new Act would have been so misjudged. Still he tried to be calm midst the universal anxiety. "You see," he said to M. Lavalette, for whom he frequently sent that he might give vent with safety to the feelings that filled his heart, "you see all are attacked with vertigo. I alone in this vast empire have preserved my presence of mind, and should I lose it I know not what would become of us!" In fact, he made constant efforts to restrain his excitable nature, checked the slightest expression of anger, listened to the most ridiculous objections with a calmness and patience which he generally showed only in times of great danger, taking care not to increase the conflagration enkindled by the passions of others by the addition of the flame of his own, and thus expiated the faults of his long despotism by sufferings known but to God and a few friends. But alas! though faults may be expiated in the sight of God, they cannot be in the sight of man. God sees the repentance and is content; but men possess neither His intuition nor His clemency; they only see the fault, and their rude justice will not be satisfied without an evident, complete, and terrible punishment! Napoleon was destined to experience the full bitterness of this truth.

The old constitutionalists, and only the wisest of these, were the sole defenders of the Additional Act. They had been flattered and all doubt removed from their minds by the fact that M. Benjamin Constant had drawn up the new constitution. They were still better pleased when they read the document itself. Madame de Staël, who was preserved by her rare intelligence and perfect knowledge of England from being infected

by the general errors, loudly approved of the Additional Act. It was also approved by the enlightened school of Genevese publicists, who followed the impulse given by Madame de Staël and M. Benjamin Constant. M. de Sismondi, the most learned of these publicists, undertook to defend it systematically in the *Moniteur*. In a series of remarkable articles he proceeded to prove that the form that had been adopted had no resemblance to the *octroi* of Louis XVIII., for this prince admitted no authority but his own, and consequently reserved to himself the power of resuming what he had given, whilst Napoleon had formally recognised the sovereignty of the nation, had submitted his work to its approbation, and was irrevocably pledged to the nation, were what he did approved; that though the mode adopted for drawing up and presenting this new constitution left a large influence to the ruling power, it was the only method that could be adopted under existing circumstances, as convoking the primary assemblies to elect a constituent body, whose deliberations would be most difficult with an enemy so near, would also give rise to interminable disputes about a work concerning whose principles all sensible men were agreed; that had Napoleon meant to deceive, he could have allowed this constituent body to enter on endless disputes whilst he went to fight the foreign enemy, and then returning conqueror, he could have held the assembly up to ridicule, dismissed it, and resumed all his former authority; that, on the contrary, having himself presented a perfect plan, a plan which with the exception of one point left nothing to be desired by the true friends of liberty, he had proved the sincerity of his determination to strip himself of his ancient authority, and to bestow a constitutional monarchy on the country; that by comparing this with all preceding constitutions, it would be seen that it was the best that had ever been given to France, and was in many respects more liberal than that of England itself; that finally, it was not only natural but necessary to retain the *senatus-consultes*, for as they were formerly annulled in everything contrary to the Additional Act, they were not to be feared in a political sense, and that annulling them altogether would be to crush the civil and administrative legislation, that is the entire organisation of the State, at one blow; that a new constitution could not be expected to do more than change the political form of the government, whilst it should be left to time to modify the civil and administrative legislation in conformity with the spirit of the Additional Act.

All that M. de Sismondi wrote was true, but true only for sensible and unprejudiced men. Others, and they were the greater number, inspired by distrust or displeasure at some clauses of the Additional Act, thought that in the whole docu-

ment they could recognise Napoleon's temper and despotism. As to the former, they might indeed have been right, for though much influenced, he may not have been altogether changed by his misfortunes; but they were wrong with regard to his despotism, for he had given them a better constitution than that of England; and since they had committed the enormous fault of recalling Napoleon, they ought to have made use of him against the enemy, and tried to make the part of constitutional monarch supportable to him. M. de Lafayette was more just, notwithstanding the susceptibility of his liberalism. He disapproved of the form but admired the principles of the Additional Act, and complimented his friend M. Benjamin Constant on them. "Your constitution," he wrote to him, "is better than its reputation; but you must try to make the nation believe in it, and to win that belief it must be put into immediate and vigorous execution."

M. de Lafayette had passed fourteen years on his estate of Lagrange, and though grateful to Napoleon for having liberated him from the dungeons of Olmütz, he could never pardon him for having deprived France of liberty. However, though feeling no ill-will towards a man who had done him an important service, and even admiring both his character and genius, he still had not the slightest faith in his change of opinion. His own opinions were so little subject to change that he could not understand how those of another could alter. However, a man so zealous as he asked nothing better than to make a trial of liberty, no matter with whom, whether with Napoleon or the Bourbons. If under Napoleon political liberty was more endangered, there was also more security for the principles of 1789, and more independence and greatness in the sight of foreign nations. Being perfectly satisfied with the Additional Act, with the exception of one point, he was most anxious to see it put into operation, and was ready to lay aside all distrust, were the chambers summoned at once. In his opinion, nothing further need be apprehended from Napoleon, were the most distinguished men of the liberal party formed into a public assemblage. When the nation should have profited by his word to repel the enemy, if it were no longer satisfied with him, he could be deposed in favour of his son, and then constitutional monarchy would be secured. Such reasoning had one defect, that it authorised Napoleon to reason in the same fashion, and say that when conqueror he would dismiss the friends of liberty if he were not satisfied with them; and thus all that would be gained by restraining him by the immediate assembling of the chambers would be to lessen his power of acting against a foreign enemy, without in any way diminishing his capacity for attacking the cause of liberty.

However that may be, M. de Lafayette, as we have said, would be quite satisfied, provided the chambers were summoned up immediately. There was no person upon whose good opinion so great a value was placed, for amongst the revolutionists none were so respected as he and Carnot. If he had not, like Carnot, had the honour of organising victory, he had that at least of not having voted either the death of Louis XVI. nor that of any citizen. Inducing him to support the empire would be the very best guarantee for Napoleon's liberal intentions. Great efforts were consequently made to win him. Many persons assisted in the task, amongst others General Matthieu Dumas, Prince Joseph, and M. Benjamin Constant. General Matthieu Dumas, who was entirely occupied in organising the national guards for the defence of the country, and who was certainly anxious for liberty, but still more for the success of our arms, took advantage of his old acquaintance with M. de Lafayette to bring him into closer connection with Prince Joseph. Joseph had been acquainted with M. de Lafayette, but their intimacy had been interrupted by his two successive royalties of Naples and Spain, an intimacy he now sought to renew with the honourable and twofold intention of procuring Napoleon a support and a fresh link with the nation. He met the illustrious patriot of 1789 with the semblance of the frankest liberalism, a principle which indeed he had adopted under his brother's heavy yoke, and which he believed himself to possess in a greater degree than he did, a mistake that materially assisted him in the part he had to play. M. de Lafayette listened with rather haughty politeness to all he had to say, and told him he would believe anything that was wished, provided the chambers were assembled immediately; but Joseph did not conceal that Napoleon would object strongly to this measure, as he would be afraid to leave a legislative assembly in Paris, whose debates might disturb the public mind whilst he was fighting the enemy.

M. Benjamin Constant also paid his court to M. de Lafayette. "You are my conscience," he said, which meant that he considered him as his excuse for his present conduct. Indeed M. Benjamin Constant could not conceal from himself that his conduct, even amid the bare-faced tergiversation of the time, had been noticed and unfavourably commented on, for it was not easy to explain how he could become Councillor of State to a prince on whose head he had once called down public vengeance. But to have M. de Lafayette for his friend and the approver of his conduct was a sufficient reply to every reproach. M. Benjamin Constant therefore sought to persuade him; but M. de Lafayette coolly told him, as he had told Joseph, that he would believe all that was said, and approve all that was

done, provided the chambers were assembled. There was a very serious legal objection to this immediate convocation, as it would be putting the constitution into operation before it had been accepted. Notwithstanding the importance of this objection, it had no influence on M. de Lafayette nor on the partisans of an immediate convocation. Although they blamed a mode of acceptance in which the popular will was treated very lightly, they were ready to treat it with still less respect by supposing it to be known even before it was pronounced. They said that the omission of a mere ceremony was but of little consequence, provided that what the people desired was done. However, this proposal must be approved by him who alone had the power to decide, and it would not be easy to obtain his consent.

Although Napoleon was determined to put the new constitution into operation, and was even anxious that it should succeed, as the success of the liberal party was identical with his, whilst its failure would be the Bourbons' triumph, he still dreaded assembling the chambers, fearing that at the first report of the cannon they would lose, not courage (the convention had shown the contrary), but presence of mind. He was prepared for terrible vicissitudes, perhaps even to being forced to fight beneath the walls of Paris, to prevent Europe from entering the capital; but he did not doubt but that he would succeed, provided that he could keep the citizens quiet, and induce them to look calmly on all the horrors of a war *à outrance*. With his instinctive clear-sightedness, he foresaw that a chamber of representatives summoned at the actual moment would contain men of every party, to whom one unsuccessful battle—which was possible, even admitting the hypothesis of definite success—instead of furnishing a motive for union and perseverance, would perhaps become a cause of dissension, and perhaps even wrest from him the sword with which he was defending France; and it must be admitted that this opinion was neither unfounded nor insincere, for newly formed and disunited assemblies are assuredly unfavourable instruments for carrying on war. He therefore wished to profit by the delay naturally resulting from the Additional Act to defer assembling the chambers, and thus gain two months, during which he would have time to strike the first blow at the enemy; nor was it impossible that his military operations might give rise to events that would terminate the campaign, if not the war, in two months. Then having recovered his ancient influence, and the courage of the nation being revived, the chambers might be allowed to meet without danger.

When we reflect on the events that succeeded, events that involved what is worse than the defeat of a dynasty—the defeat

of a nation—we perceive the prudence of Napoleon's opinion. But France felt as much distrust of his liberal opinions as Europe did of his pacific inclinations. In addition to the inconsiderate dislike felt for some parts of the Additional Act, it was generally looked upon as a deceitful promise, which Napoleon would break on his return from his next victory; and if anything could conquer the universal incredulity, it would be seeing an assembly placed beside the government, watching their movements jealously, discussing in an opposite interest public affairs, and ever ready to frustrate any unconstitutional attempts on their part. Such was Napoleon's fearful position, for which he had to thank his own past faults; he could not assemble the chambers without running the risk of having anarchy in his rear, with the enemy in front, nor could he refuse to assemble the chambers without forfeiting public confidence, without which no troops could be raised.

Joseph, from a sincere zeal, as well as from a desire to make himself of importance, sought to obtain from his brother such concessions as would gain him credit with the constitutionalists, for which reason he pressed most earnestly for the immediate convocation of the chambers. Joseph's entreaties were warmly supported by M. Benjamin Constant, who was desirous of pleasing his friends, especially M. de Lafayette, who profited with great finesse by the desire that was shown to obtain his approbation. Both said that the Additional Act had not been successful, that nobody believed in it, that something more decisive should be done, that the presence of six hundred representatives and two hundred peers around the throne could alone obtain credence for the imperial promises. Napoleon defended himself warmly. He said he knew that the Additional Act had not succeeded, that its title, for which he was in fault, and the hereditary peerage, for which M. Constant was to blame, had ruined it in the public opinion; that the public mind was running after chimeras, instead of looking for what was tangible and healthy, that this erroneous tendency was increasing daily, that no sacrifices whatsoever would restrain it; and that for the sake of trying to remedy an evil which time alone could cure, he would not encumber himself with a constituent assembly, when in addition to his other difficulties he was about to meet in conflict all the armies of Europe. For several days he resisted the entreaties with which he was assailed, and which proceeded principally from the constitutional party, who were most anxious to find new excuses for their adhesion, and at the same time to surround themselves with a numerous assembly, where they hoped to rule.

Still the entreaties, which were not less than the resistance, were supported by the unheard-of violence of the periodical

press, particularly the royalist writers, who condemned the Additional Act for not explicitly recognising the sovereignty of the nation. Unfortunately men calling themselves patriots allowed themselves to be entrapped by these declamations. Napoleon was not deceived by this, but he needed the assistance of the revolutionary and liberal party to oppose the royalist party at home, and the allied army abroad, and it was all important to him not to allow that zeal to cool by which the old soldiers, and especially the mobilised national guard, were impelled towards the frontiers. What impelled these honest men to hasten to fill the deficiencies in our regiments, or to defend the fortresses, was hearing constantly dinned into their ears that they must hasten to the frontier to expel the foreigners, the Bourbons, the nobles, and priests, in fact the counter-revolution. Now if the revolutionary and liberal party, by whom these things were said, should become silent through discontent, the consequence might be a frigidity which would deprive the army of all support, and leave it alone in its struggle with the enemy; this army was undoubtedly brave, but numerically insufficient to resist combined Europe. This consideration exerted a daily increasing influence on Napoleon, who saw a mournful want of popularity succeed by degrees to the enthusiasm with which the friends of the Revolution had received him on his disembarkation. However, this reason might not have been sufficient to influence his determination had not another been added.

Whilst at home, aided by the distrust he had inspired, it was sought to represent him as an incorrigible despot, acting artfully for the time, but only waiting an opportunity to resume his old practices; abroad he was represented as a fierce tyrant, surrounded by soldiers as fierce as himself, and not daring to move a step beyond the ranks, and inspiring terror and fear; in a word, that he was hateful to the French people, on whom he was come to impose his iron yoke again. It was in vain that he appeared at the almost daily reviews on the Place du Carrousel, where every one might approach him; notwithstanding the detailed accounts published in the *Moniteur*, it was repeated that he never appeared abroad except surrounded by soldiers. The constant repetition of this falsehood ultimately influenced public opinion in Europe, and it was believed that to overthrow the despot all that was needed was to conquer one or two hundred thousand mamelukes, when France would be found eager to cast off his tyranny. This second falsehood needed refutation as much as the first. Whatever might be the disadvantage of convoking the chambers at once, it would have the double advantage of putting an end to these false reports at home and abroad, proving that Napoleon had been serious

in granting the Additional Act, since, without waiting for the legal delays, he had put the people in immediate possession of their rights; and this step also proved that he did not fear to come in contact with the people, since he surrounded himself with their representatives. "Well," he said to Joseph and M. Constant, who still persisted in demanding the anticipated execution of the Additional Act, "I have decided, I will assemble the chambers, and thus put an end to all doubts as to my intentions. I will prove my confidence in a nation that it is said I fear, by surrounding myself with its representatives." One difficulty alone remained, that of anticipating the popular desire by dispensing with the acceptance of the constitution before putting it into execution. A decree was drawn up, preceded by a preamble, which accounted for this proceeding by attributing it to Napoleon's desire to be surrounded by the representatives of the nation, and to see them near his person for a few days before leaving for the army. To this skilfully written preamble succeeded the decree convoking the electoral colleges for the purpose of immediately choosing six hundred and twenty-nine representatives. This same decree also announced that those colleges whose presidents had been formerly appointed by the emperor should at the approaching election have the power of choosing for themselves. This decree was published on the 30th April, and it was hoped that a month would be sufficient for the electoral operations, and that the representatives would be able to meet the electors in the great assembly of the Champ de Mai, on the 26th.

He did not confine himself to this important concession. In order to prove that it was intended to put the nation in full possession of its rights, a new decree was made, which gave the communes the right of electing their mayors and municipal officers. This permission was confined to those communes where the prefects had exercised the right of electing the mayors, and the reason given for the decree was, that the new prefect might possibly be ignorant of the respective merits of the candidates. As this was the case with the greater number of communes and especially the smaller, the appointing of municipal authorities was almost entirely placed in the hands of the patriotic party. A large number of these were holders of national property, and this, as a party measure, was very well devised.

However great the ill-humour of the opposite party might be, it was necessarily lessened or silenced at least for some days by measures which put the Additional Act into such immediate and effective operation. It could now be hardly said that it was but a snare, a vain promise whose fulfilment was deferred until the establishment of peace, but which in reality would be indefinitely postponed. Nor could he who freely placed himself in

the midst of the representatives of the country be depicted as a fierce tyrant obliged to hide himself from the world. Thus Napoleon at once proved both his sincerity and moral power.

M. de Lafayette was now fully satisfied, and said so. Joseph had been commissioned to offer him a peerage; but he refused, saying that he would not accept any appointment but from the nation, and intended presenting himself to the electors of Marne. M. Benjamin Constant, in the greatest spirits, told him how the emperor's repugnance had been overcome, and in return for that service, asked his influence with one of the electoral colleges, to secure his return as one of the members of the second chamber. M. de Lafayette consented, for at this moment he was not in a mood to refuse anything. He was also asked to perform another service, one which his patriotism could not refuse, and which he undertook with the greatest pleasure. His friend Mr. Crawford, the United States' minister at Paris, was about to return to America, where he had been appointed minister of war. He was to pass through England, where he had both friends and influence. M. de Lafayette induced him to undertake to deliver some letters written in favour of peace, and addressed to some of the principal men in England. Madame de Staël, who from her long opposition to the emperor could not be suspected of partiality, wrote most pressing letters to the British ministers, with whom her brilliant talents and great fame might have some influence, and besought them to withdraw from the coalition. Napoleon, she said, was no longer a despot living in isolation, but a liberal monarch supported by all France. Both the people and the army were devoted to him; the struggle would be fearful, and for the sake of humanity and liberty it would be better to accept Napoleon, corrected, restrained by legal institutions, and really desirous of peace, if not of liberty, than to shed torrents of blood in a possibly unsuccessful attempt to dethrone him. Well received, listened to, believed and taken at his word, he would grant both the peace and liberty he had promised. And opposed by the allies, but successful in the battlefield, he would not accept the Treaty of Paris, nor perhaps think himself bound by the Additional Act. Consequently the interests of Europe, of humanity and liberty, united in recommending a pacific policy. Madame de Staël's reasoning was, as may be seen, as specious as it was clever and patriotic.

Whilst the constitutional party thus repaid Napoleon's sacrifices with the warmest support, an event of great importance occurred in the provinces which displayed the feeling entertained about resisting foreign invasion, a subject that interested Napoleon more than any other. Although the long silence of the first empire had been succeeded by political

activity and a love of contradiction, still in the provinces threatened by the enemy the prospect of danger silenced the spirit of opposition and dispute. For example, the inhabitants of Champagne, Burgundy, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, and Dauphiné took part in the preparations for defence with the greatest zeal. The old soldiers joined their regiments, and the men selected for the mobilised national guards immediately obeyed the summons of the officers appointed to organise them. Whilst the eastern provinces showed such excellent dispositions, those of the west were less zealous, though from different motives. It has been seen, by what passed at Angers, Nantes, Mans, and Rennes during the eleven months of the Restoration, that the citizens of these towns had been both offended and alarmed by the position the nobility and peasantry had assumed, especially at their audacity in taking up arms in the midst of peace. Since the 20th of March power had again passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie, at which they rejoiced, more from the sense of security induced, than from a wish to gratify any ambitious views. But great excitement prevailed at Quimper, Rennes, Mans, Angers, &c., in consequence of the proceedings of the Vendean leaders, their evident connection with England, and the appearance off the coast of English vessels laden with arms, together with acts of violence committed in the country districts. The inhabitants of Nantes in particular, who had formerly suffered so much between the attacks of the Vendéans on the one side, and the slaughters of Carrier on the other, could not see the renewal of civil war without horror. The people were in the greatest excitement, and the rumoured assassination of an old man produced a profound impression on the honest inhabitants of Nantes, who conceived the idea of forming an alliance with the principal cities of the five departments of Brittany, by which they promised mutual assistance in case of internal or external danger, and this alliance was to be called the Breton Federation, in imitation of the federation of 1790. No sooner did this project become known, a project so well suited to the existing circumstances, than it was generally adopted, and several hundred inhabitants of Nantes set out for Rennes, where the same idea had been adopted, and where they were anxiously expected. They were received with enthusiasm, fêted and lodged by the principal citizens, and some intelligent men were commissioned to draw up the compact by which the Bretons bound themselves to repress the enemy at home and abroad. Nothing could be more sincere than the conduct of the honest Bretons at this time, or freer from party spirit. They did not mean to overawe power or oppress the upper classes of the nation, but to defend themselves against the incendiarism and assassinations of the old Chouanism, and also

to prevent the landing of the English. The prevailing tone of these meetings was extreme liberalism. It was agreed to draw up a preamble in which the objects of the association should be explained, to which some articles would be added, determining the engagement of the confederates towards each other. The first stipulation was that the confederation should not form a body distinct from the other citizens, acting independently, with separate uniform, arms, and commanders, but that they should be incorporated with the existing and legal institutions of the national guard, which, as it existed throughout the empire, they could at any time join, and so become useful whenever danger threatened. They should be bound to place themselves at the disposal of the public authorities, and immediately obey their commands to join either the mobilised or sedentary battalions; and should a deficiency occur in the legal *cadre* of the national guards, the confederates were bound individually to go whithersoever the mayors, prefects, or sub-prefects summoned them to repel any attempt against public order. They also bound themselves to another duty, altogether moral, which was to efface, as far as in them lay, those false notions by which it was sought to deceive the simple peasantry, and to lead them both by word and example to fulfil their civic duties; in a word, the confederates put themselves at the disposal of the imperial government both for the internal and external defence of the country.

Notwithstanding the disadvantages attached to every political association, the confederation, influenced by a deep sense of the public danger, and divested of all personal views, being nothing more than auxiliary to the existing authority, was less objectionable than others, and might even be of great advantage to the country.

The preamble and act were drawn up, and both were about to be submitted to the prefect. The government, as we have seen, had no part in this movement, which was quite spontaneous, and resulted solely from the fears of the most independent and most honest of the Breton population. Though Napoleon had long been popular in the western provinces, where he had restored tranquillity, still his wars in 1812 and 1813 had lowered him in public opinion. He was considered as most dangerous, and his return had been welcomed only because it would put an end to the influence of the emigrants, and in the hope that he would be checked by restrictive laws. For this reason, and not wishing that the new federation should assume a Bonapartist character, the emperor's name had not been mentioned. Sensible men pointed out the danger of forming such an association independent of the government, and which could render no real service except acting under the

jurisdiction of the government, and could hope for sanction only on these conditions. The preamble was then revised, and made to correspond with the wishes of those good citizens who were willing to assist Napoleon, but on condition of a true and rational liberty.

The greater number of the towns of Bretagne sent deputations to Rennes, and several days were passed in fêtes, rejoicings, and promises of mutual assistance. In a short time more than twenty thousand confederates were assembled in the departments of the Lower Loire, Morbihan, Finisterre, Côtes du Nord, and Ile-et-Vilaine, which composed Old Brittany. No sooner was this proceeding on the part of the Bretons known than it produced a great sensation in the neighbouring departments, and by degrees throughout France. The Angevins, threatened by the same dangers as the Bretons, prepared to follow their example. It was not the Chouans that the Burgundians hated, but the Russians, Austrians, and Prussians, and they also sent deputies to Dijon to sign the Act of Federation, and adopted without alteration the original text of the Breton Federation. Lorraine, Franche-Comté, Lyonnais, and Dauphiné were inclined to do the same. Amid this general movement, particularly in the provinces threatened by civil or foreign war, it was not possible that the great city of Paris should remain indifferent and inactive. But there are many Parises in Paris; and while the nobles regretted the Bourbons, and the middle classes regretted peace, the humbler classes were inflamed with a brutal hatred against what they called the nobles and priests, and by a patriotic dislike of what they called the foreigners; they had always regretted not having had muskets to defend the walls of the capital in 1814. Amongst these were men compromised by the disorders of 1793: young men inspired by sincere patriotism, and honest soldiers retired from service, all of whom excited the inhabitants of the faubourgs to imitate the example of the people of Brittany and Burgundy. This movement commenced in the faubourgs St. Marceau and St. Antoine, and soon spread through all the others. The Parisians adopted the Act of the Bretons, but wished to have a preamble of their own, for though all followed the plan invented by the Bretons, each province wished to adduce a motive of action consonant with its own particular views. The confederates of Paris addressed themselves to Napoleon himself, asked for an audience, desired to be passed in review, and authorised to present him an address.

These different confederations had come into existence during the last days of April and the first of May. The Additional Act had been published in the meantime, and had caused some discontent, but its effect being corrected by the decree summoning

the chambers, had not lessened the enthusiasm of those provinces threatened with foreign or civil war, and they continued to form federations. The government, we repeat, had no part either in the arranging or propagation of these provincial federations. The men who composed them were influenced by a variety of motives. Those who were satisfied to get rid of foreigners, and of a counter-revolution effected by foreigners, at any price, met the spontaneous union of the more zealous portion of the people with delight. Those, on the other hand, who regretted the sacrifices Napoleon had made to liberal opinions, thought, or affected to think, that the revolutionary party was prepared to seize all authority, and expressed the greatest horror of these federations. They considered this movement, especially at Paris, where it was nearer to them, as an abomination and a serious danger. If Napoleon either encouraged or suffered them, they were resolved to look on him as a dishonest and hapless instrument of the Jacobins. As to him, he smiled at their fears, allowed them to say what they would, and was himself quite content with the movement that had taken place. He loved order from inclination, good sense, and interest, and did not feel the least inclination for what was called Jacobinists; but he understood them, and had not the same horror of them that some felt; on the contrary, he was glad that so many vigorous arms had risen in defence of the country, some of which would restrain the Chouans in Bretagne, and would dispute the entrance to the capital with the English, Russians, and Prussians. They might be an embarrassment in time of peace; but he cared little for what would happen, provided the enemy were expelled, after which he was certain, in cases of popular commotion, of the aid not alone of the army, but of the chambers, that might indeed be more liberal than he, but would never go so far as to favour democratic enterprises.

He consequently felt no hesitation in permitting or even aiding these federations. As we have said, he found them very useful in supporting public opinion against the royalists in Lyon, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes, Rennes, &c., and very useful at Paris for the defence of the capital. This last point was to him the most important of all. His plan was, as we have seen, to protect Paris by solid earthworks, as there was not sufficient time to construct defences in masonry; he intended to bring up two hundred cannon from the navy, and to have them worked by sailors; to have two hundred field-pieces worked by young lads from the different military schools; and he considered that if to the 15,000 or 18,000 men from the dépôts he could add 25,000 more from the faubourgs, all strong men, and all for the most part old soldiers, that Paris defended by

40,000 infantry and 10,000 gunners would be impregnable, and that then, unrestrained, he could with his regular army overcome every coalition. He did not reckon on the national guard, not because that he doubted their courage, but because he suspected their inclinations, and with his usual clear-sightedness saw that though necessity compelled them to rally round him for an instant, that they still secretly regretted the Bourbons and peace. He had not even determined whether he would leave them arms, but he deferred his decision on that point to the last moment. As to the federalists, he was resolved to enrol them regularly, find them reliable officers, and even incorporate them with the national guard, by which he would make use of them in the hour of danger, and if necessary transfer to them the muskets of these guards. He determined not to arm them for the present, in the first place because he required time to know and to organise them, and besides that he was not sufficiently rich in war material to be able to lavish muskets so freely.*

He confided to the brave General Darricau the task of organising them under the title of sharpshooters, attached to the Parisian national guard, in which character they were to be employed for the external defence of the capital. He even consented to review them on a Sunday, and to receive the address they wished to present him. He chose the same day for reviewing the 10th regiment of the line, a regiment that had made itself remarkable by being the only one that had fought for the Bourbons. This regiment was neither differently constituted, nor influenced by opinions different to those that had inspired the 7th, 58th, and 83rd infantry regiments, that

* There are few subjects upon which a greater variety of opinions has been expressed than about the formation of the federalists of 1815, and Napoleon's feelings towards them. Some accused Napoleon of having excited them for the purpose of employing them against the royalists; others say that he was afraid of them, and on that account would not arm them, and thus deprived himself of the important aid of the patriots. Both assertions are equally false. Napoleon knew nothing of the formation of the confederates, which indeed had no other origin than the fears of those who in the west were called "blues." Once in existence, Napoleon was not displeased at the circumstance, though he saw very clearly that the ultra-liberals might at a later period make use of them to his disadvantage. At the moment he did not feel alarmed at any excess of patriotism in those who supported him against foreigners, and men were what he wanted above all things. His dominant, and I will say his only passion, was to conquer Europe once more. Nothing else was of importance to him. What he valued in the institution of the federalists was, that it gave twenty-five thousand good soldiers for the defence of Paris. The want of muskets alone prevented him from arming the Parisian federalists immediately, and so little fear had he of their being armed, that it was his firm purpose, as we see by his correspondence, that were Paris in danger, the muskets of the sedentary national guard should be transferred to the active national guard, entrusted with the external defence of the city. It was a plausible pretext for transferring the arms of one corps to the other without offending anybody.

had joined Napoleon so enthusiastically in Dauphiné. But the peculiar circumstances in which the 10th was placed had kept the men some days longer in the service of the Bourbons. The 10th did not enjoy a good reputation in the army, and were even accused of treachery at the bridge of the Drôme, a crime of which they were quite innocent, as we have already sought to prove. Napoleon had ordered this regiment to Paris that he might see the men, and that he might address them in one of his soul-stirring speeches.

Sunday, the 14th of May, having been appointed for reviewing the federalists and 10th regiment, great excitement was caused at court by this act of twofold temerity. Those who regretted Napoleon's condescension to the revolutionary party were shocked, and said, when he was not present, that he was abandoning himself to the rabble, and that it would soon be impossible to be of his party. Those, on the other hand, who were sincerely attached to Napoleon, and who sought no false pretext to abandon him, were seriously alarmed at his meeting the 10th regiment, in whose ranks, it was said, an assassination had been plotted. These latter, through real alarm about Napoleon, kept so close to his person on that day as to annoy him.

Napoleon, unmoved by the affected lamentations of one party or the exaggerated fears of the other, descended into the courtyard of the Tuileries and commenced by receiving the federalists. They numbered thousands; men without uniforms, and some badly dressed, but the greater number old soldiers on whose tanned faces energetic feeling was unmistakably writ. He turned several times to those near him, and ridiculing the fears of certain persons, said smilingly, "It is such men I want, who will fight unto death before the walls of Paris." He then listened patiently to the discourse which the appointed spokesman of the federalists read as best he could. "Sir," he said, "we received the Bourbons coldly because they had become strangers to France, and because we do not like kings forced on us by enemies. We have received you with enthusiasm because you are the man of the people, the defender of the country, and because we expect from you a glorious independence and rational liberty. You will secure us these two precious possessions, you will consecrate the rights of the people for ever, you will reign in virtue of the constitution and the laws. We come to offer you our services, our courage, and our lives for the defence of the capital.

"The greater number of us have fought under you for liberty and glory; almost all of us are old defenders of our country, and the country may with confidence give arms to those who have shed their blood for her. Sire, give us muskets, and we

swear to fight only for the country and for you. We are not the instruments of any party, the agents of any faction. We have heard the summons of our country, we have hastened to obey the voice of our sovereign; that is sufficient to show what the nation may expect from us. As citizens we obey the magistrates and laws; as soldiers we obey our leaders. We only seek to sustain the national honour, and to render the entrance of an enemy into this capital impossible, should the city be again threatened with such an insult."

The emperor replied in the following terms:—

"Federal soldiers, I have returned alone because I relied on the people and the army, of whose attachment to their country's honour I was convinced. You have justified my confidence. I accept your offer; I will give you arms. I will give you as officers men covered with honourable scars, and who are accustomed to see the enemy fly before them. Your strong arms habituated to the hardest labour are well suited to carry muskets. As for courage, you are Frenchmen! You will instruct the national guard. I shall feel no anxiety about the capital when I know that you and the national guard undertake its defence; and if it is true that foreigners persist in the impious project of attacking our independence and honour, I shall be able to pursue victory without a feeling of solicitude about my capital. Federal soldiers, I am glad to see you, I have confidence in you. *Vive la nation.*" When he had finished this allocution the federalists defiled before him, and if men are to be judged by their dress, it was a painful spectacle. It was indeed painful to see this emperor, once so powerful and so proud, surrounded by magnificent troops, and to behold him now obliged to accept as defenders of the country men who had neither uniforms nor muskets! These soldiers were certainly as good as any others, and he did well to receive them; but what can be said of a policy that had reduced him to such extremities?

Having reviewed the federalists, Napoleon advanced towards the 10th, ordered the men to form into a square, and then alighting from his horse, he placed himself in the centre. An anxious group of officers pressed round him; he desired them to retire, and kept only two or three aides-de-camp near him, and then in a sonorous voice addressed these energetic words to the Duke d'Angoulême's regiment:—

"Soldiers of the 10th, you alone of the entire army have dared to fire on the tricolor flag, the sacred standard of our victories which we have borne into so many capitals. For such a crime I ought to erase the number of your regiment from the army list, and expel yourselves from its ranks. But I am willing to believe that the fault was your officers' and not yours,

and that it was they that misled you. I will change your commanders, I will give you better, and then place you in the van of the army. You shall be present wherever a shot shall be fired; and when by devotedness and courage you shall have washed out your shame with your blood, I will restore your standards, and I hope that in a short time you will be again worthy to bear them."

The soldiers whom Napoleon had addressed so harshly replied with loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* and extending their hands towards him, they declared that not they but their officers were in fault, that they had followed them unwillingly; but the moment they found themselves free they had declared their true opinions, and that wherever they were placed they would prove that they were not inferior to the other soldiers of the army. Far from being received with musket shots, Napoleon had met nothing but enthusiastic acclamations and proofs of fidelity. It is not by flattery, but by energetic exhortation, that men can be ruled and led to great deeds.

It was thus that Napoleon acted towards the nation at this time; and to give the public the necessary impulse, he had determined to tell the whole truth. Formerly he concealed everything, now he concealed nothing; he permitted the publication of articles from foreign journals, in which he himself was violently attacked, or which showed a senseless hatred towards France.

France could now see plainly that the expulsion of the Bourbons and the re-establishment of Napoleon, in giving some additional guarantees for the social principles of 1789, but involving doubts as to political liberty, would also cause a terrible effusion of blood. But it was now her duty to stand by what she had done, or allowed to be done, and those good citizens who would have wished to see Napoleon stopped on his road from Cannes to Paris, because that with the Bourbons liberty would be more easily obtained and peace more certain, now that Napoleon had returned with evidently wise intentions, considered it their duty to support him to the utmost of their power, to avert the danger and shame of a counter-revolution effected with foreign bayonets. Every day addresses arrived from the municipalities, tribunals, and electoral colleges, all expressing a desire to find under Napoleon's rule liberty at home and independence abroad, and these demonstrations involved the obligation of restraining and supporting him. This twofold sentiment was expressed in all, though the form varied according to the greater or less enlightenment of the quarter whence the addresses came. These sentiments were universal; they animated the electoral colleges, where, midst the excitement of the royalist and revolutionary press, preparations were

being made for elections stamped with the Bonapartist and liberal character of the time. The liberty of the press was complete, and still, though no restraint was put on printing, M. Fouché had seized a number of the *Censeur*, a celebrated journal of the time, and which, as we have already said, was printed in volumes to escape the censorship during the first Restoration, and which breathed the honest liberalism of youth. Napoleon learned the commission of this act through the remonstrances that reached him, and ordered the restoration of the volume, though filled with fierce invectives against himself. He thus showed that he was sincere in his determination to respect the liberty of the press; and this toleration, far from injuring, rather served him, for the more the people were left to themselves, the more frankly they testified the two desires that animated them—a desire for well-regulated liberty, and the determination to make foreigners respect the national independence. As an incentive to public feeling, a kind of club had been allowed to form in the café, called the Café Montansier, Place du Palais Royal, where many officers and old revolutionists assembled, and whence were heard to issue alternately patriotic and military songs, or virulent declamations against foreigners, the Bourbons, emigration, &c., &c. The excitement against all these was very great, both in the faubourgs of Paris and the eastern and western provinces, the former threatened with a civil, and the latter with a foreign war; and notwithstanding the evident disapprobation of the Additional Act, it seemed probable that Napoleon would not want support if he continued faithful to the two conditions he had imposed upon himself—to defend the country and establish liberty.

Whilst in France every effort was made to render the war a national one, the European powers dreaded lest it might become such, and many consultations were held to consider what line of conduct should be pursued. Napoleon's envoys were still repulsed, and one sent from Paris had been arrested quite recently. When M. de Flahault, commissioned to announce the re-establishment of the empire to the sovereigns assembled at Vienna, had been arrested at Stuttgart, the French cabinet sent another, well selected indeed for the office: this was M. de Stassart, a Belgian, attached to Marie Louise's service, and who, since the return of that princess to Austria, had become one of the Emperor Francis' chamberlains. This gentleman was about to leave Paris, whither he had come on private business. A man in his position, and returning to his court, had better chance than another of passing the frontier. He was entrusted with two letters, one from the Duke de Vicence to M. de Metternich, and another from Napoleon to the Emperor Francis. It was no longer a question of war or peace, or of

any political consideration, but of the most sacred domestic rights—the claims of a husband on his wife, of a father on his son; and Napoleon, addressing himself directly to his father-in-law, demanded his wife, or at least his son, whom there could be no legitimate motive for refusing to deliver to him. The Duke de Vicence made some reflections on the strange prohibition of diplomatic intercourse so strangely persevered in, and again renewed the oft-repeated offer of accepting peace on the terms of the Treaty of Paris. M. de Stassart, more fortunate than the couriers of foreign affairs who had been stopped at Kehl and Mentz, or than M. de Flahault, stopped at Stuttgart, succeeded in getting as far as Lintz, where he arrived at the end of April, and was stopped under pretence of an irregularity in his passports; he was obliged to give up his despatches, which were sent to Vienna, and placed on the table of the Congress. These letters told nothing but what was known before. However, none of the members were now swayed by the same feelings as when they signed the celebrated declaration of the 13th March against Napoleon, nor were they uninfluenced by the opinion pronounced against this declaration both in England and France.

It was therefore thought better to draw up another not more pacific than the first, but less fierce and more rational. This was intended as a reply to the English Opposition, who asserted that war was renewed solely for the advantage of the Bourbons; and was also intended to allay public feeling in France, in order to prevent the war assuming a national character there. The latter motive had the most weight, for though the English and German gazettes represented Napoleon as unsupported except by the army, the European public began to see that many interests were bound up with his, and not interests alone, but convictions, especially those of the many who were indignant at Europe pretending to impose a government on us. It was therefore sought to produce a document which would answer all these objections, but the result was not very successful. Every exertion was made to find suitable terms to declare that no intention was entertained to interfere in the government of France, nor to impose on her any particular monarch or system of government; that the allies confined themselves to the desire of excluding one man, and this for the good of all, since long experience had proved that this man was incompatible with the general peace. Although excluding one monarch, when there were but two to choose from, was in reality imposing the other upon the nation, still the secretaries of the Congress succeeded in expressing these ideas so as not to jar with the rights of nations; and to avoid all objections from the British Parliament, no mention was made of the Bourbons. But this omission ex-

cited the courts of Spain and Sicily immediately. The British embassy, too, thought that omitting all mention of the Bourbons was treating them with too much indifference, and might give an opening to dangerous pretensions. Lord Clancarty, the principal member of this embassy since the departure of Lord Castlereagh and Lord Wellington, supported the Spanish and Sicilian courts when they asked whom the allied sovereigns meant to raise to the throne of France if they put Louis XVIII. aside. Did they think of a regency under Marie Louise, a monarchy with the Duke of Orleans, or a republic? As it was impossible to give any explanation on these different subjects, the Congress separated without drawing up any declaration, as they considered that not inserting the Bourbons' name in the declaration would be a defect, and that its insertion would only excite embarrassing objections.

Two courts, the Russian and Austrian, and each from different motives, were opposed to any explicit declaration in favour of the Bourbons. Alexander was still as relentless as before towards Napoleon, either because he was piqued by the ridicule he had incurred by the treaty of the 11th of April, or because he did not wish that a personage should again appear upon the stage of the world who would throw all others into the shade. But though still as determined as ever against Napoleon, he was by no means inclined to give him Louis XVIII. again as successor. Besides that Louis XVIII. had offended him in many ways, he considered that the second restoration of the Bourbons would not be more permanent than the first. Austria came also to the same conclusion, but by a different process of reasoning. She was quite as determined as Russia to exclude Napoleon, and would not sanction Marie Louise's regency on any terms; but the Bonapartists once excluded, she would prefer the Bourbons to any other. In fact, there was not a purer royalist in Europe than the Emperor Francis. But the Bonapartes could only be expelled by war, to which Austria had strong objections, not through weakness—which is not her ordinary failing—but through prudence. She had just ended a violent struggle, and that with a success that had not crowned her exertions at any time during the past century. By it she had recovered her former possessions in Poland, together with the frontier of the Inn; she had got Illyria and Italy as far as the Po and Tessino. The greatest imaginable success in any future war could not give her more, and would, if successful, only increase the pretensions of Russia and Prussia, always so closely united. Such reflections could not inspire much desire for warfare. Besides, the intelligence from France represented Napoleon as certain of the support of the liberal and revolutionary parties, which placed the greater portion of the national forces at his disposal. Only

one thing could deprive him of this support, and that was a combination that could grant such terms to the revolutionists and liberals as would detach them from Napoleon, whom they dreaded, and of whom they had always felt the greatest distrust. Austria was consequently inclined to adopt a policy that would excite domestic troubles around Napoleon, but which, without altogether excluding the Bourbons, forbade any close connection with them. With such views M. de Metternich, who was well informed of everything that occurred at Paris, thought of the Duke d'Otranto, whom he considered just suited to the plots he contemplated. He considered that the best means of exciting confusion in France was to flatter the vanity and ambition of such a man, and he determined to send a secret agent to ask M. Fouché by what other means than a terrific war the dispute between France and Europe might be terminated. For the mission M. de Metternich chose and sent to Bâle a prudent man named Werner, who was worthy of the confidence reposed in him. At the same time he commissioned the clerk of a banking house who was going to Paris on business connected with his firm to give a letter to M. Fouché, informing him of the subject in hand, and requesting him to send somebody to Bâle with whom M. Werner might confer. Thus whilst at Vienna the allies were vainly disputing about the new declaration, M. Werner set out for Bâle, where he arrived on the 1st of May, and where he waited the confidential person with whom he was to treat.

It was not without much difficulty that the banker's clerk, bearer of M. de Metternich's letter, succeeded in gaining access to M. Fouché, nor did he attain his object without giving some slight indications of the purport of his mission. M. de Caulaincourt learned this, and with his usual fidelity told Napoleon, by whose orders the clerk was arrested, searched, and questioned, when it was found that communications either were or about to be established between M. Fouché and M. de Metternich. Although Napoleon had sworn to lay aside the old man, and had done so up to this time, still for a moment he resumed his former self. His excited imagination saw a thousand treasons concealed beneath the detected plot, and yielding to his natural impetuosity, his first impulse was to have M. Fouché arrested, his papers seized, and his perfidy denounced and punished; a proceeding he expected to be agreeable to the nation, for the public felt but little esteem for this minister, and would approve of his punishment once his crime was known.

This was but a momentary excitement. Napoleon determined to reflect, examine, and make himself fully acquainted with all particulars before coming to a decision. M. Fouché came on business, and as he entered, Napoleon assumed that impertur-

bable coolness usual to him on the field of battle, spoke to him long and confidentially of the affairs of Europe, especially of the intrigues plotting at Vienna, in order to provoke the confidence of his interlocutor, approaching as nearly as possible the fact whose avowal he sought. The wily minister did not understand the emperor's tactics, and though he had received M. de Metternich's letter, instead of disarming his master's anger by a sincere avowal, persisted in his reserve. Napoleon was tempted to break forth more than once, but restrained himself, said no more, and dismissed M. Fouché as much deceived as deceiving, and quite unconscious of the examination he had undergone. Napoleon thought the best means of discovering this plot, whose perfidy he exaggerated, would be to send a confidential person at once to Bâle, who, being provided with the private marks of recognition which had been discovered, might confer with M. Werner, and thus detect the intrigue at its very source. For this purpose he chose M. Fleury de Chaboulon, the young envoy who had joined him at Elba, and whose courage and dexterity he had rewarded by an appointment in his cabinet. He sent for him, traced the plan of conduct he was to pursue, and dismissed him with orders to the authorities on the frontiers to let no other pass but him, but to arrest M. Fouché's real agent, if he should send one, and thus prevent the fulfilment of his mission.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon set out immediately. When he arrived at the frontier he gave the prescribed orders to the authorities there, passed on, and found M. Werner at Bâle, where he at once began to act his part most skilfully. M. Werner, completely deceived, told him simply the purpose for which he had been sent. M. Fleury de Chaboulon discovered that what was called M. Fouché's plot was quite a recent affair, indeed it had hardly commenced; that consequently nothing had preceded the present communication, that for the first time in his life, when treason was in question, M. Fouché was not the originator, but the recipient of the proposal, that, in short, there was no idea of assassinating Napoleon, as that prince had believed, but of dethroning him without having recourse to the dangerous and doubtful chances of war. M. Werner assured M. de Chaboulon most earnestly that no design was entertained inimical to the life of Napoleon, he indignantly repelled such a supposition, but avowed a design against his power, and said that Europe would not suffer him on any terms to occupy the French throne; but that Napoleon once put aside, France might choose any government she pleased, a republic excepted; that great confidence was felt in the Duke d'Otranto's intelligence and influence, that his hatred to Napoleon was well known, and that his assistance was sought to help in resolving

the difficulty of how the world could be spared a new and fearful effusion of blood.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon played the part of agent to M. Fouché very well, and said that that minister had indeed reason to complain of Napoleon, and had felt some resentment against him, but that he had conquered that feeling for the sake of his country; that in 1814 he certainly had wished for other arrangements than those that had been made, that he had not desired Napoleon's return, but had become convinced how necessary he was, for he alone could place France on a firm basis, unite all parties, and form a durable government; that Napoleon had returned with healthy ideas on every subject, that he was determined to maintain peace, and to give France liberal institutions; that besides, it would be useless to think of dethroning him, as the army, the revolutionists, the holders of national property, young men filled with new ideas—in fact, all classes, with the exception of the emigrants, looked on him as the representative of their opinions and interests, and above all, as the representative of national independence; that thousands of volunteers were joining the army every day, that Napoleon was about to add four hundred thousand chosen national guards to the four hundred thousand of the regular army, and that the struggle with him would be terrible; that the campaign of 1814, in which, thanks to his genius, the allies had run such risks, would be nothing in comparison to that of 1815, because that instead of opposing forces that had been either beaten or dispersed from Dantzic to Valence, they would meet the whole force of France in Champagne, that it would consequently be better to come to terms than cut each others' throats for the sake of the Bourbons, whom France would not receive when imposed on her by force; that the Duke d'Otranto would be most happy to assist in such an arrangement, and would be glad to learn M. de Metternich's opinions on this subject, that he might endeavour to accommodate his own to them, if, as he did not doubt, they were worthy the sagacity of that great statesman.

M. de Metternich's envoy, who believed he was speaking to M. Fouché's agent, was overwhelmed with surprise at hearing language so unexpected, and persevered with innocent obstinacy in repeating that he was astonished at what he heard, that it was generally thought that the Duke d'Otranto did not like Napoleon, and that he was not at all deceived as to his real worth, that he was also considered a sensible man that would readily agree to any rational arrangement; but that since he showed dispositions so different from what were expected, he—M. Werner—had nothing to say, as he was come rather to receive than to make proposals. After a little further conversation both agreed to return to their superiors, tell them what

they had heard, and then meet again with instructions better adapted to the real state of affairs. M. Fleury de Chaboulon, who had been well instructed by Napoleon, insisted on M. Werner's getting better information as to the sovereigns' opinions on several important subjects, such as the transmission of the crown to the King of Rome in case Napoleon should abdicate, and a regency under Prince Eugène in case Marie Louise would not return to defend the rights of her son. The two envoys then separated, proposing to meet again at Bâle in a few days.

Meantime Napoleon had another and more important conversation with M. Fouché. Whether the obstinate silence of the minister of police excited an irritation that Napoleon could not conceal, or whether, as some say, M. Real had warned M. Fouché, the latter told Napoleon, with affected indifference, that an obscure person had brought him a letter from M. de Metternich, to which he had not attached any importance, and of which consequently he had made no mention. Napoleon, in going to receive M. Fouché, left M. Lavalette, who remained in the next room, where all that passed could be heard. The emperor could scarcely restrain himself at this proof of the duplicity of his minister of police; he told him that he knew all, that such a communication from the principal member of the coalition, and containing the offer of sending an agent to Bâle, was one of the most important that could happen under existing circumstances, and that it was impossible that it could be forgotten. Then in a harsh and severe tone he added, loud enough to be heard in the next room, "You are a traitor, and if I punished your treason as it deserves, all France would applaud. If my government does not suit you, why don't you say so, why do you persist in remaining my minister?" M. Fouché, like a servant accustomed to his master's violence, and who had long ceased to be well treated, murmured some embarrassed words of excuse, and retired. On his way he met M. Lavalette, to whom he said with a smile of indifference, "The emperor is the same as ever, distrusting every one, seeing treason everywhere, and quarrelling with every one, because Europe will not bear with him any longer." M. Fouché said no more, as though such treatment, whether deserved or undeserved, could only be treated with indifference.

During two months Napoleon had constantly restrained himself, but lost his self-command on this occasion, in which he committed a great fault, for such things must not be said, or if said, all further connection with him to whom they are addressed should be broken off. At the height of his power he might have given vent to this outburst of feeling, with no worse result than making an unimportant enemy; but now the

very accusation of treason made this man a real and dangerous traitor. Besides, Napoleon was unjust to M. Fouché, for though that minister had given cause for suspicion in concealing such serious overtures as those in question, it was evident from what had been learned at Bâle, that if symptoms of treason existed, none had yet been realised. It would have been better to warn the minister coolly, let him see that his proceedings were known, but not throw off all restraint, since the serious and delicate state of affairs forbade a severe punishment. Indeed M. Fouché had had the art to make the public believe that he was an independent minister, capable of giving rational advice to his master, and if necessary of opposing him. Had Napoleon punished him, many would think it was because he could not brook advice, and all would believe that fortune herself had abandoned him were he forsaken by M. Fouché. As he could not punish, it would have been wiser to remain silent. Besides, having once given way to his anger, he was not likely to win back M. Fouché by a contemptuous indulgence. Seeing that nothing serious had been done, he was determined to wait, and meantime to keep his observant eye fixed on his minister of police. He told what had passed to M. Fleury de Chaboulon, bid him call on M. Fouché and make arrangements with him for carrying on this bizarre negotiation at Bâle, and to learn what reply M. Metternich would make to the questions that had been proposed to him. M. Fleury de Chaboulon called on M. Fouché, who spoke of the emperor as of a child that could neither restrain nor guide himself, and who was again preparing his own ruin, and who ought to be served, not for his own sake, but for the common good. Having avenged himself by contemptuous remarks upon Napoleon, he agreed with M. Chaboulon upon the mode of arranging a second interview, and of turning it to profit by obtaining the best information they could.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon returned to Bâle, where he found M. Werner faithful to his appointment. M. Werner, still believing that he was treating with the Duke d'Otranto's representative, assumed a more decided tone, and explained himself more explicitly as to the intentions of the powers assembled at Vienna. In the commencement he spoke even more decidedly concerning Napoleon than on the first occasion, making his exclusion a matter of necessity, he being incompatible with the general tranquillity. Napoleon once excluded, he declared that it was the wish of the sovereigns to come to a friendly arrangement, as they entertained no ill-feeling towards France, nor did they think of imposing a government on her. What the sovereigns would prefer, and what would be sure to procure better conditions for France, would be the restoration of the

Bourbons. If France consented to this, such arrangements might be made as would secure the opinions and interests that had sprung from the French Revolution. The Charter should undergo the necessary modifications; the greater number of public employments should be bestowed on all the new families; the emigrants who had returned since 1st April 1814 should have no part in public affairs; a homogeneous and independent ministry should be formed, constituted in such a manner as to be free from all court influences. M. Werner added that if France rejected the elder Bourbon branch, the coalition would not refuse the younger; they would even, if necessary, consent to Napoleon's son ascending the imperial throne, reserving to themselves the power of choosing a competent person to act as regent, in case Marie Louise refused to accept the office. But the absolute and irrevocable condition was that Napoleon should cease to reign and place himself in the hands of his father-in-law, who would treat him with every consideration dictated by honour and family ties.

It was in vain that M. Fleury de Chaboulon repeated what he had said before, dwelling especially on the great forces at Napoleon's disposal. M. Werner listened politely, and only repeated what he had said, that provided Napoleon was excluded, the sovereigns would be willing to treat on every other point, even the transmission of the crown to Napoleon's son, they choosing a regent who would conciliate the interests of France with those of peace. Then, after many superfluous repetitions, the two agents separated, promising to meet again should their superiors consider it useful or right.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon returned to Paris, and related all that had passed to Napoleon and the Duke d'Otranto, and was ordered to discontinue communications that could tend to no result. Napoleon concluded that opinion at Vienna had been mollified, since the allies would consent to accept his son; he even conceived a hope of finding them less firm or less obstinate than he had expected, and trusted that two or three battles would be sufficient to overcome them altogether, which was what he had not calculated on before. On his side M. Fouché came to the conclusion that Napoleon was the only obstacle to peace; that he, the Duke d'Otranto, had done well in advising Marie Louise's regency, as such an arrangement would at once put an end to the dangers with which France and Europe were threatened, and that if Napoleon understood his own interests and those of his dynasty, he would adopt this plan, and abdicate in favour of his son, remaining at the head of the army until all should be arranged with the powers, and then seek an honourable and peaceful retreat in some corner of the world, the only end he could expect, after having tormented

mankind so long. These opinions M. Fouché repeated with thoughtless levity, which could only be explained by his believing that Napoleon was greatly weakened. Some of these remarks reached Napoleon's ears; but he deferred his revenge, saying, that except he proceeded to absolute treason, it was better to allow M. Fouché to intrigue and talk, both of which were an absolute want of his restless nature; that such intrigues or remarks would decide nothing, victory alone could do that; but were he once more conqueror, he could subdue or punish him; but if, on the other hand, he were conquered, an enemy the more, even were it M. Fouché, could not make his ruin more certain, which would have been rendered inevitable by defeat. This opinion, though true, was exaggerated, for even if defeated, the fidelity of those he left behind might lessen its consequences, or perhaps give him time to repair them.

M. de Metternich had not failed altogether, as may be seen, since he had introduced disunion into the French government, and had given M. Fouché an opportunity of convincing himself that Napoleon still detested and despised him, and of making him believe that were Napoleon put aside, everything could be arranged, and arranged by him, the Duke d'Otranto; for the sovereigns at Vienna were ready to accept him as the instrument of a new revolution. Allowing M. Fouché to see, even in perspective, the possibility of his playing in 1815 the same part that M. de Talleyrand had played in 1814, was flattering the strongest and most dangerous of his passions, and inspiring him with the desire of gratifying it. The Austrian minister had not wasted his exertions, though he had no idea of the injury he had done our cause, or the service he had done his own. However that might be, it was still considered necessary at Vienna to add some explanation to the declaration of the 13th of March, and to address a fresh declaration to France and to Europe. Up to this time it had been found impossible to construct a declaration that would satisfy all, some considering it unjust and unwise to pass over the Bourbons in silence, and others thinking it imprudent to announce the intention of imposing them on France. In this embarrassment the coalition profited by some circumstances that occurred most opportunely. The treaty of the 25th of March was just at this time brought back to Vienna, ratified by all the courts. England alone had added a clause to the 8th article, to the effect, that though the allied powers wished well to the Bourbons, their essential and primary object was to secure the welfare of Europe, endangered by Napoleon's occupying the throne of France. It was necessary now to reply to the reservation, and state how far it was adopted. A private despatch was therefore sent from cabinet to cabinet, which, because of its easy and unrestrained style,

gave a better opportunity of explanation and of conciliating the finer shades of opinion than could be done in a solemn declaration addressed to all Europe. Lord Clancarty consequently sent a despatch to Lord Castlereagh, in which he was authorised to declare to the British Cabinet that the Congress accepted the reservation attached to the 8th article, and understood it in the same sense as England; that the declaration of the 13th of March, the refusal of all communication with France, and the arrest of her couriers, simply signified that the actual ruler of that great country was believed to be incompatible with the peace of Europe; that long experience proved what might be expected from him if once allowed to secure his position; that he would profit by the first opportunity to take up arms, and again seek to subject Europe to a yoke she was determined not to endure; that the allies consequently went to war with him and his adherents, not from choice, but necessity; that they did not in any way dispute the right of France to choose her own government, nor did they seek to restrict the exercise of this right; that they confined themselves to requiring that whatever dynasty might be chosen should give guarantees for the permanent tranquillity of Europe, and this point once secured, they would refrain from all interference in the internal affairs of a great and free nation.

Lord Clancarty finished by saying, that in order to be certain that he was giving the opinions of the different cabinets exactly, he had submitted his despatch to their principal ministers, who had unanimously approved and authorised all that it contained.

Whilst at Vienna such efforts were made to unite those who wished for a formal declaration in favour of the Bourbons, and those who only sought Napoleon's exclusion from the throne, the British ministers were compelled by the Opposition to enter into an explanation, and avowed that theirs was a war policy. They were fortunate enough to get Parliament to adopt their views. We shall give a brief account of what occurred in London.

The treaty of the 25th of March, announcing the renewal of the alliance of Chaumont, had been published in the different journals towards the end of April, and caused no little surprise to the members of Parliament, who had been told that the English ministers' preparations for war were merely precautionary, and did not imply a determination to make war on France. Were the ministers acquainted with this treaty of the 25th of March or not when the royal message had been discussed on the 7th of April? If they knew of it, they had deceived Parliament, and sinned against political honesty, which in a free country might permit silence, but cannot countenance falsehood. Mr. Whitbread, one of the most talented and active members of the Opposition, called upon Lord Castlereagh, whilst

all the members sat silent and surprised, and asked an explanation of his conduct, and whether the treaty of the 25th of March was authentic or not. Lord Castlereagh, taken by surprise, muttered some words in reply, acknowledged the fundamental principles of the treaty without admitting the exact terms. "What difference is there," cried the Opposition, "between the real treaty and that which has been published?" Lord Castlereagh could not tell of any, since none existed, and replied that the treaty not being yet universally ratified, he was not permitted to enter into any explanation. The Opposition, however, saw plainly that the treaty was authentic, that the English government had pledged themselves with the other allies to declare immediate war, that the ministers had completely deceived them when talking of precautionary measures, for it was impossible to credit that the treaty signed at Vienna on the 25th of March was not known in London on the 7th of April, that is thirteen days after it had been signed. Lord Castlereagh, not daring to venture on a direct falsehood, admitted that he knew of the treaty on the 7th of April. "Then you have deceived us most shamefully," exclaimed the members of the Opposition with the greatest violence. The minister was greatly embarrassed; and with good reason, for though political morality was then at a very low ebb, Parliament had never been so daringly deceived. Mr. Whitbread then said that as the time for explanation had not yet arrived, it would be better that the sittings of Parliament should be suspended until such time as it would be convenient to tell the entire truth, as otherwise the members might fall into error, and vote contrary to their principles whilst they remained ignorant of the true state of affairs. Lord Castlereagh, driven to extremities, appointed the 28th of April to lay the treaty before the House and justify its contents.

On the 28th of April the treaty was laid before Parliament, and gave rise to a violent discussion. Mr. Whitbread having repeated that Parliament had been deceived by the ministers who spoke only of simple precautions when they were really preparing for war, then said that this war was dangerous and by no means necessary to the interests of Great Britain, and moved that a respectful address should be presented to the Crown, requesting that the best means of preserving peace might be taken into consideration. Lord Castlereagh then spoke, and indulged in some personalities, saying that if ministers had formerly listened to the advice of Mr. Whitbread and his friends, the struggle against Napoleon would have been abandoned on the very eve of triumph, and England would be far from the magnificent position she had acquired, had she not followed advice very different from that offered by those gentle-

men. He then sought by subtleties and semi-falsehoods to reply to the reproach of having treated Parliament with duplicity. What had been said on the 7th of April? That ministers were about to make preparations to meet whatever events might arise, but they had made no precise declaration of war or peace. They had only promised to protect British interests in the best possible manner, and these interests depended on a strict union with the continental powers. As these powers, from their geographical position, were in more danger than England, it was only right that the question should be decided by them. Far from having advised them to make war, the danger of such a step had been pointed out to them; but it was unanimously admitted that a general disarmament would be folly in the presence of such a man as Napoleon, and that as to keep their forces on a war footing would involve the allies in overwhelming expenses, they had come to the determination of declaring war. Could England then separate from the continental powers, and break off an alliance to which the deliverance of Europe was owing, and to which she was still indebted for her safety? Nobody ventured such an assertion. Neither would any one dare to say that these powers were in the wrong. In short, was it possible for them to exist in a state of perpetual anxiety, and as a consequence of this anxiety keep their forces constantly on a war footing? Was it not evident, for example, that if Napoleon were allowed to secure himself on the French throne, and permitted to assemble three or four hundred thousand men, that he would profit by the first opportunity and again attack his neighbours? It was said indeed that he was changed, and had adopted pacific views; yes, changed in words, to lull the vigilance of the powers, and those would be very foolish indeed that would put faith in such a change. At the very first favourable moment, as soon as he should perceive a diminution in the forces of the allies, or the appearance of disunion amongst themselves, he would again spring upon Europe and again subdue her to his yoke. This was a truth which no rational man could doubt. It would therefore be wiser to profit by the advantage of being prepared, for there are times when attack is nothing more than defence. It was indeed asserted by some that the man in question would be supported by the great French nation. If it were so, and that the French nation from weakness or ambition would support this man, well, then, let her take the consequence! Europe should not be exposed to inevitable destruction because one nation chose to have such a ruler, or because a corrupt army, covetous of riches and honour, chose as its leader a barbarian who sought to renew the wild enterprises of Asiatic conquerors! The allies did not want to impose a government on France; they only

sought to deprive her of the power of injuring others, of perpetually disturbing the repose and political existence of the world.

Such was the substance of Lord Castlereagh's explanations. Though he did not say that war had been irrevocably decided on, he had so amply dilated on the motives for declaring it that his words were equivalent to a declaration of war. Many members replied to Lord Castlereagh; of these the most distinguished was Mr. Ponsonby, a man of moderate opinions, and who had induced the majority to vote on the 7th of April in the sense of the royal message, as he considered that it left England still free to declare for war or peace. Mr. Ponsonby had consequently a better right than anybody else to complain of having been deceived. It was evident, he said, that on the 7th of April the Cabinet wished Parliament to believe that there was still a choice between peace and war, which was not the case, for war had been resolved on, since at that time the treaty of the 25th of March had been signed at Vienna and had arrived in London. Mr. Ponsonby might have asserted this more positively had he seen Lord Castlereagh's despatches. The members of the House of Commons believed on that day that they were voting for precautionary measures, when in reality they were voting for war. The House had therefore been deceived by the ministry. "Now," said Mr. Ponsonby, with an indignation the more significant in a man of his equable temper, "such conduct would not be tolerated in private life, and what opinion are we to form of it when practised in public affairs, where the interests, not only of an individual, but of a whole country are at stake." Mr. Ponsonby did not consider the reasons for undertaking the war at all sufficient, especially when compared with the risk. "Undoubtedly," he added, "England ought not to separate from the continental powers; but she evidently had a right to advise; and was it certain that the British ministers had, as they boasted, shown their allies all the dangers of this new struggle? These dangers were serious, as they were about to defy at once a great man and a great nation." Mr. Ponsonby added that he had never esteemed this man in a moral point of view; but nobody could deny his immense genius, nor the energy of the people under his command. To insult such a people, to attribute to them every vice, and arrogate to ourselves every virtue, was not the way to discuss such a subject seriously. It was no less true that they were securing to the extraordinary man to whom they were opposed the support of that redoubtable people, by their scarcely concealed attack upon their independence. It was said that no intention was entertained of imposing a government on them, but merely in the general interests of the community to forbid

them one in particular. "If," continued Mr. Ponsonby, "there were three or four other governments besides this interdicted one from which they could choose, then it might be said that no attempt was made to impose one on them. But every rational man must see that France had no choice but between Bonaparte and the Bourbons; and excluding Bonaparte, was it not compelling them to accept the Bourbons? These latter had been tried, and notwithstanding their moral qualities, had offended the nation by their political faults; and it would be insulting the French people beyond endurance to compel them to accept the Bourbons again. It would be carrying Mr. Pitt's policy beyond all bounds to renew a war for the sake of the Bourbons, who, when almost miraculously restored to their throne, had not been able to maintain their position. If such reasoning were carried out, the august dynasty actually occupying the English throne could not have reigned, for the English people would have been under an obligation to struggle unto death for the re-establishment of the Stuarts. And even were the boasted advantages obtained for Great Britain by the last peace compromised, let them be abandoned; but there was no need of making such a sacrifice, for Bonaparte offered peace, offered it with importunity on the conditions of the Treaties of Paris and Vienna. Should then torrents of blood be shed, the national debt be doubled, and the income-tax prolonged to infinity, and all this for advantages that nobody thought of contesting? Some said that Napoleon's word could not be relied on; that he was an ambitious, insincere man. But to speak plainly, since the sittings of the Congress at Vienna, had any power in Europe the right to accuse another of ambition? Doubtless the enterprising disposition that Napoleon had formerly shown furnished a just cause of alarm, for men rarely change; but it was also true that as age advances, their conduct undergoes modifications, and men who in early life could not endure repose, at a later period seek and love quiet. Besides, a clear view of his own interest is often sufficient to modify the conduct of a man of genius. Napoleon hated England, but had he not proved his desire to please her by abolishing the slave trade? When he set the Duke d'Angoulême at liberty after a price had been set upon his head, was his conduct not very different from what it had been towards the Duke d'Enghien? This obstinate, incorrigible man was therefore not as unchangeable as was said, and if to prevent a pretended danger he was driven to extremities and compelled to fight, and the French nation forced to join him, might he not gain two or three brilliant victories, and what would then become of the advantages gained in the last war, which they were so anxious to protect? What would become of these continental

powers, for whose protection prudence and reason had been sacrificed? In case of such an event, would it not be evident that false calculations had been made, and because certain persons would not believe in a change of conduct if not of disposition, which self-interest had rendered most probable, they would have risked the advantages gained by a long war, and which nobody was disputing, together with the safety of the continental sovereigns; for certainly were Napoleon again victorious, he would not accept the Treaty of Paris. They might therefore by excess of prudence be wanting in real foresight, and create the very difficulty they were seeking to avoid."

Such were the reasons advanced by both parties in the British Parliament, and the entire may be reduced to this: Could Napoleon's offers of peace be trusted? Thus the same doubt that prevailed in France influenced the rest of the world, and war was to be declared against Napoleon, not for what he meditated at the time, but for what he had done or wished to do formerly. He offered peace, he sought it by every means direct and indirect, asked for it humbly, and was met by universal doubt. This doubt indeed was the only reply that could be made to the excellent reasoning of the English Opposition, and though the Parliament appreciated Mr. Whitbread's pacific address, it was rejected by two hundred and seventy-two votes against seventy-two.

From this moment war was proclaimed against us in London in the name of all Europe, and unfortunately, whilst it was only resolved on in London, it was actually commenced in Italy. We have seen how the unfortunate Murat had been brought into connection with the island of Elba by the Princess Pauline, who had gone alternately from Porto-Ferrajo to Naples, and from Naples to Porto-Ferrajo. By her zeal, and with the assistance of the Queen of Naples, she had succeeded in reconciling Napoleon to Murat, and prepared their united efforts for the new course of events, which might be easily foreseen, though its details could not be known beforehand. When Napoleon was about to leave Porto-Ferrajo he communicated his intention to Murat, and desired him to write to Vienna and announce his intention of observing the Treaty of Paris. He also advised him not to take the initiative in hostilities, but to wait until France, replaced under the Bonaparte sceptre, could give him assistance; he was to fall back if attacked, that he might have the advantage of distance and concentrated forces on his side, and to fight rather on the Garigliano than on the Po. This advice was worthy of him that gave, but quite above the comprehension of him that received it. Murat's imagination took fire when he heard of Napoleon's land-

ing and entry into Grenoble. He felt no doubt of his brother-in-law's success, and in his excitement, almost forgetting the Austrians, he only thought of the danger of seeing Italy pass as quickly as France under the imperial sway, and of his again losing the iron crown; for this hapless prince not only thought of keeping the kingdom of Naples, but of doubling or trebling his dominions. He did not put an iota of the prudent advice he had received into execution.

On first learning Napoleon's departure, far from sending the message with which he was entrusted to Vienna, and by which it was intended to tranquillise Austria with regard to Murat as well as with regard to France, he betook himself to his usual practices of dissimulation. He sent for the English and Austrian ministers, and told them that he was quite ignorant of his brother-in-law's intention, a useless falsehood, which nobody would believe, and he would have done better in admitting what he knew, as it would give him an opportunity of assuring Austria and England that their interests should not suffer. Then, when assured of Napoleon's success, instead of remaining at a distance from the Austrians in the south of the peninsula, he thought to seize all Italy at once, and proclaim himself king before the empire should be proclaimed on both sides of the Alps. He determined to commence his march at once, making several excuses to Austria and England, whom he did not wish to offend, and whom he wished to deceive as long as possible. His first step was to take possession of the Marches, as a retaliation on the Pope, who had not recognised him; and he next intended to advance to the banks of the Po, telling Austria and England that he thought it better to take up a position on the line of the armistice of 1814, when it was stipulated that the Austrians should occupy the left bank of the Po, and the Neapolitans the right. Such a proposition could only be sustained by Murat's resuming his position of 1814, that is, by becoming the ally of the coalition against France. He said nothing contrary to such a supposition, and even sent the most tranquillising assurances to England. Before leaving to put himself at the head of his troops, he confided the regency of the kingdom to his wife, who did all she could to turn him from his foolish enterprise; but he took no notice of her advice, gave her the most extensive powers, and left ten thousand men to protect Naples, a precaution most necessary in the existing state of the public mind, and which ought to have influenced him not to advance northwards, but to concentrate his forces behind the Garigliano. He had still at his disposal fifty thousand men, all well equipped, and making a tolerably good appearance, but deprived of their French officers, who had left the Neapolitan service, some through

disgust, others because of the ordinance of Louis XVIII. which recalled them. Murat had also thirty thousand militia; but these could not be efficiently employed in their own country, especially in a war in which the rivalries of contending dynasties would exercise so great an influence. He commenced his campaign with fifty thousand men, including those in the Marches.

This first unwise division of the Neapolitan forces was not the only one. Murat sent a column through the Roman States to Tuscany, in order to expel the Austrian general, Nugent. This column, consisting of seven or eight thousand Neapolitans, was ordered to pass within view of Rome, advancing through Viterbo and Arezzo to Florence, and to rejoin the principal army at Bologna. The appearance of an armed force so near the Vatican was not calculated to please the Pope, nor to reassure him as to the views of the Neapolitan court. Murat sent General Campana to assure him of his devotion to the Holy See, and to implore him to remain at Rome; for this new King of Italy affected to imitate Napoleon in all things, and whilst creating an Italian kingdom for himself, wished that the head of the Catholic Church should remain in his dominions, peaceful, honoured, richly endowed, and nominally free. But it was not easy to persuade the Pope, who had refused to be the subject of the modern Charlemagne, and was still less inclined to submit to a petty Italian prince, whose bravery, devoid of genius, gave him no right to believe himself the founder of an empire. Uninfluenced by Murat's assurances, the Pope left his capital accompanied by several cardinals, and was soon followed by all the most distinguished persons in Rome, amongst whom were Charles IV., King of Spain, and his wife, the Prince of Peace, the Queen of Etruria, &c. All retired to Genoa. The example was followed by the other Italian courts. The Grand Duke of Tuscany went to Leghorn, where he was sure of protection from the English; the King of Sardinia joined the Papal court at Genoa, where Lord Bentinck was staying.

The Neapolitan troops destined for Tuscany passed under the walls of Rome without entering the city, and proceeded towards Florence through Arezzo. Murat, with the principal corps, passed through Ancona and Rimini.

Whilst advancing in this way, he addressed both English and Austrians in the most friendly tone. He said that his intention in advancing towards the Po was to place himself in a position conformable to the terms of the armistice of 1814, which was rather an insinuation of alliance than a threat of hostility. But such a comedy could not last long, and the unfortunate Murat was soon compelled to declare his intentions fully, and to let the people of Italy see what crown he ambitioned to place on his head. Napoleon had sent message

after message to keep him quiet, and at last sent General Bel-liard, an excellent adviser both in civil and military policy. But these messages did not reach Murat on his road, and he had nothing to guide him but rumours and some letters from Joseph, who sent him an account from Switzerland of Napoleon's triumphant progress, and implored him to join the cause of France.

When Murat arrived at Ancona he learned that Napoleon had passed beyond Lyon, that the French army joined him wherever he appeared, and that henceforth no doubt could be entertained of his success. This intelligence produced a magical effect on Murat. He saw Napoleon re-established on the throne, and again putting forth his hand to seize Italy, and fancy painted the Austrians as quickly expelled from Italy as the Bourbons had been from France. From these imaginings he concluded that he ought not to allow himself to be anticipated, that he ought himself to expel the Austrians from Italy, take their place, and appear before Napoleon as an auxiliary with twenty million Italians at his disposal, and consequently one whom it would not be easy to dispossess in favour of Prince Eugène. His excitement was increased by the neighbourhood of the Austrians, who had taken possession of the Legations, and whom he should meet on leaving the Marches. He must therefore either stop on the frontier of the Marches and there wait the course of events, or declare himself at once by attacking the Austrians. Murat and three of his ministers who accompanied him had a great discussion on this subject. All begged him to take time and not throw down the gauntlet to the allied powers. Up to this time he had done nothing that he could not justify to the Austrians or English. He had announced that he was about to occupy the line of the ancient armistice, and would prove his sincerity by stopping in his progress before he had gone so far. He might there await the course of events in France with safety, with the advantage of not compromising either himself or Napoleon, and of not removing the seat of war too far from Naples in case hostilities should commence. These were sufficient and more than sufficient reasons for pausing in his course. But Murat considered that the prestige of Napoleon's fame would make his success as certain in Italy as in France. He fancied that the French empire would be no sooner established in France than it would again spring up at Milan by a reflex action, and that Prince Eugène would be again proclaimed viceroy. This last fear tormented him, and he wished to meet Napoleon with the double advantage of having expelled the Austrians and of being in actual possession. Whilst his ministers were making the greatest efforts to prevent his commencing hostilities, and

when he seemed half inclined to adopt their advice, he received a letter from Joseph dated Prangins, in which this prince told him of Napoleon's late triumphs, conjured him to adopt his cause, and to aid him in Italy both by arms and diplomacy, and at the same time to endeavour to win the Austrians from the coalition by assuring them that they should not be molested; he then added these unfortunate words: "*Speak and act as your own feelings dictate, advance to the Alps, but do not pass them.*"* This letter, written in the intoxication of joy, contained the most deplorable contradiction, for it advised Murat to display a friendly feeling towards the Austrians, and at the same time to advance towards the Alps. Yet had Murat read it with somewhat more reflection than it had been written, he would have seen that Joseph did not understand the existing state of things. Had Joseph known that the Austrians occupied both banks of the Po, he would not have supposed it possible to act in a conciliatory manner towards them and at the same time advance towards the Alps. He evidently did not know that the Austrians were on the right bank of the Po, but thought them confined to the left bank as in 1814, which would have permitted another force to advance, without coming into conflict with them, to the foot of the Alps, at least in some parts of the chain. Besides, it was quite evident that this advice to march to the Alps, but not to go beyond, was not so much an invitation to advance as a recommendation not to violate the French frontier. Unfortunately Murat took no notice of anything but of the advice to march towards the Alps; he wished to seize all Italy at once; he would not listen to the advice or entreaties of his ministers, but passed the frontier of the Legations, and drove back the vanguard of the Austrian cavalry on Cesena. As the Austrians were not numerous enough to oppose an army of more than forty thousand men, they retired in good order towards Bologna. They were commanded by General Bianchi. The loss on both sides was inconsiderable.

It was on the 31st of March that Murat flung aside the mask, and assumed the Italian crown by his own authority. On the same day he published a most declamatory proclamation, dated from Rimini, calling all Italians to independence, and promising them a united Italy. In this proclamation he did not speak of Napoleon or of France, and that through two very mean motives: first, that he might still keep on terms with the English; and secondly, to avoid any reference to the viceroyalty of Prince Eugène. This was very unwisely done, for it was folly to think of temporising with the English after breaking with

* This letter, which has been spoken of as the deciding cause of Murat's conduct, is still to be found in the *Affaires Etrangères*. It is dated Prangins, 14th of March, and contains the passages literally as we have quoted them.

the Austrians; nor was it less foolish to think of forming at that time a purely Italian party independent of Austria or France. Owing to the long wars against Austria, there was at that time in Italy no choice but to be either the partisan of Austria or of France. Besides, though the Italians had been alienated from Napoleon in 1814, because of all that they had suffered under his rule, they had immediately returned to him; they knew but him, they could only feel enthusiasm for him; and Murat chilled their zeal when he substituted his own for that great name, and did even worse in referring to his defection in 1814, which had been unanimously blamed by all opposed to the Austrian rule in Italy.

This unsuccessful proclamation was his first vexatious failure. Some youthful imaginations were excited by it, but it produced no effect on the mass of the people, who augured but little good from Murat's proceedings. He advanced to Bologna, having had a skirmish on the way with the Austrian cavalry, and collecting a few Italians, sought to form a government there, but he met with very little assistance. Still, in this populous and enlightened city of Bologna, animated by Italian patriotism, he might have found many ready to aid him, though displeased at his too evidently self-interested views, but that with his usual heedlessness he had not thought of procuring muskets, without which the greatest enthusiasm, could he have excited it, would have been useless.

Having displayed his empty royalty for some days to the people of Bologna, he continued his march towards Modena and Parma, intending to cross the Po, and assume the iron crown at Milan. This was a strange mode of following Napoleon's or even Joseph's advice, who had so strongly recommended him to act with policy towards the Austrians. The latter, in falling back, concentrated their forces. A sanguinary conflict took place on the Panaro, in front of Modena, in which each side lost about eight hundred men. The Neapolitans, under Murat, behaved very well, and advanced to Modena. General Filangieri, who afterwards distinguished himself, was seriously wounded on that occasion. As the Austrians were not in a position to take the offensive, they recrossed the Po, intending to defend its banks until their forces should be assembled.

Having committed the great fault of attacking the Austrians, instead of remaining in the Marches and concentrating his forces before the Abruzzi, by which he would have afforded an opportunity for diplomatic or military negotiations, Murat had but one way of repairing his error—if indeed it could be repaired—and this was, to recall the troops he had sent into Tuscany, and then at the head of fifty thousand men to advance on Parma, Placentia, and Pavia, whence it was only a step to Milan

by crossing the Po in the upper part of its course. He would by this have got possession of all the Austrian posts on the Lower Po, and produced a profound impression on the public mind by entering the capital of Lombardy. This indeed had been Murat's plan, especially as it would be following Joseph's advice of advancing to the Alps; but as he could not avoid mingling intrigue with rashness, he tried to continue relations with Lord Bentinck, assuring him that he only took up arms because Austria had deceived him by plotting against his crown after having guaranteed its possession to him, but that if England would support him he would support her. Lord Bentinck, who, though perfectly upright, was not deficient in astuteness, told him that if he wished to be believed, he must first respect the King of Sardinia's dominions; and Murat had the folly to pause in his progress, and even to turn back. He abandoned the idea of crossing the Po above Placentia, where he would have found the passage less difficult, and the Austrians weaker, and returned towards Bologna, in order to attempt a passage at Ferrara. He attacked Occhio-Bello on the 8th of April, and after losing a great number of men, was obliged to give up all idea of crossing this great river. He returned to the Legations, not knowing what to do, for he dared not return to Piedmont, because of the English, nor could he force the Po, defended as it was by the entire Austrian army. He had proclaimed himself King of Italy, but no popular acclamation confirmed this spontaneous investiture. His defect had deprived him of the impulse under which he had advanced on the offensive, and, by advancing too far, he had sacrificed the strength which a defensive position would have given him. Reckoning from that moment, he was morally even before being materially ruined. He then, but too late, thought of the advice his brother-in-law had given him, and determined to return through the Marches to the Abruzzi route, in order to fight, on the banks of the Garigliano, the decisive battle that Napoleon had advised him to avoid; or in any case to let it be as near Naples as possible. He therefore fell back through Cesena and Rimini; but the Austrians, having had time to concentrate forces to the amount of sixty thousand men, followed him under the command of Generals Bianchi and Neiperg (the latter had left Marie Louise to serve in Italy). It was therefore doubtful whether Murat could reach Capua or Naples without being compelled to accept battle. During the execution of this most difficult retreat his rearguard was every day engaged in skirmishes, in which Murat sustained the courage of the Neapolitan soldiers by his personal bravery, but which always ended in his losing the disputed position. His troops were soon seriously diminished



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by demoralisation and desertion. Having arrived with the greater number of his troops at Tolentino, he determined to decide his fate by a desperate conflict. The battle was long, and was well sustained by the Neapolitans, with Murat fighting like a hero at their head. So desperate were his efforts, as he flung himself into the midst of the enemy's battalions in search of conquest or death, that for a moment he believed victory to be within his grasp. But unfortunately General Neiperg arrived with fresh troops, and Murat was obliged to yield to the numbers and superiority of the Austrian army.

The vanquished Neapolitans retired along the sea-coast by Fermo and Pescara; but a body of Austrians having made a flank movement through Salmona, Castel di Sangro and Isernia, they were quickly compelled to resume the direct route to Naples. Murat attempted to keep the enemy back, but after the fatal effort of Tolentino his soldiers deserted in thousands. He soon had no more than ten or twelve thousand men, and when he reached the neighbourhood of Capua he left this wreck of his army to Baron Carascosa, that he might not himself fall into the hands of the Austrians. He returned privately to Naples, where he was very badly received by the queen, who had vainly sought to prevent his foolish expedition, and to whom he addressed these mournful words, "*Madam, do not be surprised at seeing me alive, for I have done all I could to meet death.*" The unfortunate Murat spoke the truth. He had behaved like a hero; but nothing can supply the want of political judgment in a ruler. He embarked on board a small vessel for Provence, whilst his wife treated with the Austrians and English concerning the surrender of Naples. The complete evacuation of Naples by this branch of the Bonaparte family was naturally the principal condition of the capitulation, and the restoration of the Bourbons its inevitable consequence. The queen asked nothing but liberty for herself and her children; but this, like many other conditions, was violated by the allies, and Napoleon's sister was taken to Trieste. On the 20th of May all was over at Naples.

Such was the end of Murat's royalty. The termination of his life, delayed for a few months, was still more mournful. This unfortunate man was gifted with the most brilliant military talents; he was brave even to heroism, and would have been an accomplished cavalry officer if to the talent of leading his squadrons to the charge he had added that of economising the lives of his men. He was good, generous-hearted, and possessed of some intelligence, but was attacked by that *maladie de régner* with which Napoleon infected his relatives, and even his lieutenants, and of which the helpless Murat died. This moral pest for a moment changed an excellent man into a

faithless and almost perfidious one, and into a disastrous ally for France, for according to Napoleon's opinion, Murat was twice the cause of his ruin—by abandoning him in 1814, and by joining him too soon in 1815. This opinion was doubtless exaggerated, for Murat was not of sufficient importance to cause the ruin of France, though he might compromise her seriously. It is certain that if in 1814 he had joined Prince Eugène, instead of declaring against him, a great number of Austrians would have been detained in Italy, by which the invaders of France would have been considerably diminished, or so far restrained that Prince Eugène would have been able to descend by Mont Cenis on Lyon, a proceeding that might have had the most happy results. It is also certain that if Murat in 1815 had concentrated his sixty thousand men in the neighbourhood of Ancona, and there taken up a position of imposing immobility, at the same time giving occupation to the Austrians, the latter would not have had a single soldier to send to Antibes or Chambéry, and thirty thousand men might have been brought from the Vosges to Ardennes, by which Napoleon would have had a much larger body of forces at Waterloo. It is true that though Murat had not twice caused the ruin of France, as Napoleon said,* still he compromised her twice by his fatal desire of reigning, which turned a heroic and generous soldier into a mediocre king, a faithless relative, and a bad Frenchman.†

Whatever may be the justice of these different opinions, the war in Italy was finished about the middle of May, and the Austrians were able to lead the greater part of their forces towards France. All the armies of Europe were now advancing towards our frontiers. Besides the troops that the Austrians would be able to bring to the Var and Mont Cenis, 70,000 more of their troops, 40,000 Bavarians, 20,000 Wurtembergians,

* Ninth volume of Napoleon's Memoirs, page 18.

† Napoleon also accused Murat of being the cause of the Austrians not listening to him in 1815, as they believed that the offensive operations of the Neapolitan army had been caused by advice from Paris. This arose from an ignorance of facts on the part of Napoleon; and very natural, for at St. Helena he had not access to the documents connected with the Congress of Vienna. Long before Napoleon had landed at the Gulf of Juan the Austrians had divined Murat's intentions from the note he had addressed to the Congress concerning the Bourbons, and were so certain of an attack on his part that they had ordered, as we have already mentioned in Book LVI., a concentration of one hundred and fifty thousand men in Italy. Besides, the declaration of the 13th of March had been published before the Neapolitans had marched on Cesena, and had no connection with Murat's conduct in Italy. This unfortunate man had no influence on the political resolutions of the court of Vienna with regard to France, and the consequences of his errors, sufficiently great without being exaggerated, were that he engaged too soon with the Austrians, by which the latter, having decided the Italian question, were able to send fifty or sixty thousand men towards the Alps in time to counteract the efforts of a large portion of our forces. Such is the simple truth, free from all exaggeration, and conformable to our uniform practice when treating of men and things.

10,000 Badeners, and 10,000 men belonging to the petty princes of Germany, were marching towards the Rhine. These were followed by 80,000 Russians who had already reached Prague, and 70,000 more who were actually traversing Poland: 120,000 Prussians under Blucher were encamped between the Sambre and the Meuse, besides important reserves on the Oder. Lastly, 100,000 English, Hanoverians, Hollando-Belgians, and Northern Germans were concentrated round Brussels, under the Duke of Wellington. This latter had advised Blucher to wait for the general assembling of the European troops before attacking Napoleon; but finding about the middle of June that with the Prussians, 250,000 men were assembled, he was tempted to commence the siege of our fortresses without waiting the arrival of the column from the east. But it had been so generally resolved not to act except unanimously, that Wellington and Blucher confined themselves to collecting their troops, choosing their positions, and making arrangements for communicating with each other in case of the sudden appearance of the French. All were now moving towards our frontiers, and about the end of June our country was about to be invaded by 450,000 men, independent of the Russian and Prussian reserves, or the Austrians who were coming from Italy.

The English were to pay a subsidy of five millions sterling to be divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria, two millions and a half to be divided between the petty princes of Germany, and another million for the second Russian army; making altogether eight millions and a half sterling, or two hundred and twelve millions five hundred francs. Generally speaking, the feeling of the people of Europe against France was considerably toned down; but that of the governments was more virulent than ever. For example, the English did not care to restore the Bourbons at the expense of injuring their commerce and perpetuating the income-tax. The Germans had either given up all hope of liberty, or had been plundered like the Saxons, and all oppressed by the expenses of war, had no desire to see it renewed. The Belgians regretted the French since the arrival of the Dutch, English, and Prussians amongst them. The Austrians were quite discontented at the preponderance of the Russians. These different sentiments worked on the minds of the people, and caused them to view the sovereigns assembled at Vienna with a portion of the hatred that a year before had been exclusively bestowed upon Napoleon. The sovereigns, on the other hand, were more irritated than ever, and could not forgive Napoleon for having disturbed them while enjoying the gratification prepared for their ambition at Vienna. These sentiments were shared by the troops, though condemned to fight again. The Prussian army, as we have

already said, was more excited than any other. The officers at Liége, offended by the dislike of the inhabitants, frequently committed outrages on some of the Belgians, who were considered friends of ours, and declared that this time they would not leave one stone upon another in the French provinces. They even threatened to cut the throats of the women and old men; but fortunately were not able to fulfil these ferocious threats. They came into daily collision with the Saxons. The journals of the Rhine continued to indulge in the most exaggerated language. The Bourbons, they said, did not know how to govern, an art that Napoleon understood but too well, for he had drawn more from the resources of France in two months than the Bourbons had done in a year. Therefore neither the one nor the other ought to be allowed to reign. France ought to have a dozen kings—a project proposed before—whilst Germany should have the benefit of a single emperor; Alsace and Lorraine should be restored to Germany, and the national property employed in remunerating the German soldiers, and paying the expenses of the exterminating war that was about to be undertaken. No proposition should be listened to unless France, as a sign of submission, should first give up Lille, Metz, and Strasburg. The French emigrants at Ghent were in constant communication with Wellington and Blucher, telling all they could learn about France, and discussing the important question of a fresh insurrection in Vendée. Lord Wellington, who was attentively watching Napoleon's preparations, was desirous of embarrassing him by an insurrection on both shores of the Loire. Did no other effect result from such a combination than that ten or fifteen thousand men should be detained between Nantes and Rochelle whilst the combatants were engaged between Maubeuge and Charleroi, it would be a vast advantage for those who would be obliged to bear the first shock of the French armies. But the Vendean leaders, finding the zeal of the people in their province cooled, had resolved not to anticipate the movements of the allies, nor to make any movement until the latter should have given full occupation to all the French forces.

In compliance with the urgent solicitations of Lord Wellington, the Marquis de la Rochejaquelein was despatched to give the long-deferred signal of insurrection, with a promise of assistance from an English fleet bringing arms and munitions of war.

Such was the unpromising picture that presented itself to Napoleon towards the end of May. It would be difficult to describe how much he had been affected by Murat's catastrophe. Though the fate of Murat and the Neapolitan army could not be regarded as a presage of what was to befall him and the

French army, still he could not avoid looking on the events at Naples as a sinister omen. The late favour that fortune had bestowed on him on his passage from Porto-Ferrajo to Paris had not deceived him, and the difficulties that soon arose, together with the increasing animosity of all Europe, convinced him that implacable fortune was not yet appeased, and he now looked on the few days between the 26th of February and the 20th of May as the last gleams of the setting sun. When he saw Murat overthrown—Murat, whose frivolity he had always regarded with a kind of antipathy, but who had led his cavalry so well on the battlefields of Europe, and who was one of his oldest companions in arms—he gave way to the deepest commiseration, and became oppressed by sombre forebodings which he in vain endeavoured to conceal, but which his friends perceived in spite of his efforts at self-control. Though discontented with his brother-in-law, he sent a confidential person to console him, and tell him, but with gentleness, how numerous and serious his faults had been, and to advise him to remain for some time between Marseilles and Toulon in whatever place he preferred. It would not indeed be wise to present the vanquished King of Naples to the Parisians, nor to gladden the enemies of the empire with the view of a victim whom they would only look on as the forerunner of one still more important and more detested.

The royalists, with the usual ill-feeling of party spirit, seemed to divine all that passed in Napoleon's mind, and rejoiced greatly. They looked on Murat's fall as the forerunner of Napoleon's. They took no notice of the difference between the men, but remarked, indeed not without some truth, that if Napoleon and the French army were much superior to Murat, Lord Wellington, Marshal Blucher, Prince Schwarzenberg, and the five hundred thousand men under their command were no less superior to General Bianchi and the Austrian army at Tolentino. Profiting by the liberty accorded them, they enumerated the symptoms that had preceded Murat's fall, and published them in certain journals. They were unremittingly active, particularly in the south, at Marseilles, Toulouse, and Bordeaux, whilst the preparations in Vendée gave grounds to apprehend a speedy rising in that quarter.

All this was clearly seen by Napoleon, and he considered that the only remedy for such a state of things was an immediate, vigorous, and successful war. M. Fouché, animated by a love of foreign as well as domestic intrigue, made a fresh attempt to enter into relations with the powers at Vienna, to whom he sent M. de St. Léon, a man of talent, professing liberal opinions, intimately acquainted with M. de Talleyrand, and every way suited to set forth in strong terms the danger of an obstinate

struggle in favour of the Bourbons. M. Fouché gave him a letter for M. de Metternich, a very sensible and almost eloquent epistle, in which he pleaded Napoleon's cause most warmly, hoping that, should he not serve Napoleon, for whom he did not care, he might perhaps secure the regency of Marie Louise, or promote the interests of the Duke d'Orléans, and thus avert the return of the Bourbons. Napoleon was not deceived either as to M. Fouché's motives, or as to the little prospect there was of his success; however, he allowed him to proceed with his attempt, as it could neither injure him, nor interrupt any of his preparations. But he saw that his real, his only resource was an immediate attack upon that portion of the allied forces that was within his reach, and he thought of profiting by the circumstance of Prince Schwarzenberg being in the rear of the other column, to fall suddenly on Blucher and Wellington, cantoned on our northern frontier. He was already contemplating, as we have said, one of his most profound projects, and if any hope existed for him, it gleamed from within, from his own genius, which showed to his keen military glance the chances left by the short-sightedness of his enemies. Could he gain one more such victory as of old, the royalists would be silenced, Europe, now heedless of his overtures, would consent to negotiate, and all the difficulties with which his government had to contend would pass away. He worked night and day in preparing an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men between Paris and Maubeuge, and this mass he intended to hurl like a club at the head of the English and Prussians, the enemies nearest to him. He was most anxious to set out, and hoped that when the votes on the constitution would be announced in the assembly in the Champ de Mai, the elections over, and the two chambers assembled, that he would be able to leave Paris for Flanders, there to decide his fate and that of the world in two or three days. Never had he worked with more energy or success. The picked battalions of the national guard were formed with the greatest expedition, especially in the frontier provinces, where alone he was certain of obtaining one hundred and fifty thousand men. Napoleon sent these battalions, clad in a simple blouse with coloured collar, to the different fortresses, where their old muskets were to be repaired during the leisure hours of garrison life. Unfortunately the recruiting of the regular army was not so successful. The number obtained by recalling the old soldiers was not as great as had been expected. Many of them preferred serving in the mobilised national guards, whose service was limited both as to locality and duration, conditions which contributed not a little to the rapid formation of these battalions. Many also had married; and others, who had only served during 1813 and 1814, had no taste for war, of which

they had known nothing but the disasters. From all these causes, instead of the ninety thousand men that were expected from the hundred and fifty thousand that had deserted in 1814, only seventy thousand could be collected, of which fifty-eight thousand had already presented themselves, and twelve thousand were on their way to join. By adding these to the hundred and eighty thousand men that composed the effective army on the 1st of March, and to the fifty thousand on six months' leave of absence, who had all obeyed the summons of recall, there was a prospect of raising an army of three hundred thousand men, of whom two hundred or two hundred and ten thousand were to be on active service, and the remainder left in dépôt or in the interior. This certainly was not a sufficient number to meet the dangers that threatened France. Napoleon determined to call in the conscripts of 1815, whom the Council of State had declared to belong to government, at least that portion of them that had been incorporated in 1814. A law commanding the return of the others was ordered to be prepared for presentation to the two chambers. It was calculated, after allowing for losses, that these conscripts would amount to one hundred and twelve thousand men, of whom forty-five thousand could be recalled immediately. The active army would thus amount to four hundred and twelve thousand. It was expected that the mobilised national guard would amount to two hundred thousand, which, with fifty thousand sailors expected in Paris and Lyon, twenty thousand federalists in Paris, and ten thousand at Lyon, would be a sufficient number to defend France. There still remained another resource on which Napoleon had already calculated, and this was to ask the assembled chambers for an extraordinary levy of one hundred and fifty thousand men to be raised from those that had formerly served. Napoleon would thus have about eight hundred thousand soldiers, who, with unity amongst those in power, and perseverance in action, would leave little reason to doubt of the safety of France.

Still the force actually at his disposal amounted only to three hundred thousand, of whom, as we have said, more than two hundred thousand might be led to the field. There were two hundred thousand well-chosen national guards to defend the fortresses and defiles of our frontiers. Napoleon had ordered that the forty-five thousand conscripts of 1815, that could be legally raised, should be immediately called out, which would give him the command of two hundred thousand men, a sufficient force in his hands to strike a first terrible blow. But this force could not be at his disposal before the middle of June.

He worked incessantly to combine and organise these troops, for which purpose alone he wrote one hundred and fifty letters a day; at one time ordering one or two hundred recruits who

had been left in a *dépôt* to be sent on to join their battalion, at another arranging for cavalry regiments that had men but not horses, or for others that had horses but not men, or who wanted equipments. Napoleon, with his wonderful memory, took note of everything, gave his orders, sent officers in all directions to see that they were executed, received them immediately on their return, listened to their reports, and sent them off again as often as the complete accomplishment of their tasks required. Napoleon had already sent the third battalions from such fortresses as had received a large number of mobile national guards, and had organised the fourth, which was intended to serve as a *dépôt*. The fifth battalions of some regiments had been formed, in which case the fourth was immediately sent to join the other battalions. These, however, were the exceptions, for the regiments had in general but three battalions, which would have been sufficient had they contained greater numbers; but notwithstanding all the efforts that had been made, very few consisted of more than six hundred men. Napoleon paid no less attention to the cavalry than to the infantry. Thanks to the *dépôt* at Versailles, to the horses taken from the *gendarmérie*, and to the purchases made in the provinces, he hoped by the middle of June to assemble forty thousand excellent cavalry soldiers, including the imperial guard, all of whom had seen service. The preparing of clothes and repairing of arms engaged no little portion of his attention. Napoleon visited in person the workshops of the tailors, saddlers, armourers, and animated the artisans by his presence. The artillery officers employed in directing the construction of arms rendered the greatest services. He was able to give new muskets to the entire army, repaired muskets to the mobilised national guard, whilst he still had one hundred thousand for the conscripts of 1815. Should the war continue until winter, he would be able to supply all wants during the summer and autumn. By his wonderful exertions Napoleon had in two months—from the end of March to the end of May—raised, equipped, and armed three hundred thousand men, fifty thousand of whom had been on six months' leave of absence, seventy thousand were old soldiers, and one hundred and eighty thousand were picked national guards; an enormous feat, as those will acknowledge who understand administrative difficulties, and which would have been impossible but for the immense number of military men in France at that time.

With a prudence that foresaw all things, Napoleon calculated that if the enemy crossed the frontier, both the fortresses and *dépôts* would be blockaded. He therefore ordered all the *dépôts* to fall back: from the northern frontier, on Abbeville, Amiens, St. Quentin, Chalons, Bar, Brienne, Arcis-sur-Aube,

and Nogent; from the eastern, towards Chalon, Dijon, Autun, and Troyes; and from the southern frontiers, on Avignon and Nîmes. By this he was assured that should a sudden invasion isolate our fortresses, it would not isolate our regiments, nor deprive them of supplies of men or war materials. A commission composed of Generals Rogniat, Dejean, Bernard, and Marescot—who had been restored to favour, from which he had unjustly fallen after the capitulation of Baylen—was occupied in putting our fortifications of the first, second, and third rank in a state of defence. The most urgent repairs, with the providing of arms and provisions, had been ordered, and were in course of execution. Moreover, the commission pointed out those passages of our frontiers where an intersected route or well-placed earthworks would enable the mobilised divisions of the national guard to offer an effectual opposition to the enemy. Paris and Lyon, as being the most important posts, were already protected by works.

Napoleon had not forgotten that in 1814, while he was manœuvring round Paris, both his crown and France would have been saved had that great city been able to hold out but one week. He considered Lyon as important in the east as Paris in the north, and ordered that all the preparations that the shortness of the time would allow should be made for the defence of both. We have already seen that he had been content with earthworks at Paris, not having had time to construct them in masonry. General Haxo had covered the two declivities of Belleville with redoubts, so that the Plain of Vincennes to the south, of St. Denis to the north, together with all the heights, were occupied, and there is no doubt but that if Marmont's soldiers had been so supported on the 30th of March 1814, they would not have yielded. The Canal of St. Martin, which runs from Villette to join the Seine at St. Denis, was defended by *flèches*, so as to present a well-defended line. Preparations were made for inundations at St. Denis. It was not very likely that the enemy, piercing this line, would dare to venture between the heights of Montmartre and the Seine, as they would risk being thrown into the latter. But in any case, Montmartre, Clichy, and l'Etoile had been provided with strong redoubts, by which they were turned into very solid *réduits*. Lastly, the earthworks were commenced on the left bank, between Montrouge and Vaugirard. The federalists, with a number of the national guards, had offered to assist in raising these works. Napoleon accepted their services for the sake of the good example they gave; but he had two thousand well-paid labourers, whose more skilful hands exactly and speedily followed the plan of the redoubts marked out by General Haxo.

As the public were acquainted with all our relations with

Europe, Napoleon, having nothing more to conceal, had ordered these redoubts to be armed—in the first place, that he might himself preside at the operation, and secondly, to tone down, before the appearance of the enemy, the effect that such operations might produce. He reasoned differently now from what he had done in 1814, since, instead of concealing the dangers that threatened the country, he sought to put them in the strongest light. Of the three hundred large cannon that had been ordered from the ports, and which were to be transported by sea to the mouths of the Seine, two hundred had arrived at Rouen, and were en route to Paris. They were placed in the unfinished works as they arrived. To avoid any confusion that might arise from the difference of calibre in the distribution of ammunition, Napoleon arranged that the twelve and six pounders were to remain on the right bank, which was the most exposed, while the eight and four pounders were placed on the left. He had formed a battery of the large pieces of ordnance that arrived from the ports on the highest points of St. Chaumont. The schools of St. Cyr and Alfort, together with the Polytechnic, every day practised at the guns. A park of two hundred field-pieces was prepared at Vincennes; these were to be employed as movable artillery, and sent to any point where they might be needed. Two regiments of sailors from Brest and Cherbourg were marching towards Paris. Napoleon had also ordered the revision and complete organisation of the federalists, whom he formed into twenty-four battalions. Though he could not arm them yet, he gave each battalion a hundred muskets, for the purpose of drilling those who had not served before. His object was to reduce the national guard by degrees to eight or ten thousand sure men, and to give the fifteen thousand muskets of the others to the federalists. It was not from any demagogical calculation that he made this arrangement, but from a certain distrust of the national guard, whom he suspected of royalist principles, and from his great confidence in the zeal and bravery of the federalists, whose lives he did not hesitate to sacrifice beneath the walls of Paris. Thanks to all these preparations, in six weeks at the very utmost, that is, at the end of June, Paris would be protected against every attack.

With the defence of the capital Napoleon had combined that of Nogent-sur-Marne, Meaux, Chateau-Thierry, Melun, Montereau, Nogent-sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube, and Auxerre, and placed all under the orders of Marshal Davout, whom he intended to invest with extraordinary powers, and to appoint governor of Paris. The defender of Hamburg, proscribed by the Bourbons, seemed to him to possess in the highest degree the military and political qualities necessary for such a post.

He expected to be able to leave him seventy or eighty thousand men, composed of what would remain of the national guard, the federalists, the sailors, and the dépôts. With such a force, such fortifications, and such a governor, he considered Paris invincible.

Napoleon was occupied at the same time with the defence of Lyon, for which he ordered the different works that were to be executed. Acting on the same principles in this second capital as in the first, he had ordered one hundred and fifty large pieces of ordnance to be brought from Toulon by the Rhône, and to be placed in the works. A regiment of marines was marching to the same destination. The veterinary school at Lyon, like the schools at Paris, was to work part of the batteries. Trusting in the good feeling of the inhabitants, he had fixed the number of national guards who were to defend the city at ten thousand. He sent them ten thousand old muskets, which were to be repaired at extra workshops that were to be erected in the town. From the surrounding districts, Burgundy, Franche-Comté, and Auvergne, all of which had followed the example of Brittany, he expected to draw ten thousand federalists, who, with the dépôts, would complete the garrison of Lyon. The superintendence of these details was entrusted to Marshal Suchet. Napoleon recalled him from Alsace, and appointed him to the command of this frontier, with these words: "I am satisfied as to the safety of any place you command; go then and guard the east for me whilst I go to protect the north against all Europe." Marshal Suchet was to have, with the seventh corps, twenty thousand excellent troops, besides twelve thousand furnished by two divisions of national guards, and would consequently be able to occupy Savoy with thirty-two thousand soldiers. Supported by Lyon, which was well fortified, he had every chance of repelling the Austrians. On the Lower Rhône, in the direction of Avignon, was a reserve of four of the six regiments of the eighth corps. With the remaining two, and three regiments from Corsica, Marshal Brune was to form the ninth corps, which was to watch over Var, Toulon, and Marseilles. The latter city was the object of special watchfulness. Napoleon ordered that the Marseillais national guard should be disarmed, and reduced to fifteen hundred sure men, that the forts of St. Jean and Nicolas should be armed, and that all ammunition not absolutely necessary should be taken to the arsenal at Toulon. He caused the bridge of St. Esprit to be cut down, and ordered that the small fortress of Sisteron should be put in a state of defence to stop the progress of the enemy, should they venture into Dauphiné and Lyonnais after invading Provence. Above Lyon in ascending the Saône Napoleon had placed under General Lecourbe, as we

have already said, a supplementary corps, that was not counted amongst the nine corps appointed for the defence of the territory, as it had been formed later, and consisted of one division of the line. Napoleon had also given him two fine divisions of the select national guards, and confided to him the defence of the gap of B fort and the passages of the Jura. The army of Alsace, or the fifth corps, joined with Lecourbe, guarded the Rhine. This fifth corps had been formed altogether in the lines of Wissembourg. Picked battalions occupied Strasburg and the fortresses from Huningue to Landau. Other battalions guarded the passages of the Vosges, whilst the light cavalry, aided by the volunteer lancers raised in the district, scoured the country along the Rhine. It was arranged that on the first appearance of the enemy the tocsin should be sounded, the commandants of fortresses should retire within their defences, the generals and prefects should retreat, carrying with them the cattle, provisions, and the *lev  en masse*, consisting of all the well-disposed citizens. They were to retire towards the difficult passes whose defence had been prepared beforehand, make a stand there as long as possible, and only fall back at the last extremity, and then join the *corps d'arm e* appointed for the protection of the frontier. Free bodies organised in the district itself where there were numbers of old soldiers were to take part in these measures. Lastly, having exerted his genius in order to profit by all the resources of the country, Napoleon thought of another combination, which in certain districts might be of real utility. When looking over the accounts of the war minister, he had remarked that there were fifteen thousand officers and seventy-eight thousand non-commissioned officers and soldiers pensioned by the State. If few of these could bear the fatigues of bivouacs, or heat, cold, and hunger, many of them could serve in the interior of a town, hold a musket or sword, or be useful in some way. Being attached to the Revolution and the empire, and feeling no affection for the Bourbons, they would serve as a check on the ill-disposed, for which reason Napoleon determined to recall twenty-five or thirty thousand, and distribute them in those towns of whose sentiments he was not satisfied, where they would be ready to rally round the authorities and support them by word or deed as occasion might require. Napoleon did not wish to compel them, but merely to appeal to their zeal; and to render the change of place more easy, he ordered that besides their pay, they should receive travelling expenses and rations. He ordered some to be sent to Marseilles, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Nantes, Angers, Lille, Tours, Dunkirk, &c. Thus not one man in the country, from the youngest to the oldest, was allowed to remain idle or useless.

To these measures of a universal and indefatigable foresight Napoleon added others necessary for the particular organisation of the army under his command. It has been already seen that it consisted of five corps: the 1st was stationed in the neighbourhood of Lille, under Count d'Erlon; the 2nd near Valenciennes, under General Reille; the 3rd near Mézières, under General Vandamme; the 4th near Metz, under General Gerard; and the 5th between Paris and Laon, under Count de Lobau. Napoleon intended that the corps under Generals d'Erlon and Reille, and those commanded by Generals Vandamme and Gerard, advancing from different points, should be concentrated at Maubeuge; then strengthening them with the guard and the 6th corps from Paris, he intended to cross the frontier with a hundred and fifty thousand men. The time is not yet come for explaining the measures by which he hoped to surprise the nearest and most considerable portion of his enemies. But having determined to commence operations on the 15th June at the latest, and being then in the last days of May, he traced General Gerard's march, who, as he had to advance sixty leagues to the point of concentration, would be obliged to put his troops in motion before the others. Napoleon had told him in the strictest confidence the day on which he was to move forward, and he pointed out all the precautions he should take in order to conceal the real reason of his departure. The Count de Lobau was ordered, as fast as his regiments should be ready, to send them to Soissons and Laon, where the 6th corps was assembled. Napoleon was very much occupied with the guard, which he hoped to raise to twenty or twenty-five thousand men; the organisation of this body was now confided to General Druot. As usual, the great reserve of artillery was the chief object of Napoleon's care, and he carried his vigilance so far as to inspect it himself, and to point out even a defective harness.* As he had not yet a sufficient number of draught horses, notwithstanding the six thousand obtained from the peasantry, he ordered eight or ten thousand to be procured in the provinces neighbouring the *corps d'armée*; for these horses ready money was paid.

So many things could not be accomplished without involving some annoyance. Marshal Davout, accustomed to act at a distance from his master, and with a certain independence, sometimes lost temper at finding himself under a surveillance that left him neither liberty nor repose. He was obedient most certainly, but not like the Duke de Feltre, that is, to the total annihilation of his own individuality. He was particularly

* I give these details from innumerable letters before me at this moment, and in which the most trifling remarks on the different descriptions of matériel are noted down.

annoyed because Napoleon appointed all the officers himself ; but this was a point upon which the emperor was most tenacious, as at that crisis it was as essential to be assured of the fidelity as of the bravery of the military. It was arranged that three trustworthy persons, the Counts Lobau, la Bédoyère, and Flahault, should revise the selection. The two latter being well acquainted with the sentiments of the young officers, found fault with some of the appointments made by the war minister, at which the latter was not a little offended. Napoleon had to interfere several times ; but we should not mention such things were it not that these disputes with the minister of war induced at a later period serious consequences. A dispute arose about General Bourmont, whom Marshal Davout would not admit to active service, and for whose fidelity Generals la Bédoyère and Gerard were ready to answer with their lives. Napoleon, after much consideration, adopted the opinion of the two generals, but was obliged to send a formal order to Marshal Davout, without which he would not have submitted.

Napoleon chose Marshal Mortier to command the imperial guard. He would have wished to recall Berthier, and make him major-general of the army. Berthier, who had been head of his staff in all his wars—Berthier, the correct and unwearied transmitter of his wishes ; in short, he wished to have his friend Berthier near him. Berthier had yielded to some temptations ; but Napoleon let him know that he wished him to forget these errors, as he himself had forgotten them, and bade him come and join him again. Berthier could not resist the appeal ; he set out for France, but was so closely watched that when he arrived at Bâle he was obliged to return to Germany, where a deplorable and mysterious death awaited him.

At a loss how to replace his major-general, Napoleon bethought him of Marshal Soult, the most hard-working of his lieutenants, who had joined the Bourbons, believing that their government would endure ; but now finding that he had been mistaken, he was seeking to efface the traces of his error. He felt embarrassed by the violent proclamation he had once published against Napoleon, and now sought to redeem his fault by addressing an equally violent one to the army on the occasion of his assuming the rank of major-general. Through consideration for the marshal, Napoleon softened down many of the expressions, and had it then published as an order of the day.

He knew men too well to notice their changes of opinion, especially in such times as those. It was more important to him that men should be good soldiers than consistent politicians. The essential point was not whether Marshal Soult had served more than one master, but whether he possessed Berthier's

clear-sightedness, precision, and exactitude. Events would soon show whether Napoleon had made a happy choice. His last measure was to give the regiments their former numbers, which to the great regret of the men had been changed. This restoration gratified them, and placed them in some sort under an obligation to act in a manner worthy of their past career.

Napoleon ordered all his generals to put themselves at the head of their troops, with the exception of Marshal Soult, whom he kept with him, in order to initiate him into his new functions. Napoleon was ready to leave, and only waited the assembling of the Champ de Mai and the meeting of the chambers. That moment was approaching. The votes on the Additional Act had been pronounced, the elections were over, and almost all the newly-appointed deputies had arrived in Paris. The violent abuse of the journals, pamphleteers, and newsmongers against the Additional Act had been silenced by the elections, which gave a diversion to the public mind, and proved at the same time that there was no intention of evading the promised constitution, since the chambers had been summoned even before the appointed time. There had been perfect freedom in voting for the Additional Act, and at the elections. There had been no restraint either in writing or speaking, nor were the votes of those who gave the most offensive reasons for their political opinions rejected. M. de Lafayette had accepted the Additional Act at Meaux, but made a reservation in favour of the sovereignty of the people, which, in his belief, had been entrenched on by some of the articles of this Act. M. de Kergorlay voted against it, protesting in favour of the Bourbon dynasty. The government had not defended themselves, as no arrangement had yet been made for the defence of power in a free State. With the exception of the momentary suspension of the sixth volume of the *Censeur*, a suspension immediately removed, as we have seen, by Napoleon's order, personal liberty had not been attacked in any way, and the people enjoyed the varied, confused, and violent liberty of the time of the Revolution. Each had proposed his chimera, and in the form that pleased him; but one ingredient of a revolution was wanting, and that was excitement—not the excitement of parties (for rarely has there been more), but of the nation itself. The nation took no part in the voting for or against the Additional Act at the municipalities, notariats, or *justice de paix*, nor in the choice of representatives at the electoral colleges. Disgusted with revolutions and counter-revolutions, the people knew not whom or what to approve, and in their indecision remained concealed at home. We are speaking now of the intermediate classes, the wise, discreet, and disinterested portion of the nation. The Bourbons, whom they

had not wished for, but whom, upon reflection, they had believed capable of affording them a pacific and liberal government, had, after a reign of eleven months, completely disgusted them. Napoleon, who gratified their pride, and responded to many of their instincts, terrified them, for without considering whether he were changed or not, or whether he were really inclined to peace and liberty, they plainly saw that his destiny was war, exterminating war, that could end only in the destruction of France or of Europe. Thus, disgusted by the one, and terrified by the other, the classes of whom we have spoken shrank back to their hearths, and took no part either in the adoption of the Additional Act or the choice of the representatives.

Formerly, when France looked on General Bonaparte as a saviour, three or four millions hastened to record their votes; but now, not more than twelve or thirteen hundred thousand had voted on the Additional Act, and not more than one hundred thousand electors appeared in the electoral colleges.

These limited numbers showed plainly who it was that had presented themselves at the municipalities, the notariats, and the colleges: these were partisans in whom passion never cools. We say too much perhaps in saying partisans, for the Bourbon partisans had not dared to appear at any of these places. It was not that they would have suffered any restraint—far from it. Their adversaries, piquing themselves on their moderation, took very good care not to attack nor even threaten their safety. But the royalists disliked everything connected with liberal institutions, and forming the most unjust opinion of their adversaries, they looked on them as dangerous terrorists, and from want of custom and courage they neglected to exercise their rights. Only a few of the boldest ventured to vote, and that more from bravado than a desire to exercise their rights. Only three or four thousand out of thirteen hundred thousand voters had registered a “no” against the Additional Act, and a still smaller number had appeared at the electoral colleges to dispute the election of the popular candidate, so that everything passed off with the greatest calmness and in the most perfect order. Those who had appeared in the greatest numbers were the old revolutionists, the holders of national property, the passionate admirers of national glory who persisted in seeing it personified in Napoleon, public functionaries dating from 1789, and lastly, many enlightened men who considered that the fault of permitting Napoleon’s return having been committed, it was better to defend the national independence in his person, and to give an honest trial to constitutional monarchy, which he proposed in so specious a manner; for those who are not slaves to prejudice or party spirit will accept liberty by whomsoever offered. The choice

made by these different classes of electors was, in general, good, and of a moderate character. There being no opposition, the choice everywhere fell on civil or military functionaries anxious for the consolidation of the new empire, on holders of national property desirous to secure their possessions, on revolutionists, such as Barère, who repented the lengths to which they had gone, or on young and upright liberals, like M. Duchêne of Grenoble, whose opinions were sound, but who were deficient in experience. All these had adopted the two prevailing resolutions—to support Napoleon against Europe, but to resist him should he return to his despotic practices. However, these newly-chosen representatives, more attached to Napoleon through motives of interest than to liberty, which they professed as a principle, had so often heard it said that in accepting Napoleon, his glory, and social principles, they ought not to accept his despotism, that they had become very susceptible with regard to the imperial power, and acted more like liberals than Bonapartists, and that to such a degree as to compromise Napoleon's cause for that of liberty, though such was not their intention. Such a state of things would require a tact, patience, and dexterity that were not likely to be found in ministers meeting free assemblies for the first time.

In obedience to the decree that invited them to assist at the ceremony of the Champ de Mai, the electoral colleges chose as their representatives the most zealous, the richest, and most inquisitive of the electors. From four to five thousand of these arrived in Paris, independent of the six hundred representatives. Deputations had also come from the regiments that were to receive their colours at the Champ de Mai. Napoleon had ordered the ministers and other high functionaries to throw open their houses to the deputies of every kind, and to receive them most hospitably. All uttered the same opinions, that Europe should be opposed, and if possible conquered, as war with her was unavoidable; but immediately after the conclusion of peace the idea of conquest should be abandoned, and a true constitutional monarchy founded, so that the nation might not be at the mercy of strangers abroad, or of a single individual at home. These sentiments were echoed by the government, whose feelings they expressed—some indeed, like Carnot, with an honourable fidelity to the emperor; others, like M. Fouché, with a scarcely concealed spirit of intrigue. This latter, of his own freewill, assiduously cultivated the acquaintance of the electors that had been sent to Paris, the deputies in particular, preferring the younger as more manageable, and affecting, as was the fashion of the day, the most unchangeable dislike to the Bourbons, together with the greatest alarm at Napoleon's being at the head of the government, saying that

if he had had the patriotism to abdicate in favour of his son, everything—this he knew for certain—would be immediately arranged, that he had received communication, &c. Such assertions made by the minister of police had a most dangerous effect, and did no more honour to his sagacity than to his fidelity; for the sovereigns, firmly attached to the Bourbon cause, would not accept any of his imaginary arrangements, and if they pretended to have no ill-will but towards Napoleon, it was that in getting rid of him they might at the same time seize the sword of France. The Duke d'Otranto's remarks, spreading from mouth to mouth, caused great excitement, and even came to Napoleon's ears, though in a somewhat subdued form. He, however, learned sufficient to see that his minister of police was betraying him; but restraining himself better than on a former occasion, he awaited a more favourable opportunity for enforcing his authority, which would have been perfectly right, for no well-regulated State would endure a minister who denounced the sovereign he served as a public danger. A good citizen might think so, especially before Napoleon's return; but with such sentiments he ought not to accept the post of minister of police.

Had all the reports relative to the Additional Act and the election of representatives been sent to Paris, they might have been immediately revised, and the ceremony of the Champ de Mai, which was to solemnise the acceptance of the new constitution, might have taken place on the 26th of May, the day appointed. The opening of the chambers would have followed at once, and then Napoleon could have left for the army. But as some days would be required to collect the *procès-verbaux*, the ceremony was deferred until the 1st of June. Napoleon resolved to open the chambers three or four days later, and to leave on the 10th or 12th, so as to be in full operation on the 15th. Eighty-seven places of meeting were appointed in Paris for the deputations from the electoral colleges, who were to revise the votes of their departments, and appoint a central deputation for a general revision under the superintendence of the high chancellor.

The deputations employed the last days of May in these formalities, but Napoleon devoted them to the completion of his military preparations. About this time his mother, his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, and his brother Jerome, having escaped the vigilance of the English navy, arrived in Paris. Napoleon advised his brother to forget, and to seek to make others forget, that he had been king, and be thenceforward nothing but a soldier, and take the command of a division of the second *corps d'armée* (General Reille's), which the prince most willingly did. At the same time another member of the imperial family arrived;

Prince Lucien, who had so long persisted in living in Rome, far from the favour and authority of his brother, and who only relaxed in his estrangement since the family misfortunes had commenced. He came to Paris for two equally honourable motives—to join his brother, and to plead the Pope's cause. Napoleon felt the greatest pleasure at seeing his brother again, particularly at this time when the fleeting enthusiasm of the 20th of March had passed away, and so many were becoming unfriendly to him. He gave him all possible satisfaction with regard to the Pope. Being determined to observe the treaties of 1814 with regard to sovereigns for whom he felt no esteem, and who had shown themselves his implacable enemies, he must be much more inclined to do so towards an inoffensive prince whom he loved even when he persecuted him, who was neither his rival nor enemy, and whose moral authority—which was a great consideration—might be used to Napoleon's advantage if he were only properly treated. He desired his brother to tell the Pope—which was but the repetition of his first instructions—that he did not intend to interfere for the future either in the spiritual or temporal affairs of the Holy See; that he would do all he could to preserve the ancient pontifical territory, including the Legations; and that in France he would guarantee him the exercise of his spiritual authority on the basis of the Concordat. This was all that was necessary to please the Pope and win him to our side should we be victorious.

Napoleon established Prince Lucien in the Palais Royal. He wished to have him appointed representative for Isère, a department devoted to the imperial cause. His private intention was, if Lucien were chosen member of the Chamber of Representatives, to appoint him president of that chamber, for he had not forgotten how he had presided over the Cinq Cents on the memorable day of the 18th Brumaire.

Whilst he was thus occupied with these cares previous to his departure, he received the sudden information of a serious insurrection in Vendée. We have seen how, when the Duke de Bourbon had appeared in that province, he had been very coolly received, and that he had been compelled, not by timidity, but prudence, to retire into England. We have also seen how Louis XVIII. had sent the Marquis Louis de la Rochefoucauld from Ghent to Vendée, bidding him pass through London, and commissioning him to rouse the zeal of the old servants of the house of Bourbon. We shall now see how Vendée answered this appeal.

The old surviving Vendean leaders, MM. d'Autichamp, de Suzannet, de Sapinaud, men of experience, in whom royalist zeal was tempered by good sense, finding that the opinions of

the peasantry had become strangely modified during the last twenty years, objected to exposing the province to new ravages for a vain attempt at a civil war which could have no serious result. They asserted that Vendée, though able to make a useful diversion when hostilities should have commenced between Napoleon and the allies, was yet wholly incapable of resisting him until he should be first attacked by the coalition. They were therefore determined to wait until the cannon should resound on the Sambre before giving the signal for a revolt on the Loire.

Men of more inflammable temperament blamed this seeming pusillanimity, and wished that the fault of having allowed the Duke de Bourbon to leave might be expiated by greater zeal. Touched by these reproaches, and their hearts stirred by old memories, the veteran leaders hastened to go through the province, number the peasantry, and see on how many fighting men they could reckon, and thus prove the warmth of their loyalty. It was animated by such sentiments that the emissaries of the Marquis Louis de la Rochejaquelein found them. This brother of the illustrious Henri de la Rochejaquelein, not having yet served in Vendée, joined to a desire of upholding the hereditary greatness of his name an exalted faith in the goodness of his cause and great personal courage; but his prudence did not equal his other qualities. He had received from the English some muskets and ammunition, with the promise of a large and immediate supply of arms, powder, artillery, and money. He had set out with the first instalment of the promised aid, and embarked on board a small English vessel anchored within view of the Sables d'Olonne, whence he wrote to his brother Auguste de la Rochejaquelein to acquaint him with his mission, plans, and expectations.

Upon receipt of this intelligence, an assembly of leaders was held on the 11th of May at Chapelle-Basse-Mer, near the Loire, in the domain of M. de Suzannet, successor of the celebrated Charette. Those present at this meeting were MM. d'Autichamp, de Suzannet, and Auguste de la Rochejaquelein, the third of the brothers of that name. M. de Sapinaud alone was absent. Notwithstanding the reasons these leaders had for deferring the insurrection, they could not resist the intelligence contained in the letters of the Marquis de la Rochejaquelein, promising large assistance in arms, ammunition, money, and even men, and the speedy commencement of European hostilities in Flanders. It was therefore decided that on the 15th of May the tocsin should be sounded, and arms taken up throughout Vendée. Each leader was to command in the district with which his family ties and former services connected him: M. d'Autichamp in Anjou; M. Auguste de la Rochejaque-

lein in the neighbourhood of Bressuire, that is in Le Bocage; M. de Sapinaud in the district called Le Centre, lying between Mortagneles-Herbiere, St. Fulgent, and Bourbon Vendée; and lastly, M. de Suzannet was to command in the Marais. It was estimated that M. d'Autichamp would be able to raise eighteen thousand peasants, M. Auguste de la Rochejaquelein five thousand, M. de Sapinaud eight thousand, and M. de Suzannet twenty-five thousand—the entire amounting to fifty-six thousand men. Such are the calculations made in time of civil war, that is to say, baseless.

Several officers sent by Louis de la Rochejaquelein arrived between the 11th and 15th of May, announcing his speedy arrival with fourteen thousand muskets, several million cartridges, and a corps of three hundred English artillerymen. This first supply was to be followed by another four or five times larger. Such intelligence, confirmed by trustworthy men, decided the leaders of the insurrection, and they kept their word on the appointed day.

During the night between the 14th and 15th of May the tocsin sounded throughout these hapless districts, which twenty-five years before had been drenched with blood and heaped with ruins, and that without being able to check the invincible French Revolution, and with no other result than to render it a little more bloody. The Vendéans were not about to do better this time, or rather let us say, were about to do worse, since for a mere dynastic question they were about to draw off fifteen or twenty thousand Frenchmen from the formidable rencontre at Waterloo, and thus contribute to the most fearful tragedy in our history. These poor peasants, some excited by their personal recollections, others by the recitals of their fathers, rose at the call of their leaders, and presented themselves armed with muskets, sticks, and scythes fastened to poles. About a third of them had very indifferent muskets, and very few powder and ball. The most zealous urged on the faltering with encouragements, reproaches, and even threats. A great number joined from fear of being called cowards or *blues*. M. d'Autichamp, who expected to have been able to raise eighteen thousand men, had found but four, at the utmost five thousand willing to join him; with these he advanced towards Chemillé and Chollet, where there were four battalions of the 15th and 16th regiments of the line, and though most anxious to take possession of these two points, which commanded the route from Angers to Bourbon-Vendée, prudential motives induced him to abstain from the attempt. He dreaded meeting three thousand regular soldiers with four or five thousand badly armed peasants. He left some detachments to reconnoitre, and advanced along the Sevre between Clisson, Tiffauges, and

Mortagne, in order to communicate with M. de Suzannet, join him, and then attempt something with their combined forces.

M. Auguste de la Rochejaquelein, who in his country had never encountered any but gendarmerie and national guards, flung himself on Bressuire, disarmed the national guard, seized a hundred and fifty muskets, and having heard that his brother Louis was on the coast with a supply of matériel, resolved to hasten thither in order to supply his wants. But considering it dangerous to make this movement while the forces occupying Chollet were in his rear, he determined to advance boldly towards that town, in the hope of joining M. d'Autichamp, and of taking this important post with his assistance.

At this very time General Delaborde, who had the 12th, 13th, and 22nd military divisions under his command, that is, the divisions of Bretagne and Vendée, had ordered the troops to concentrate themselves, and desired the colonels of the 25th and 26th to repair from Chollet to Bourbon-Vendée, in order to reinforce General Travot, commandant of the department of Vendée. The 26th was already en marche, and was passing through the village of Echaubroignes, where it was surprised on the 17th of May by M. Auguste de la Rochejaquelein and his two thousand five hundred peasants, who appeared on his rear on their way to Chollet. Although the men of the 26th did not amount to more than a thousand, they drew up, defended Echaubroignes, and then forced their way through the insurgents in order to return to Chollet, as they dreaded not being able to advance to Bourbon-Vendée. They had about fifty men killed and wounded, and of the insurgents about double that number were put hors de combat. The insurgents had fought in their own disorderly fashion, but with an ardour inflamed by native courage and faith in their cause.

M. Auguste de la Rochejaquelein was now compelled to come to a stand, for his poor followers could never be more than a few days absent from their homes, and believed that they had done sufficient for their cause for the time being if they traversed a few leagues or once encountered the enemy. He, however, retained four or five hundred of his best armed and most resolute men, with whom he intended to join his brother on the coast.

Meanwhile M. de Suzannet had left Maisdon, assembled his forces between Machecoul, Clisson, Montaigu, and Bourbon-Vendée, whence he advanced to St. Léger to assist M. de Sapinaud, who had assembled his army of Le Centre. When he arrived at St. Léger on the 16th, he learned the arrival of M. Louis de la Rochejaquelein off the coast of St. Gilles with a small English division, and he immediately advanced to meet him. He found him disembarked at Croix-de-Vie, having been

aided by the people of the country, who had attacked the custom-house officers and old coastguard. But great was M. de Suzannet's surprise when he found in what the boasted aid from England consisted. There were no artillerymen, there was no money, and only two thousand muskets instead of the promised fourteen thousand. This was supporting the old reputation of England in these parts, that is, of making large promises, but forgetting to keep them, a reputation shared in by all the emissaries that appeared in her name, however high their rank. The muskets, powder, and more especially the money, were absolutely necessary to the Vendean insurgents, not that they were avaricious, but as they were armed with nothing but rusty muskets or sticks, they needed weapons to fight, and money to procure provisions. Possessed of ready money, they might always send forward some peasants to procure bread and meat, and they might thus avoid the pangs of hunger, and support themselves without incurring the disgrace of ravaging the country through which they passed.

M. de Suzannet's soldiers were painfully undeceived, and complained that it was the old trick practised again; that England, as of old, only sought to perpetuate war for the destruction of France. M. Louis de la Rochejaquelein pretended that it was not so, assured them that a large convoy would soon arrive, and at length obtained some credence. M. de Sapinaud arrived with his two thousand troops as dejected and discontented as those of M. Suzannet, and all retired into the Bocage to avoid the attacks of the *blues*, who would unfailingly come in great numbers from Nantes and Sables.

M. Louis de la Rochejaquelein had presented himself in the name of Louis XVIII., and united in his person the twofold character of representative of his king and envoy of the British government. He inherited a great name, possessed zeal and courage, and although inferior in rank and age to the old Vendean chiefs, he was appointed generalissimo, thanks to the easy disposition of MM. de Suzannet and de Sapinaud. Though this arrangement was established for the purpose of promoting military unity in the operations, it could not induce concord in sentiment, for M. d'Autichamp, a lieutenant-general, and renowned for his former services, could not be pleased at seeing himself placed under the orders of M. Louis de la Rochejaquelein, a simple *maréchal-de-camp*, wholly unacquainted with Vendean warfare. But M. de la Rochejaquelein wrote to him, and he submitted, like his brothers in arms, to a superior whom he believed to have been appointed to Vendée by the king.

It was necessary to decide on some plan. The two thousand muskets had been taken by the inhabitants of the Marais and divided between them. About eight hundred thousand

cartouches had been landed, and of these one portion was sent to M. d'Autichamp, and the other to M. Auguste de la Rochejaquelein, under an escort of some hundred men. MM. de Suzannet and de Sapinaud had collected seven or eight thousand men, and were anxious to make some attempt before these should return to their homes. The most useful conquest would be to seize Bourbon-Vendée, which was within reach, and was the principal town in the department, or the Sables, a naval port that would be most useful for future disembarkations. M. de Suzannet, influenced by a local feeling, wished to seize the island of Noirmoutiers, which would secure a large and serviceable *réduit* in the middle of Marais. A doubt as to which of these projects should be adopted prevailed, when intelligence of General Travot's having left Bourbon-Vendée arriving, all the Vendean leaders agreed to advance towards that point. They hoped to profit by the absence of this general and take possession of his principal station, or to assail him en route if he had not many troops. Pursuing this project, they passed the night of the 19th at Aizenay.

General Travot had recalled some detachments from the Sables, and joining these to what he already had, he set out for St. Gilles with twelve hundred men, in order to prevent the disembarkations that were taking place in the Marais. He met the convoy destined for M. Auguste de la Rochejaquelein, captured a part, and then advanced towards Aizenay, where the great mass of the insurgents was assembled. Caring little about numbers, and suspecting that the movements of the insurgents were not conducted after a strictly military fashion, he determined to attack them by night at Aizenay. He consequently advanced to that point on the night of the 19th-20th of June, found them in the greatest disorder, some sleeping after a fatiguing march, others eating and drinking after their long privations, but none keeping guard. He fell suddenly with a thousand men on these six or seven thousand unfortunate peasants, threw them into the greatest confusion, killed or wounded three or four hundred, and put the rest to flight. These at first took refuge in the neighbouring woods of Aizenay; and then the greater number returned to their homes, as was their wont after a few days' absence, whether conquered or victors.

Meanwhile M. d'Autichamp remained on the frontier of his district. Having learned that the 15th and 26th regiments of the line had fallen back on Pont-Barré in the direction of Angers, he had seized on Chollet, and then gave his men leave to return to their homes, which they would have done even if he had not given them permission. M. Auguste de la Rochejaquelein collected the wrecks of the convoy that had been

destined for him, joined his brother, and then returned to Bressuire.

Although the Vendean leaders had retained none but the most devoted men, they had almost become masters of the Bocage, that is, of the country lying between Chemillé, Chollet, and the Herbiers on one side, and Bressuire and Machecoul on the other. The small imperial garrisons had fallen back, some on the Loire, and others on the principal cities of the interior, such as Parthenay, Fontenay, and Bourbon-Vendée. The peasantry, though as courageous as ever, were neither so zealous nor fanatical, and the number of those who took part in the insurrection was not more than fifteen thousand. The extreme smallness of the assistance sent by England had cooled their ardour, and roused all their ancient prejudices against the British government. In order to correct the bad effect of this, M. Louis de la Rochejaquelein assured them that a large convoy would soon arrive, and it was not without difficulty that he succeeded in making himself believed. The veteran leaders, as of old, were not on the best terms with each other. M. d'Autichamp was not pleased at finding himself under M. Louis de la Rochejaquelein's authority; and the latter, with the assistance of General Canuel, an imperial officer who had become a furious royalist, tried to submit Vendée to a military organisation, which would have deprived the inhabitants of their natural peculiarities, without imbuing them with the qualities of a regular army. His plan was, to bring the four Vendean armies into somewhat closer proximity, and then to advance altogether to the coast to await the convoy of ammunition, arms, and money which he expected, and whose arrival he was constantly promising in order to keep up the courage of these poor peasants, who could not fight without arms, or support themselves without money.

Such were the events which had taken place in Vendée during the last days of May. Napoleon was neither surprised nor seriously alarmed by them. With his usual quickness of perception, he saw that the insurrection did not possess sufficient energy to extend beyond the province where it originated, or cause any serious danger in the interior of the country. However, it was sufficient to interfere with his military preparations, and it would be absolutely necessary to send some troops to the frontier of the insurgent country if he did not wish the evil to spread further. He was therefore obliged to sacrifice some of his regiments, a sacrifice greatly to be regretted, and which he was resolved to make as light as possible; for he said that one battle gained in the north would do more towards the pacification of Vendée than all the troops he could send there. He had intended to place General Delaborde at the head of the troops

destined for the insurgent province ; but that general being ill he replaced him by General Lamarque. While awaiting the departure of the latter he sent on General Corbineau, in whose intelligence and energy he had well-grounded confidence. His first instructions to him were to concentrate his troops, and resist the entreaties of those towns where the holders of national property had taken refuge, and who were all demanding garrisons. He desired him to tell them that it was their business to provide for their safety by organising national guards. The points of concentration were Angers and Nantes on the Loire, and Bourbon-Vendée and Niort in the interior. Since the evacuation of our vast conquests the gendarmerie were very numerous in France, and there was a very large dépôt at Versailles. Napoleon formed them into five battalions of foot and three squadrons of horse, and sent them without loss of time to the banks of the Loire. These battalions and squadrons, composed of tried soldiers, were to serve as a rallying-point to the federalists and national guards. The next thing to be done was to prepare columns of regular troops, to penetrate into the interior of the insurgent country to crush the insurrection. The 26th and 15th regiments of the line had fallen back on Angers: Napoleon allowed them to remain there, that they might have time to collect their effective force, and strengthen them by the addition of the 27th. The 43rd was at Rochefort, and the 65th at Nantes. Napoleon ordered that they should be reinforced by two or three regiments from General Clausel's corps, and ordered that the third and fourth battalions of these regiments should be immediately formed. This being done, the columns stationed on the circumference of the insurgent province were to enter centripetally, and crush the rebels wherever they appeared. Napoleon gave orders that no quarter should be given. These columns were followed by military commissions, commanded to try and execute immediately the principal rebels who should be taken with arms in their hands. He ordered that the chateaux of the different leaders of the insurrection should be rased to the ground. He wished to terrify these hapless peasants by the examples of an immediate and rapid punishment ; and it must be admitted that they had not the same legitimate reasons for revolt as in 1793, since their religion, lives, and properties were respected, and they had even been spared the rigours of the conscriptions, for the levies made in their provinces were so small as scarcely to deserve the name. "When the Vendéans see," said Napoleon, "to what they are exposing themselves, they will reflect and become calm." That the result might be more speedy, he sent the 47th regiment by post to Laval, where the Chouans were beginning to make some disturbance, and a division of the

young guard, under General Brayer, as a reserve to Angers. Thus, notwithstanding his determination to detract as little as possible from the main body of the army, this deplorable insurrection deprived him of four or five regiments, of several of the third battalions, and a division of the young guard, amounting in all to at least twenty thousand men; a great loss on the approaching battle-day, when it might have turned the scale of victory. It was a great misfortune, of little advantage to the royalist cause, whilst it ruined that of France at Waterloo.

Napoleon saw from these movements of the royalists that it was intended to aid the enemy without by insurrections at home, and he was determined not to leave a clear stage to those who, seeking to ruin him, might destroy France. He wished that measures should be taken against those who were ostensibly fomenting civil war. But this was opposed by some of his ministers, who, with justice, refused to adopt again the exercise of arbitrary authority, and this principle was particularly urged by M. Fouché, who sought to win favour with all parties by accommodating himself to their views. It was a very serious question, for on one hand there was the danger of allowing uncontrolled liberty to adversaries who were only too well disposed to profit by the facilities accorded to them, and on the other there was the risk of returning to the barbarous laws of the Convention and the Directory. Napoleon insisted that a bill should be drawn up, defining in moderate but decided terms the different misdemeanours tending to provoke civil war, or conniving at a foreign one, and this he intended should, together with the bills on financial questions, be the first presented to the chambers. Meanwhile he desired the Council of State to seek amongst anterior laws for those that were neither exaggerated nor cruel, and order them to be put in force. He ordered that all who were not habitual residents should leave the insurgent districts, and that a list should be made out of those who had left their ordinary residence either to command troops or to join the Court at Ghent, and commanded that they should return to their dwellings immediately, under pain of having their property confiscated. At Toulouse, and still more at Marseilles, daring men, known as implacable enemies of the empire, were preaching insurrection to an excitable population. Some of these were removed, and the national guards of these towns were reduced to a small number of reliable men who might safely be trusted with arms.

"I do not wish to act with cruelty," he said to his ministers, "but I wish to intimidate; for if, while six hundred thousand men are marching towards France, I suffer such domestic insurrection, we shall have revolts in Paris itself aiding the allied armies." His ministers remained silent, M. Fouché as well as

the rest, though secretly determined not to execute his master's orders, and that not from any respect for the principles of a rigorous legality, but to serve his personal interest with the royalists. Sad and deplorable are the times when a civil war connives with a foreign invasion, when men are agitated between the fear of not defending their country to the utmost, and the apprehension of betraying the principles of rational political liberty.

However, Napoleon considered that other measures than intimidation should be used against the Vendéans. He saw plainly that they were not as zealous as formerly, and there was evidently a difference of opinion, and even disunion, amongst them, and thought that political means might be usefully employed. "These unfortunate Vendéans are mad," he said to his ministers. "During my whole reign I have not interfered with them, I have not disturbed one of their priests or leaders. On the contrary, I have rebuilt their cities, made roads for them, in fact, done everything that the time would permit, and in return, they rise against me when all Europe is opposed to me. Notwithstanding my objection to cruelty, I cannot allow them to go on in this way, and I shall be compelled to visit them with fire and sword. But after all, for what purpose? They cannot decide the question. I am going to fight against their friends, the English and Prussians, and to decide not only the fate of two dynasties, but of all Europe. If I am conquered, their cause is won; if I conquer, they cannot be victorious. I will eradicate every trace of this hateful civil war, both men and things; I will destroy everything that can induce these poor deluded peasants to destroy, or allow themselves to be destroyed by their countrymen, for the gratification of the most absurd prejudices. Consequently their fate depends not on them, but on the coalition and me. Let them keep quiet; let them not allow their fields to be laid waste, their huts to be burned, and their best men murdered, and all for an object which they cannot attain. Can they not allow mine and a foreign army to decide the question in deadly conflict. Most certainly men enough will fall, without making it necessary that Frenchmen should cut each others' throats. Let them wait for a few days and all will be decided. You," he said, turning to the Duke d'Otranto, "have known and have had relations with these Vendean chiefs: there must be many of them in Paris. Get them to your house, by fair means or foul, make them listen to reason, and propose a suspension of arms, which will spare much useless suffering to hapless France. You need not ask for a long truce. In four weeks their cause will be lost or gained, and that by shedding other blood than theirs; and should their cause be lost as they understand it, their true interests

will be saved, for by my laws and labours I shall serve them more than the Bourbons ever would, for whom they have been sacrificing themselves uselessly for the last twenty-five years."

The Duke d'Otranto could not receive a more agreeable mission than that of entering into personal relations with adverse parties. He summoned MM. de Malartie, de Flavigny, and de la Béraudière, and sent them into Vendée to propagate Napoleon's sentiments, which he delivered exactly, though in his own style. "Why," he said to them, "will you sacrifice yourselves for the sake of those Bourbons, to whom you owe nothing, and to injure a man who has advanced your interests, and who perhaps will not be in power for more than six weeks longer? You are misled by the prejudices of your priests and the ambition of your leaders. They are leading you to slaughter for their own interest, and not for yours; but if you have the sense not to interfere, you will be rid of the empire in a short time, or you will be under a yoke not very burdensome to your province. You detest Bonaparte, I do not like him much better; but neither you nor I can do anything. He is going, like a madman, to oppose all Europe; in all probability he will be overcome, in which case we will come to an understanding; and as, should Bonaparte be defeated, he can only be replaced by the Bourbons, we shall make arrangements for their recall, and for making them reign more wisely than before. I do not ask you to lay down your arms, nor to submit to the empire, but to suspend hostilities. I shall even endeavour to obtain that the imperial troops shall be withdrawn from your province, that you shall be masters there, but on condition of your remaining quiet and inoffensive."

These words were calculated to make an impression on the Vendéans, for independent of the iniquity of their late attempt, and which they did not acknowledge even to themselves, and which was no other than to deprive the French army of 20,000 soldiers, their attempt at civil war was absurd—extravagant. The three Vendean negotiators were touched by the true and almost cynical language of the Duke d'Otranto, and immediately set out for Vendée to propose a suspension of arms on the conditions we have mentioned. And as had been told the Vendéans, they would not have long to wait, for they were on the eve of the 1st June, the day appointed for the Champ de Mai, after which Napoleon would set out for the army to decide the dispute between him and Europe.

Almost all the registers of the votes on the Additional Act had arrived, and their revision had commenced. The deputations from the electoral colleges had assembled on the 29th and 30th of May in the eighty-seven places of meeting appointed them, and had begun the computation of the votes. This work

being ended, each college appointed five members to revise, under the superintendence of the prince high chancellor, the votes received from all the departments. They had also authorised their delegates to draw up an address to the emperor. These delegates, amounting to about four or five hundred, assembled on Wednesday, the 31st, in the Palace of the Corps Législatif, and found that the number of votes, not including those of departments whose registers were not yet come in, was 1,304,206, of which 1,300,000 were affirmative, and 4206 negative. The number of votes for the institution of the consulship for life was 3,577,259, and for the institution of the empire 3,572,329. The numerical superiority of the affirmatives was the same; but the number of voters had been reduced almost to one-fourth, which proves that in 1815 the rational majority of the nation, divided between the counter-revolution represented by the Bourbons, and war represented by Napoleon, knew not to whom they could confide her destiny, and testified their irresolution by their silence.

The revision being finished, the address was next to be prepared. Several were proposed; but that drawn up by M. Carion de Nisas, with the approval of government, was adopted. In this the two prevailing opinions of the day were very warmly expressed—those were, France's determination to fight under Napoleon's orders for national independence, and after the establishment of peace to develop public liberty according to the system of constitutional monarchy. Devotedness to Napoleon was as warmly expressed as could be desired. M. Dubois d'Angers, whose voice was strong enough to be heard in the largest assembly, was appointed to read this address.

The object for which the Champ de Mai was to be held had changed very much since its announcement at Lyon, when it was intended to present the new institutions to the assembled electors, and to crown the King of Rome in presence of his mother; but by Marie Louise's refusal, and the manner in which the Additional Act had been presented, it was reduced to a simple revision of votes. In order that the ceremony should make more impression on the public, Napoleon determined to distribute the colours to the troops about to leave for the northern frontier. These standards given to men who swore to die in their defence within a few days was a circumstance well calculated to touch the feelings of the numerous citizens collected at the Champ de Mai. Even to the very eve of the ceremony the most contradictory reports were in circulation as to what was to take place. These originated with the Duke d'Otranto. This indefatigable intriguer was always dreaming of getting rid of Napoleon, not that the Bourbons might be recalled, whom he considered still worse, but to have, if possible,

a regency under Marie Louise and the King of Rome, thinking that he himself would rule under the government of a woman and a child. M. de Metternich's attempt at a secret negotiation with him, interrupted by M. Fleury de Chaboulon's mission to Bâle, had only increased his idea of his own importance, and confirmed his resolution of getting rid of Napoleon, and substituting for him Marie Louise and the King of Rome. He boldly said to every one that would listen to him, with an imprudence that nothing but Napoleon's precarious situation could explain, that if this *man*, as he called him, had any patriotism, he would retire from the stage and abdicate in favour of his son, by which he would infallibly disarm Europe, or at least show that she was in the wrong, and so make it incumbent on every Frenchman to fight to the death. He added that they would not be obliged even to fight, as in all probability Napoleon's abdication would be sufficient to appease Europe. When M. Fouché was asked on what authority he made such assertions, he answered with a mysterious air, that he had good reasons for what he said, hinted at intimate relations with foreign powers, by which he not only gave authority to his words, but importance to himself. According to him, Napoleon ought to profit by the Champ de Mai to give this proof of his disinterestedness, and to essay this profound stroke of policy. It may be imagined what progress such assertions made, especially when uttered by the minister of police, a man not much respected, but supposed to be of great weight. To avert Napoleon's anger and excuse any of these remarks that might reach his ears, M. Fouché resolved to present him what he considered a most profound project, which was, to offer his eventual abdication to the sovereigns, on condition of an immediate peace, and should this be rejected, to denounce their bad faith to the nation, and summon every man to take up arms.

According to the Duke d'Otranto's reasoning, should this proposal be accepted by the sovereigns, Napoleon would have secured the crown to his son, and vast glory to himself, and would be accompanied by the universal respect of mankind into whatever retirement he might choose; whilst, on the other hand, if the sovereigns refused, he would have a right to demand the very greatest sacrifices from France.

Napoleon disdainfully rejected this scheme of an over-excited brain, more remarkable for fertility of invention than soundness of judgment. Whenever Napoleon had the wisdom to restrain himself in M. Fouché's presence, he treated him with the greatest disdain; a convenient mode of acting towards a presumptuous person, whose assumption he might otherwise be obliged to treat too seriously. It was not very difficult for him to prove both to M. Fouché and others how chimerical such a

project was. When Europe demanded that Napoleon should be sacrificed, she only meant to disarm France, and that once done, to make us pass under the yoke. Indeed, were this offer of an abdication not immediately followed by the delivery of Napoleon into the hands of the sovereigns, which would have been an act of baseness on the part of France, and of deceit on the part of Napoleon, Europe would have looked upon the whole thing as a jest, deserving only of contempt. And had Napoleon been given up, the French would be in the same position as the Carthaginians, who, having delivered their arms and ships to the Romans, were then compelled to yield Carthage too; and so Europe, that did not approve either of Marie Louise or the King of Rome, would have imposed the Bourbons on a people that had been so silly as to put themselves in her power. And the sole result of these tergiversations would have been to exhibit both hesitation and fear, to weaken Napoleon's authority at the moment he most needed support, to spend in useless negotiations time so valuable for military preparations, and above all, to enervate the moral strength of the military, who saw only Napoleon, and wished to see no other object than him. Reasons so evident showed how very superficial was M. Fouché, and how very little solidity there was in his plans. This did not prevent M. Fouché from expatiating on his project in every direction, which caused no little excitement in the public mind, by propagating the idea that Napoleon by an act of devotedness might have saved France from the fearful dangers to which she was left exposed. The real self-sacrifice on the part of Napoleon would have been to die at Elba, an act of virtue too heroic to be expected from any mortal. Were it not so, the aspirations of master-spirits would never shape themselves into acts, which is to say, that the human heart would be void of ambition.

This question of an eventual abdication, which indeed had never been seriously proposed, having been put aside, it was next to be considered in what character Napoleon should appear at the Champ de Mai. Should it be as a general, more a soldier than an emperor, or as a sovereign surrounded by all the pomp of a throne? Many very sincere liberals, but inclined to republicanism, who only wished to use Napoleon as a means of ridding them of the Bourbons, desirous that even externals should correspond with what they considered the true state of the public mind, were anxious that Napoleon should appear at the Champ de Mai as a simple soldier. On the other hand, the alarmed partisans of authority exclaimed loudly when it seemed that Napoleon was likely to yield to the liberals; they did not hesitate to say that he was abandoning himself to the revolutionists in order to win their support, and that it would have

been as well for him to have remained at Elba as to return to be their slave. Napoleon took as little heed of the demands of the one party as of the affected fears of the other; but he was piqued by the assertion that he had sunk in position, that he had fallen into the hands of the *canaille*, merely because he had consented to reign as a constitutional monarch. Therefore, though he did not attach much importance to what had been said by the zealous partisans of imperial authority, he did not wish to justify their unfriendly remarks by appearing as it were uncrowned before the thousands assembled from all parts of France. He consequently determined to appear at the Champ de Mai with the same state as at his coronation. This was certainly no very serious fault, since his fate was to be decided by a battle in Flanders, and not by the fleeting impression produced by a futile spectacle on agitated minds; but still it was an error, as he needed the support of the friends of liberty, whose feelings he ought to have conciliated in trifles. However that may be, he did not give himself much trouble about these conflicting opinions, but appeared on the 1st of June at the Champ de Mai wearing silken robes, a plume of feathers, and imperial mantle, and in the coronation carriage drawn by eight horses, preceded by the princes of his family, and with marshals riding on either side. Amongst the latter was Marshal Ney, whom Napoleon had not seen for a month. When he saw him he could not restrain a movement of anger, and said, "I thought you had emigrated." He proceeded to the Champ de Mars, through the gardens of the Tuileries, the Champs Elysées, and by the Jena bridge, and ever through an inquisitive and anxious crowd that applauded him very warmly. On one side of the Champ de Mars were the twenty-five thousand men composing the Parisian national guard, and on the other, twenty-five thousand soldiers of the imperial guard and of the 6th corps, who were to leave immediately after the ceremony. Napoleon was cheered by all; but the imperial guard and 6th corps received him with almost frantic acclamations. These impassioned cries, it must be acknowledged, did not proceed from an interested devotedness to the revolution they had effected, but were the expression of their resolution to die for the honour of the French army!

Napoleon drove round the military school, where he entered by the rear. When he had ascended to the first floor he was conducted to the place set apart for the ceremony. This was an external building of a semi-circular form, the two extremities connected with the military school, and the centre opening on the Champ de Mars. The throne, to which rose on the right and on the left a semi-circular flight of steps, was supported against the Ecole Militaire; opposite was an altar, and through the open space beyond was seen the Champ de Mars all bristling

with bayonets. In front of the building a platform was erected, from which Napoleon was to distribute the standards, and from this platform a long flight of steps decorated with magnificent trophies communicated with the Champ de Mars.

Napoleon, accompanied by his suite, took his place on the throne amid enthusiastic cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* His brothers were seated on *tabourets* on either side. Behind and a little higher was a gallery close to the windows of the Ecole Militaire, occupied by his mother and sisters. To the right and left, on the benches of the semi-circular amphitheatre, were seated according to their rank the different *corps d'état*, the civil and military authorities, the magistrates, the newly-elected representatives, the deputies of the electoral colleges, and the military deputies come to receive the standards of their regiments. This vast assembly comprised from nine to ten thousand persons. At the altar stood M. de Barral, Archbishop of Tours, surrounded by his clergy, and preparing to celebrate mass, whilst from all parts of the enclosure the Champ de Mars could be seen occupied by fifty thousand soldiers of the regular army and national guards, and a hundred pieces of cannon. Paris had never seen a more imposing spectacle. Content, that sentiment that vivifies everything, was alone wanting to the scene. The emperor had been received with the loudest acclamations by the electors and military deputies, but alas, these acclamations spoke more of desire than of hope! Napoleon's noble countenance wore a grave and almost sad expression beneath his plumed cap. No wife, no son sat beside him, and all felt the painful isolation to which the inexorable will of Europe had reduced him. Instead of wife and child were seen brothers, whose presence recalled the many fatal wars undertaken for family aggrandisement. Amongst these brothers, Lucien alone was beheld with favour, for he alone had never worn a crown. Some of those present disapproved of the pomp displayed; others, and they were the greater number, were occupied with more serious thoughts, and were reflecting on the pressing dangers of the State. From time to time the soldiers uttered convulsive cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* In them the prevailing sentiment of sadness gave way to the noble enthusiasm of patriotism. In a word, the aspect of the whole scene was that of preparations made for a duel unto death—not between two individuals, but between one nation and the entire world.

The ceremonies commenced by imploring the blessing of heaven upon a throne that had been restored, God alone knew for how long, and upon a nation now prostrate at the foot of the altar. Mass was celebrated, and a *Te Deum* sung. After mass the deputies of the electoral colleges, about five hundred in number, and headed by the prince high chancellor, ad-

vanced to the front of the throne. Their spokesman then read the address in a loud and sonorous voice, and was distinctly heard by all present. This discourse spoke of devotedness to the emperor, of liberty, of peace, could it be obtained from Europe, and if not, of a desperate war, for these were the sentiments of all who desired or submitted to Napoleon's return. The substance of the address was as follows:—

“Assembled from all parts of the empire, around the tables of the law, on which we have just inscribed the wishes of the people, it is not possible for us, the organs of France, not to give utterance to her sentiments, and not to tell the head of the nation, in presence of all Europe, what the nation expects from him and he may expect from her. What do these monarchs desire, Sire, who are advancing against us with such warlike preparations? What have we done to justify their aggressive proceedings? Have we violated any of the treaties of peace? Enclosed within frontiers which nature had not marked out for us, and which even before your reign had been removed by victory and peace, we have not overstepped these narrow bounds, through respect for treaties which you have not signed, and which you still were willing to observe. What, then, is the object of our enemies? They do not like the ruler we have chosen, and we do not like him they would impose on us. They have dared to proscribe you—you that have been so often master of their capitals, and who have generously propped them on their tottering thrones! This hatred on the part of our enemies increases our love for you. If they proscribed the humblest of our citizens, it would be our duty to defend him with the same energy, for he would be under the ægis of France.

“Do they ask only for guarantees? Are they not to be found in our new institutions, and in the will of the French people henceforth united to yours? Vainly do they seek to conceal their evil designs, under the single plea of seeking to separate you from us, and of giving us masters who understand us no more than we understand them! Their short stay amongst us has destroyed every illusion attached to their name. They can no longer believe our oaths, nor we their promises. It was but too evident that they sought to restore tithes, privileges, feudality, and all that had become hateful to us. A million officials, magistrates devoted for twenty-five years to the maxims of 1789, a still larger number of enlightened citizens who have adopted these same principles after mature reflection, and from amongst whom we have chosen our representatives, five hundred thousand warriors, our strength and our glory, and six million landed proprietors, who owe their title of possession to the Revolution—these were not the Frenchmen

of the Bourbons; they wished to reign for the advantage of a few privileged men who during the last twenty-five years had been either punished or pardoned. Their throne, raised for a moment by foreign arms, and surrounded by incurable errors, has sunk before you, because you brought with you from your retreat—which generates great thought only in the minds of great men—true liberty and solid glory. Has not the triumphal march from Cannes to Paris opened all eyes? Does the history of any people present a more national, a more heroic, or a more imposing scene? Is not this bloodless triumph sufficient to undeceive our enemies? Do they wish for a more bloody one? Well, then, Sire, you may expect from us all that the heroic founder of a throne may hope from a faithful and energetic people, who are immovable in their twofold desire for liberty at home and independence abroad.

“Confiding in your promises, our representatives are about to revise our laws in the calmness of matured wisdom, and to assimilate them with the constitutional system; and may the rulers of nations listen to us during this time. Should they accept your offers of peace, the French people will expect that your firm, liberal, and paternal government will console them for any sacrifices made for peace; but should we be left no choice between disgrace and war, the nation will rise as one man to free you from the perhaps too moderate offers that you have made in order to spare Europe fresh convulsions. Every Frenchman is a soldier, victory will again follow your eagles, and our enemies who counted on our dissensions will have cause to regret having provoked us.”

This discourse, of which we have only given the principal passages, and which was pronounced with a sonorous voice, and touched all present, won the warmest applause even from the prejudiced.

The arch-chancellor then announced the number of votes, which was, as we have said, 1,300,000 affirmatives, and 4206 negatives, and declared that the Additional Act had been accepted by the French people. The Act was presented at the foot of the throne. The emperor signed it, and then pronounced the following discourse, conceived with his usual strength of thought, and couched in his customary nervous style:—

“ELECTORS, DEPUTIES OF THE ARMY AND NAVY,—As emperor, consul, and soldier, I have received everything from the people. In prosperity and in adversity, on the battlefield, in the council chamber, on the throne, or in exile, France has been the abiding and sole object of my thoughts and actions.

“Like the Athenian king, I have sacrificed myself for my

people, hoping that her natural integrity, her rights and honour, would be assured to France, as had been promised.

“Indignation at seeing these sacred rights, acquired by twenty-five years’ victory, ignored and lost for ever, the cry of the wounded honour of France, and the desires of the nation, have recalled me to this throne, which is dear to me, because it is the palladium of independence, honour, and national rights.

“Frenchmen, when amidst the general rejoicings I traversed the different provinces on my way to my capital, I necessarily calculated on a long peace: all nations are bound by the treaties their governments have signed.

“I had then but one thought, that of founding our liberty on a constitution suited to the wishes and interests of the people. I have convoked the Champ de Mai.

“I soon learned that those princes who ignore all principles of honour, who have outraged the opinions and dearest interests of so many peoples, are about to attack us. They mean to enlarge the kingdom of the Low Countries by giving her our northern frontier fortresses as a barrier, and also to appease their own dissensions by dividing Lorraine and Alsace between them.

“We have been obliged to make preparations for war.

“However, before trusting my own person to the risks of battle, my first care has been to constitute the nation without delay. The people have accepted the Act I presented to them.

“Frenchmen, when we shall have repulsed these unjust aggressors, and that Europe will be convinced of what she owes to the rights and independence of twenty-eight millions of men, a solemn law, modelled after the forms designed by the Constitutional Act, shall consolidate the different requirements of our constitution, which at present exist in distinct and separate forms.

“Frenchmen, you are about to return to your provinces. Tell your fellow-citizens that the present position of public affairs is serious; that by concord, energy, and perseverance, we shall come victorious out of the struggle between a great people and their oppressors; that future generations will scrutinise our conduct severely; and that a nation has lost everything when she has lost her independence. Tell them that foreign kings, whom I have placed upon their thrones, or who are indebted to me for the preservation of their crowns, and all of whom, in the days of my prosperity, vied with each other for my alliance and the protection of the French people—all now direct their blows against my breast. Did I not see that it is our nation that they detest, I would place this life, for which they are so anxious, at their mercy. But also tell your country-

men that the rage of our enemies will be powerless so long as Frenchmen regard me with that affection of which they have given so many proofs.

"Frenchmen, my wishes are those of the people; my rights are theirs; my honour, my glory, my happiness, can be no other than the honour, glory, and happiness of France."

The discourse excited the warmest acclamations. The Archbishop of Bourges, acting as grand almoner, then presented the New Testament to Napoleon, who with his hand upon the book swore to observe the constitutions of the empire. The prince high chancellor was the first that took the oath of fidelity. "We swear!" cried thousands of voices. Then arose loud acclamations on every side, and together with the oft-repeated cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were mingled cries of *Vive l'Impératrice*. The latter exclamation not being warmly responded to, caused some embarrassment, since none could tell whether it was right to repeat it in the absence of her who should have hastened with her child to join her husband, but who had neither the courage nor the inclination to do so. This painful silence was broken after a few moments by the military deputies, who brandished their swords and cried *Vive l'Impératrice! Vive le Roi de Rome! We shall bring them back.*"

When this part of the ceremony was ended, Napoleon rose, laid aside the imperial mantle, crossed the semi-circular enclosure, and advanced to the platform where he was to distribute the flags. The scene at this moment was glorious, because the grandeur of the moral feeling that pervaded the assembly corresponded to the magnificence around. Close to the emperor stood the minister of the interior holding the standard of the Parisian national guard, the war minister with the flag of the first regiment of the line, and the minister of marine holding the flag of the first naval corps. The numerous steps communicating with the Champ de Mars were crowded on one side with officers holding the flags of the national guards and of the army, and on the other, with the deputations commissioned to receive them. In front were fifty thousand men and a hundred pieces of cannon ranged in several lines; in short, nearly the entire population of Paris was assembled in the Champ de Mars.

Napoleon advanced to the first step, and addressing the detachments of the different corps who were immediately in front and within reach of his voice, he said, as he took hold of one of the flags, "Soldiers of the Parisian national guard and of the imperial guard, I confide to you the eagle and the national colours; you swear to defend them with your lives if necessary against the enemies of the country and the throne!" "Yes,

yes, we swear it!" was replied by thousands. "You," resumed Napoleon, "you soldiers of the national guard, swear not to allow foreigners again to sully the capital of this great nation!" "Yes, yes, we swear it!" cried the national guards in all sincerity, and fully determined to fulfil their promise. "And you, soldiers of the imperial guard, you swear to excel yourselves in the approaching campaign, and to die rather than allow foreigners to dictate to your country!" "Yes, yes!" replied the soldiers of the guard with enthusiasm, a promise they soon fulfilled on the plains of Waterloo, not by conquering, alas! but by dying. These short addresses being finished, and responded to with ardour, the military deputations advanced in serried ranks to receive their standards. Napoleon became animated by a scene that recalled the many encounters in which these regiments had distinguished themselves, and addressing suitable phrases to each, filled up the measure of their enthusiasm. This scene, though prolonged, produced a deep effect upon the spectators. As the day was now far advanced, and as there was not sufficient time to distribute the flags of the national guards to the deputies of the electoral colleges, this part of the ceremony was adjourned to the following days. The troops then defiled in quick step, amid the flourish of trumpets and cries of *Vive l'Empereur*, enthusiastically repeated by the soldiery, and soon caught up by the national guards, who were carried away by the prevailing enthusiasm.

Whilst this portion of the ceremony, which was pronounced magnificent by the beholders, was being performed in the Champ de Mars, anxiety, disunion, and deep preoccupation reigned in the enclosure behind, in which the different *corps d'état* were assembled, and whence they had not a sufficiently distinct view of the ceremony to be impressed by it. The liberals, tainted with republicanism, thought the scene before them bore too much resemblance to the old empire; their opponents, more alarmists than alarmed, considered it too like the Revolution; whilst the greater number of electors, who had come in all sincerity to Paris, would have wished to approach nearer to the emperor, and not to be separated from him by the pomp of a great ceremony. Thus, whilst in front all hearts were transported with national enthusiasm, those assembled in the rear were saddened and divided by an anxiety arising naturally from the circumstances. It was no longer the federation of 1790, when the nation was ignorant, enthusiastic, and united; it was the morrow of a vast revolution, in which the nation had acquired information, had fallen, was overwhelmed by faults of her own commission, almost driven to desperation, and retaining none of the sentiments of 1789, except a heroic bravery, well exercised by twenty-five years of warfare. M. Fouché imprudently

contributed to these dissensions, which ultimately brought about his own ruin; he dared, during one of the intervals of this long representation, to say in a low voice to Queen Hortense: "The emperor has lost a great opportunity of filling up the measure of his glory, and of securing the crown to his son by abdicating. I have advised him to do so, but he will not take advice." Such expressions were not calculated to unite all in a common resolve to defend France and liberty under Napoleon, whom all parties ought to have accepted, since they had either desired or permitted his return, and who indeed was the best military leader they could have found.

Wishing to complete the distribution of the standards, and come into closer connection with the electors, Napoleon determined to assemble them in the great gallery of the Louvre, where, drawn up in two lines, they, together with the military deputies, would have sufficient space. He appointed the following Sunday, the 4th of June, for this second ceremony, and fixed the opening of the chambers for Monday the 5th, or Tuesday the 6th, according to the time necessary for arranging them. He intended to leave on the following Monday, June the 12th, and expected to have the chambers installed and set to work before leaving for Flanders to decide his own fate and that of France. There was a great difference of opinion—some thinking it would be better not to take the initiative in hostilities, but to await the enemy between the frontier and the capital, and so throw upon them the odium of being the aggressors; whilst others, more influenced by military than political reasons, and knowing that the English were alone on the frontier, wished to overpower them by attacking them unexpectedly. Napoleon listened to all; replied but rarely, that he might conceal his designs, whilst he watched the movements of the adverse masses with an observant eye, and calculated the point where he might interpose and strike, before the different columns of the enemy could combine their forces.

He estimated that the time for this would be about the 15th of June, when he hoped to have assembled the forces necessary for effective operations. The Count de Lobau pressed him to commence operations. "Wait," he said, "until I shall have at least a hundred thousand men under my command, and you will see what I shall do with them." He expected to collect a hundred and fifty thousand men by the middle of June, and having fixed his own departure for the 12th, Napoleon wished, before leaving, to arrange with the chambers the mode of managing public affairs.

He convoked them for Saturday the 3rd of June, so that they might be able to verify the credentials of their members, choose a president, vice-president, and secretaries, and be regularly con-

stituted before the imperial séance, for at that time the members were sworn, and the business of the chamber in full operation before the sovereign came in person to open the session. Napoleon had a private motive for acting thus. He wished, as we have already said, that his brother should be chosen president of the Chamber of Representatives, for which purpose he had him elected representative of the department of Isère, and that indeed without the least difficulty. He therefore wished to await the result of the scrutiny in the Chamber of Representatives before publishing the list of peers, amongst whom he could not refuse to inscribe his brother's name in case he should not obtain the presidency of the second chamber.

In any case Napoleon's project was very difficult of execution. The six hundred and odd members of the Chamber of Representatives, the greater part of whom were, as we have said, old magistrates, military officers, holders of national property, and sincere revolutionists, were all animated by the very best dispositions, and determined to support Napoleon, but to restrain him within the bounds of the new constitution. They were certainly displeased with the Additional Act, not because they wished any addition to what it contained, but because it connected the second empire too closely with the first, and because it left them very little to do. However, as the emperor in his discourse at the Champ de Mai seemed to authorise their remodelling the imperial laws in order to adopt them to the Additional Act, and even to modify the latter if necessary, they had been gratified on all essential points, and had no serious cause for opposition. Still, having been elected under the general feeling of distrust toward the imperial despotism, they were extremely anxious to prove their independence. All who exercise authority, individuals or assemblies, have their foibles: the members of the Chamber of Representatives had one, which was the fear of appearing servile. They were therefore always ready to address Napoleon in the language of the Tribunes of old, though animated by very different sentiments, whilst they ought to have been, on the contrary, though ready to resist if he returned to his old customs, willing to join him in saving France and the principles of the Revolution. This susceptibility rendered the Chamber of Representatives little disposed to choose Prince Lucien; the members would have considered themselves compromised by assuming the imperial colours at the very commencement of their sittings. To this feeling was added the inexperience of newly arrived provincials, who knew nothing of Paris, of men, or the management of public assemblies. Though they rejected Lucien because he was the emperor's brother, they did not know whom else to choose. Some mem-

bers inclined to republican principles would have been satisfied with M. de Lafayette, who, though he had accepted the Additional Act, did not conceal his disapprobation of Napoleon; but the revolutionists accused him of an inclination for the house of Bourbon. He was too revolutionary for some, not sufficiently so for others, and was not likely to get a majority of votes. M. Lanjuinais was approved by all parties, because he had opposed the Mountain in the days of the Convention, and the emperor during the first empire. His being ennobled by Louis XVIII. was not considered an objection. That would show that the members of the chamber were not exclusive, but chose the friends of liberty wherever they found them. M. Lanjuinais had therefore every chance of being chosen president of the Chamber of Representatives.

The inconvenience of a too-lately conceded liberty is, as we have already observed, that it is first put into operation under perilous circumstances, when power and freedom are mutually jealous, and when they oppose each other instead of uniting for the common good. The government, as deficient in experience as the chamber, did not understand the motives which influenced the latter, and committed the mistake of seeking an impossibility in the presidency of Prince Lucien; whilst they would have advanced their own interests more by giving up this project, and not opposing the election of M. Lanjuinais, which was neither offensive nor injurious.

The Chamber of Representatives assembled on Saturday the 3rd, voted a provisional president, and then divided into committees to verify the elections, and declare all those duly admitted to whose elections no objection could be made. The commissioners appointed to examine the elections of Isère remarked in all simplicity, and not from any ill-feeling, that as in all probability Prince Lucien would be elevated to the peerage, it would be necessary to know this before admitting him, or his colleague, M. Duchesne. The chamber deferred his admission until the list of peers should be officially announced. The admission of all to whose election any objection could be made was in like manner postponed. This objection to Prince Lucien did not arise from ill-will. But ill-will soon came: it was whispered that Napoleon wished his brother to be appointed president, that that was the real reason for deferring the publication of the list of peers, and this was soon followed by many unfavourable remarks. One member said that the chamber ought immediately to proceed to the election of the bureau, for which it would be necessary to know who was to be appointed to the peerage, that no mistake might occur in the selection. The government made no reply, since no arrangements had been made for the direction of the assembly, and all remained

in a state of indecision, which, though it had not yet called forth any expression of dissatisfaction, would eventually do so. It was arranged, though the chamber had been invited to take part in the ceremony at the Louvre, that the members should hold a sitting at the Palace of the Corps Législatif, in order to finish the question of the elections, and proceed to business as quickly as possible.

On the next day, the 4th of June, whilst the deputations that had assisted at the Champ de Mai were assembled at the Louvre, the representatives assembled at the Palace of the Corps Législatif in order to continue their labours. At the very opening of the meeting the question of Prince Lucien's election was again raised, and this time with a malicious feeling, and it was asked in what light his election was to be regarded. One member suggested that Prince Lucien being a peer in his own right, he could not be a representative. The assembly, more inclined to assert its own independence than to seek causes for hostility, was by no means pleased at this suggestion, and rejected the proposed motion for adjournment. Things were in this state when a letter addressed to the provisional president by Carnot, minister of the interior, announced that the list of peers would not be published until the Chamber of Representatives should be constituted. So despotic a mode of proceeding showed but little knowledge of public assemblies. The chamber expressed strong disapprobation; one member, M. Dupin, exclaimed, "And if we in our turn say that we will not resolve ourselves into a deliberative assembly until the list of peers is published, what reply can be made to us?" This remark, though very just, expressed more anger than was felt by the assembly, and was received with loud murmurs. The members then proceeded to the election of a president, without deciding the question of the elections of Isère. Prince Lucien's name was not mentioned, as the decision concerning his admission had been deferred. Not one vote was given to him; all were divided between MM. Lanjuinais, de Lafayette, de Flaugergues, and some other candidates. M. Lanjuinais had one hundred and eighty-nine; M. de Lafayette, sixty-eight; M. de Flaugergues, seventy-four; M. Merlin, forty-one; M. Dupont de l'Eure, twenty-nine. These votes expressed the sentiments of the chamber. The chamber wished to assert its independence, and was evidently inclined to choose the man most likely to maintain it, for M. Lanjuinais had been one of the opposition in the old Senate, without being the declared enemy of the emperor. However, although M. Lanjuinais had the greatest number of votes, he had not an absolute majority. The scrutiny was recommenced, when he obtained two hundred and seventy-seven votes; M. de Lafayette, seventy-three; and M. de Flaugergues, sixty-eight. M. Lanjuinais was

appointed president, subject, however, to the emperor's approval, as provided by the Additional Act.

Whilst these scrutinies were going on at the Palais of the Corps Législatif, the second ceremony of the distribution of colours was proceeding at the Louvre. The emperor, seated on his throne, first received some deputations come to present addresses, and then proceeded to the Louvre gallery, which contains the *chefs-d'œuvres* of painting, collected by our kings during so many centuries, for the amusement and instruction of the French people, and for the glory of France. On one side were ranged the deputations from the electoral colleges, with the standards for the national guards; and on the other, the military deputations. This gallery, the largest in Europe, filled with glorious standards, and containing ten thousand persons, produced a grand and singular effect in its lengthened perspective. This ceremony was principally for the sake of the electoral colleges. Napoleon, whom they had the pleasure of hearing and seeing quite near, addressed them with his usual felicitousness of expression, and produced a good impression on the greater number. Their imaginations no longer represented him as an oriental despot, but as a great man, simple, accessible, and ready to listen to the demands of his subjects. When he had reached the large square saloon at the end of the gallery Napoleon turned back, and directing his looks towards the military deputies, again electrified them by his presence and his words. He told them that they would soon again meet where they had so often met before, where they had learned to know each other's value, on the battlefield, whither they were now summoned, not by the love of conquest, but to assert the national independence. This ceremony commenced at noon, and did not finish until seven in the evening. It was succeeded by a magnificent fête in the gardens of the Tuileries.

At the close of the day, Napoleon had to examine the scrutinies of the Chamber of Representatives, and to come to a resolution on the subject. His first feeling was one of extreme displeasure. Opposing him on an important question would not have wounded him so deeply as this personal slight, this repelling his brother for another, a respectable man indeed, but who had been one of the opposition in the Senate under the first empire. He considered that it would have been wiser, as well as more generous, to unite themselves closely to him at a moment when all Europe affected to make war on him alone. But as we have often had occasion to repeat in this history, for the general benefit, the consequence of our faults is to be punished for them at a time when this chastisement is most poignant. After having during fifteen years accepted, encouraged, and exacted boundless servility, Napoleon

could not now obtain that personal consideration which at this moment would have had the double merit of being a proof of courage, and a beneficial demonstration in the presence of a foreign enemy. He had restrained himself during two months and a half, but could do so no longer, and gave way to the greatest irritation. "They wish to insult me," he said, "by electing an enemy. As the reward of all the concessions I have made, they want to offend and weaken me. If it be so, I will resist, I will dissolve this assembly, I will appeal to France, who knows but me alone, that will confide her defence but to me, and values not these obscure men, who altogether could do nothing for her. These men," he added, "do not want the Bourbons, they would be miserable if they risked their places, their properties, and opinions by their return, and will not support me, who alone can secure what they fear to lose, for it is only by cannon-shot that the Revolution can be defended, and who amongst them could fire one?"

This first explosion of anger would not have had any bad consequences, or rather would have had the advantage of calming Napoleon by giving vent to the feelings that oppressed him, had it not been divulged and even exaggerated by the perfidy of the Duke d'Otranto, who told everywhere that Napoleon was incorrigible, that he wished to dissolve the chambers the very day after their assembling. Napoleon became calm after having given vent to his anger. Carnot, the prince high chancellor, M. Lavalette, M. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angély endeavoured to calm him, which they did without difficulty, as his anger once passed, his own great mind suggested to him all that the wisest men could say. He saw that disunion at this moment would be madness, that some allowance must be made for the weakness of this assembly that wished to appear disobedient when most devoted. Besides, M. Lanjuinais was an honest man, friendly to the Revolution, though opposed to its excesses, anxious for the success of the common cause, and easily won by kindness. This was warmly asserted by M. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angély, who, by his past career and brilliant eloquence, was eminently qualified to become the organ of the government in communicating with the chambers. For this reason he was more anxious than ever to win their good opinion by supporting their cause with the emperor. Although sincerely devoted to Napoleon, he had fallen under M. Fouché's influence, who, seeing that he was flattered by the important part he was called upon to act with regard to the chambers, encouraged him to accept the position, and facilitated his success by every possible means, and endeavoured to persuade him that Napoleon could only be saved by opposing him, which was, alas! only too true some years before, and which,

had it been recognised and practised in time, might have saved both Napoleon and France; but it was too late in 1815, and might be even most dangerous when practised in the face of all Europe. However, M. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angély's advice to accept M. Lanjuinais as president was very wise, for at the time any other choice would have been unsuitable and impossible.

Whilst some were endeavouring to persuade Napoleon, others had gone in search of M. Lanjuinais, and told him, which was true, that he owed it to the emperor, to wait on him and come to an explanation after his long opposition in the Senate, and reassure him as to the use he would make of the immense power he would possess as president. M. Lanjuinais repaired to the Palais d'Elysée the very same evening, and was immediately admitted. Napoleon received him with extreme amiability and frankness, and said: "The past is forgotten; I am not so weak as to think of it; I estimate men only by their existing dispositions and opinions. Are you my friend or my enemy?" M. Lanjuinais was touched by the frankness with which Napoleon questioned him, and said that he was not his enemy, that he looked on him as the representative of the Revolution, and that he would support him cordially, provided the conditions of the constitutional monarchy were maintained. "We are agreed," said Napoleon; "I ask no more." The interview terminated in the most amicable manner, and Napoleon resolved to confirm the choice of the chamber.

However, the rumour of his first opposition to the choice had spread abroad. M. Fouché told it to everybody; he said Napoleon was still the same, that he could not suffer an independent assembly, and that it would be a miracle if the chamber were not dissolved in a few days. The next day, Monday the 5th, the members assembled to complete the work of their organisation; what had happened was whispered from bench to bench, and as the result of M. Lanjuinais' interview with Napoleon was not yet known, great discontent prevailed. The temporary president announced that he had communicated the decision of the chamber to the emperor, who had replied that he would think about it, and communicate his resolution by his chamberlain. This announcement was received with loud murmurs. One member very justly remarked that it was not through the intervention of a chamberlain that the monarch ought to communicate with the chambers. M. Dumolard, and after him M. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angély, endeavoured to explain the emperor's reply by saying that the temporary president had not caught his words, an explanation the latter immediately adopted as a reparation for his want of tact in repeating what it would have been much wiser to

conceal. During this discussion M. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angély, in order to put an end to a difficulty that interrupted the proceedings of the chamber, hastened to the Elysée, and returned with the decree appointing M. Lanjuinais to the presidency, which he presented in his character of minister of State, and thus removed all cause of offence. The discontent of the chamber was appeased by M. Lanjuinais' election being approved. The members then chose their vice-presidents, M. de Flaugergues (403 votes), M. Dupont de l'Eure (279 votes), and M. de Lafayette (257 votes). The fourth vice-president was not appointed until the next day, when General Grenier was chosen.

At the same time that the definite appointment of a president was announced to the Chamber of Representatives, the Chamber of Peers was presented with a list containing the names of those that were to be nominated to the peerage. Napoleon had desired his brothers and principal ministers to draw up a list of peers, each according to his own views. From these different lists he composed one consisting of one hundred and thirty names, a number which could and ought to be increased afterwards, according as success should attract new supporters, especially amongst the old noblesse. M. de Lafayette had been pressed by Joseph to accept a seat in the upper chamber, but he preferred taking his place in the Chamber of Representatives, where he would find more conformity of opinion, and would exercise more direct influence over passing events. Napoleon had chosen his brothers, Joseph, Lucien, Louis, and Jerome (who were peers in their own right), his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, his adopted son, Prince Eugène (detained at Vienna by the coalition), Marshals Davout, Suchet, Ney, Brune, Moncey, Soult, Lefebvre, Grouchy, Jourdan, and Mortier; the ministers Carnot, Decrès, de Bassano, Caulaincourt, Mollien, and Fouché; Cardinal Cambacérès, the Archbishops of Tours (de Barral), of Bourges (de Beaumont), de Toulouse (primate); Generals Bertrand, Druot, Belliard, Clausel, Savary, Duhesme, d'Erlon, Exelmans, Friant, Flahault, Gerard, Lobau, la Bédoyère, Delaborde, Lecourbe, Lallemand, Lefebvre-Desnoettes, Molitor, Pajol, Rompon, Reille, Travot, Vandamme, &c. He had chosen many regicides, Sièyes, Cambacérès, Carnot, Fouché, Thibaudeau, not because they were regicides, but because they were eminent men, whom being regicides should not exclude from important public functions. From the old noblesse he had chosen MM. de Beauvau, de Beaufremont, de Boissy, de Forbin, de la Rochefoucauld, de Nicolai, de Praslin, de Ségur, &c. If he did not choose a greater number of the old noblesse, it was because there were not more to choose from. He expected that his approaching victories would win over others. It was not his love for old names, as was said, that directed his choice, but because he saw the advantage

of placing these men in the upper chamber, which should be at once conservative and independent.

Prince Joseph was greatly offended when he heard the decree read by which he was appointed peer, as he considered that he was one in his own right. Notwithstanding all the efforts that were made to keep him silent, he declared that it must be by a mistake of print that he was mentioned in the decree, as he was a peer by birth, and not by the emperor's nomination. It was great imprudence on the part of the emperor's brothers not to restrain themselves in the midst of the disturbances that were already commencing. Who could be blamed for speaking unwisely if the emperor's brothers could not forbear such childish protests. They committed another fault no less important, in not wishing to sit with their colleagues, but demanding distinctive seats beside the president. They gave up this pretension when they saw how badly it was received. Prince Lucien was the first to give the good example by taking his seat amongst his colleagues.

The 5th and 6th of June being occupied by these proceedings, the imperial séance was deferred until the 7th. This séance was to consist in reading the speech of the Crown, and in the members of both chambers taking the oath of fidelity to the emperor. Napoleon had as usual written the speech that he was to deliver, and had drawn it up in that concise, frank, and firm style that accorded so well with a mind so resolute as his. He wished to grant a constitutional monarchy, not that he himself might be restrained, but from the conviction that it was needed, and that his own faults had rendered it indispensable. He determined to explain his views in brief but decisive terms. Knowing also that the representatives saw with regret that a complete constitution was presented to them, in which there was nothing that required alteration, he consented to grant them the right to take part in its construction by amalgamating the old constitutions with the new. To this permission he wished to add some advice given in the same firm tone as the concession itself. This done, there still remained important points to be treated on. Although by no means inclined to persecute, Napoleon was determined that he would not allow himself to be attacked by any of the opposing parties with impunity. He would have wished to anticipate the insurrection in Vendée; but on this subject he found himself at variance with his ministers. The latter, though believing that certain conspiracies ought to be repressed, were still afraid that if anterior laws were put in force, it would only furnish a pretext to those who said that the old arsenal of revolutionary laws was still allowed to exist. This difficulty must be arranged, and measures proposed that, without being arbitrary, would restrain the somewhat daring

activity of all parties. The press had been freed from the censorship, but this only made it the more necessary and right that its excesses should be restricted by the regular tribunals. Lastly, a budget was to be presented.

All this would afford sufficient and regular occupation to the chambers, and Napoleon had himself drawn out the plan of procedure in a clear and concise discourse, which was unanimously approved by his ministers when communicated to them.

Whilst he was preparing his address to the two chambers, the lower one, with the eagerness of all new assemblies, was impatient to enter on the most delicate subjects. On Tuesday, June the 6th, the eve of the imperial séance, a member proposed a motion relative to the oath to be taken on the following day. He proposed that a declaration should be made purporting that no oath could be exacted but by virtue of some law, and that the oath to be taken on the following day should not in any way prejudice the right of the chambers to modify the imperial constitutions.

This proposal caused great excitement. Were it taken in its strictest sense, it must be concluded that the required oath was illegal, and ought not to be taken unless a law were drawn up on that very day to authorise it. But even were this law immediately drawn up, it would not be possible that it could pass both chambers within twenty-four hours, and it would therefore be impossible to take the oath on the following day, by which it would seem to all Europe that the chambers refused to swear fidelity to Napoleon. Such a circumstance at a time when five hundred thousand soldiers were marching towards France might produce the most serious results.

This proposal was received with evident displeasure by the members, for though very watchful of their independence, they were aware that having placed Napoleon on the throne, it would be wrong to seek to weaken his position. Several members objected at once. They said that former *senatus-consultes* had authorised the taking of the oath to the emperor, and that it was perfectly legal since these had not been repealed; that besides, it was an understood thing that this oath only implied fidelity to the imperial dynasty, and by no means involved an admission of the immutability of the laws, since their revision had been decided on and even alluded to by the emperor in his discourse at the Champ de Mai. M. Roy, afterwards minister of finance under Louis XVIII. and Charles X., and who had been harshly treated by Napoleon, replied that since the second empire was commencing with a new order of things, the Chamber of Peers having no resemblance to the Senate, nor the Chamber of Representatives to the Corps Législatif, the *senatus-consulte*

that had been spoken of should be considered as having fallen into desuetude, and insufficient to legalise the oath required of the two chambers. The assembly, aware of the danger involved in this discussion, gave evident signs of dissatisfaction. MM. Dumolard, Bedoch, and Sebastiani replied warmly to M. Roy, saying that if the peerage and the Chamber of Representatives differed from the Senate and the Corps Législatif, the monarch still remained, and they were as much bound to be faithful to him under the new régime as under the old; that besides, as the common safety depended on the concord of those in power, it was only complying with the exigence of the time to take the proposed oath with alacrity. M. Boulay de la Meurthe, minister of State, went still further, for he spoke of a foreign party, amongst whom he did not class, he said, either the originator of the motion, nor those who supported him; this party, he said, was headed by the royalists, who only sought to create disunion at home, that they might open the gates of France to the enemy. These exaggerated assertions were received in embarrassing and even reproving silence. The termination of the discussion was demanded on all sides. At first it was proposed to return to the order of the day; but soon something more definite was desired, and the oath was declared legal, suitable, and necessary. Whether it was that its opponents were absent or converted, this proposal was unanimously adopted by the assembly.

In a country long accustomed to the exercise of liberty, where it has become customary to attach importance to the acts of the majority, and not of individuals, which must be left free, as they are thus deprived of any dangerous tendency, much importance would not have been attached to this séance.

But his opponents profited by the opportunity to assert that Napoleon was not supported by the nation, since the representatives objected to the oath of fidelity the very day after their instalment. Napoleon was much affected by it. He had wished that since the allied powers directed all their attacks against himself individually, that the chambers would have met this feeling by identifying themselves with him. Seeing that fate itself was against him, he had become sad, especially since Murat's fall; he became still more so now, when instead of the firm and cordial union that he needed, he saw himself reduced to a state of isolation. He felt more deeply than ever that it was arms alone that would decide and win him back the hearts of the people which—it is sad to say—are most attracted by success.

On the 7th he repaired, clad in a simpler costume than he had worn at the Champ de Mai, to the Palace of the Corps Législatif, where he was warmly applauded by the represen-

tatives, whose sentiments were excellent, if their experience was but small, and who, strange to say, received him much better than the Chamber of Peers. In consequence of the extremely liberal tone of public opinion, the Chamber of Peers, embarrassed if not ashamed of owing its existence to mere authority, thought it better suited to its dignity to receive its founder with moderate applause, whilst it left a more vivacious expression of sentiment to the lower chamber, that owed its existence to the nation.

The emperor having taken his seat on the throne, with his brothers on either side, the prince high chancellor read the oath, which was as follows: "I swear to be obedient to the imperial constitution, and to be faithful to the emperor." The high chancellor then summoned the peers and the representatives, who all took the oath most readily. This done, Napoleon pronounced in a tone of impressive gravity the following discourse, which is a model of simplicity, conciseness, and dignity:—

"MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN OF THE CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES,—During the last three months circumstances and the national confidence have invested me with unlimited power. This day the dearest wish of my heart is satisfied—I am come to found a constitutional monarchy.

"Men have no control over the future; the destiny of nations can be fixed but by institutions alone. France needs a monarchy to secure her liberty, her independence, and the rights of the people.

"Our laws are scattered; one of our most important duties will be to collect them into a single form, and to reconstruct them on a uniform principle. This is a work that will distinguish the present epoch in the eyes of succeeding generations.

"I desire that France should enjoy all possible liberty. I say possible, because anarchy will ever lead to an absolute government.

"A formidable coalition of kings is opposed to our independence; their armies are at our frontiers.

"The frigate *Melpomene* was attacked in the Mediterranean by an English frigate, and taken after a desperate resistance. Blood has been shed in time of perfect peace.

"Our enemies calculate on our internal disunion. They are exciting and fomenting civil war. There have been meetings of malcontents; communications are held with Ghent now, as with Coblenz in 1792. Legislative measures are absolutely necessary. I feel perfect confidence in your patriotism, intelligence, and attachment to myself.

"The liberty of the press is an essential part of the existing

constitution, of which no portion can be altered without changing our entire political system; but repressive measures are necessary, especially in the present state of the nation. I recommend this important object to your consideration.

“My ministers will inform you of the state of our affairs.

“The state of the finances would be most satisfactory but for the increased expense caused by existing circumstances.

“However, all expenses might be met if all the resources of the budget were available within the year, and it is to the means of obtaining such a result that my minister of finance will direct your attention.

“It is very likely that the highest duty of a monarch will soon summon me to fight for the country at the head of her children. The army and I will do our duty.

“Let you, peers and representatives, give the example of confidence, energy, and patriotism to the nation, and like the Senate of that great nation of old, be resolved to die rather than survive the dishonour and degradation of your country. The sacred cause of nationality will triumph.”

This discourse, which treated on every important subject with such exquisite tact and perfect dignity, was received with the applause it so well deserved. A more complete acknowledgment of constitutional monarchy could not be desired, nor a more explicit profession of its principles.

At the commencement of a career in which the English had preceded us by two centuries, it was only natural that we should imitate their customs. Each chamber therefore determined to present an address in reply to the speech from the throne, and their bureau, increased by some additional members, was ordered to draw up the address, so that it might be presented within the week, as Napoleon's departure was announced for the following Sunday or Monday.

Napoleon had indeed decided to strike that blow which since his return to Paris he had been preparing against that portion of the coalition that was within his reach. It is not yet time to tell of his arrangements; it will suffice to say that midst all the occupations caused by the insurrection in Vendée, the assembling the chambers, and the presence of the electors who had come to the Champ de Mai, he had never ceased, day or night, in making preparations to commence the attack on the 15th of June. The day after the ceremony of the Champ de Mai he had sent the guard and 6th corps to Laon, he had ordered Generals Erlon and Reille to join in those operations which General Gerard had been conducting for several days, and by which the general concentration of the army behind Maubeuge would be effected. He gave them the most minute

instructions as to the precautions they were to take in order to deceive the enemy, and which indeed did deceive them, as we shall soon see. Napoleon calculated that if the guard and 6th corps reached Maubeuge on the 14th, that on the 15th he could appear beneath the walls of Charleroi at the head of one hundred and thirty thousand men. He would have had one hundred and fifty thousand but for the insurrection in Vendée; but with the force at his command, such as it was, he hoped, if not to finish the war, at least to give it such a character as would make the European powers reflect, and would bring about the union of the disturbed and discordant minds in France. If these pre-occupations did not interfere with his other labours, neither did his other labours interfere with them. Though he affected the greatest gaiety in the numerous receptions at the Elysée Palace, where he dined in public every day, he sank into profound sadness when alone with Queen Hortense and M. de Lavalette. The eagerness of the chambers to avoid all appearance of servility, which led them to separate from him at a time when they ought to have offered him their most cordial support, affected him more than he cared to confess. He was afflicted at no longer seeing concord amongst those in power, at finding the public mind in a state of confusion, each one rushing into the arena of theoretical discussions, which Napoleon had hoped to close by publishing the Additional Act; everybody lauding his own chimera, and trying to give it publicity; and the general aspect of affairs so depressing as to render the assembling of the chambers inevitable at a time when the first essay of liberty was to be made within ear-shot of the enemy's cannon. In the midst of the confusion produced by this spirit of contradiction, he felt that the superstitious admiration of which he had been the object for fifteen years, and which his miraculous return from Elba had reawakened for a moment, was now gradually fading away; he saw himself surrounded by suspicion, and his most trifling actions criticised in every possible way. His most sincere friends, who formerly would not have dared to repeat what was said of him, now hastened, some through affection, others through a diminution of respect, to tell him of the harshest things that were said against him. From those he learned that M. Fouché still continued to make the most impertinent remarks, that he did not execute his orders, especially those with regard to the royalists, who were in communication with Ghent and Vendée; that, on the contrary, he treated them with the greatest consideration, and frequently sent for them to his office that he might win favour with them by disobeying the emperor's orders. When Napoleon learned this treacherous conduct he became angry, was tempted to punish, but forbore, fearing it might be said that he had reassumed the despot,

and thus his former severity towards inoffensive persons, such as the bearers of the Bull for instance, deprived him now of the power of restraining formidable enemies detected in overt acts of treason. He recovered his serenity in thinking of war and the chances it offered to a man of genius, in thinking of the triumphs he had won in 1814, which would have saved him had he had a few redoubts outside Paris, or a brother worthy of him within. But scarcely had his courage been revived by these thoughts than it sank again when he reflected on the masses of enemies that were marching towards France, when he thought of all the enemies at home; and he asked himself if his government would be able to bear a reverse, which was possible even in a war destined to be eventually successful; and with his vast sagacity he believed that the present state of things gave unerring indications of an abiding opposition to his interests, a feeling that though it did not shake his strong heart, cast a veil of sadness over his spirit. He often spoke on this subject with his friends, and sometimes, though overpowered by fatigue, he often passed a great part of the night in discussing the change in things around him, in reflections on the fate of great men, and his own destiny in particular, which indeed had all the appearance of a declining star.

It was whilst under the influence of these gloomy forebodings that he determined to visit Malmaison, where the Empress Josephine had died the preceding spring, and where he had not been since his return from Elba. He felt a want of revisiting that modest dwelling, where he had passed the happiest years of his life, with a wife who certainly was not faultless, but who was a true friend, one, like whom a man does not meet a second in his lifetime, and one whom he never ceases to regret once that she is lost. He made Queen Hortense accompany him; she had not ventured to visit a spot so full of distressing memories since the death of her mother. Notwithstanding his numerous occupations, he spent several hours wandering through this little chateau and the gardens, where Josephine once cultivated the flowers she had caused to be brought from all parts of the globe. He fell into a mournful reverie as he again beheld these objects, at once so dear and so saddening. What a difference between 1815 and the years 1800, 1801, and 1802, when he was admired, trusted, and loved by everybody. But at that time he had neither ravaged countries, nor enslaved nations, and instead of a tyrant, he was looked upon as a saviour. As he reflected on these things he did not palliate his own faults, but with the clear-sightedness of genius, applied to his own conduct the rules of inexorable justice. Still he thought that as he had been cured of his faults, the world might have some little confidence, and allow him to prove the

new wisdom he had brought back from Elba. But, alas ! men do not restore their confidence once they have withdrawn it. God alone accepts repentance, because He alone can judge of its sincerity.

As Napoleon wandered through a spot at once so attractive and so painful, he said to Queen Hortense : " Poor Josephine, I feel as if I ought to meet her at every turn. Her death, which I heard at Elba, was one of the saddest events of that fatal year 1814. She had her weaknesses to be sure, but *she* would never have abandoned me."

When Napoleon returned from Malmaison he desired Queen Hortense to order a copy of one of Josephine's best portraits. Not knowing where he might be in a month, he wished to take this talisman with him, as a memento of the happiest years of his life.

Little time was left him to indulge his sadness, for the numerous affairs to be arranged before his departure soon concentrated all his attention. Next to the preparations for war, the direction of the chambers was the most serious subject of consideration. He had several conversations on this topic, on which he spoke with as much intelligence as though, instead of being a warrior, administrator, and absolute monarch, he had all his life been prime minister to George III. On the eve of his departure, when ready to step into his carriage, he said to his ministers : " I do not know how you will conduct the chambers during my absence. M. Fouché thinks that public assemblies can be ruled by bribing some old corrupt politicians, or flattering some young enthusiasts ; but he is mistaken. That is intrigue, and intrigue will not do much. In England, though such means are not absolutely neglected, nobler and more important measures are employed. Remember how Mr. Pitt acted, and see how Lord Castlereagh acts. The English Houses of Parliament are old and experienced ; they have been long acquainted with the men who are to guide them ; they like or trust them either because of their talents or of their character. These they almost impose upon the Crown, and having made them ministers, it would be very inconsistent, and even injurious to themselves and their country, if they did not follow their direction. It was for this reason that Mr. Pitt was able to rule the English Houses by a look, and that Lord Castlereagh can guide them so easily at present. Ah ! had I such instruments, I should not dread the chambers. But have I anything of the kind ? Look at these representatives, men come from all parts of France, all well intentioned, no doubt, and anxious that I should get myself and them out of difficulties, but for the most part wholly inexperienced in the duties of public assemblies, knowing nothing of the anxiety

or responsibility of legislation, and personally at least unacquainted with my ministers, to whom they are equally strangers. Who do you suppose will direct them? I certainly could not have chosen my ministers better than I did. I have taken them, as one may say, under the influence of public confidence. The country itself would have given them to me had I left the choice to it. Could I, for example, find a better minister of justice than the wise Cambacérès, a more imposing minister of war than the laborious and severe Davout, a safer minister of foreign affairs than the grave and pacific Caulaincourt, a minister of the interior better suited to satisfy and arm the patriots than that excellent Carnot? Would not the financiers themselves have pointed out the probity and talent of Count Mollien? And will not the people believe that the government has its eye always upon them when M. Fouché is minister of police? And yet which of you, gentlemen, would appear before the chambers to address them, to gain a hearing, or to lead them. I have tried to supply this want by means of my ministers of State, Regnaud, Boulay de la Meurthe, de Merlin, and de Defernon. Regnaud has talent, certainly; but do you think that he could appease a storm in time of danger? No, nobody in an inferior position can impress men, rule, or influence them. Alas! it is not in our peaceful Council of State that men are prepared to face the fury of public assemblies. No, no," repeated Napoleon, "you cannot govern these chambers, and if I do not soon gain a battle, they will swallow you all up, however great you may be. You well know that circumstanced as I was, it was not possible for me to avoid convoking them, for I was placed within a vicious circle. I gave the Additional Act myself in order to avoid the interminable and confused discussions of a new Constituent Assembly; but men would not believe in the Additional Act, and to win their faith I was forced to convoke the chambers, which I see clearly are about to resolve themselves into a Constituent Assembly. All that follows as a consequence. For our part, we must try to extricate ourselves as well as we can. Those to whom the administration is confided, and the ministers of State, will speak as best they can, and I shall fight. If I am victorious, we shall oblige everybody to keep his proper place, and we shall have time to accustom ourselves to this new régime. If I am conquered, God alone knows what will become of you and me. It was our fate, and nothing could avert it. All will be decided in twenty or thirty days. For the present let us do what we can, and wait what the future will bring. But let the friends of liberty look well to it; if through their own clumsiness they lose the game, it is not I but the Bourbons that will gain it."

After this singular conversation, which took place the night before his departure, Napoleon passed a decree, declaring that the ministers and his brothers should form a council of government, with Joseph as president, that the four ministers of State, aided by six councillors of State, should conduct all communications with the chambers, where they would appear in the name of the Crown, discuss the laws, and give all necessary explanations whenever it might be necessary to justify the acts of government. As he signed this decree he smiled, and repeated several times, "Ah, indeed it is essentially necessary to you that I should win a battle." He did not mean by this that a victory would enable him to crush the authority of the chambers, and re-establish an absolute government, for he could not see how it would be possible in the present state of the public mind to govern in the name of a solitary silent authority; but he hoped that when the anxieties attendant on danger would have passed away, that confidence would return, and that he would be able to infuse unity and simultaneousness of action into the public mind, and so enable the new institutions to work smoothly. Were he victorious, it is very possible he would not have confined his views to this; but at that time he was convinced that his own cause was identical with that of moderate liberty, and that the triumph of the opposite opinions would be the triumph of the Bourbons. "If we do not succeed in this attempt," he often said, "we must only yield the place to Louis XVIII." He did not foresee that even with the Bourbons themselves, supported by five hundred thousand foreigners, liberty would rise again, provided that the country were allowed the right of voting the laws and budget in an independent assembly, though that assembly were composed of the most violent royalists.

During these three days the two chambers had prepared their addresses. Many circumstances occurred in the lower chamber which proved its desire of remaining united to the emperor, at the same time that it dreaded appearing servile. M. Felix Lepelletier, in replying to the motion relative to the oath, proposed that Napoleon should be styled the saviour of the country. The anxiety immediately depicted on every countenance showed how all dreaded that a new course of adulation was about to begin. "What will you say then," interrupted a member, "when Napoleon will have saved the country?" This inopportune proposal was put aside by some judicious remarks of a few representatives devoted to the government. The proposed address breathed the prevailing sentiments of the time, that is, a desire to unite with Napoleon; but it also revealed a great watchfulness over the public liberty, and extreme anxiety to revise the imperial laws, and assimilate them with

the Additional Act, which it was their secret wish to remodel altogether. Even the Chamber of Peers itself, as inexperienced as the lower chamber, sought to adopt the prevailing tone of the time, and presented an address that said, "Should our success correspond to the justice of our cause, to our confidence in the emperor's genius and bravery of the army, *the nation will have nothing afterwards to fear but the intoxication of success and the seductions of victory.*" This phrase disturbed Prince Cambacères, who asked permission to communicate it to Napoleon. The latter disapproved of it extremely, and it was changed to the following: "*Should our success correspond to the justice of our cause . . . France asks no other result than peace. Our institutions will serve as guarantees to Europe that the French government will never be hurried away by the seductions of victory.*" This correction was adopted after a warm discussion.

Thus, as it often happens, each one forgetting his individual rank and character, became the flatterer of the ruling spirit. Napoleon was to receive the two chambers before leaving, and he resolved to give them some sage advice, authorised by present circumstances, and which is not forbidden to the Crown—especially when in the right—even in the most rigorously constitutional monarchy. Napoleon received the chambers on the 11th of June.

Having heard the address of the peers, he made the following reply:—

"We are engaged in a serious struggle. It is not the *intoxication of success* that endangers us to-day; it is the *yoke* under which foreigners seek to make us pass.

"The justice of our cause, the public spirit of the nation, and the courage of the army, give us every reason to hope for success; but should we meet with a reverse, it is then that I should most desire to see the energy of this great nation displayed; it is then I would wish to see the Chamber of Peers give proofs of its devotedness to the country and to me.

"It is in times of danger that great nations, like great men, display the energy of their character, and become objects of admiration to posterity."

When Napoleon had heard the address of the Chamber of Representatives he said:—

"It gives me pleasure to hear my own sentiments expressed by you. In our present serious position my thoughts are all absorbed by this impending war, on which the independence and honour of France depend.

"I shall leave to-night in order to take the command of the army; the movements of the enemy have rendered my presence indispensable. I shall be glad if during my absence a commis-

sion appointed by both chambers would deliberate upon the entire body of our laws.

"The constitution is our rallying-point, it must be our polar star in these stormy times. Every public discussion that will tend to lessen confidence in that will be a misfortune for the State. We should find ourselves in the midst of shoals without compass or guide. We have arrived at an important crisis. Let us not imitate the example of the Lower Empire, which became the laughing stock of posterity, because when surrounded on all sides by barbarians, the people occupied themselves with the discussion of abstract questions whilst the battering-rams of the enemy were beating in their gates."

These noble but severe remarks offended those to whom they were soon to be only too applicable; but so great was their truth and justice that they made a profound impression on the majority. It was indeed true that the dangers to be feared were not those that result from victory. It was no less true that an allusion to the Greeks of the Lower Empire attacked by Mahomet's battering-rams was inopportune. The representatives, who were present in great number, commenced to applaud loudly, but were restrained by M. Lanjuinais under pretext of deference for the Crown. Napoleon would assuredly have pardoned such a breach of etiquette. The greater number, who were devoted to Napoleon as the defender of the Revolution and of France, were greatly displeased by the president's prohibition. They retired each with very different sentiments; Napoleon's friends declaiming against foreigners, whilst his enemies declared that a decree ought at once to be drawn up forbidding the dissolution of the chambers, as they asserted that should Napoleon return victorious, his first act would be to dissolve them. The persons who spoke in this way did not consider that a decree of the assembly anticipating the emperor's right to dissolve the chamber would be simply violating the constitution in the most audacious manner. The majority, believing in all sincerity that it would be a good and patriotic work to labour at the remodelling of our laws, were thinking of appointing a committee to revise and amalgamate the imperial constitutions.

Having dismissed the members of the two chambers, Napoleon completed his preparations on the same Sunday evening, took leave of his ministers; gave his last instructions for the defence of the capital to Marshal Davout, whom he had appointed commandant of Paris; took leave most cordially of Carnot, whose sincerity had touched him; parted coolly but without any appearance of anger from M. Fouché; and then passed the remaining moments with his family and friends. As the hour of strife approached, his spirits rose, for he felt himself

upon the ground he had ever trod as master. He folded Queen Hortense, his adopted daughter, affectionately in his arms, and said to Madame Bertrand, as he shook hands with her before getting into his carriage, "Let us hope, Madame Bertrand, that we shall not soon have to regret the island of Elba." Alas! the hour was approaching when he would have to regret everything, even the saddest days of his past life! He set out on Monday the 12th of June, at half-past three in the morning.

Such was, until military operations commenced, which was very soon, as we shall shortly see—such was that fatal and sombre period called the "Hundred Days," a period that commenced with an extraordinary triumph, but soon changed into difficulties, annoyances, and gloomy presentiments! This contrast may be easily explained; from Porto-Ferrajo to Paris, from the 26th of February to the 20th of March, Napoleon stood in opposition to the faults of the Bourbons, and besides, he enjoyed a succession of successes from Porto-Ferrajo to Cannes, from Cannes to Grenoble, from Grenoble to Lyon, and from Lyon to Paris. It seemed as if fortune herself had returned to associate with her favourite; sometimes bringing a favourable wind to his flotilla, and sometimes bringing to meet him men who could not withstand his influence. But having once entered Paris, it was no longer the faults of the Bourbons that stood opposed to him, it was his own, the faults that had accumulated during his first reign, to remedy which all his genius and repentance seemed unavailing. The Treaty of Paris, which he had so obstinately refused in 1814, and even sacrificed his crown rather than accept, he now accepted without hesitation, and offered terms of peace to Europe with a humility that well became his glory. "No," replied Europe, "you offer peace, but not sincerely." And she repulsed the suppliant with proceedings so rude as even to forbid his couriers to pass the frontiers. Napoleon next addressed himself to France with a sincere offer of liberty, for though his temper abhorred restraint, his genius enabled him to see that he could no longer govern without the nation, and that liberty was the only choice left him. France did not reply in the same terms as Europe; but she seemed to doubt, and to convince her of his sincerity, Napoleon was obliged to convoke the chambers at once, those chambers filled with excited, violent, and implacable parties, who offered him no support against Europe but their divisions. Repelled by Europe, received with distrust by France at a moment that he needed all the support that she could give, Napoleon, after twenty days of joy, sank into a state of gloomy sadness, which he could only shake off when extracting from our military ruins the heroic but unfortunate army of Waterloo! He

triumphed through the faults of the Bourbons, but sank beneath his own, and after having presented to the world so many glorious and instructive spectacles, he offered another more deeply moral and tragic—genius sincerely but vainly penitent. But we must say that midst all these vicissitudes, these twenty days of fleeting joy, these “Hundred Days” of mortal sadness, there was one actor that had not one, no, not one single day’s content, and that was France! France, the hapless victim of Napoleon’s faults as well as of those of the Bourbons; a victim because she had allowed these faults to be committed, which was at once her error and her punishment. What a sad century is ours, at least for those who saw its commencement. Heaven grant that the generation which succeeds us may see it close with happier days! But let the men of that generation believe that it is by turning to profit the lessons in which the first half of the century abounds, and which it has been the object of this history to narrate truthfully, that they will be enabled to ensure and to deserve this happy termination.

END OF VOL. XI.

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